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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation uses development theory and principles of New Institutional Economics (NIE) as 
points of departure to study the role of leadership and other aspects of institutional change in 
Rwanda’s history. Alston, Melo, Mueller and Pereira’s (2016) critical transitions framework, which 
emphasises the role of leadership in institutional change, serves as a conceptual framework for the 
analysis. This framework identifies shocks to economic and political outcomes as the sources of 
opportunities for individuals or groups to show leadership, change the dominant network and their 
beliefs, and implement institutional change. 
The study applies the critical transitions framework to Rwanda’s history to identify five epochs of 
institutional change: (i) the ‘Golden Era’ (pre-history to 1894); (ii) colonial period (1894-1961); (iii) 
First Republic (1961-1973); (iv) Second Republic (1973-1994); and (v) the post-genocide period 
(1994 to the present). The most recent period followed the genocide in 1994 that was spurred by a 
recurrent theme in the country's history, namely ethnic tension between Hutu and Tutsi. Since then, 
Rwanda has displayed one of the most impressive examples of post-conflict reconstruction in human 
history. 
Amongst Rwanda's achievements was being named by the World Bank's Doing Business project as 
the country that made the largest number of reforms to improve its business environment during the 
past decade and a half. This study uses Doing Business data to quantify pro-business institutional 
change from 2002 to 2013. The bases for this choice are the associations between the data collected 
by Doing Business and key concepts in NIE, as well as the theoretical underpinnings of the Doing 
Business project. 
This dissertation employs fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA), a set-theoretic 
technique that allows for equifinality (various routes to an outcome), to analyse the determinants of 
pro-business institutional change in Rwanda and in Sub-Saharan African countries more generally. 
The analysis attempts to explain such institutional change in terms of combinations of five causal 
conditions: transactional leadership, state fragility, the strength of the business environment prior to 
the reforms, and the democratic and autocratic features of the polity.  
The results for Rwanda indicate that effective transactional leadership, a governance style with few 
democratic features and many autocratic elements, and an already-supportive business environment 
at the start of the period influenced pro-business institutional change from 2002 to 2013. The 
country’s leaders established structures for dialogue and engagement with stakeholders outside of the 
ruling party and for coordination of actions by different state departments and other stakeholders. 
They also created an environment of stakeholder commitment to implementation of projects and 
policies.  
Nsanzabaganwa’s (2012) connectedness model explains the policymaking processes behind 
institutional change in Rwanda. It describes policymaking in the country as a product of the 
interaction between the politician, policy expert, private sector and change manager. Political 
scientists now know that autocracies frequently establish the same economic institutions that 
academics historically viewed as typical hallmarks of democratic governments. The co-existence of 
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an inclusive policymaking process and a relatively autocratic political regime in Rwanda is consistent 
with this phenomenon. 
This dissertation has a strong focus on change in formal institutions, but also highlights the role of 
informal institutions (like trust) in change processes. The main suggestion for future research that 
emanates from this dissertation is that analyses of institutional change should give more attention to 
the interplay between leadership and informal institutions. However, complex measurement problems 
would have to be overcome before informal institutions can receive more prominence in such 
analyses. 
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OPSOMMING 
Hierdie proefskrif gebruik ontwikkelingsteorie en beginsels van Nuwe Institusionele Ekonomie (NIE) 
as vertrekpunte om die rol van leierskap en ander aspekte van institusionele verandering in die 
geskiedenis van Rwanda te bestudeer. Alston, Melo, Mueller en Pereira (2016) se “critical transitions 
framework”, wat die rol van leierskap in institusionele verandering beklemtoon, dien as ŉ 
konsepsuele raamwerk vir die ontleding. Dié raamwerk identifiseer skokke in ekonomiese en 
politieke uitkomste as die bronne van geleenthede vir individue of groepe om leierskap te toon, die 
dominante netwerk en hul oortuigings te verander, en institusionele verandering te implementeer. 
Die studie pas die “critical transitions framework” op Rwanda se geskiedenis toe en identifiseer vyf 
epogge van institusionele verandering: (i) die “Goue Era” (voor-geskiedenis tot 1894); (ii) koloniale 
periode (1894-1961); (iii) Eerste Republiek (1961-1973); (iv) Tweede Republiek (1973-1994); en (v) 
die periode na die volksmoord (1994 en daarna). Die mees onlangse epog volg op die volksmoord in 
1994 wat veroorsaak is deur ŉ herhalende tema in die land se geskiedenis, naamlik etniese spanning 
tussen die Hutu en Tutsi. Sedertdien het Rwanda een van die mees indrukwekkende periodes van 
heropbou ná konflik in menseheugenis beleef.  
Een van Rwanda se prestasies was om deur die Wêreldbank se “Doing Business”-projek benoem te 
word as die land wat die afgelope anderhalfdekade die meeste verbeterings aan die sakeklimaat 
aangebring het. Hierdie proefskrif gebruik “Doing Business”-statistiek om besigheidsvriendelike 
institusionele verandering van 2002 tot 2013 te kwantifiseer. Dié keuse berus op die verwantskappe 
tussen die statistiek wat deur die “Doing Business”-projek ingesamel word en kernkonsepte binne die 
NIE, sowel as die teoretiese grondslae van die “Doing Business”-projek.  
Hierdie proefskrif gebruik “fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis” (fsQCA), ŉ 
versamelingsteoretiese tegniek wat ruimte vir ekwifinaliteit (verskeie roetes tot die uitkoms) laat, om 
die determinante van besigheidsvriendelike institusionele verandering in Rwanda en in Sub-Sahara 
Afrika in die algemeen te ontleed. Die ontleding poog om sodanige institusionele verandering te 
verklaar aan die hand van kombinasies van vyf oorsaaklike elemente” transaksionele leierskap, die 
risiko van staatsineenstorting, die toestand van die sakeklimaat voor die afskop van die hervormings, 
en die demokratiese en outokratiese eienskappe van die regering.  
Die uitslae vir Rwanda dui aan dat institusionele verandering vanaf 2002 tot 2013 deur effektiewe 
transaksionele leierskap, ‘n regeringstyl met min demokratiese en heelparty outokratiese elemente, 
asook ‘n reeds-ondersteunende sakeklimaat aan die begin van die periode beïnvloed is. Die land se 
leiers het strukture vir dialoog en skakeling met belanghebbendes buite die regerende party en vir 
koördinering van handelinge deur verskillende regeringsdepartemente en ander belanghebbendes 
geskep. Hulle het ook ‘n omgewing tot stand gebring waarin belanghebbendes tot die implementering 
van projekte en beleid verbind is. 
Nsanzabaganwa (2012) se “connectedness model” verduidelik die beleidmakingsprosesse agter 
institusionele verandering in Rwanda. Dit beskryf beleidmaking in die land as ‘n produk van die 
interaksie tussen die politikus, beleidskenner, privaatsektor en veranderingsbestuurder. Politieke 
wetenskaplikes weet nou dat outokrasieë dikwels dieselfde ekonomiese instellings skep wat 
akademici tevore as tipiese kenmerke van ‘n demokratiese bestel beskou het. Die naasbestaan van ŉ 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
vi 
inklusiewe proses van beleidmaking en ŉ relatief outokratiese politieke bestel stem met dié 
verskynsel ooreen. 
Hierdie proefskrif fokus sterk op verandering in formele instellings, maar plaas ook klem op die rol 
van informele instellings (soos vertroue) in veranderingsprosesse. Die vernaamste voorstel vir 
toekomstige navorsing wat uit hierdie proefskrif voortspruit, is dat ontledings van institusionele 
verandering meer aandag aan die wisselwerking tussen leierskap en informele instellings moet gee. 
Moeilike metingsprobleme sal egter eers oorkom moet word voor informele instellings groter 
prominensie in sulke ontledings kan verkry. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
“There is nothing more difficult to execute, more dubious of success, nor more dangerous to administer 
than to introduce a new order of things, for he who introduces it has all those who profit from the old 
order as his enemies, and has only lukewarm allies in all those who might profit from the new.” 
Machiavelli (1532 [1998]: 21) 
 
 
1.1 Introduction and background 
 
A globally publicised genocide in 1994 resulted in the death of up to 10% of the Rwandan population, 
with another 30% fleeing into exile. The fatality rate was the second-highest of all genocide events 
since 19501 (Diamond 2005: 313). The killing decimated Rwanda’s political system: the majority of 
the ministers in the first post-conflict cabinet had no proper offices, administrative personnel, 
stationary or even electricity (Prunier 1995: 300). A lack of human resources severely undermined 
the quality of the judicial process. There were only 12 prosecutors and 244 judges left in the country 
by November 1994 compared to 70 prosecutors and 758 judges a year earlier (Brehm, Uggen and 
Gasanabo 2014: 335). Based on the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGIs), the World Bank 
assessed the rule of law in 1996 as amongst the bottom decile of countries worldwide. International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) data indicate that Rwanda’s real gross domestic product (GDP) practically 
halved during 1993-1994, while nominal government spending and the volume of merchandise 
exports both dropped by almost two-thirds. These factors illustrate how decades of post-independence 
progress in the small economy were wiped out in only two years (Kelsall 2013: 120). 
 
However, the east African country's recovery after the genocide is considered to be one of the most 
impressive examples of post-conflict reconstruction in human history (Soudan 2015: iii). By 2015, 
almost 99% of the refugees that fled in 1994 and during armed clashes in 1997-1998 either had 
returned to Rwanda or were able to remain in a different capacity in their former countries of asylum 
(United Nations [UN] 2015. The Mo Ibrahim Foundation (2017) recently ranked the quality of overall 
governance as ninth on the continent, linked to a critical annual performance review of high ranking 
public officials (Alpert 2012). The judicial system showed a significant improvement in human 
resources and quality of service, with the rule of law assessed by the WGIs in the sixth decile in 2016. 
IMF data show that the collapse in real GDP during 1993-1994 was reversed by the year 2000. The 
size of the real economy had increased by a factor of three by 2014. The country’s volume of 
merchandise exports increased by an average of 11% per annum over from 1995 to 2014. The Mo 
Ibrahim Foundation (2017) saw the country as providing one of the most supportive business 
environments for private enterprise on the continent. 
 
Rwanda’s post-genocide recovery stands in stark contrast to the economic deterioration in the years 
prior to the massacre. This contrast highlights the inability of imported policies to rectify the country’s 
crisis in the early 1990s. Efforts by multilateral organisations (e.g. the IMF) to stabilise the country’s 
economy and politics actually had the opposite effect, and Rwanda fell deeper into an economic crisis 
as 1994 approached. The cookie-cutter approach of multilateral development strategies – the plans 
                                                          
1 The Cambodian genocide from 1975 to 1979 had the highest fatality rate (Diamond 2005: 313). 
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were not significantly customised to Rwanda’s domestic conditions (Evans 2010: 37) – failed to yield 
the expected results. Rigid structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) based on a universal model for 
stabilisation and development were unsuccessful, and the associated economic and political 
instability contributed to the outbreak of conflict in Rwanda (Andersen 2000: 446-447). The country 
was an excellent example of how rigid SAPs in the 1980s that emphasised macroeconomic 
stabilisation, privatisation, and free market development were often flawed in their methods. The 
World Bank has admitted that the results of these programmes were mixed, and Easterly (2005: 20) 
found that SAPs generally did not achieve significant change in macroeconomic policy and growth 
outcomes.  
 
Nsanzabaganwa (2012: 14) associated Rwanda’s dramatic post-genocide economic turnaround with 
three factors, namely (i) the empowerment of local communities to plan and implement programmes 
with home-grown solutions; (ii) strong institutions and accountable leadership; and (iii) Rwandans’ 
rejection of the notion of the poverty trap. Kigabo (2010: 86-92) added positive ideology and strict 
political will to the list. The ideology included the creation of structures, mechanisms and practices 
that encompassed the participation of citizens in public affairs like policymaking. Many of these 
features were context-specific and borne out of national leadership of Rwanda's success in creating 
the necessary conditions for economic recovery and development through the establishment of peace, 
security, unity, reconciliation, inclusion and strong institutions.  
 
Both Kigabo (2010: 89) and Nsanzabaganwa (2012: 14) identified strong institutions as an important 
part of the post-genocide development success. Institutions became an important element of 
contemporary development theory as some of the ideas behind rigid SAPs fell into disrepute. There 
are currently three main streams of thought relevant to development theory and the construction of a 
modern developmental state, namely the ‘institutional approach’, ‘new growth theory’, and the 
‘capability approach’. The institutional approach emphasises the key role played by formal and 
informal societal institutions in fostering investment and innovation; in fact, it favours these elements 
over resource endowments and capital as sources of long-term growth. This approach uses historical 
analysis to understand determinants of long-term growth, and complements the other two streams 
(Evans 2010: 41-43). 
 
The new growth theory sees ideas and the stock of human knowledge as instrumental to growth and 
development, as opposed to earlier theories that focussed on physical capital and labour. Using 
historical analysis, the institutional approach also emphasises the primacy of human knowledge over 
physical assets as a determinant of economic growth. The capability approach, in turn, originated at 
the intersection of philosophy and economics, and regards expansion of humans’ functional 
capabilities (e.g. the ability to participate in political decision-making) as more important than income 
or wealth as a key driver of economic development. Despite its different intellectual roots, the 
institutional approach also acknowledges the capabilities of people within a society as a key driver of 
long-term development, and emphasises the importance of political and property rights in 
guaranteeing these capabilities (Evans 2010: 42-44).  
 
Nsanzabaganwa (2012: 134) argued that the positive institutional and socio-economic changes in 
Rwanda since 1994 should be attributed to the leadership style in the country after the genocide. The 
emergence of a high-quality governance style in Rwanda, which was remarkable against the backdrop 
of the repeated mistakes of pre-genocide governments, centred predominantly on the leadership of 
one man: President Paul Kagame (Friedman 2012: 256). The president’s policy ideas are aligned to 
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newer forms of thinking about economic development that emphasise multifaceted, context-specific 
approaches. This is congruent with what Evans (2010: 37) referred to as “a continuously reflexive, 
‘learning by doing’ process” of establishing a successful developmental state.  
 
Under Kagame’s leadership, Rwanda became the darling of many within the global aid community 
(Ansoms, Cassimon & Marysse 2006: 4). The ‘Friends of the New Rwanda’ include prominent 
advisors such as former British Prime Minister Tony Blair and former American President Bill 
Clinton, as well as the majority of international aid agencies (Reyntjens 2013: xiii). The significant 
international attention on developments in Rwanda under Kagame’s leadership hides the fact that the 
world had little interest in the country before the genocide made international headlines in April 1994. 
Before this, knowledge of the country’s ethnic, political, social and legal dynamics was generated by 
a limited number of scholars in Belgium2 and, to a lesser extent, France and the United States (US) 
(Reyntjens 2013: xiv). With the genocide rooted in centuries-old ethnic, political and social divisions, 
and the country’s governance also strongly influenced by these factors, the explosion of interest in 
Rwanda’s past around the time of the genocide logically centred on these issues as well.  
 
It is because of the nature of this discovery – through the lens of the genocide – that ethnic and 
governance issues still determine the way that Rwanda is seen today. The volumes of literature about 
post-genocide Rwanda focusses on ethnicity, politics, sociology and justice. These include, amongst 
many others, books by Clark and Kaufman (2008), Straus and Waldorf (2011), Kiwuwa (2012), and 
Reyntjens (2013), peer-reviewed articles by Zorbas (2004), Hintjens (2008) and Ingelaere (2014), 
and academic dissertations by Sahinkuye (2000), Du Toit (2009) and Huggins (2013). Economics has 
taken a backseat in the scholarly work on Rwanda, playing second fiddle to ethnicity, politics and 
justice. Research on the Rwandan economy is the focus of only a few scholars, most prominently An 
Ansoms and Philip Verwimp.3 Ansoms focuses her economic research on rural agriculture, land rights 
and poverty, mostly at the micro level. Verwimp’s economic research investigates factors such as 
healthcare, education and inequality, most often through the genocide lens. By comparison, much 
more research has been undertaken on the country’s ethnic and political dynamics. 
 
In addition, only a few academic studies on Rwanda studied issues emphasised by the institutional 
approach. The associated field of New Institutional Economics (NIE) combines elements of 
economics, politics, anthropology, psychology, sociology and law, amongst other social sciences, to 
understand how people behave (Hodgson 1998: 169). NIE theory offers tools to examine how 
institutions determine the choice sets of individuals and organisations and how institutional change 
modify the choice set. Institutions are defined as “regularities in repetitive interactions among 
individuals. They provide a framework within which people have some confidence as to how 
outcomes will be determined” (North 1986: 230-231). Together with demographic factors (including 
ethnicity) and a society’s stock of knowledge, the institutional framework determines a society’s 
                                                          
2 Rwanda was a Belgian colony from 1916 to 1961.  
3 This claim is based on a literature search and correspondence with Rwanda scholars Filip Reyntjens and An Ansoms.  
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incentive structure. By implication, institutional change can result in changes to incentives and an 
economy’s features (North 2005: 22).4 
 
NIE focusses on the influence of human-made institutions on economic behaviour and outcomes. 
These factors are widely accepted in the field as important determinants of long-term economic 
development and prosperity. Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2005: 402) found convincing 
empirical support that differences in institutions explain differences in countries’ prosperity levels. 
They determined that economic and political institutions control incentives and constraints for 
individuals, organisations and the polity5, thereby shaping economic and political outcomes. The 
Korean case study illustrates the importance of good economic and political institutions. The Korean 
peninsula was divided along the 38th parallel north in 1945 to form North Korea (Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea) and South Korea (Republic of Korea). The two countries shared ethnic, linguistic, 
cultural, geographic and economic homogeneity, with limited geographic distinctions.6 However, the 
two countries’ leaders chose remarkably different institutional paths that provided the deep 
determinants of growth.7 North Korea followed a socialist model and abolished private property 
rights, with economic and political decisions determined by the state. South Korea, in turn, 
maintained a system of private property and attempted to use markets and private incentives to 
develop the economy (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2005: 405). By 2015, approximately 70 
years after the split, the IMF calculated that nominal GDP per capita in US dollar terms was 21 times 
higher in the south than in the north.  
 
Many key elements within the field of NIE are already present in Rwanda-related scholarship, 
including demographic factors (ethnicity), politics, sociology and law. Nsanzabaganwa (2012), for 
example, considered economic development policy in post-genocide Rwanda and combined insights 
from many of these key elements. Many aspects of the creation and implementation of economic 
policy are related to NIE. Nsanzabaganwa (2012: iii) stated that she applied NIE analysis to 
policymaking processes in Rwanda. The application of NIE theory was limited to the introductory 
chapter but served as a conduit for introducing the author’s ‘connectedness model’ for explaining 
policymaking. The model served as a normative description of the ‘how’ of a successful policymaking 
process. Furthermore, it characterised the types of relationships (i.e. informal institutions) between 
actors that were necessary to achieve success.8  
 
                                                          
4 A distinction must be made between institutions and organisations. According to the widely cited definition by North 
(2005: 22), organisations are the players of the game: “They are made up of groups of individuals held together by some 
common objectives. Economic organisations are firms, trade unions, cooperatives, etc.; political organisations are 
political parties, legislatures, regulatory bodies; educational organisations are universities, schools, vocational training 
centres. The immediate objective of organisations may be profit maximising (for firms) or improving re-election prospects 
(for political parties); but the ultimate objective is survival because all organisations live in a world of scarcity and hence 
competition.” 
5 The polity is a de jure or de facto political entity providing governance.  
6 Leurquin (1963: 39-46) provided a detailed analysis of the countries’ geography and climate.   
7 Proximate determinants of growth include investment, labour, and finance. Deep determinants include institutions, 
openness, and geography (Bhattacharyya 2004: 587).  
8 While early references to work by North (1990) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2010) identified the relevant institutional 
theory, Nsanzabaganwa (2012: 183-199) did not reference any publications focussed on institutions and institutional 
change in Rwanda. Although Nsanzabaganwa (2012) lacked the institutional foundation that the dissertation purports to 
have, the connectedness model remains important for understanding the process of policymaking and institutional change 
in Rwanda. For this reason, the model is used in Chapter 6 of this dissertation to gain deeper insight into the role of 
leadership and trust in changing formal institutions in Rwanda. The applications also contribute to the formulation of 
future research suggestions in Chapter 8.   
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Kiwuwa (2012) highlighted the importance of institutions in guiding political processes in countries 
such as Rwanda that have high levels of ‘ethnic consciousness’. Specifically, institutions structure 
the political process to mitigate this consciousness, influence the behaviours of actors, and define the 
avenues to pursue interests. Kiwuwa (2012: 163) identified a skewed institutional bias under 
Rwanda’s First Republic (during the period 1961-1973) and Second Republic (during 1973-1994) 
that resulted in “dysfunctional efforts to pursue democratic transition”. This ultimately led to the 
failure of the Kayibanda and Habyarimana governments. By contrast, the Kagame government’s 
institutions provide a unifying framework that was especially crucial in enhancing progress in the 
country’s transition. According to Kiwuwa (2012), institutions and institutional change have been 
essential factors in political change in Rwanda for at least 60 years. However, a dearth of supporting 
literature prevented Kiwuwa (2012) from explaining this history in detail.  
 
Macro-level studies on institutional change in Rwanda are rare. Ansoms and her co-researchers are 
the only authors with a clear focus on institutions, specifically regarding property rights. This includes 
research into the reorganisation, dispossession and administration of property rights to farmland and 
swampland (e.g. Ansoms 2013; Ansoms and Hilhorst 2014; and Ansoms, Murison, Wagemakers and 
Walker 2014). In turn, Glazova (2015) considered the contribution of informal practices, e.g. the 
Gacaca court system, to post-genocide rebuilding. Other studies on institutions in Rwanda were 
primarily static, i.e. not focussed on institutional change. This includes research into in-country 
inequality in property rights (Isaksson 2014), the influence of transaction costs on smallholder banana 
farmers (Jagwe, Machethe and Ouma 2010), and third-party enforcement mechanisms for 
maintaining peace after civil wars (Mukherjee 2006).  
 
Ansoms and other researchers identified many problems with post-genocide leadership decisions 
regarding reforms to Rwanda’s agricultural, rural and land rights policies and institutions. Leadership 
in this area was essential, because two-thirds of Rwandan workers were employed in agriculture, 
hunting, forestry and fishing. Leadership is also crucial for institutional change. Williamson (1994, 
quoted in Rodrik 1996: 32) reported on a meeting in which high-ranking technocrats were asked to 
evaluate a list of hypotheses on determinants of the feasibility and success of policy and institutional 
reform. Many ideas were debated and rejected, with the necessity for visionary leadership amongst 
the few that received strong support.9 Leadership is recognised by the Austrian School in Economics 
but is primarily applied by its members to business organisations and not political organisations. In 
turn, political scientists elaborate on leadership, though mainly in the context of principal-agent 
models (Alston, Melo, Mueller & Pereira 2016: 233).  
 
Leaders are important. Harberger (1993: 343) commented that not only history is significant in the 
formulation of economic policy, but also “the efforts of a key group of individuals, and within that 
group, one or two outstanding leaders” in directing policymaking. He drew on episodes of reform in 
Latin America10 to “help readers see the process of reform from a different, perhaps more intimate 
perspective than our literature typically provides.” Harberger’s (1993: 343) core message was that 
reform processes would most likely have failed, or never got started, if not for the leadership shown 
by these individuals. More recent empirical evidence increasingly confirms the causal relevance of a 
national leader in shaping economic and political outcomes. Leaders who know how to change 
                                                          
9 The other two elements were the need for a strong political base and a coherent economic team. 
10 These narratives included reviews of Brazil and Argentina, two countries that formed the basis of building and verifying, 
respectively, the critical transitions framework explored in Chapter 2 and applied in Chapter 3.  
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institutions can mould economic and political outcomes to align with their own beliefs and goals 
(Ahlquist and Levi 2011: 3, 7).  
 
However, even though leadership is seen as important by many social scientists, institutional 
researchers have, until recently, not been paying enough attention to this topic.11 Ahlquist and Levi 
(2011: 1) commented that interest amongst political scientists in leadership dynamics is cyclical in 
nature and that the subject has again come into fashion over the past decade. Alston et al. (2016: 186) 
found in their review of NIE literature that leadership “is a relatively absent concept in most 
frameworks of institutional change”. This could be explained by the fact that, amongst social 
scientists, there is still dissensus about the exact meaning of the term ‘leadership’ (Ahlquist and Levi 
2011: 5). By leadership, Alston et al. (2016: 186) mean that “certain individuals at certain moments 
in a country’s history make a difference because of their actions”.12 Leadership entails three aspects: 
(i) identifying and understanding the problem facing a society; (ii) the ability to coordinate others in 
affecting the changes; and (iii) having the moral authority to make all stakeholders accept the change 
(Alston et al. 2016: 15). This is the kind of leadership associated with Kagame and other dynamic 
leaders. Of late, such leadership has inspired academics to study its importance for economic and 
political outcomes. 
 
1.2 The research question and methods 
 
Section 1.1 identified three key issues that warrant further investigation. Firstly, there is a dearth of 
research on institutional change in Rwanda at the macro level, despite the vital role of institutions in 
the country’s political processes over time. Secondly, Kagame is credited with creating a leadership 
style in the country that resulted in a dramatic turnaround in its economic and political fortunes after 
the 1994 genocide. Thirdly, the role of leadership is mostly absent from frameworks for analysing 
institutional change despite its importance for affecting such change. Against this background, the 
main goal of this dissertation is to explain institutional change and the role that leadership plays in 
the process, with a specific focus on the experience of Rwanda. In order to achieve this goal, this 
dissertation aims to answer four questions:  
 
1) What framework that incorporates the role of leadership can be used to explain institutional 
change? Institutions matter, as NIE scholars know. However, a growing body of research 
indicates that leadership also matters. This implies that institutional change cannot be viewed 
within a framework that ignores the role of leadership.  
2) Which periods of institutional change in Rwanda’s history can be identified using such a 
framework? Tools for analysing institutional change try to delineate periods of change. Once 
the first question has been answered (i.e. once a suitable framework has been identified), the 
available literature can be reviewed to determine epochs of institutional change in the history 
of Rwanda.  
3) Which qualitative and quantitative tools can be used to enhance understanding of recent 
institutional change? This case study requires tools to quantify institutional change in Rwanda 
                                                          
11 For example, the indexes of textbooks such as Brousseau and Glachant’s (2008) ‘New Institutional Economics: A 
Guidebook’ and Groenewegen, Spithoven and Van den Berg’s (2010) ‘Institutional Economics: An Introduction’ do not 
contain any references to leadership.  
12 This definition of leadership is important in several aspects in the remainder of this dissertation. However, the definition 
is not unique, and is echoed by Brady and Spence (2010: 4), amongst others.  
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from 2002 to 2013 and to identify causal conditions behind the change. The broad range of 
social sciences drawn upon by NIE scholars provides tools for case-based analysis.  
4) Based on empirical results, what role did leadership play in institutional change after the 
genocide in Rwanda? The importance of leadership in institutional change in Rwanda’s post-
genocide period can be deduced from qualitative and quantitative information. Furthermore, 
which features have characterised the policymaking process that has effected institutional 
change in the country? The attempts to answer these questions will also point to topics for 
future research into institutions in Rwanda.  
 
In answering these questions, this dissertation uses a mixed methods approach that combines both 
qualitative and quantitative tools. As discussed in Section 1.2, this includes Alston et al.'s (2016) 
critical transitions framework, a method known as fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis 
(fsQCA), and Nsanzabaganwa’s (2012) connectedness model, amongst other elements, all in the 
context of a case study-oriented approach. The mixed methods approach used here is rooted in the 
shortcomings of current models for explaining institutional change, which neglect the role of 
leadership in this process of change. Put differently, using an existing model for institutional change 
would be insufficient for understanding institutional change in Rwanda due to the lack of leadership 
components within these models. The tools used in this dissertation specifically incorporate the 
influence of leadership alongside other factors in institutional change. The mixed methods approach 
is also increasingly used in institutional research due to the field’s post-disciplinary embracing of 
diverse tools for understanding human behaviour. 
 
1.3 Structure of the dissertation 
 
Chapter 2 provides theoretical perspectives from NIE on institutions and institutional change. The 
first part of the chapter (Section 2.2) explains how institutions influence economic outcomes and 
outlines four key aspects of institutional analysis: property rights, transaction costs, enforcement 
mechanisms, and informal institutions. The second part of the chapter (Section 2.3) examines theories 
of institutional change. The discussion of the forces resulting in change includes a review of external 
and internal influences, and consideration of path-dependent processes and purposefully designed 
adjustments – a complex mixture that has prevented consensus about the best method to analyse 
institutional change. The next part of the chapter (Section 2.4) outlines the critical transitions 
framework – a relatively new approach that is eminently suitable for studying institutional change in 
Rwanda. The final part of the chapter (Section 2.5) explains why case studies are appropriate for 
analysing institutional change.  
 
Chapter 3 uses the critical transitions framework to delineate periods of institutional change in 
Rwanda since pre-history.13 It identifies five epochs: The ‘Golden Era’ (pre-history to 1894); colonial 
period (1894-1961); First Republic (1961-1973); Second Republic (1973-1994); and the post-
genocide period (1994 to the present). The framework emphasises two key factors in institutional 
change: windows of opportunity and the leadership showed by individuals to affect change. The 
analysis identifies changes to the country’s leadership, their beliefs, constitutional-level institutions, 
as well as laws and enforcement. These changes resulted in new economic and political outcomes 
and brought the country back to ‘autopilot’ situations in which only incremental changes are made to 
                                                          
13 Pre-history is broadly defined as the period predating written records. In the case of Rwanda, as in many African 
countries, the lack of written source material and archaeological evidence resulted in scarce historical data being available 
prior to the mid-19th century (Sellstrom and Wohlgemuth 1997: 21). 
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the institutional setup to maintain the status quo. This chapter builds on the theoretical considerations 
detailed in Chapter 2 and available historical literature about Rwanda.  
 
Chapter 4 discusses two helpful tools for analysing institutional change in the period after the 
genocide in Rwanda. Section 4.2 focusses on the information published by the World Bank's Doing 
Business project on countries’ business environments. It discusses links between Doing Business 
variables and critical concepts of NIE to argue that this dataset is suitable for analysing institutional 
change. Section 4.3 outlines the usefulness of fsQCA as a method to combine (qualitative) case study 
research with empirical analysis. More specifically, it explains why this method, which is seldom 
used in economic research, is ideal for the exploration of institutional change as studies in this 
dissertation.  
 
Chapter 5 conducts a set-theoretic analysis of recent institutional change in SSA using the fsQCA 
method and Doing Business reforms as the outcome variable. The discussion of the data in Section 
5.2 includes an explanation of the influence of the critical transitions framework on the selection of 
causal conditions such as leadership and economic and political outcomes. Section 5.2 also formulates 
four testable hypotheses about institutional change. Sections 5.3 and 5.4 presents the steps and results 
of the empirical analysis and identifies plausible explanations of recent institutional change in the 
sample of African countries. It also uses these explanations to evaluate the four hypotheses.  
 
Chapter 6 interprets the reform experience in Rwanda by considering the four hypotheses and possible 
causes of the country's success. This kind of case study evaluates the plausibility of the fsQCA results 
and the possibility of omitted-variable bias. The chapter starts by examining the outcome variable 
(pro-business reforms) in Section 6.2 and then turns in Section 6.3 to the causal condition (state 
fragility) that did not feature in the country’s pathway solution. Section 6.4 examines the causal 
conditions that do appear in Rwanda's pathway solution: the initial business environment, measures 
of autocracy and democracy, and leadership. These analyses focus on the data values for Rwanda, 
qualitative information relevant to this data, the extent of congruence between the narrative and the 
data values, and the implications of the results for the hypotheses. Section 6.5 discusses possible 
omitted causal conditions.  
 
Chapter 7 considers aspects of recent institutional change in Burundi. The introduction to the chapter 
emphasises the many parallels between Burundi and Rwanda, including their business environment 
reform successes. The point of departure for this review is the reality that none of the pathway 
solutions identified in Section 5.4 explains Burundi’s reform success. Section 7.2 provides a 
background of Burundi’s economic and political history as a precursor to the examination in Section 
7.3 of the country’s data values, similar to that for Rwanda in Section 6.4. Section 7.4 examines the 
outcome variable and how reforms were achieved in order to explore the possibility of omitted-
variable bias. Section 7.5 considers regional integration and supranational leadership as an omitted 
factor.  
 
Chapter 8 summarises the findings of the preceding chapters, presents the most important conclusions 
about the research questions, and provides suggestions for further research.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
9 
 
CHAPTER 2: INSTITUTIONS AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE – 
ESTABLISHING A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The Korean experiment, as discussed in Section 1.1, was a case study about the significance of 
institutions. The different institutional paths followed by North and South Korea after their split in 
1945 led to a significant disparity in the nominal GDP per capita in these countries. Another 
experiment in institutional differences, on a much larger scale, was the European colonisation of large 
parts of the world. The institutions employed in different areas of the colonial world were vastly 
different. The institutional approach explains major reversals of economic fortune by how colonial 
societies were managed within these institutional settings. For example, the Aztecs and Incas in the 
Americas were considered to have been amongst the world’s most prosperous civilisations in the year 
1500. In contrast, the countries that currently overlap the boundaries of these empires are only upper-
middle-income countries. They include Mexico, which contains the Aztec territories, and Peru, in the 
centre of the former Inca Empire. In turn, countries that currently occupy the territories of less-
developed civilisations that inhabited North America, Australia and New Zealand in 1500 are now 
much more prosperous than those of the descendants of the Aztecs and Incas (Acemoglu, Johnson & 
Robinson 2005: 404-407).  
 
The basic premise behind the institutional approach is that economic reversal occurred where 
European colonisers introduced inclusive institutions (e.g. private property rights) in previously poor 
areas such as North America, Australia and New Zealand. In turn, colonisers introduced extractive 
institutions in some areas that were previously prosperous, for example the Aztec and Inca empires. 
These changes to the institutions resulted in changes in prosperity that cannot be explained by the 
unchanged physical environments. Inclusive institutions provided incentives and opportunities for 
investment and innovation, which, in turn, fostered growth and prosperity. Private property rights 
secured titleholder or similar rights for a broad section of society. The introduction of these rights in 
previously poor and sparsely populated areas enabled or induced Europeans to settle in large numbers 
in the poorer areas under more inclusive institutions, thus enabling investment and prosperity 
(Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2002: 1232-1235).  
 
Analysis of natural experiments such as the Korean peninsula and colonial ‘reversals of fortune’ 
underscore that understanding institutions and institutional change is a requirement for understanding 
long-term changes in countries’ economic development and prosperity. Institutional economics is a 
century old, with Hamilton (1919) providing the first real manifesto of institutional economics 
(Rutherford 2001a: 16). The list of scholars in the field of Old Institutional Economics (OIE) include 
such notable names as Thorstein Veblen, John Commons14 and John Kenneth Galbraith (Stanfield 
and Wrenn 2005: 25). OIE started incorporating more fields of study into the realm of economics. 
According to Frederick Mills, this moved institutionalist thinking to “a climate thoroughly opposed 
to the rationalistic tenets of classical economic thought” (Rutherford 2001b: 176). OIE specifically 
incorporated elements of psychology in order to better understand human behaviour, which is much 
more complex than suggested by the assumption of rational decision-making used in neoclassical 
economic thought (Rutherford 2001b: 175). 
                                                          
14 Veblen and Commons were the founders of OIE (Groenewegen, Spithoven and Van Den Berg 2010: 87).  
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Institutional research was popular in the period between the First World War and Second World War, 
both in academia and in the US government, where it had significant influence on Franklin 
Roosevelt’s New Deal. The field of study made significant contributions to, for example, the 
development of unemployment insurance, workers’ compensation, labour legislation, social security, 
and support programmes for agricultural pricing. However, OIE fell out of favour from the 1950s due 
to many new developments in other more mainstream fields of economics. In turn, OIE failed to 
advance some of its key theoretical underpinnings beyond the stages reached by Veblen and 
Commons prior to the Second World War (Rutherford 2001b: 182-183). Institutional economics 
again became more popular during the 1980s in the guise of what is known as NIE (Hodgson 2000: 
325). As discussed in more detail below, this field of study is characterised by an even wider multi-
disciplinary analysis of economic phenomena that include not only elements of psychology but also 
political science, anthropology, sociology, history and law (Hodgson 1998: 169). This resulted in 
significant development of institutional theory since the 1980s, especially in comparison to the period 
of stagnation in the three decades after the Second World War.  
 
Chapter 2 discusses key theoretical concepts from NIE relating to institutions and institutional 
change. This is required to analyse these features in the Rwandan context in later chapters. The 
remainder of Chapter 2 is structured as follows:  
 
 Section 2.2 discusses property rights (examples of formal institutions), transaction costs, 
enforcement mechanisms and informal institutions. 
 Section 2.3 outlines theories of institutional change,  
 Section 2.4 summarises Alston et al.'s (2016) critical transitions framework and shows its 
usefulness as a tool for explaining institutional change,  
 Section 2.5 considers whether case studies are appropriate tools for exploring institutional 
change, 
 Section 2.6 concludes the chapter.  
 
2.2 New Institutional Economics (NIE) 
 
Research by Nobel laureates Douglass North and Ronald Coase is most often the starting point for 
studying NIE theory. North testified that modern institutional economics “should study man as he is”, 
i.e. humans making choices that are not necessarily rational and utility-maximising. In this scenario, 
where humans display bounded rationality, North (1986: 230) argued that NIE theory offer tools to 
examine how institutions determine the choice set available to individuals and groups and how these 
institutions change over time and modify their choice set. Institutional economists accept that humans 
have bounded rationality, and reject the instrumental rationality assumption of neoclassical 
economics. Neoclassical economics postulate that societies are characterised by efficient economic 
and political markets. Institutions are unnecessary in such societies. In reality, economic agents have 
bounded rationality due to incomplete information and inadequate mental capacity to process this 
information. As a result, human societies develop regularised rules and norms to structure human 
exchange (North 1993; 159-160). In other words, societies created institutions.  
 
Institutions are defined as “regularities in repetitive interactions among individuals”. They provide a 
framework “within which people have some confidence as to how outcomes will be determined” 
(North 1986: 231). The institutional framework is the ‘rules of the game’ imposed on organisations 
or groups of individuals. Together with demographic factors and stock of knowledge, the institutional 
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framework determines a society’s incentive structure and shapes the features of the economy. By 
implication, changes to the rules of the game result in changes to incentives and therefore an 
economy’s features and fortunes (North 2005: 22). Institutional frameworks consist of three elements: 
formal rules, informal constraints, and enforcement characteristics. These three factors can be 
explained with the aid of an example from recreational activity: formal rules determine what an 
athlete may and may not do during a sports game, while informal rules (e.g. team culture and 
sportsmanship) are associated with team behaviour that influences the degree to which players behave 
in a sportsmanlike manner. The referees are there to enforce the formal rules affecting how a game is 
played while team members enforce the informal rules (North 2003: 2). These three elements are 
defined more formally and in more detail in Sections 2.2.1-2.2.4.  
 
Alston (2008a: 32-34) used a graphical representation, which is shown in adapted form in Figure 2.1, 
to explain how institutions determine the economic performance of organisations and countries. 
Figure 2.1 indicates that formal and informal institutions (societal laws and norms, respectively) 
determine the property rights assigned to individuals and organisations in an economy. These rights 
include the right to use, sell and bequeath assets. Property rights, in turn, shape innovation and 
technology. (Technology is therefore endogenous in this model and not exogenous as assumed by the 
standard neoclassical model.) The basic premise behind this connection is hat property rights allow 
transactions in technology and ownership of the productivity gains of technological progress by 
developers. Technology then determines an organisation or economy’s transformation costs. These 
include the costs of combining inputs to generate outputs, that is, the costs of internal production in 
businesses. Both technology and internal production costs determine transaction costs. These costs 
are the costs associated with production and exchange, e.g. searching, negotiating, monitoring, 
logistics, and production coordination. Ultimately, these factors all influence the performance of the 
economy, including that of the private sector.  
 
Figure 2.1: How institutions affect economic performance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Alston (2008a: 33) 
 
The purpose of the remainder of Section 2.2 is to introduce salient concepts in NIE by providing 
definitions, summaries of roles and overviews of empirical evidence. These concepts are property 
rights, transaction costs, enforcement mechanisms, and informal institutions, and each subsection 
discusses relevant theoretical issues. Technology is not discussed here in any detail as it is an 
endogenous factor in the process of how institutions affect economic performance. The institutional 
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hypothesis explains that these institutions determine countries' long-term economic prosperity. 
Considering the discussions in Chapters 3, 5, 6 and 7 on institutional change in African countries, it 
is tempting to broadly touch on these theoretical concepts in an African context. However, African 
countries are heterogeneous, and it would not be prudent to try and apply these NIE concepts in a 
broad stroke to the continent.  
 
As an example of this complex situation, Chang (2011: 477-478) comments that institutional 
economists see the common-law legal system as more favourable in protecting investors than the 
civil-law legal system. However, due to the complexity of societies, this is not necessarily the case. 
People with dissimilar cultural values could experience different incentives within the same legal 
system, potentially making the common-law system less attractive than the civil-law system in such 
a context. A legal system or legal tool (e.g. property rights, as discussed in Section 2.2.1) could also 
have disparate incentives for growth and investment in different contexts. Local context, at a sub-
national and community level, is very important. For example, Ensminger and Rutten (1991: 684-
685) found that common property rules amongst the pastoralist Orma tribes of north-eastern Kenya 
was more conducive to long-term sustainable livestock farming than private property rights. NIE 
promotes private property rights, though in the case of the Orma, this led to overgrazing – a deterrent 
to long-term prosperity for livestock farmers. ‘Better’ institutions15 like strong private property rights 
are often better attuned to the needs of urbanised, developed economies as opposed to developing 
countries with relatively large non-urban societies. As a result, institutions are only really ‘better’ if 
their development and implementation takes local contexts into account (Chang 2011: 474).16  
 
2.2.1 Property rights 
 
The construct of property rights is much more intricate for institutional economists than merely the 
right to use, sell and bequeath something, e.g. a building or a piece of land. This basic understanding 
of the right to use such a resource and exclude others from using it needs further expansion if it is to 
be approached scientifically. The solution can be found in Roman law, which differentiated between 
the right to use (‘usos’ in Latin) an asset, the right to transfer (‘abusus’) an asset and the right to the 
fruits (‘fructus’) of an asset (Segal and Whinston 2010: 2). More elements can be added to this 
definition of property rights by considering additional Latin phrases: ‘de facto’ and ‘de jure’. The 
former involves the claiming of a property right by an individual or group while the latter involves 
bestowal of these rights by a government or similar authority (Alston, Harris and Mueller 2009: 2). 
More broadly defined then, property rights are a bundle of decision rights that encompasses the 
abovementioned ideas (Segal and Whinston 2010: 2). In this context, property rights can range from 
open access (unrestricted use of the asset) to commons arrangements (access limited to a select group) 
to private property (exclusion of all but a few or one individual) (Alston and Mueller 2005: 573). 
 
Acknowledgement of the importance of property rights institutions to the success of economies have 
a long history, and can be traced at least as far as back as Adam Smith’s (1776) thinking on economic 
development.17 Levine (2005: 62) identified two views on the determinants of property rights regimes 
                                                          
15 These institutions are often referred to as Global Standard Institutions (GSI), and are typically found in Anglo-American 
countries (Change 2011: 474).  
16 This context-specific perspective is underscored by the discussion in Chapter 6, which shows how relatively autocratic 
governance has supported effective transactional leadership in Rwanda after the genocide.  
17 Kim (2009) suggested that Smith’s (1776) views on European economic development, from feudalism to capitalism, 
appear to be a precursor of North’s work. The latter emphasised a complicated link between the polity and the economy 
in history. 
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in former colonial societies. Firstly, the law view traces cross-country difference in property rights 
protection to legal traditions which were formed centuries ago and spread via conquest and 
colonisation. Secondly, the endowment view stresses the roles of natural resources, climatic 
differences, indigenous populations18 and disease dynamics. Both views were found by Levine (2005: 
83) to be valid at a time when scholars were still undertaking comparative empirical testing. However, 
irrespective of how property rights institutions are formed, these constructs determine economic 
behaviour by creating incentives and disincentives. Because they define the costs and rewards of 
decision making, property rights establish the parameters within which decisions are made about the 
use of resources (Libecap 1986: 229).  
 
Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson and James Robinson have individually and collectively delved 
deeply into the concept of property rights from an institutional perspective.19 Their research has 
distinguished between contracting institutions (that support private contracts) and property rights 
institutions (that constrain the expropriation of property by governments and elites) – two concepts 
not often explored individually but instead within a cluster of institutions. The three authors' empirical 
analysis of former European colonies revealed strong and distinct relationships between contracting 
institutions and property rights institutions. However, while property rights institutions had a 
significant influence on long-term economic growth, investment decisions and financial 
development, contracting institutions were found to have had a more limited impact (Acemoglu and 
Johnson 2005: 950).  
 
2.2.2 Enforcement mechanisms 
 
Property rights can be enforced via legal and extra-legal mechanisms. Legal mechanisms involve the 
use of sanctions by states to force compliance with property rights, while extra-legal mechanisms 
range from informal dispute resolution in the shadow of the law to parties’ reputations for upholding 
contracts. Such reputation-based processes can be alternative to formal mechanisms. The formal and 
informal mechanisms of enforcement comprise the institutions that underpin the rule of law and form 
a backdrop for all legal transactions (Hadfield and Weingast 2011: 3-4). The availability of recourse 
to law and the courts is a safeguard for market participants involved in various transactions (Alston 
2008a: 34). The World Justice Project (2018) identified several essential characteristics of such a 
system. These include that all public and private entities are accountable to the law, that legislation 
is transparent and applied evenly, that laws are enforced reasonably, and that justice is delivered 
timely by a competent judiciary. 
 
Private property rights are not a natural occurrence in biology or ecology and are the result of human 
societies’ choices and social institutions. Thus, there is a need for the human polity to administer such 
rules. This requires a powerful enough government to protect property rights yet refrain from the 
associated capacity to expropriate such rights. Because the state has a comparative advantage in 
coercive power, it is necessary to have a constitution that places restrictions on the power of the state 
(North and Weingast 1989: 805-806). In theory, an independent judiciary enables the implementation 
of formal institutions (such as constitutions) and enforcement mechanisms without prejudice or 
favour (Levine 2005: 61). Most economists agree that the enforceability of formal contracts and 
agreements support economic development (Nelson and Sampat 2001: 40). Understanding how, 
                                                          
18 Common property, for example, develops around pre-existing kinship relations (Fitzpatrick 2006: 1028). 
19 Their most prominent publication is arguably the 2001 paper ‘The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An 
Empirical Investigation’, one of the most cited economics articles of the past two decades.  
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when and why states enforce or violate property rights and contracts are among the essential tasks for 
institutional economists. Related factors include understanding of the influence of polities on 
transactional environments, and understanding of the interaction between economic and political 
markets (Menard and Shirley 2005: 4-5).  
 
Nobel laureate Elinor Ostrom (2004: 8) contributed significantly to the understanding of various 
public and private enforcement mechanisms, stating that formal rules have to be monitored and 
enforced by the participants, officials or both in order to be effective and change behaviour. Her 
statement was related to ecological systems and common resource usage but is relevant to many 
economic settings. Ostrom was mindful of North’s (1984) view of a perfect world. North (1984: 257-
258) stated that there would be no opportunism, shirking and cheating if a neutral third party 
impartially evaluated disputes and awarded compensation to the party injured as a result of contract 
violation. He further stated that such a world does not exist. Instead, an impersonal judiciary with the 
power to enforce judgments is needed to enforce the rules. The state is an enforcer of contracts and 
property rights, among other things. Political scientists postulate that robust third-party enforcement 
of laws is a prerequisite for economic development. Based on this, Olson (1996: 22) argued that the 
difference between rich and poor countries is that the wealthier economies have a third-party enforcer 
of complex contracts.  
 
Ideally, the third-party enforcer is a formal entity tasked with this job. Where such a state entity is 
unable to perform the task, informal institutions provide proxies for these functions. A plural system 
involving both formal and informal mechanisms is common (Fitzpatrick 2006: 1038-1039). The 
enforcement of property rights, for example, allows an individual or organisation to enter into a 
contract that enables the transfer of ownership of a physical or intellectual good to another agent. 
However, these contracts are generally constrained by incompleteness due to individuals having 
imperfect information and communication and calculation skills (i.e. bounded rationality). This 
results in the occurrence of transaction costs to implement such a contract given that all potential 
contingencies involved in the agreement cannot be anticipated. The incompleteness necessitates 
regulation to reduce uncertainty in the case of various contingencies (Furubotn and Richter 2008: 17-
18). Hence, the critical issue is that enforcement mechanisms established by the state or the agents 
themselves must be in place to protect formal institutions. Furthermore, this determines the cost and 
incentives of doing business in an economy. The cost of enforcement increases when formal and 
informal institutions clash (Pejovich 1999).  
 
2.2.3 Transaction costs 
 
Nobel laureate Oliver Williamson created the term New Institutional Economics (NIE) in 1975 and 
was a pioneer in developing the approach known as Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) (Furubotn 
and Richter 2008: 16). TCE is a theory of organisations and considers, amongst other factors, how 
organisations exist and operate to minimise costs. The Williamson approach built upon the earlier 
work of Coase (1960: 15), who pointed out that it is unrealistic to assume that market transactions are 
costless and argued that transaction costs are ubiquitous. Transaction costs result from the steps 
necessary to find a counterparty, convey an interest to deal with them, negotiate, reach an accord, and 
ensure that all the terms of the contract are observed. Dahlman (1979: 147-148) formulated the 
following three-step definition based on the phases of the transaction process: 
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 Search and information costs due to imperfect information between transacting parties. 
 Bargaining and decision cost to determine a counter party’s desire to trade under certain 
conditions. 
 Policing and enforcement costs to ensure that one or more parties do not violate the conditions 
of the transaction. 
 
A more trusting relationship between parties – an issue related to informal institutions – naturally 
reduces the need for complex contracts and increase information sharing (Chu and Dyer 2003: 57). 
This will invariably reduce the cost of transactions, as defined by Dahlman (1979) and North (1984). 
Indeed, a higher level of trust will reduce search and contracting costs (those steps needed to find and 
negotiate with a partner) as well as monitoring and enforcement costs (those steps related to policing 
the agreement). Regarding the last point, enforcement becomes increasingly important in the 
transaction process as humans move from personal exchange (amongst family, friends and long-
standing business relationships, with high levels of trust) to impersonal exchange (which is more 
prevalent in developed economies and relies less on trust). Impersonal exchange in the absence of 
third-party enforcement exists only where one party has overwhelming coercive power relative to the 
other party, as in serfdom and slavery (North 1984: 258-259).  
 
Transaction costs are also at play when private parties interact with the polity on a direct basis (e.g. 
the supply of public services) and a third-party basis (e.g. enforcement of law). Uncertainty arises 
because the public entity lacks knowledge of the characteristics of every individual or organisation 
and because high levels of trust between such actors are far from guaranteed. For example, there 
cannot be certainty on the part of the government about the intent of the business, quality of physical 
capital, trustworthiness in direct property trading property with other private entities, full disclosure 
of tax obligations, compliance with cross-border trade laws, etc. To address the resulting 
asymmetrical information, public entities require disclosure via paperwork and inspections and 
provide documentation to certify information (Dahlman 1979: 147-148). The private party is liable 
to pay certain explicit and implicit costs when transacting with the public entity. These include direct 
monetary payments for transactions or exchanges, and indirect payments to fund public sector activity 
(e.g. taxes). 
 
In global trade and other areas, the costs involved in search, information sharing, monitoring and 
enforcement are real concerns for public entities responsible for the public good. To reduce 
uncertainties in international trade and other forms of transacting between private parties, public 
entities require companies to provide relevant information for collection in a public registry, submit 
their activities to regulatory scrutiny, and obtain certification that such steps were taken. These actions 
by the government reduce private transaction costs. Spending money, either explicitly or implicitly, 
to fund search, decision-making, policing, and enforcement processes is part and parcel of the 
institutional environment in which private entities operate. In the case of African stock exchanges, 
for example, investors are enticed by high returns, but face high dealing and settlement costs.  
 
2.2.4 Informal institutions 
 
Formal enforcement mechanisms are associated with constitutions and courts of law, while informal 
enforcement is associated with societal and religious conventions, among other things. Informal 
constraints are norms, conventions, and internally held beliefs (North 2005: 27). These informal 
institutions include societal and religious processes like codes of conduct, taboos and standards of 
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behaviour that humans use to explain and evaluate the world around them (North 1989: 1322). 
Informal institutions emanate from socially transmitted information and are part of human heritage. 
These institutions are the parts of a community’s heritage that can be identified as culture (Pejovich 
1999: 166) and which determine the way people process and use information (North 1990: 42).  
 
Social scientists’ understanding of the impact of culture on economic outcomes has come a long way 
in a short time. As recently as the 1980s, economic analysis was unable to incorporate socio-cultural 
phenomena such as trust and confidence beyond two-way interactions between individuals (Coleman 
1984: 85). Even at the turn of the millennium, economists were reluctant to rely on concepts like 
culture as a possible determinant of economic phenomena (Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales 2006: 23). 
Less than a decade later, however, a comprehensive review by Alesina and Giuliano (2013: 2) showed 
that specific cultural variables determine many economic choices, and even affect the speed of 
development and the wealth of nations. Cultural factors change very slowly due to their social 
embeddedness (Williamson 2000: 596-597). Such inertia is due to the evolutionary nature of these 
conventions, which do not allow for quick change in their long-lasting grip on society and the conduct 
of individuals. The term ‘institutional stickiness’ describes situations in which new institutional 
arrangements cannot take hold due to cultural factors (Boettke, Coyne and Leeson 2008: 332).  
 
It can be argued that attempts to understand the influence of social variables on economic outcomes 
should consider information from social sciences other than economics. In a study focussed on the 
contributions of sociologists to this question, Granovetter (2005: 33) listed three channels by which 
social structure and networks affect economic outcomes: these systems affect the flow and quality of 
information, act as a source of reward and punishment, and determine confidence that others will do 
the ‘right’ things. Sahlins (1972) used an example of changing levels of trust and confidence in a 
system of tribal trading with distant markets to argue that social structure determines the flexibility 
of the economic system. In turn, Fernandez (2010) adopted an epidemiological approach from the 
biological sciences to study the impact of culture on economic outcomes. Her method studied 
differences in economic outcomes for individuals who share institutional settings but differ with 
regards to cultural backgrounds (e.g. several groups of immigrants in a new country).  
 
Broadly speaking, economists use two definitions of culture. The first emphasises social conventions 
and individual beliefs, while the second focusses on individual values and preferences. The latter is 
consistent with cultural models in the fields of sociology and anthropology. The two definitions are 
not mutually exclusive, though (Alesina and Giuliano 2013: 5). Many empirical researchers prefer 
the definition by Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2006: 23), who described culture as “customary 
beliefs and values that ethnic, religious, and social groups transmit fairly unchanged from generation 
to generation”.20 The cultural traits that receive most attention in empirical literature on trade and 
commerce are (i) trust towards others, (ii) individualistic and collectivist orientations, (iii) the 
relevance of family ties in society, (iv) the extent of cooperative behaviour, (v) attitudes towards 
work, and (vi) religion and religiosity (Alesina and Giuliano 2013: 6-16). While the impact of culture 
on economic outcomes is clear, international comparisons are complicated by the reality that 
individual surveys and laboratory experiments within particular population settings are the sources 
of measures of informal institutions. Religious beliefs and values, for example, are multifaceted and 
cannot be reduced to one or a few quantitative variables. These challenges are further explored in 
Chapter 8. 
                                                          
20 Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2006: 24) admitted that this definition is not comprehensive. However, it does capture 
for this dissertation the dimensions of culture, which can affect economic outcomes. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
17 
 
2.3 Theories about institutional change 
 
Interest in institutional change grew significantly in the 1980s as scholars started studying the 
emergence and historical evolution of institutional variation in economic systems (Campbell 2011: 
89). Endeavouring to understand institutional change is essential for further progress in the social 
sciences in general and economics in particular (North 1994: 1). Instances of institutional change 
were at the heart of most significant historical developments over the past millennium. Khawaja and 
Khan (2009: 250-255) listed several historical experiences in institutional differences and changes 
that helped map the present-day dynamics of global economic prowess and political power. These 
include the divergent institutional paths during the late 17th century of, on the one hand, Britain and 
The Netherlands and, on the other hand, Spain and France. This was due to the beneficial impact of 
international trade on British and Dutch commercial interests. Another example was the rapid 
industrialisation of Britain and Germany during the 19th century compared to the slower progress in 
Austria-Hungary and Russia, where smaller benefits weakened incentives for elites. Finally, more 
favourable attitudes among policymaking elites to commercial freedom allowed North American 
states to industrialise more quickly than Latin American and Caribbean ones did during the 19th 
century. 
 
Easterly (2008: 99) pointed out that historical evidence, contemporary research and common sense 
suggest that institutional change is gradual in the vast majority of cases. Khawaja and Khan (2009) 
also denied the existence of quick-fix solutions for weak institutions. Williamson (2000: 596-597) 
differentiated between four types of institutions, based on the frequency at which they change: 
 
 Embedded culture and norms that change over centuries and millennia 
 High-level formal rules like constitutions that change over decades and centuries 
 Governance rules that govern day-to-day interactions and can adjust over years 
 Prices and quantities in individual contracts that adjust continuously.  
 
History obviously matters (North 1990: vii). A society’s formal and informal institutions are the 
products of historical evolution. The reality that institutions evolve into their present-day form from 
a recognisable structure in the past makes them the carriers of history. As implied by the notion of 
path dependence, institutions may be unable to shake off the effects of past events in the absence of 
significant shocks. Institutions tend to be sticky and slow to change and may carry remembrances of 
the past for a long time. David (1994: 205-206) commented that Aristotle’s teleological method “links 
the present state of arrangements with some originating context or set of circumstances and 
interpolates some sequence of connecting events that allow the hand of the past to exert a continuing 
influence upon the shape of the present”. Put differently, arrangements such as institutions have their 
origins in distant history, and it is the long-term interaction between institutions and organisations 
that determine institutional change. 
 
David (1985) was the first to highlight the issue of path dependence in economic history by reviewing 
the history of the QWERTY keyboard. The layout had its origins with the mechanical typewriter, 
designed in 1873 to minimise the clashing of the type bars that imprinted letters on pages. Modern 
personal computers still use the same standardised keyboard layout even though clashing type bars 
no longer hinder typing. Moreover, more efficient layouts exist, including the Dvorak Simplified 
Keyboard (DSK) that allows the user to type 20%-40% faster. The embeddedness of QWERTY 
reflects three factors, namely (i) the technical interrelatedness between keyboard hardware and the 
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human user’s software skills and experience; (ii) economies of scale as the rollout of QWERTY 
encouraged further adoption of the layout; and (iii) the rising cost of switching from QWERTY to, 
for example, the DSK. As a result, and despite technological changes, the less efficient QWERTY 
keyboard remains the dominant layout. It began a path towards contemporary keyboard usage that 
could not be swayed by a more efficient alternative. The value of David’s (1985) analysis of path 
dependence is that it emphasises North’s (1990: vii) assertion that history matters.  
 
Nonetheless, human social systems (institutions) change over time due to humans’ creative capacities 
and problem-solving abilities. Humanity can question, abandon, change, and create new rules that 
distinguish the human social world from those of many other social animals. Creative cognitive 
capacities help explain the complexity of human institutions, the emergence of opportunities for new 
variation, and the likely rates of institutional change. It might initially appear that Lewis and 
Steinmo’s (2012: 317) discussion of the role of intellect in institutional change would prompt a view 
of quick rather than gradual institutional change, considering that humans are the most intelligent 
social animals and therefore able to apply their creative capacities and problem-solving abilities 
quickly. Since institutions are part of the intergenerational transfer of norms and behaviour, they 
cannot be expected to easily change from one generation to the next. Even when humans apply their 
creative and reasoning skills they rarely recalculate and rationally reassess all possible choices. As a 
result, evolutionary institutional change has been subject to significant path dependence, which has 
made institutions sticky.  
 
To be sure, the Darwinist perspective is not the only theory about institutional change. Caballero and 
Kingston (2009: 153) distinguished between the evolutionary processes discussed above and changes 
that are purposefully designed and implemented.21 They found three possible derivatives of the 
centralised process of rulemaking that determine the process of change. Firstly, institutional change 
can be a product of supply and demand dynamics, with constituents demanding change from their 
political suppliers. This entails a process of bargaining. Secondly, authorities can have a more 
independent role when the demands of their constituents are not the only considerations in 
rulemaking. Politicians’ interests can be at play as well, which makes the bargaining process less 
efficient. (Here the judiciary plays a role in mediating the creation of new rules.) Thirdly, political 
actors can have a more autonomous role in driving institutional change – the extreme cases being 
dictatorships in which the rulers' subjects are hardly involved (Caballero and Kingston 2009: 157-
158). In such cases, citizens could opt for revolutionary action to secure change. 
 
Considering then that some institutional change can be attributed to path-dependent processes and 
others to purposefully designed adjustments (the ‘how’), it is also important to consider the impact 
of exogenous shocks and endogenous triggers on the institutional framework (the ‘why’). North 
(2005: 22) saw room for both endogenous and exogenous influences on institutional change as this 
added considerations of space to the earlier thinking linked to time. While exogenous change (e.g. 
revolution) can be seen as more dramatic than endogenous (evolutionary) change, gradual change can 
be of great significance in itself. Slowly unfolding changes may be very significant as causes of other 
outcomes (Mahoney and Thelen 2010: 3). As a result, this dissertation neglects neither exogenous 
nor endogenous factors when discussing the process of institutional change.  
 
                                                          
21 Hargrave and Van de Ven (2004: 262) pointed to continuous and evolutionary change, as opposed to discontinuous and 
revolutionary change. 
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The continuous interaction between institutions and organisations is the key to both deliberate and 
evolutionary institutional change. This can be due to external as well as internal developments. North 
(2005: 22) stated that new or altered opportunities could be interpreted as resulting from exogenous 
changes that change relative prices to organisations, or from endogenous competition among the 
organisations in the polity and the economy. There is scope for both sets of influences. 
Acknowledging that institutions can be determined by the forces of history or by forces outside of the 
current economy also makes it easier to understand the effect of institutions on societies (Engerman 
and Sokoloff 2005: 649). Such exogenous factors include military conflict and the discontinuous 
change brought by the introduction of new technology. These developments fall outside of the 
existing institutional preferences operating and competing within a society. Caballero and Kingston 
(2009: 171-172) suggested that these exogenously caused shifts in institutions do not rely on one part 
of society implementing a change for reasons of self-interest (as would be the case with endogenous 
change), but involve individuals and organisations in a coordinated shift in the beliefs and strategies 
of many players.  
 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2005: 390) stated that economic institutions are endogenous in 
their origin and determined by the collective choices of societies. However, there is no guarantee that 
all individuals and groups will prefer the same set of economic institutions because different 
economic institutions lead to different distributions of resources. Hence, competition among groups, 
organisations and individuals is almost inevitable. According to them, the entity that eventually wins 
the competition and determines the economic institutions is the faction with most political power. 
The distribution of political power is also endogenous and is determined by political institutions. To 
be clear: political power is the ability to enforce a set of chosen economic institutions, either by legal 
(de jure) bestowment of this right or by extra-judicial (de facto) processes not specified by a 
constitution or other formal rules. Poorly allocated political power can constrain the competition 
between different forces within a society. This goes to the core of why some societies chose economic 
institutions that were not good for them. The majority did not have the political power to undo the 
institutional choices by the minority with political power. 
 
More extensive discussion of exogenous and endogenous change is not required in this study, as it 
does not attempt to rank the different approaches. In fact, there is no broad consensus yet on 
conceptualising institutional change. Some researchers find the evolutionary approach relevant to 
their case studies while others focus on the design-based argument because it suits their subject matter 
better. The question naturally arises as to how to integrate these theories. Caballero and Kingston 
(2009: 167) explored the interaction between automatic and deliberate mechanisms of institutional 
change and the circumstances in which each applies. This dissertation adopts the so-called 
equilibrium view of institutional change in which deliberate and evolutionary changes to institutions 
are possible because of endogenous and exogenous influences on the status quo. Put differently, the 
equilibrium view of institutional change accommodates slow and fast-moving changes stemming 
from internal and external sources. This was a viable departure point for using the critical transition 
framework proposed by Alston et al. (2016) (see Section 2.4).  
 
A significant challenge to social science is to understand why a society moves from one institutional 
equilibrium to another. Moreover, the biggest challenge for NIE researchers is choosing a framework 
or toolset for analysing such institutional change. There is not yet a consensus amongst institutional 
researchers about the best method to attempt such a feat. Caballero and Kingston (2009) reviewed 
different theoretical approaches to conceptualising institutional change, which was borne out of the 
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dilemmas they faced in being confronted with different theories of institutional change. Their study 
did not endeavour to resolve the problem but instead attempted to map out areas of confusion. This 
was seen as a necessary first step towards achieving consensus or at least understanding (Caballero 
and Kingston 2009: 152). In providing an updated overview of approaches to institutional change, 
Caballero (2013: 4) reiterated that an all-encompassing theory of institutional change is yet to be 
produced and that different theories can be useful in the analysis of different processes of institutional 
change. More recently, Bedock (2014: 358) stated that many theoretical challenges remain when it 
comes to the ‘how’ and ‘why’ of institutional reforms.  
 
2.4 Alston et al.'s (2016) ‘critical transitions framework’ 
 
While social scientists have developed powerful analytical tools to understand the outcomes of 
diverse institutional systems, the majority of these toolkits are calibrated towards analysing static 
worlds, while the real world is, in fact, forever changing. To address this issue, an effective framework 
for institutional change needs to make room for deliberate and evolutionary changes to institutions, 
provide tools for analysing dynamic situations, and include structural variables present in all 
institutional arrangements. Also, as discussed in Section 2.2.4, such a model needs to accommodate 
the fact that unintended change, evolutionary processes, and intentional design are at work in many 
real-world examples of institutional change (Basurto and Ostrom 2011: 317). These various forces 
are often challenging to separate. Ostrom (2011: 9) stated that an institutional framework should 
identify the major structural variables that are present in all institutional arrangements, but whose 
values differed from one type of arrangement to another. Such a diagnostic tool should be based on 
the premise that institutions are different configurations of written and unwritten rules that shape 
human interactions (Basurto and Ostrom 2011: 318).  
 
A relatively new approach to understanding institutional change from Alston et al. (2016) is a viable 
option for answering the research questions in Section 1.2 whilst conforming to the requirements set 
out in the preceding paragraph. Alston et al. (2016: 171) set out to explain economic and political 
developments in Brazil in their book entitled ‘Beliefs, Leadership, and Critical Transitions: Brazil, 
1964-2014’. Consequently, they developed a framework that can explain how countries transition 
from unsustainable to sustainable institutional structures. They argued that, while institutional 
researchers can identify sustainable trajectories of economic and political development, there is no 
universal strategy for making the change from less sustainable towards more sustainable institutions. 
In other words, there is no perfect recipe for countries to make such transitions. 
 
Alston et al. (2016: 169) did not set out to define a formula for change. Instead, they focused on 
creating a general inductive framework for understanding critical transitions that is reflective and not 
prescriptive as a recipe would be. They argued that the general lessons from institutional change in 
Brazil enable the creation of the ‘critical transition framework’ that can be generalised to understand 
institutional change in other countries. Indeed, once the critical transition framework was fleshed out, 
the authors offered a similar, albeit much shorter, assessment of institutional change in Argentina 
(Alston et al. 2016: 191-208) to verify the generalisability of the scheme.22 Generalisability across 
different case studies is vital for the robustness of a qualitative conceptual framework. A case is 
generalisable if it is informative about a general phenomenon and broadly applicable beyond the 
specific site, population, time, and circumstances studied (Mabry 2009: 222). Alston et al. (2016) 
                                                          
22 Alston (2017: 360-366) provided a similar application to the US during the late 18th century. 
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motivated the generalisability of the structure by constructing their critical transition framework as a 
tool to help understand other episodes of institutional change and also testing its usefulness in the 
Argentinian context.23 The critical transitions framework is best understood from the schematic in 
Figure 2.2. 
 
Alston et al. (2016: 14) start their institutional scenario with the so-called autopilot position in which 
institutions are more or less stable.24 Here, institutions change only at the margin instead of 
fundamentally. Those in political power put in place formal rules that suit their needs and expected 
economic and political outcomes. Attempts to disrupt the status quo will produce few gains and at a 
high cost. The dominant network25 within the institutional setting comprise organisations with 
economic, political, religious, or social motives and operations. Their power within the network is 
based on the ability to influence and shape institutions. In a highly democratic society, for instance, 
this network would include representatives of ordinary citizens. In a repressive society, the dominant 
network is limited to elites from the political, economic and religious organisations, depending on the 
individual context. The dominant network structures their institutional environment according to their 
beliefs. Alston et al. (2016: 226-227) cited a definition from North (2005) indicating that beliefs are 
the subjective perceptions of actors and organisations about how the world works. In the autopilot 
scenario, the beliefs of the elite are consistent with institutions. Hence, institutions are structured 
according to what the dominant network believes is most accommodative to their desired outcomes. 
 
The autopilot scenario includes constitutional-level institutions that can refer to a country’s codified 
constitution or other laws that fundamentally influence incentives within society (Alston et al. 2016: 
26). Examples include laws governing elections and the separation of powers. These high-level 
institutions underpin laws and enforcement, and broadly corresponds to the notions of formal ‘rules 
of the game’ and third-party enforcement (Alston et al. 2016: 179 & 189). Laws and rules are 
underpinned by certain core beliefs amongst the dominant elite and, quite often, other organisations 
and actors (Alston et al. 2016: 189). Stability in the autopilot scenario is dependent on incremental 
changes to the ‘rules of the game’, which are much more commonplace than large-scale 
constitutional-level changes. These adjustments are needed to achieve realignment after minor 
changes in either beliefs or outcomes (Alston et al. 2016: 171, 191).26 With continued incremental 
adjustments, the dominant network’s beliefs continue to match their expected economic and political 
outcomes. These are the results of the cause-and-effect beliefs held by the dominant network. The 
members of the network expect to derive specific incentives and rewards from their actions and base 
their activities and institutional formation on their understanding of the cause-and-effect structure 
(Alston et al. 2016: 190).  
 
                                                          
23 The greater goal of their endeavour is summarised well in the preface to North’s (2005: vii) ‘Understanding the Process 
of Economic Change’: “[I]f we can achieve an understanding of the underlying process of change then we can develop 
somewhat more limited hypotheses about change that can enormously improve the usefulness of social science theory in 
confronting human problems.” 
24 Underlined text highlights the key components of the critical transitions framework as identified by Figure 2.2.  
25 As indicated in Section 1.1, Harberger (1993: 343) argued that these individuals are instrumental in giving direction to 
policymaking.  
26 The constitutional level institutions, laws and enforcement mechanisms, and incremental change identified by Alston 
et al. (2016) broadly align with the second, third and fourth types of institutions identified by Williamson (2000: 596-
597) and listed in Section 2.2.4. The first component is embedded culture and norms (informal institutions) that take 
centuries and millennia to change.  
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Figure 2.2: Autopilot and critical transitions 
Source: Based on Alston et al. (2016: 191) 
 
A critical factor in moving from the autopilot situation into a period of institutional change is the 
deviation between actual and expected economic and political outcomes (point 1 in Figure 2.2). This 
arises when incremental changes to the institutional design can no longer compensate for differences 
between beliefs (which include expected outcomes) and actual outcomes. This is caused by an 
endogenous or exogenous shock to the system that significantly divides actual from expected 
outcomes. The shock is also a break between one epoch and the next. The tremor can come from 
diverse sources, for example economic factors, political factors, climate change, military action, 
disease or famine. These jolts can bring the core beliefs of the dominant network into question. It can 
also cause actors or organisations to enter into or exit from the dominant network. This happens 
because consensus among the members of the network about required changes to institutions breaks 
down when beliefs became malleable (Alston et al. 2016: 25).  
 
At this point, Alston et al. (2016: 176) identify a window of opportunity for changes in a country’s 
economic and political outcomes by a significant adjustment in beliefs and institutions. This is not 
the same as Acemoglu and Robinson’s (2013: 431) critical junctures, which refer to moments in time 
when significant events or the confluence of factors result in disruptions of economic or political 
power. A critical juncture implies a point in time when change happens. Alston et al.'s (2016: 176) 
window of opportunity is not a point in time, but rather a series of opportunities for change that, if 
seized upon successfully, ends in a modification of the dominant core belief. The possible series of 
changes may be frequent, but the execution of all these changes in the correct sequence is rare. A 
window of opportunity can arise from several factors, for example, changes in rents, incentives or 
rewards received by the dominant network; the entrance of a new actor or organisation into the 
dominant network; and changes in the beliefs of the dominant network.  
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A transformation of the dominant network (point 2 in Figure 2.2) and its beliefs provides an 
opportunity for leadership to emerge and make the necessary changes to the institutional setting 
(Alston et al. 2016: 176). Certain individuals emerge as game changers in these situations with the 
ability to make a unique difference to a country’s institutional trajectory.27 Such a game changer will 
hold beliefs (and associated views on appropriate institutions) that could place a country on a new 
trajectory, towards a new autopilot situation dependent on continued incremental change and 
enforcement. Most often, the beliefs held by such a leader are aligned with the beliefs of many others 
(Alston et al. 2016: 186-187).28 Other requirements for a leader include the ability to identify a 
window of opportunity and be able to find a solution to the problems at hand (Alston et al. 2016: 188-
189). Note, however, that the influence of leadership is not always benign; it can take a country in a 
negative direction as well.  
 
Once leadership emerges, this person’s first task is to realign the dominant network’s beliefs (point 3 
in Figure 2.2). This can be done by changing the dominant network’s beliefs in the autopilot situation, 
and may take some time while elites within the dominant network jostle for power (Alston et al. 2016: 
193). Once progress is made towards a new set of beliefs, changes to institutions are needed to align 
these new beliefs with a new set of economic and political outcomes. The constitutional-level and 
laws and enforcement components of the scenario can change if the dominant network can exercise 
cognitive (identifying) and coordinative roles and enact institutional deepening (which also includes 
incremental change)29 (Alston et al. 2016: 194-195). The new rewards and incentives for actors and 
agents in the economy result in new economic and political outcomes, which are maintained through 
incremental change. This closes the book on the historical period that started with the original 
autopilot situation. If all goes according to the theoretical plan, a new set of outcomes will align with 
the new set of beliefs and move the dynamics to a new autopilot situation. In some societies, this will 
translate into a more open economic and political environment (Alston et al. 2016: 194). However, a 
better autopilot situation is not guaranteed – if one dictator replaces another, for example, change is 
not necessarily for the better. 
 
The reality that institutional researchers are still far from agreeing on a specific model for institutional 
change makes it important to evaluate whether the critical transitions framework adheres to academic 
standards of good practice in case study research. Regarding the choice of framework, Hargrave and 
Van de Ven (2004 and 2006) set out criteria that categorise the four different types of models of 
institutional change available for selection. This is needed to determine whether the critical transitions 
framework qualifies as such a framework. Hargrave and Van de Ven (2004: 261) used the standard 
Northian definition for institutions and defined institutional change as the difference in an institution's 
form, quality, or state over time. To analyse this, it is necessary to compare the arrangement of 
institutions at two points in time to understand the difference. One of the options for understanding 
the move from the first to the second point is to consider concepts and variables about specific actions 
and activities – this is usually associated with ‘variance theory’ and is explained with the aid of 
econometric modelling. The second option is a narrative of how things change. This is associated 
with ‘process theory’, and it should be immediately apparent that the second option is more closely 
aligned with case study methodology (Hargrave and Van de Ven 2004: 262). 
                                                          
27 Schofield (2006) identified this as ‘transformative’ leadership; a catalyst for discontinuous change at a pivotal moment. 
28 On a similar note, Storr (2009) examined North’s notion of an ‘ideological entrepreneur’ that plays a role in institutional 
change by changing minds and, in so doing, institutions. This can be seen as a precursor to the expanded concept of 
leadership in the critical transitions framework.  
29 Canes-Wrone (2006) identified this as ‘transactional’ leadership; a leader manages and attempts to implement policy 
within a larger economic, social and political context. This definition of leadership is further explored in Section 5.2.2. 
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Scholars have converged on four distinct perspectives on institutional change, and their writings 
provide insight into four different models: the institutional design model, the institutional adaptation 
model, the institutional diffusion model, and the collective action model. (The critical transitions 
framework emanates from the fourth model.) Each of the four models provides an internally 
consistent account of institutional change, but addresses different questions or aspects of change, and 
relies on a different generating mechanism to explain change (Hargrave and Van de Ven 2006: 866). 
Broadly speaking, these four models emerged in the order listed below. The institutional design model 
was favoured by theorists who regarded institutional change as the outcome of purposeful actions by 
individuals to maximise their own goals.30 The institutional adaptation model gave more 
consideration to the pressure that the institutional environmental itself exerts on individuals and 
organisations to reshape institutions. Hence, this second model is perhaps a more societal view than 
the institutional design one, which emphasised individualistic reasons for change.31  
 
Thirdly, the institutional diffusion model takes into account elements from both preceding models by 
considering how institutional arrangements are adopted and diffused amongst individuals and 
organisations. It also takes into account evolutionary process as well as formal and informal 
processes.32 The fourth construct, the collective action model, is a contemporary model that 
supplements and extends the other three (Hargrave and Van de Ven 2006: 868). Of the four models, 
the collective action model is the closest in spirit to the critical transitions framework, and best serves 
the purposes of this dissertation as a model for understanding institutional change. In fact, with the 
already discussed critical transition framework in mind, the initial part of the following outline of the 
collective action model narrative is rather familiar. The key differences and improvements made by 
Alston et al. (2016) that should be highlighted are that the critical transitions framework incorporated 
two key concepts: windows of opportunity, and leadership.  
 
Starting with the status quo institutional setup (earlier referred to as autopilot), the institutional 
scenario of the collective action model comprises networks of individuals, groups and organisations 
with a collective identity (beliefs) occupied with the drive for social change or social consistency. 
This network operates within a defined set of mobilising and political opportunity structures that 
determine how they can organise to generate change or maintain the status quo. In a democratic 
system, for example, this would be a representative government, while in a dictatorship this would 
be a small ruling elite. Indeed, there is scope for the structure to be that of a dominant network rather 
than a larger more representative group. The network’s beliefs are shaped by shared understandings 
and interpretations of what the world is, how this departs from desired outcomes, and what actions 
could be taken to achieve those outcomes. This is determined by a frame of reference of issues and 
technologies shaped by opposing actors (Hargrave and Van de Ven 2004: 277-278). These frames 
are seldom cut from the same piece of cloth and can involve available selections (e.g. from other 
countries) and domestic cultural issues (Hargrave and Van de Ven 2006: 870).  
 
This view of beliefs resonates with the notion that actual economic and political outcomes are not 
always congruent with everyone’s expected or desired outcomes. In the collective action model, the 
institutional frame at a given point in time (i.e. autopilot) represents a temporary settlement between 
opposing political coalitions within the network. Hargrave and Van de Ven (2004: 279) cited Schon 
                                                          
30 See, for example, Commons (1924 and 1950). 
31 See, for example, Scott (2001). 
32 See, for example, Kraatz and Moore (2002). For a much more detailed discussion on the first three models, see Hargrave 
and Van de Ven (2004: 264-277). 
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(1971) for elaborating on the process by means of which public policies emerge or change. This 
process includes a disruptive event (a shock, in the critical transitions framework) that triggers an 
appreciation for change and a reactive sequence of events. This creates an opportunity for networks 
to propel their ideas into the limelight for scrutiny and debate. Social movements play identical roles 
in reactive and proactive process models. The motivation for this role is to mobilise the resources 
needed to push and ride ideas into good currency, i.e. to win the battle over framing (Hargrave and 
Van de Ven 2004: 279). These ideas – either new of originating from the periphery – need to resonate 
at the highest political level. 
 
Social movements have to struggle with entrenched interests within ruling networks to shape 
institutions (Hargrave and Van de Ven 2004: 281). This requires mobilisation of structures towards 
a bottom-up approach to enacting change. Hargrave and Van de Ven (2006: 873) offered a segmented, 
polycentric, integrated network (SPIN) structure as an example, in which diverse and networked 
groups did not follow a single leader but instead were united by a shared ideology. For example, 
mobilising campaigns aimed at legitimising a social innovation require the support of stakeholders 
(e.g. consumers) who implement such changes to convince politicians. Only then will cognitive 
legitimacy transpire in terms of which the innovation or change is considered a valid, viable and 
useful institution. The network of decision-makers will only be adopted after such legitimacy is 
achieved and, if successful, the resulting institutions will hold for as long as the dominant network 
remained in power (Hargrave and Van de Ven 2006: 875-876). 
 
In spite of a shared foundation, the collective action model clearly deviates at some point from the 
critical transitions framework. While both contain essential elements of institutions, identity and 
beliefs, networks, and the outcomes of institutional change, Alston et al.'s (2016) critical transitions 
framework incorporated two key elements that the collective action model did not account for. These 
are windows of opportunity during which the beliefs of the dominant network are malleable, and the 
importance of a leader or leadership group in enacting top-down changed. Beliefs are made available 
to some extent during windows of opportunity, but little would happen unless someone seizes the 
opportunities. Leadership plays a role during these times (Alston et al. 2016: 15). Leaders are shaped 
in such situations by acting on problems facing their societies. This requires cognition of the problem, 
the ability to coordinate with others in the dominant network, and the moral authority to do so. In the 
critical transitions framework, the responsibility for change is in the hands of a person or persons in 
the dominant network.  
 
Windows of opportunity are defined as series of opportunities for change that could end in changes 
in the dominant core beliefs. It is during these periods that the dominant networks – collectives that 
do not appear to vary much in the above four models of institutional change – are altered by the entry 
or exit of actors. Alston et al. (2016: 176-177) stated that such injections of new blood and the culling 
of old bones alter the beliefs sets of dominant networks and can make them more or less receptive 
towards the desires of social movements (The word ‘less’ confirms that windows of opportunity do 
not necessarily lead to institutional change). Following shocks, reformed dominant networks could 
opt for different institutional setups that do not necessarily surrender to the lobbying of social 
movements – if they consider these inputs at all. The critical transitions framework accommodates 
the notion that institutional change is compatible with minimalist and elite-dominated networks, as 
confirmed by the experiences of some dictatorships, monarchies and autocracies.  
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There are undoubtedly many windows of opportunity, but it is the interaction between windows of 
opportunity, beliefs, and leadership that matters. Alston et al. (2016: 177) indicated that windows of 
opportunity are not always windows for change, and that it is the actions of certain individuals at 
precise moments that make a meaningful difference. The point is that leaders do not necessarily step 
up to the challenges when windows of opportunity open after the occurrence of shocks. In the case 
of Argentina, Alston et al. (2016: 204) treated the long period from 1946 to the present as one epoch 
within the critical transitions framework, because of the inability of the country’s leadership to 
complete and entrench the changes needed to effect a critical transition. When such a person does 
step up, the individual taking a leap of faith in the right direction can also be referred to as an 
‘institutional entrepreneur’. Some of the most dramatic and important institutional changes in history 
came about because of political entrepreneurs who eschewed reliance on established institutional 
mechanisms and successfully created new institutions (Greif 2006: 201-202). These leaders included 
Muhammad (who unified Arabia under Islam), Franklin Roosevelt (who created the US social 
security system) and Nelson Mandela (who helped end apartheid in South Africa). 
 
Ahlquist and Levi (2011: 2-4) provided a review of research on leadership in the fields of political 
science, economics, and management studies. They indicated that an emphasis on the importance of 
leadership can be traced as far back as the writings of Machiavelli (1532) and that the topic is now 
back in fashion amongst political scientists. While academic literature still lacks consensus about the 
characteristics of leaders and leadership, the authors argued that the apparent discordance is mostly a 
product of scholars’ attempts to appropriate the term for their own research purposes. Their review 
of the literature identified five characteristics of leadership that most scholars are likely to accept: (i) 
relational (leaders need followers), (ii) asymmetric (attention and information mainly flows in one 
direction), (iii) salient (attention and respect are commanded), (iv) domain-specific (a leader in one 
area can be a follower in another), and (v) instrumental (action is coordinated) (Ahlquist and Levi 
2011: 5).  
 
Alston et al. (2016: 193-199) underscored that the crucial role of leadership is the changing of beliefs 
of what economic and political outcomes should be, and for leaders to then enact institutional changes 
so that expected and actual outcomes are aligned. Also, leaders are required to work on institutional 
deepening if changes are to remain in place. They stated that recognising this role for leadership is a 
departure from the standard economic and political rational-choice models populated by 
representative agents. This suggests that members of dominant networks are no longer just agents 
representing median voters in countries, but that they have specific characteristics that make them 
leaders. While the collective action model is not an example of a rational choice model,33 it seems to 
suggest that dominant networks are tools used by social movements to get their desired institutions 
in place. This does not make room for unique leadership qualities and the ability to swoop in during 
windows of opportunity to make significant institutional changes.  
 
The critical transitions framework considered the foundation established by the collective action 
model and built upon this to create a more current framework for understanding institutional change 
by incorporating aspects of beliefs, leadership, and windows of opportunity. Alston et al. (2016: 186) 
found that leadership is a relatively absent concept in most frameworks of institutional change. By 
                                                          
33 Scott (2001) argued that rational choice would preclude participation in collective action, as the personal benefit derived 
from such action would be distributed to all members of a certain grouping, irrespective of membership. For example, 
joining a labour union where benefits of collective bargaining are shared amongst all workers in an industry irrespective 
of union membership creates a free rider problem. Rational individuals would have no incentive to join the union as 
benefits can be accrued without membership.  
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improving upon the collective action model, their critical transitions framework provides a more 
developed structure for understanding institutional change. It also enables deeper analysis of specific 
components of the framework, based on their requirements. This dissertation selected the critical 
transitions framework over alternative frameworks for understanding institutional change because it 
assigns a key role to leadership in processes of institutional change. 
 
2.5 Should case studies be used to understand institutional change? 
 
Alston et al. (2016) was a case study in institutional change. The use of case studies is not the norm 
in contemporary academic economic research as the method often delivers too specific results, instead 
of the more generalised findings required to formulate economic theories. This dissertation makes 
use of case studies for the exact reason that Alston (2008b: 103) also advocated their use: the method 
allows researchers to isolate the impact of a theoretical concept in a more detailed and potentially 
more compelling manner. Case studies enable analysis of determinants and consequences of 
institutions and institutional change. They also provide building blocks for understanding institutional 
change and for moving closer to consensus on institutional change. Given the lack of an all-inclusive 
theory of institutional change, case studies form building blocks for researchers to create more solid 
theoretical and empirical fundamentals for a theory of the dynamics of institutional change (Alston 
2008b: 104-105). The focus on Rwanda in this dissertation makes it an explanatory34 case study that 
explicates the ‘how’ and ‘why’, in order to provide a rich description of the change in the country, as 
demanded from case studies by John and Rule (2011: 8, 29). 
 
It is important to emphasise from the outset that neither qualitative nor quantitative approaches are 
inherently superior for understanding institutional change. After all, case studies are the bases of 
observance for enumerating data for quantitative research. A good example is a household census. 
While the quantification of households in a census provides a breadth of knowledge, individual case 
studies offer scope for much greater depth. Both dimensions are important for understanding complex 
social occurrences. Indeed, main purpose of case study research is to obtain in-depth understanding 
of particular instances of phenomena (Mabry 2009: 214).   
 
Thorough investigation of a particular phenomenon can uncover new sources of data that are useful 
for quantitative research, which sometimes reduces information to data and statistics (Mabry 2009: 
216). Another essential factor in qualitative research (and for institutional economists in particular) 
that can sometimes not be delivered by quantitative research is that cases often take different paths to 
reach similar destinations. The aim of many quantitative assessments is to obtain linear or other 
equations that fit set of data parameters, whereas qualitative assessments allow the generation of more 
than one equation. By focussing on one solution instead of multiple answers, the quantitative 
indicators are in essence disembodied and forced to yield a single result (Byrne 2009: 4).35  
 
                                                          
34 By contrast, the book by Alston et al. (2016) is an example of an ‘exploratory’ case study. While institutional change 
in Brazil was well researched, the critical transitions framework was a new theoretical construct for explaining such 
changes. The generation of new theory is one of the potential outcomes of an exploratory case study with the other being 
the debut analysis of a previously unexplored case. 
35 Byrne (2009: 4) emphasised that he and Ragin – co-editors of Byrne and Ragin (2009) – do not discard the value of 
quantitative research in itself but reject the utility of causal modelling based on disembodied variables.  
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NIE scholars acknowledge the important issue of ‘equifinality’, defined by Goertz and Mahoney 
(2009: 314) as the study of multiple causal paths to one outcome.36 The opportunity to understand 
multiple routes to a specific institutional setup should be advantageous to economists and political 
scientists given that reference was made before to the lack of a clear recipe for changing from 
unsustainable to sustainable institutions. For example, Moore (1966) identified three different routes 
to the modern world: (i) the capitalist democratic path (which produces parliamentary democracies), 
(ii) the capitalist-reactionary path (which creates fascist dictatorships), and (iii) the communist path 
(which results in communist dictatorships). Hicks, Misra, and Ng (1995) also found three separate 
paths to the establishment of a proto-welfare state.37 Equifinality, also referred to as multiple 
conjunctural causation or multiple causation, plays an important role in many qualitative scholars' 
thinking about causal relationships. In contrast, discussions of multiple causations are mostly absent 
in quantitative work. The word ‘equifinality’ does not form part of the methodological vocabulary of 
large-N quantitative research. This is because large-N quantitative analysis seeks to provide 
generalised findings about individual causal effects. Hence, this methodology speaks about the 
sample as a whole instead of particular cases (Goertz and Mahoney 2006: 236-237).  
 
Case studies are also particularly important for interdisciplinary studies at a time when social science 
is increasingly ‘post-disciplinary’, both in conceptualisation and in practical application (Byrne 2009: 
6). It seems fitting to use case studies in the context of institutional economics considering the 
multidisciplinary approach of NIE. Institutional economists adapt useful concepts and methods from 
political science, sociology, law, anthropology, cognitive science, evolutionary biology, and other 
disciplines. This helps economists explain the rules, norms and beliefs that govern human interactions 
(Menard and Shirley 2005: 2). For guidance on a checklist to validate the applicability of the critical 
transition framework to case study work, economists such as Meyer (2001) and social scientists who 
contributed to the books edited by Byrne and Ragin (2009), Alasuutari, Bickman and Brannen (2009), 
and John and Rule (2011) provide insight into the range of decisions relevant to case study design.  
 
While there are virtually no specific rules for constructing case studies, there are many useful 
strategies and insights available regarding good practice. This is both the strength and the weakness 
of the approach. It is a strength because it allows for tailoring of the design and data collection 
procedures to the research questions. On the other hand, the case study approach has resulted in many 
poor academic studies. This has left it open to criticism, especially from quantitative researchers 
(Cook and Campbell 1979). The fact that the case study is an open-ended design implies the need for 
a principled approach to key choices (Meyer 2001: 329). Using the critical transitions framework is 
already a step in the right direction given that case study methods allow for the use of conceptual 
frameworks in research. The following paragraphs refer to issues of casing, the number of units of 
analysis, the selection of cases, construct and internal validity, objectivity, inter-subjectivity, 
reliability, and generalisability. These concepts fall under the rubric of trustworthiness (Meyer 2001: 
344).  
 
                                                          
36 In his writings on general systems theory, Von Bertalanffy (1968) defined equifinality as the ability of an open system 
to reach the same final state from different initial conditions and in different ways. The concept of ‘multifinality’ refers 
to a system in which similar initial conditions and/or routing by different paths lead to dissimilar end-states. As such, it 
is the antithesis of equifinality. 
37 Several decades of research underscored that institutions are critical for economic development. However, this research 
also showed that there was no clear recipe for implementing institutional change towards producing better economic and 
political outcomes (Alston 2017: 354).  
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Casing – delimiting the case focal point – is an essential component of case studies. This requires 
identification of various dimensions of the bounded system that is a case study, namely the categorical 
(unit of analysis), spatial (geography), temporal (time and chronology) and thematic (the questions to 
be answered) (John and Rule 2011: 19-20). Making known the limits of the case study enables the 
reader to engage with the output in full knowledge of the boundaries. Researchers have to be upfront 
about these limits (Goertz and Mahoney 2009: 308). The limits for exploring Rwanda in further 
chapters are the focus on the country’s formal institutions within the confines of its present-day 
geography. This limitation identification is cognisant of Newbury’s (2009: 282) warning against 
treating African history as one of national units considering the sometimes fluid boundaries between 
states.  
 
However, unlike many African states that are currently demarcated by borders determined during the 
colonial period, Rwanda has essentially existed in its current form for at least five centuries (Turner 
2013: 12). This study of Rwanda covers the period from pre-history to the aftermath of the genocide. 
The focus on this long period is essential, because Rwanda’s ethnic makeup before colonisation and 
the various changes in ethnic dynamics during the colonial and post-independence periods were at 
the core of institutional change in the country over the past 100 years. Even the most recent regime 
change, which established the Kagame administration after the 1994 genocide, had its roots in ethnic 
issues more than a century old.  
 
Past economic and political outcomes therefore form an essential backdrop for any exploration of 
Rwanda's recent institutional dynamics. It should also be emphasised that Rwanda’s genocide during 
1994 will not be a focal point of this dissertation. Without diminishing the salience of the event,38 on 
which much has been written (see e.g. Prunier 1995, Klinghoffer 1998 and Straus 2006), the genocide 
was an element of a shock to the autopilot situation and is treated as such in the critical transitions 
framework.39 Lastly, there will be a limited focus on regional politics – such as conflict with the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC, the former Zaire) – beyond those factors that have 
influenced domestic institutions.   
 
John and Rule (2011: 95) indicated that the theory generated by other research is essential for 
formulating new research questions. When considering the established theory, Meyer (2001: 345) 
suggested adhering to construct validity when evidence suggests that the theoretical framework used 
in a case study corresponds with the subject matter at hand. This influences the legitimacy of the 
application. It was asserted that the process of institutional change in Brazil, which underpinned the 
critical transitions framework, and be generalised to those in African states as well. Remaining with 
matters of legitimacy, internal validity focuses on the legitimacy of the suggested relationships among 
different concepts (Meyer 2001: 346-347). More formally, it is the accuracy of data and the 
reasonableness and warranties of data-based interpretations (Mabry 2009: 221).  
 
Objectivity is a challenge for qualitative researchers because their sensitivity to specific subject matter 
is invaluable for illuminating small nuances that might not be observed in the absence of close 
personal attention. The term ‘case study’ suggests the objective and subjective aspects that constitute 
its meanings. The case is the object or unit under investigation while the ‘study’ points to the 
                                                          
38 While UN population data indicate that the Rwandan population decreased by 18.5% from 1990 to 1995 while the 
population of Cambodia fell by only 11% from 1975 to 1980, the former experienced a significant outflow of refugees 
that inflated the extent of the drop in the population (Diamond 2005: 313). 
39 For deeper insight into the pre-colonial history of Rwanda, see Newbury (2009). 
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subjective side of the enquiry. Thus, a case study is as much about the case as about the researcher. 
An epidemic (the object or unit) can be viewed from a medical, economic or educational perspective, 
for example, and the discourse (language) of the study will be different depending on the background 
of the researcher (John and Rule 2011: 5-7).  
 
A large volume of methodological literature on case studies focusses on the generalisability of this 
type of scholarship. Generalisability pertains to the appropriateness of transplanting the findings used 
for or yielded by one case to other case studies (Meyer 2001: 347). In the present context, the issue 
is the scope for generalising from Alston et al.'s (2016) narrative of Brazil to Rwanda. Put differently: 
generalisability pertains to the capacity of a case study to be informative about phenomena beyond 
the particular site (e.g. geography, population or time). Byrne (2009: 1) highlighted the importance 
of this feature by stating that the central project of any social science is the clarification of causes that 
extend beyond the unique specific instance. This accords with Amenta’s (2009: 356) view that the 
sole purpose of a case study is not just to understand other cases better. The motivation for 
undertaking a case study may be the assumption that the sample case is representative of a larger 
population and capable of yielding useful information about the larger grouping. However, Byrne 
(2009: 1) also warned against ‘universalisation’, which happens when the limits set to the extent of 
generalisation are too broad.  
 
Many social scientists believe that their methods may overwhelm the uniqueness of objects and events 
in the social world (Ragin 1992: 2). In case analysis, which is most often backward-looking in time 
(Kerper 1998: 356), the objects of investigation are considered similar enough to be treated as 
instances of the same broad historical phenomenon. This provides the basis for using methods of 
investigation as general theories for the analysis of similar objects. The generalisability of the critical 
transitions framework was evident in the Argentinian example offered by Alston et al. (2016: 199-
208) after their analysis of Brazil. The success of the application to Rwanda will further enhance the 
generalisability of the framework to the African context. There are also lessons to be learned when it 
is not possible to generalise a theory to a particular case. Atypical cases that provide unexpected 
results, or prove incompatible with a theory challenge and assist theorists in improving their 
hypotheses and postulations (Mabry 2009: 217). This is the key factor behind a review in Chapter 7 
of recent institutional change in Burundi. 
 
2.6 Conclusions 
 
Endeavouring to better understand institutional change is fundamental for progress in social sciences 
in general and economics in particular. There is, however, no consensus amongst social scientists 
about the best theoretical framework for analysing institutional change. This is partly attributable to 
the varied causes of institutional change, which include deliberate changes implemented at a given 
point in time as well as evolutionary changes in institutional design. Until the release of Alston et al.'s 
(2016) critical transitions framework, the collective action model was the most recent theoretical 
construct for analysing institutional change. However, Section 2.3 identified some shortcomings of 
this model and instead advocated the use of the critical transitions framework to explain the process 
of institutional change.  
 
The critical transitions framework incorporates the key role of leadership in moving a country from 
unsustainable to sustainable institutions. The framework starts with a so-called autopilot situation in 
which a dominant network in a country has created institutions that match their view of how the world 
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should work to generate their desired economic and political outcomes. Within this setting, a basket 
of institutions is periodically or continually adjusted at the margin but remains broadly intact and 
generates the economic and political outcomes desired by the political elite. Institutional change is 
set in motion in this framework by a shock that causes a deviation between expected and actual 
economic and political outcomes. This affects the composition of the dominant network as well as 
the members' beliefs about the how the world works and what institutions should be in place to reach 
their desired outcomes.  
 
It is in this state of flux in beliefs that opportunities arise for leadership by an established or new 
member of the dominant network. Depending on the ability to perceive a window of opportunity for 
change and to harness the resources to do so, this leader can set the institutional setup on a path 
towards change by readjusting the dominant network’s beliefs about how the world works. This will 
kick-start a top-down process of adjustments to constitutional-level rules followed by changes to other 
laws and enforcement mechanisms. In combination, the adjusted beliefs and reworked institutional 
matrix will produce new economic and political outcomes that are re-aligned with the dominant 
network’s beliefs. If this process is successful, the country will return to a new equilibrium (autopilot) 
situation in which institutions are enforced and reformed at the margin to deepen the status quo.  
 
Section 2.4 explained that institutional economists seldom use narrative-based case studies to enhance 
their understanding of institutional change. However, it also argued that such in-depth investigations 
of specific subjects or events are highly valuable and able to yield information that would have 
remained hidden if only econometric techniques were used. Various criteria (e.g. generalisability and 
objectivity) should be satisfied when undertaking a case study anchored in a theoretical framework. 
Section 2.4 also explained how this study meets these requirements.  
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CHAPTER 3: A HISTORY OF INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN RWANDA 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Alston et al.'s (2016) critical transitions framework is a relatively new tool for sketching a narrative 
of institutional change, based on the experiences of Brazil and Argentina. Former European colonies 
(such as Brazil, Argentina and Rwanda) have for some time been hotbeds for research on institutions 
and institutional change. Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001), for example, produced one of the 
most referenced economic papers over the past two decades40 in which they showed that mortality 
rates in former colonies were driving forces behind the creation of different institutions. Regression 
results revealed a positive relationship between mortality rates amongst European clergy and armed 
forces stationed in the colonies between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries, and the likelihood 
that colonisers established extractive institutions. They argued that these institutions endowed elites 
with unconstrained power and created incentives for infighting to control this power. Acemoglu and 
Robinson (2013: 344) listed 15 African countries – including Rwanda and Burundi – in which these 
power struggles resulted in bloody civil wars, economic ruin and state failure during the 20th century. 
 
Power struggles, violence and ethnic nationalism have for centuries been at the centre of regime 
changes in Rwanda (Straus 2006: 182). In contrast, the period after the genocide in Rwanda has been 
one of the most impressive examples of post-conflict reconstruction in history as the Kagame 
government reformed the country’s economy and politics. It is essential to understand the country’s 
experience of institutional change to understand the current institutional trajectory. “History matters. 
It matters not just because we can learn from the past, but because the present and the future were 
connected to the past. Today’s and tomorrow’s choices were shaped by the past” (North 1990: vii). 
The dynamics that brought about the changes since 1994 have been present and influential in Rwanda 
for centuries, and the future of the country is rooted in this past.  
 
To enhance understanding of Rwanda's current institutions, this chapter applies the critical transitions 
framework to identify five institutional epochs in the country's history:  
 
 The so-called Golden Era, which stretched from the country’s pre-history under successive 
kings until the arrival of the Germans in the late 1890s and the start of colonial rule.  
 The Colonial era, which stretched from the beginning of German rule in 1896 and continued 
through Belgian rule (which began in 1922) to the country’s independence in 1961. 
 The First Republic under Gregoire Kayibanda that lasted from 1961 until 1973. 
 The Second Republic under military leader Juvenal Habyarimana from 1973 until 1994. 
 The Kagame regime from 1994 to date.41 
 
The following five sections (3.2–3.6) contain narratives of each epoch in Rwanda. As per the elements 
of the critical transitions framework, these include information on the dominant network and their 
beliefs, constitutional-level institutions and laws and enforcement mechanisms to administer these, 
economic and political outcomes of these settings, as well as the incremental changes that sustained 
these setups. In this dissertation, the narrative of each epoch is not initiated with a discussion of the 
                                                          
40 As of February 2019, the article had been cited more than 12,000 times since its release in December 2001. 
41 To put this in context, Alston et al. (2016) identified four epochs in Brazil since the 1960s and three in Argentina since 
1912. There is no rule of thumb about the average length of an epoch.  
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dominant network, though. Because the primary focus of this dissertation is on institutional and 
economic issues, the starting points for each narrative are Rwanda’s economic and political outcomes 
in the autopilot situation, with a broader focus on economic factors. As indicated in Section 1.1, 
economic and political institutions shape economic and political outcomes by determining incentives 
and constraints for individuals, organisations and the polity (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2005: 
402). Economic outcomes are products of economic institutions that, in turn, are determined by 
political institutions (Acemoglu and Robinson 2013: 43).  
 
Following this change to the standard layout of applications of the critical transitions framework, the 
content of Sections 3.2-3.6 is structured around the following nine elements: 
 
A) Economic and political outcomes 
B) Dominant network 
C) Beliefs 
D) Constitutional-level institutions  
E) Laws and enforcement 
F) Incremental changes 
G) Shock 
H) Deviated economic and political outcomes 
I) Window of opportunity 
 
Each of the narratives first determines the nature of the country’s economics and politics during the 
period in question and then uses political and institutional perspectives to explain how this came to 
be. In accordance with Figure 2.2, each new epoch starts once a leader has taken the necessary steps 
to reform the dominant network and initiate a process of institutional change. The consistent use of 
the nine elements listed above serves several goals. These include: 
 Verifying the generalisability of the critical transitions framework to geographic settings other 
than Brazil and Argentina 
 Identifying the key factors associated with the country’s economic development over time, as 
summarised in Table 3.1 
 Highlighting the contrast between outcomes in the post-genocide period and the agriculture-
dominated economic outcomes in earlier periods 
 Confirming the core elements of the critical transitions framework that serve as theoretical 
underpinnings for the hypotheses in Section 5.2. 
 
Table 3.1 summarises the key factors that influenced economic development in Rwanda during the 
identified periods of institutional change. The synopsis provides a broad picture of the historical 
trends that shaped the Rwandan economy, but also introduces the detailed analysis in Sections 3.2–
3.6.  
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Table 3.1: Rwanda’s development across five epochs of institutional change 
 
 
Golden Era (pre-
history to 1894) 
Colonial Period 
(1894-1961) 
First Republic 
(1961-1973) 
Second Republic 
(1973-1994) 
Post-Genocide 
Rebuilding (1994 
to present) 
Economic and 
political 
outcomes 
Subsistence 
agriculture; 
Tutsi-headed 
clientage system 
Subsistence 
agriculture and 
the introduction 
of cash crops; 
clientage system 
phased out 
Subsistence 
agriculture and a 
greater focus on 
cash crops; Hutu-
controlled 
government 
Subsistence 
agriculture and 
cash crops 
(especially coffee 
and tea); highly 
centralised 
government 
Modernisation of 
farming and 
reduced 
economic 
dependence on 
agriculture; 
decentralised 
government 
administration 
Dominant 
network 
Nyiginya 
monarchy 
controlled Tutsi-
led state, all 
education 
informal 
Bakagaga 
monarchy and 
indirect rule from 
Germany and 
Belgium 
controlled Tutsi-
led state, 
Catholic Church 
controlled 
religion and 
education 
PARMEHUTU 
headed 
independent 
Hutu-led 
government, 
Catholic Church 
controlled 
religion and 
education 
MRND headed 
one-party 
government, 
Catholic Church 
controlled 
religion and 
education 
RPF leading a 
consociational 
government, 
education 
managed by 
national 
government 
Beliefs 
Kingship used to 
control Hutu 
majority to 
protect Tutsi 
minority 
Indirect colonial 
rule reinforced 
Tutsi rule over 
Hutu 
Hutu rule over 
Tutsi; church 
separated from 
state 
Government 
legitimacy by 
empowering 
Hutu to farm for 
subsistence and 
cash 
Non-ethnic ethos 
promoting 
economic 
development and 
agricultural 
modernisation 
Constitutional-
level 
institutions 
No formal 
constitution, 
ubuhake 
agricultural 
system controlled 
access to cattle 
and social 
mobility 
No formal 
constitution, 
indirect 
European rule; 
rules based on 
agriculture-based 
society 
First formal 
constitution 
adopted in 1962 
put limits on 
certain human 
rights; influence 
of Catholic 
Church still quite 
visible 
31 articles of 
1962 constitution 
suspended; 
pressure on 
freedom of 
expression, 
labour rights; 
new constitutions 
adopted in 1978 
and 1991 with 
limited 
improvement 
New constitution 
adopted in 1995 
provided legal 
and practical 
framework for 
new political 
landscape 
Laws and 
enforcement 
Chiefs managed 
day-to-day 
processes; non-
permanent 
Gacaca 
community 
courts used to 
resolve disputes 
Traditional law 
remained most 
important, 
colonial law only 
used in 
exceptional 
cases; Gacaca 
courts became 
more frequent 
and formalised 
Gacaca courts 
developed into 
extensive 
administrative 
system 
supporting 
formal judicial 
system 
Gacaca courts 
increasingly 
integrated into 
the formal 
judicial system 
Old-style Gacaca 
courts used to 
deal with most 
genocide crimes, 
rule of law 
entrenched in the 
formal judiciary 
Source: Information in Sections 3.2-3.6 
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Table 3.1 shows that agriculture dominated the Rwandan economy for most of its history. Some 97% 
of Rwandans were employed in agriculture during the pre-colonial period and this portion had 
dropped only marginally to 95% at the time of independence (see Figure 3.1).42 Agriculture, forestry 
and fishing accounted for 68.4% of GDP in 1959 (own calculations based on Leurquin 1963: 65). It 
was only in the 1990s that agricultural employment dropped below 90% of total employment. The 
importance of agriculture as a source of value added and jobs declined notably in the new millennium. 
Agricultural employment accounted for less than 80% of jobs by 2010, while farming activity 
accounted for only 30% of GDP. In that year, the most significant components of non-agricultural 
employment were wholesale and retail trade (21.6%), construction (15%) and manufacturing (11.6%) 
(National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda [NSIR] 2014: 50). This represented a notable change in 
economic outcomes in the country after the genocide. 
 
Figure 3.1: Trends in agricultural employment and urbanisation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: Belgian House of Representatives (1925: 14), Griffiths (1993: 122), Sahinkuye (2000: 19) 
Zahorik (2011: 159), NISR (2012: 41), Government of Rwanda (2015a: 5) 
 
Hence, it is unsurprising that urbanisation rates were meagre for much of Rwanda's history. Families 
traditionally lived in isolation and urbanisation is a recent phenomenon. Figure 3.1 shows that this 
only changed during the second half of the colonial period when the first planned settlements were 
introduced and administrative posts evolved into urban areas (Government of Rwanda 2015a: 5). 
Only 2.6% of the population lived in urban areas by the time of independence. This number was so 
small that Leurquin (1963: 48) stated soon after independence that there were no villages in the 
country and that the population was scattered throughout the countryside. Attempts during the latter 
(Belgian) part of the colonial period to create settlements to improve public service provision were 
met with reluctance by Rwandans (Leurquin 1963: 64). Urbanisation did not accelerate until after the 
genocide, and by 2010 nearly a quarter of the population lived in towns and cities. 
                                                          
42 It was almost impossible to conduct a census in Rwanda before the early 1920s because skilled personnel were not 
available and other acute priorities dominated. Population statistics became more precise from the 1940s as church records 
provided information about demographic changes (Zahorik 2011: 158-159). However, information about employment 
remained very limited. For example, the number of people employed in agriculture was not officially recorded until after 
independence. Records for earlier years simply showed the numbers of people residing in urban areas and under chiefs in 
rural areas. This reflected the minor role of non-agricultural, private sector employment in the country during the colonial 
period. Statisticians had little reason to track this small number of jobs. 
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3.2 The Golden Era: pre-history to 1894 
 
The Twa (a pygmy race), who were the original inhabitants of Ruanda43, thrived as hunter-gatherers 
in wooded areas in the west of the region. The Hutu44 arrived during the 5th century in a Bantu 
expansion to the Great Lakes area from the savannahs of present-day Cameroon (Sellstrom and 
Wohlgemuth 1997: 21). Hutu focussed on small-scale crop cultivation and small animal husbandry 
and cleared the forests to cultivate the land. Some authors stated that the two groups coexisted in 
relative peace, while others (e.g. Pottier 2002: 12) suggested that the deforestation by the Hutu 
confined the Twa to areas much smaller than they were used to previously.45  
 
The pastoralist Tutsi probably arrived from the north and east during the 15th century. Their arrival 
was described by some as an invasion, and Overdulve (1995: 3) suggested that it became increasingly 
military-like from the 16th century onwards. By contrast, many historians such as Gearon (2004: 
1296) referred to sporadic waves of arrivals over several generations, and Reader (1998: 611) argued 
that these were in fact peaceful migrations. This included, for example, the arrival of a group of exiled 
Tutsi following a revolt “several hundred years ago” at the court of Bunyoro in Uganda (Leurquin 
1963: 47). In part due to the orderly assimilation suggested by most sources and probably also in line 
with the theory of relatively peaceful co-existence, the groupings were not territorially segregated 
during the Middle Ages, and the Tutsi readily adopted the Hutu language and cultural traits 
(Klinghoffer 1998: 6). However, the Tutsi, who held pastoralist cultural values largely excluded the 
Hutu from their political structures on account of their agriculturalist values (Newbury 2009: 209). 
 
A) Economic and political outcomes 
 
By the 16th century, a Tutsi monarchy had taken power in Ruanda – their military forces were superior 
to that of the incumbents – with select Hutu chiefs in tow. Nonetheless, Hutu were allowed to join 
the ruling ranks and become Tutsi themselves through marriage, military promotion or upward 
economic mobility. By the 17th century, the distinction between Tutsi and Hutu had little to do with 
ethnicity and increasingly centred on economic and social status: in short, rulers were Tutsi, and 
peasants were Hutu (Gearon 2004: 1296). At that stage, kin-based units (clans) included people of 
different ethnicities (Newbury 2009: 189). The distinction between Hutu and Tutsi evolved in a 
complex manner that reflected elements of ethnicity, lineage, clan, and socio-economic status, all of 
which coalesced in differing ways in different parts of the Ruandan kings' territory (Jones 1999: 57).46  
 
The agricultural organisation that accompanied this socio-political structure was a clientage system 
reminiscent of feudal Europe. The Tutsi elite (shebuya, or lords) granted land and cattle to Hutu 
(umugaragu, or clients) who were indentured to them for (in kind) taxes, farm labour, military service 
                                                          
43 The area now known as Rwanda was for centuries designated as Ruanda. The spelling of the country’s name was 
officially changed to Rwanda at independence on 1 July 1962. Hence, Sections 3.2 and 3.3 refer to Ruanda, while Sections 
3.4 to 3.6 and all other parts of this dissertation) refer to the sovereign country of Rwanda.  
44 The plural forms of the country’s ethnic names are not governed by fixed rules. Following the recommendations of 
Kinzer (2008: xi), this dissertation uses the more common forms "Twa", "Hutu" and "Tutsi", without placing an ‘s’ at the 
end.  
45 Knowledge of earlier phases of Hutu civilisation is limited, because the arrival of the Tutsi all but erased it from living 
memory (Sahinkuye 2000: 10). This is one of the reasons for the claim that social and economic factors (rather than 
genetic ones) were the original basis for the differentiation of Hutu and Tutsi (Diamond 2005: 318). 
46 A more detailed discussion of the various theories about the relationship between the Hutu and the Tutsi falls outside 
the scope of this dissertation. The explanation provided here and subsequent references to ethnic factors – for example, 
Footnote 64 - serve to emphasise the complex and long-standing nature of ethnic issues in Rwanda.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
37 
 
(Stoecker 1986: 95), and the sharing of calves born from these cattle (Sahinkuye 2000: 22). The Hutu, 
who were pastoralists before the arrival of the Tutsi, were impressed with the quality of Tutsi cattle 
and preferred these animals to their historical stock (Newbury 2009: 294). Hutu were allowed to stay 
on parcels of land claimed by the mwami (king) as part of the uburetwa labour service arrangement. 
This system required farmers to work for the state on one or two out of every five days of the 
Ruandese calendar. In turn, the landlords were responsible for providing governance and military 
support (Pottier 2002: 13).  
 
What differed from the European feudal system was that the peasants – cattle raising Hutu – attained 
the ability to build wealth and secure upward social and economic mobility (Stilwell 2002: 18). This 
was referred to as being ‘dehutucised’ and then ‘tutsified’ (Sahinkuye 2000: 22). Some authors 
suggest that mobility was common (e.g. Newbury 1988: 11) and that it was also possible for Tutsi to 
move down into the ranks of the Hutu if they lost their cattle (Dowden 2008: 228). The ubuhake 
agricultural system was inherited by the next generation and was firmly established in Ruandese 
culture by the start of the 19th century (Gearon 2004: 1296).47 This pre-colonial economic and political 
scenario, which post-genocide leaders view as “something of a golden era, a state of so-called 
harmony” (Pottier 2002: 9), is identified here as the base autopilot situation. 
 
B) Dominant network 
 
By the start of the 19th century, the Great Lakes region had six large states: Ankole, Buganda, 
Bunyoro, Karagwe, Ruanda and Urundi,48 each with a population of half a million or more. Kings 
and elaborate hierarchies ruled these territories (Atmore and Oliver 1994: 21).49 The Nyiginya clan 
established themselves – by diplomacy and conflict – as a key element of Ruanda’s dominant network 
and exercised power in local politics for several centuries. The clan was initially a Tutsi grouping but 
later contained Hutu as well (Jones 2001: 18). Their authority extended beyond the country’s current 
borders50 in the early 19th century but varied across time (De Lame 2004: 1297-1298). By the early 
19th century, a centralised Nyiginya polity within a hierarchical society governed Ruanda. The 
centralised political and administrative structures ensured that the royal court could transfer its 
influence down to the lowest levels of society (Coupez and d’Hertefelt 2009: 233, 235) and 
maintained Tutsi loyalty by supporting the agricultural clientage system. The maturing domestic 
political scene in Ruanda, as well as the neighbouring Urundi, Buganda and Bunyoro, enabled these 
states to grow their administrative reach and economic prowess by wars of expansion. This enabled 
them to expand trading activities into networks centred on Lake Kivu and the shores of Lake Victoria 
(Cohen 2003: 102). 
 
 
 
                                                          
47 While it is correct to state that an ubuhake arrangement was a voluntary choice for the Hutu, it is important to note that 
the system was embedded in Ruandan culture.   
48 Ankole and Bunyoro are today located in south-western and western Uganda, respectively. Karagwe is one of six 
districts in the Kagera region of Tanzania. Urundi was the pre-independence name of present-day Burundi.  
49 The Great Lakes states had remained largely isolated from outside influence up until the 19th century. Over the course 
of several centuries, the territories evolved from clan-based societies into sizeable monarchies. Each of the kingdoms 
were ruled by elaborate hierarchies and exhibited high levels of cohesion, with subjects sharing common languages and 
religious traditions. In the highland states of Ankole, Ruanda and Urundi, cattle farming was the focal point of society 
(Meredith 2014: 290).    
50 Unlike many African states that are currently demarcated by borders determined during the colonial period, Rwanda 
and Burundi have existed largely in their current forms for at least five centuries (Turner 2013: 12).  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
38 
 
C) Beliefs 
 
Due to a large population imbalance in favour of the Hutu, the minority Tutsi always felt threatened 
unless they were able to rule society. Any representative system of rule (e.g. democracy) would have 
relegated the Tutsi to a subordinate position. As a result, the Tutsi went to great lengths to dominate 
the majority Hutu (Arnold 2005: 281). Kingship in this Ruandese context was thus less about divine 
right to rule and ancestral heritage and more about the ability to achieve self-security and mediate 
between the needs of various groupings (Coupez and d’Hertefelt 2009: 229-230). Based on their 
analysis of the Umuganura ritual,51 Coupez and d’Hertefelt (2009: 235-238) explained that ecology, 
technology, culture and society were central to Ruandese and in particular Tutsi beliefs, and that the 
kingship mediated between these elements. Myth and legend, which grounded kings' roles as 
mediators among nature, culture and his people, tell that early monarchs provided food and fire to 
people of the land. The Umuganura ritual reinforced this practical relationship between the kingship 
and other Ruandans and underplayed the supreme importance of the king compared to what can 
generally be expected from royal rituals.52 The dominant network used the ritual to reinforce on an 
annual basis the notion that the kingship plays a coordinating role between his people and nature.  
 
D) Constitutional-level institutions 
 
The members of the dominant network could not keep their privileges intact without exclusive control 
over the power that granted such prestige. In Ruanda, the basis of social power and prestige – and 
therefore the ability to mediate – was the effective management of cattle. The feudal-like system 
allowed the Tutsi to keep complete control of all Ruandan cattle, because a Tutsi lord could confiscate 
a Hutu client’s livestock under any pretence. Moreover, outside the ubuhake structure, the king had 
the pre-eminent right to all Ruandan cattle. This perpetuated the notion that not all Ruandans were 
born equal (Sahinkuye 2000: 30). The clientship structure was an essential element of social cohesion 
and organisation, thus necessitating the need for the ubuhake (Maquet 1962: 138, 150). Another 
important factor in maintaining the ubuhake was the preservation of control from one generation to 
the next. These structures are grouped under the sphere of constitutional-level institutions, as they 
were the overarching framework determining societal incentives that enabled Tutsi to monopolise 
social and political power for several centuries. As was the case in many African societies at the time, 
there was no formal constitution in Ruanda.53  
 
There was no formal education system either (Hilker 2010: 4). Education forms part of the 
constitutional-level institutions in a society, because teaching fundamentally influences incentives 
and decision-making. Education is the process of deliberately forming the minds and characters of 
                                                          
51 Coupez and d’Hertefelt (2009: 229-251) analysed the rituals surrounding the First Fruits ceremony (ritual VIII in the 
Ubwiiru code) that comprises 18 separate but interrelated rites. Spaced throughout the year, the rituals culminate during 
the time of the sorghum harvest in February and March. It counted amongst the most important social and ritualistic 
events in the kingdom, and Coupez and d’Hertefelt (2009: 234) pointed out that the ceremony “touches on very broad 
questions pertaining to the nature of [Ruandese] society in general.”   
52 By contrast, the Hutu kings who governed small areas before the arrival of the Tutsi were absolutist. The institution of 
kingship was the focal point of politics, religion, legal and economic activity (Sahinkuye 2000: 13).   
53 Uncodified institutions can act as constitutional-level institutions. In essence, constitutions are the highest norms, laws 
and standards within a jurisdiction, and in pre-colonial Africa these unwritten hierarchies were undocumented products 
of political engagement within the dominant network. Institutions do not necessarily gain gravitas from formalisation as 
such. The United Kingdom, for example, still did not have a codified constitution at the start of the current millennium, 
but was considered to have had an unwritten constitution vested in peoples’ consciousness and contained within their 
established customs, conventions and practices (Gutto 2003: 2). 
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individuals by transmitting accumulated knowledge, skills, and values from one generation to the 
next.54 In pre-colonial Ruanda, education was informal in nature: village and family elders taught 
children moral and social values through stories, dance and other methods (Mafeza 2013: 2). This 
included the rituals surrounding the First Fruits ceremony, as outlined in Footnote 51.  
 
E) Laws and enforcement 
 
Effective control over a feudal-like society required the ability to extract resources (e.g. the taxes or 
calves due to the shebuya) and to regulate social relationships. This required laws and enforcement 
mechanisms to ensure social control. Indicators of social control include compliance in the form of 
desired behaviour, participation in actions allowed by the institutional setting, and acceptance of the 
legitimacy of the controller. In the case of Ruanda, the king employed a complex pyramid of political, 
cultural and economic relationships, with these three factors enmeshed. Each district – centred on a 
hill – was assigned chiefs to manage extraction and control.55 The chiefs had various tasks: Sahinkuye 
(2000: 23-25) identified chiefs of land holdings, pastures and the army; Musoni (2004: 61) identified 
pasture, agriculture, military and hunting; and Dowden (2009: 229) identified chiefs of family 
matters, land disputes, and cattle management. More than 95% of these positions, which could be 
unified into one function (Zahorik 2012: 134), were held by Tutsi. Farming-related institutions are 
the primary concerns here in view of the overwhelmingly agrarian nature of the Ruandese economy. 
 
The Gacaca56 system of community courts was not a permanent feature of the judicial process in the 
pre-colonial period. Their application was limited to ad hoc assemblies that dealt with intra- or inter-
family disputes or conflict in rural areas. The courts were based on unwritten laws and norms, and 
were administered by male household heads (women were only allowed as claimants and defendants). 
The aim of sanctioning a wrongdoer was reconciliation rather than punishment; hence, harsh 
sentences such as imprisonment were never imposed. Instead, appointed judges sought to remind 
transgressors of the societal view that membership of communities defines individuals. A guilty 
party’s sanction would include restitution and restorative processes to enable the transgressor to 
regain his or her place in the community. Ideally, defendants would admit their mistakes to elders at 
the start of a Gacaca sitting. At the end of the 19th century, the Gacaca system was the main process 
to ensure social order in communities across Ruanda by dealing with uncomplicated cases involving 
livestock, damage to property, marriage and inheritance (Clark 2010: 51-53).  
 
F) Incremental changes 
 
The constitutional-level institutions, laws and enforcement mechanisms, as well as the 
abovementioned incremental changes implemented to the latter two, shaped the economic and 
political outcomes enjoyed by the elite. That an estimated 96% of pre-colonial Ruandans were 
peasants dependent on subsistence farming suggests that the desired economic outcome of riches for 
a select few was indeed achieved (Sahinkuye 2000: 19). The Tutsi clan enjoyed a gracious living that 
matched their social standing. Their success signalled a surplus generated by fruitful mediation 
between ecology, technology, culture and society. The broader Tutsi kingship desired a continuance 
of their dominance, and the longevity of their rule can be interpreted as a successful political outcome 
                                                          
54 These elements align with empirical researchers, preferred definition of culture, as highlighted in Section 2.2.4.  
55 Rwanda is often called ‘The Land of a Thousand Hills’. 
56 Derived from the Kinyarwanda word for ‘grass’ or ‘lawn’ to reflect the outdoor setting of most of these hearings (Clark 
2009: 247). 
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(Sadin 1976: 37). While Newbury (2009: 252-276) raised questions over the quality of the available 
chronological details about the kingship, it is indisputable that the Nyiginya dynasty held on to power 
for more than a hundred years.57 This era lasted until the end of King Rwogera's reign in the middle 
of the 1800s, when 87% of the population were Hutu, 12.5% Tutsi, and 0.5% Twa.  
 
The renowned warrior king Rwabugiri, who ruled until his death in 1895, succeeded King Rwogera. 
Under Rwabugiri, the ubuhake system began to show its faults ever more clearly. He was a strict and 
sometimes draconian ruler who used his military might to enforce the country’s feudal structures. 
During his reign, the Tutsi had to work harder and harder to remain in power due to growing resistance 
from peasants. As a result, the dominant network incrementally placed more extractive pressure on 
the bondage structure of the economy to subdue the restive Hutu. Towards the end of the 19th century 
the vast majority of Hutu peasants, if not all of them, had to sell their labour. Animosity between 
landlords also manifested in growing conflict among Tutsi families. They were faced with widening 
inequality within their domains as epidemics turned pastoralist Tutsi into cropping Hutu. There were 
also instances of Hutu slave capture to service the demand of non-African merchants on the country’s 
doorstep (Sahinkuye 2000: 21).58 In an example of incremental change necessary to fund the growing 
political costs of remaining within the dominant network, land, labour and cattle “were increasingly 
being used by the ruling [Tutsi] class to tighten their grip on [Hutu] farming lineages” (De Lame 
2004: 1298). Formerly compliant Hutu were also increasingly resisting the excessive demands of the 
royals and moved residence to smaller towns, some of which even built up defences (Cohen 2003: 
110).  
 
G) Shock – deviated outcomes 
 
By the 1890s the favourable economic and political outcomes associated with the mid-century might 
of the Nyiginya clan were fracturing. The golden era (autopilot) period detailed above came to an end 
in the mid-1890s when a combination of endogenous and exogenous events over a three-year period 
shocked the dominant network. These included: 
 
 The sudden death from illness of Rwabugiri (the longest reigning mwami in at least 500 years) 
in 1894 
 The assassination of his chosen successor Rutarindwa in 1896 
 The crowning of the youthful king Musinga, who was not a Nyiginya, during the same year 
 The arrival of the German colonisers in 1896 
 
These factors, combined with famine, rinderpest and other epidemics (Reader 1998: 611), exercised 
a profound shock on the kingship towards the turn of the century and opened a window of opportunity 
for change.  
 
                                                          
57 Overdulve (1995) divided the pre-colonial monarchical era into two main periods: the period of Tutsi military expansion 
(1350-1800) and the period of socio-political strengthening under the Nyiginya dynasty (after 1800). The latter period is 
said to have been the start of gradually increasing ethnic tension between the Hutu and Tutsi due to the growing military 
power and land ownership of the Tutsi aligned to the royal family. These two paradigms are treated as one institutional 
epoch as the dominant network was relatively stable during the two periods.  
58 Compared to other kingdoms in the region, Ruanda and Urundi held out for a long time against intrusions from outside 
the Great Lakes area. Ruanda and Urundi withstood the military aggression of neighbouring states even when the latter 
acquired firearms through trade (Kimambo 2003: 94). Outside influence in the period from 1800 to 1884 came mainly 
from Swahili, Arab, Turkish and Egyptian cultures, and not from Europe (Atmore and Oliver 1994: 21).  
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H) Window of opportunity for leadership 
 
The kingship in many interlacustrine countries did not have a precise system of succession or heirs 
apparent, and Rwabugiri designated his son Rutarindwa as successor some six years before his death 
(Reid 2009: 52). The royal court understood that Rwabugiri wanted an orderly transfer of power to 
keep the dominant network functioning as before, but also wanted to avoid the crowning of an 
underage successor. Hence, the succession process was set in motion with the anointment of 
Rutarindwa, who was in his mid-twenties at the time, as co-regnant alongside his father in 1889. 
However, while male kings were the norm in Ruanda, royal succession was related to matrilineal 
factors. Rutarindwa's mother died by execution before his crowning, and Rwabugiri appointed his 
favourite wife Kanjogera (of the Bega clan’s Bakagaga lineage) as his adoptive mother. Rwabugiri 
ignored the rule that ‘substitute mothers’ were not supposed to have sons of their own who were 
eligible to rule: queen-mother-in-waiting Kanjogera desired that her own son Musinga should wear 
the crown (Des Forges 2011: 14-15).  
 
By the end of the 19th century, a period marred by increasing violence against the populace and 
anarchy in the royal court, rivalries between powerful factions within the dominant network 
culminated in a coup d’état (De Lame 2004: 1298). One of the notables charged with the king’s 
protection, military commander Bisangwa, was killed in a skirmish with German troops, and the 
Bakagaga siblings took the opportunity to eliminate the other two notables, Mugugu and Sehene, late 
in 1896. Rutarindwa was vulnerable to attack when he moved the royal court to Rucunshu in 
Marangara. During the construction of his new residence, and while staying in a modest house, the 
king was attacked by forces loyal to Kanjogera. The monarch’s forces were outnumbered and soon 
deserted him, leaving the king and his loyal followers to commit suicide (Des Forges 2011: 15-17). 
Rwabugiri’s expectations of a peaceful succession failed. Reality had deviated sharply from the 
dominant network’s expectations of the country’s future political outcomes. Rutarindwa ruled for less 
than a year, and the coup d’état that resulted in his suicide left no apparent heir.  
 
3.3 The Colonial Period: 1894-1961 
 
Ruanda was a European colony for more than six decades. At the Berlin Conference in the mid-1880s, 
the country was declared a part of the German sphere of influence in East Africa. With no haste to 
explore an area and kingship that Germans only had vague information on, the first official contact 
between Germany and the small state occurred fully ten years after the conference. Berlin maintained 
limited involvement in Ruanda’s affairs and implemented indirect rule via the local Tutsi government. 
Belgium assumed control of Ruanda’s administration after the First World War and maintained a 
similar indirect administration of the country. It was only from the late 1920s that the Belgians 
became more involved in Ruandan economic and political affairs. The Belgian authorities were 
aligned with the ruling Tutsi and widened the division between the Hutu and the Tutsi. Brussels 
further increased its control over Ruanda during the 1930s and 1940, and it was only in the late 1950s 
that the organisation of local political parties along ethnic lines threatened to destabilise the dominant 
network. Not long after, in 1961, Ruanda gained independence from Belgium.  
 
A) Economic and political outcomes 
 
The subsistence farming and barter economy of the pre-colonial period started transforming into a 
cash economy during the colonial period, and only the most isolated individuals could escape the 
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need to earn money (Reader 1998: 615).59 For the most part, the old agricultural clientship system 
became obsolete during the period (Klein-Arendt 2004: 1299), and laws limited the services that 
could be claimed by landlords. Especially from 1945 onwards, the authorities moved to suppress 
ubuhake contracts. By 1959, some 21,000 contracts that covered approximately 210,000 head of cattle 
– about a third of the livestock of Ruanda – had been dissolved. Nonetheless, as indicated in Figure 
3.1, farming remained the dominant occupation, with 95% of workers employed in agriculture by the 
time of independence. Crop cultivation techniques remained simple, with only the simplest tools used, 
virtually no usage of draft animals, and limited reliance on irrigation (Leurquin 1963: 62, 76). 
Belgium supported the farming economy with agricultural research stations and support services 
(Leurquin 1963: 48). This enabled a notable rise in crop yields (except potatoes) towards the end of 
the colonial period, as shown in Table 3.2. 
 
Table 3.2: Crop yields in selected years (kg per hectare) 
 
Crop 1940 1959 Percentage change 
Sorghum 990 1,200 +21.2 
Eleusine (goose grass) 475 600 +26.3 
Bea 500 750 +50.0 
Peas 587 800 +36.3 
Sweet potatoes 6,190 7,500 +21.2 
Cassava 6,500 13,000 +100.0 
Potatoes 7,855 7,000 -10.9 
Arabica coffee 333 1,160 +248.3 
Cotton 557 1,216 +118.3 
Source: Leurquin (1963: 59), own calculations 
 
As reflected in Table 3.3., crop and livestock raising accounted for 68.4% of Ruandan GDP in 1959.60 
While the pre-colonial Tutsi regime was focussed on domestic food security (which included barter 
trade) and the acquisition of external land via military campaigns, the post-Berlin Conference 
governments in Europe also desired development of export trade (Reader 1998: 604), and introduced 
the rupee currency into the local economy (Sahinkuye 2000: 45). The initial economic outcomes 
generated by the Belgians were quite favourable for the colonial overseers and local kingship. Coffee 
exports, for example, jumped from five tonnes in 1927 to 2,000 tonnes a decade later, as new colonial 
laws enabled chiefs to force their subjects into producing the crop. European powers were 
increasingly looking to African colonies for coffee supplies, because of concerns about Brazil’s 
domination of world coffee production. This reinforced ethnic divisions between the Hutu and the 
Tutsi: under colonial laws aimed at stimulating production, the Hutu were almost always the workers 
that had to provide coffee-producing labour tribute to the Tutsi chiefs (Kamola 2007: 577-578). 
 
Poverty and inequality remained rife amongst ordinary Rwandans due to the asymmetrical 
distribution of political and economic power. Another big problem was that the number of cattle in 
the country remained stationary for much of the latter part of the colonial period. This was associated 
with the five-fold increase in the head tax on cattle from 1940 onwards (Leurquin 1963: 80). A further 
challenge for a trade-driven development model was that Ruanda was dependent on costly and 
unreliable transit to the Indian Ocean through Tanzania, Uganda or Kenya, and to the Atlantic Ocean 
                                                          
59 Apart from the import of salt, external trade was almost non-existent in pre-colonial Ruanda. Family units were geared 
towards self-sufficiency in their agricultural activities (Blankoff-Starr 1960: 24), with internal trade limited to Tutsi 
trading milk and meat for Hutu grains and vegetables (Dowden 2002: 229).  
60 This is the earliest estimate of Ruandan GDP. 
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through the then Zaire. The distances from landlocked Kigali to the Indian Ocean and to the Atlantic 
Ocean are 1,500 km and some 2,000 km, respectively (Sellstrom and Wohlgemuth 1997: 15). 
 
Table 3.3: Breakdown of Ruandan GDP in 1959 
 
Sector Value (millions of Congolese francs) % of total 
Agriculture  6,850 62.5 
Food crops 5,700   
Industrial crops (coffee & cotton) 1,150   
Stock raising  650 5.9 
Meat 480   
Milk 150   
Hides 20   
Fishing  40 0.4 
Mining and quarrying  180 1.6 
Manufacturing  500 4.6 
Construction  350 3.2 
Transportation  130 1.2 
Trade  850 7.8 
Housing  160 1.5 
Public administration  1,000 9.1 
Other services  250 2.3 
Total  10,960 100.0 
Source: Leurquin (1963: 65), own calculations 
 
B) Dominant network 
 
A new dominant network formed in the late 1890s started the transformation of Ruanda’s agricultural 
economy to cash cropping. Following Rutarindwa’s suicide in 1895, some 15 months of strategic 
manoeuvring in a rapidly shifting political field by Kanjogera, her brothers Kabare and Ruhonankiko, 
and their respective allies, culminated in the crowing of the teenaged Musinga. The manoeuvring was 
not just diplomatic: the aftermath of the coup d’état was a violent period for the country. Musinga 
was enthroned in February 1897. Kanjogera and her brothers joined him at the top of the kingship 
hierarchy and formed the head of a reorganised dominant network.61 However, the country was still 
in crisis, and big steps were needed to solidify the new dynasty. Des Forges (2011: xxiii-xxiv) pointed 
out that the queen mother stepped up during this time of peril to show political entrepreneurship akin 
to Alston et al.'s (2016) view of leadership. This should not be too surprising considering that 
interlacustrine women enjoyed a higher economic, political and cultural status than their counterparts 
in southern and western regions of Africa (Reid 2009: 52).  
 
The famine and disease that hit Ruanda and Urundi in the late 1800s left these areas vulnerable to 
conquest when the Germans arrived to implement colonial rule (Reader 1998: 611). A few military 
skirmishes with the Germans from 1894 to 1896 convinced the dominant network that it would be 
difficult to match the firepower of the Europeans. When Captain Hans Von Ramsey of the German 
military entered the royal court in March 1897 to demand loyalty to Berlin in return for German 
protection of the kingship, the Ruandan queen was happy to accept (De Lame 2004: 1298). According 
to Des Forges (2011: 18), Ramsay’s caravan “demonstrated wealth and power that the [royal] court 
realised could be useful in dealing with its enemies. The promise of German defence against the 
                                                          
61 As queen mother, Kanjogera became the most important person in the kingdom, while her brother Kabare acted as a 
regent over the weak and irresolute Musinga (Prunier 1995: 24).  
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Belgians and their Congolese troops and any internal threat must have encouraged the [royal] court 
to accept graciously an arrangement it could not have refused.”  
 
The Berlin and Brussels conferences left Africa politically weak, and its great kingdoms faced a 
desperate situation as Europe colonised the continent. Combat and guerrilla warfare to resist 
colonisation had much the same result as the diplomatic outcomes of these conferences: conquest by 
the Europeans. Only a few states avoided violent colonisation by reaching negotiated colonisation 
settlements. These states included Ruanda, Urundi, Basutoland (Lesotho), Morocco, Swaziland and 
Tunisia, where rulers negotiated for incorporation into colonial domain and kept their states intact 
(Fetter 1979: 8).62  
 
C) Beliefs 
 
The Kanjogera-led dominant network identified a window of opportunity after the crowning of 
Musinga to establish a new set of beliefs amongst the kingship of how the royal leadership might 
thrive. This included the introduction of German colonial influence at the highest level of governance. 
During a “wobbly authority” (Prunier 1995: 25) following the coup, the indirect rule of the Germans63 
was a determining factor in reinforcing the kingship and the rule of the Tutsi over the Hutu. In turn, 
the Tutsi elite acted as intermediaries for the colonial administration, with the established political 
organisation in Ruanda enlisted to enact the indirect rule. In most of their colonisation campaigns, 
the Germans exploited ethnic rivalries: one grouping would join the Germans in fighting the other 
grouping with the hope of winning favour with the victorious Europeans (Stoecker 1986: 105). 
Germany saw differences in the physical characteristics and political organisation of the two groups 
and used this to justify their preference for the Tutsi (Stilwell 2002: 18). The Hutu were seen as the 
less imposing physical specimens amongst the two groups (Diamond 2005: 314), and the Germans 
(and later the Belgians) regarded the Tutsi’s as superior to the Hutu because of their paler skin colour 
and taller stature (Stilwell 2002: 18). The German colonisers, in particular, are said to have identified 
with the “aristocratic demeanour” of the more politically organised Tutsi, which supplied all officials 
selected by the Germans to serve in the colonial administration (Reader 1998: 612).64  
 
                                                          
62 Ethiopia is the only African country that was never colonised.  
63 By 1914, there were only five German civil servants present in Rwanda (Sellstrom and Wohlgemuth 1997: 26).  
64 Written around the time of independence, the Belgian government text translated by Blankoff-Starr (1960: 19-20) 
provides an anthropologist’s observations on the different physical characteristics of the ‘Pygmoid Twa’, ‘Negroid Hutu’, 
and ‘Ethiopid Tutsi’. The Tutsi were said to have a slightly lighter skin colour and were on average taller than the other 
two groups. According to Klinghoffer (1998: 6-7), the ‘Hamitic hypothesis’ suggests that the Germans and Belgians 
believed the fairer skinned, tall-in-stature and politically more organised Tutsi migrated to Ruanda from southern 
Ethiopia. These Ethiopians, in turn, were racially linked to peoples in the Middle East and Europe, specifically 
descendants of the biblical figure Ham – the son of Noah. Some European proponents of the Hamitic hypothesis suggested 
that the Tutsi were black only in skin colour, and white in stature (Sellstrom and Wohlgemuth 1997: 26). This helped 
Europeans explain the presence of sophisticated tribal kingdoms in an area viewed from afar as savaged and uncivilised 
(Sahinkuye 2000: 55). Tutsi politics were seen by Europeans as culturally more advance (Scholz 2015: 4), with a 
hierarchical, orderly and sophisticated governance system (Straus 2006: 20). The idea of a conquering superior race of 
natural-born rulers as an explanation for such political organisation was first presented by British Indian Army officer 
and explorer John Hanning Speke (Sahinkuye 2000: 55), who in the 1850s spent time exploring Central Africa under 
sponsorship from the Royal Geographic Society (Allen 2004: 190). The Germans were the first to use this 
anthropological/sociological hypothesis in Ruanda (Scholz 2015: 4), thought the theory was used throughout the colonial 
period when European powers had to choose sides – for example, the case of Britain choosing sides with the Masai in 
Kenya (Jones 2001: 17). Scholz (2015: 4) referred to this as a variety of ‘scientific racism’: ostensibly using genetic and 
anthropological reasons for explaining the presence of certain political systems, and favouring a race with apparent Middle 
Eastern and European roots. 
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D) Constitutional-level institutions 
 
While historians are correct in underscoring the limited direct presence of the Germans in Ruanda – 
only a few dozen soldiers were stationed there at any given time – the introduction of colonial 
influence in the dominant network had many other effects. The Germans brought to Ruanda many 
things that affected the constitutional-level institutions of the country to varying degrees. These 
included the establishment of missions by the Society of Missionaries of our Lady of Africa, also 
known as the ‘White Fathers’,65 as part of the education system (Court 2016: 50). While the German 
and Belgian governments established public schools in Ruanda during their respective colonial 
tenures, Roman Catholic missionaries always dominated and to some extent even monopolised 
education (Sahinkuye 2000: 58-59). The Tutsi saw education as a tool for reinforcing their dominance 
within the colonial context and believed that a close-knit affiliation with the church would enhance 
their dominant position (Reader 1998: 628). In turn, the Catholic Church used this to take a leading 
role in shaping the ideology and mythology around ethnic identities.  
 
School teachings in Ruanda were divisive. Missionaries used the curriculum to stress the differences 
between Hutu and Tutsi pupils. By categorising children inside the school, and letting these 
distinctions flow into the rest of their young lives, education reflected and intensified ethnic divisions 
(Mafeza 2013: 3). Specifically, the education system taught the superiority of the Tutsi over the Hutu. 
School attendance was paid for and not compulsory, meaning that the poor (Hutu) were largely 
excluded. This also meant that the wealthier minority Tutsi were disproportionately accommodated 
in the education system. It was also these Tutsi who – amongst the few Ruandans who finished 
primary school – continued on to secondary education. High schools taught a Europeanised form of 
Ruandan history to Tutsi children that used the Hamitic hypothesis to stress their superiority via the 
Hamitic hypothesis, as discussed in Footnote 64 (Moshman 2015: 2). 
 
Apart from church and school operations, the White Fathers were also involved in politics. The 
international church’s approach of fostering positive relationships with local political leaders 
complemented the approach of the Germans and later the Belgians. This, in turn, resulted in the 
church siding with the royal court over, for example, territorial matters and conflicts. This vision of 
evangelism made the church a close ally of the colonial state and the Tutsi-dominated royal court 
(Court: 2016: 55-56). While the Tutsi were wary of the missionaries and saw their role primarily as 
providers of education, the White Fathers entered everyday political life with the interactions they 
had with local chiefs. Furthermore, the Hutu became enamoured with the missionaries and saw them 
as protectors and patrons. A subsequent Tutsi uprising in 1904 against the White Fathers threatened 
the Germans’ control over Ruanda. In response, Germany structured a tripartite ruling structure that 
consisted of its own representatives, the royal court, and missionaries. This formalised the Catholic 
Church’s role in local politics (Court 2016: 57-58).  
 
Other innovations by the Germans included opening the country up to external trade in cash crops 
(initially cotton, tobacco and rice, and later coffee), and the introduction of modern transportation 
with the construction of railways.66 Initial progress was slow, however, and development plans were 
not fully implemented by the start of the First World War (Sahinkuye 2000: 45). As a result, it can 
                                                          
65 French Cardinal Charles Lavigerie founded the society in 1868. At the time, Lavigerie was posted in Algiers at what 
was then called the Archdiocese of Carthage. His aim with establishing the White Fathers was to spread the gospel in 
Africa and to transform African people into French subjects. The methods employed by the organisation was to adapt 
their evangelisation to local ways. This included the courting of political leaders (Court 2016: 56).  
66 There were no organised transport networks in the country before colonisation (Leurquin 1963: 47). 
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be argued that the timeline of the critical transitions framework lingered around this point of 
constitutional-level change until the Belgians furthered institutional change that started with their the 
initiation of colonial practices by their German counterparts. The replacement of German rule with 
Belgian rule in 1916 is not identified as another shock or effective change in the dominant network, 
because indirect rule characterised the final years of the German period and the early ones of the 
Belgian period. Newbury (2009: 168) interpreted both periods as ones of minimal European 
influence, while Brown (2011: 180) interpreted the regimes as being similarly arbitrary in their regard 
for the rule of law.  
 
At Versailles, in the wake of the First World War, the victorious Allied forces were not interested in 
granting independence to German colonies and were even less interested in returning these territories 
to the defeated Germans. Hence, the winners divided the spoils, and the Belgians received Ruanda 
and Urundi (Reid 2009: 197). The League of Nations entrusted former German colonies such as 
Ruanda to other European powers with the premise that they should be governed until the colonial 
economies and polities were able to stand on their own feet (Reader 1998: 605). Brussels had little 
interest in quickly digging its heels into Ruandan territory, because it had than enough land and 
responsibilities in the Congo.67 Some historians (e.g. Reader 1998: 613) suggest that Belgian political 
leaders did not want possession of Ruanda as it would have added to the complexity of their 
established colonial portfolio. Sahinkuye (2000: 46) stated that the initial occupation of Ruanda in 
April 1916 was intended to provide Brussels with a bargaining chip during the post-war negotiations: 
“for use as a pawn in negotiations,” said Belgian Minister of Colonies Jules Renkin during 1916. 
London even rubberstamped the idea. The Belgians were hoping for a three-way deal with Britain 
and Portugal that would see Brussels acquire a portion of Angola adjacent to the Congo River. 
However, the Portuguese could not be persuaded to trade a piece of Angola for a piece of German 
East Africa (Reader 1998: 613-614).  
 
The Belgians continued the German tradition of indirect rule that allowed the Tutsi to rule their land 
on condition that the areas remained peaceful (Van Dijk 2006: 194-195). Belgium was instructed by 
the Treaty of Versailles to maintain the German way of governance in the interest of proper 
administration, and only 205 Europeans were resident in the country by 1945 (Leurquin 1963: 48). 
After an effective ten years of this wait-and-see approach, the Belgians started making meaningful 
policy (constitutional-level) changes between 1926 and 1931 (Punier 1995: 26). In the case of 
Ruanda, these top-level changes were still associated with anything influencing incentives in 
agriculture: in 1960, some 95% of Ruandese were involved in farming, and this number was still as 
high as 90% by 1990 (Griffiths 1993: 122).  
 
Belgium established its own form of indentured labour that was reminiscent of the pre-colonial 
practice of Ruandese working a set number of days for the state. Some 2% of able-bodied males were 
employed in Congolese mines, and the remainder of the male workforce was liable for one month of 
compulsory unpaid labour to cultivate crops. Their output of beans, cassava, potatoes and sweet 
potatoes were for consumption in the Congo, which was a greater priority for the colonial authorities 
than Ruanda and Urundi were (Reader 1998: 615). Brussels also reintroduced coffee and required 
each chief (and, by implication, the people under his command) to plant a half acre of the crop.68 
                                                          
67 A focus on the Congo was amongst the Belgian priorities that kept it from doing population surveys in Ruanda.  
68 Coffee was introduced following the discovery of a variety of wild coffee tree in the Congo-Nile watershed (Leurquin 
1963: 47).  
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With these measures, the indirect rule of the colonial administration transformed the agricultural way 
of life of the Rwandese people.  
 
E) Laws and enforcement 
 
Compared to earlier eras, colonial governments accepted more responsibility for their territories 
during the early 1900s and, especially, in the interwar period. This redefined the continent: “The 
constantly changing institutions of non-literate societies were set in the written word of law; origin 
myths were transformed into tribal histories; socio-economic distinctions made one tribe better than 
another.” More formal judicial systems and civil administrations were created based on European 
models (Reader 1998: 603-604).  
 
In the early phases of Belgian rule, Ruandese judicial processes were preoccupied with customary 
law, while colonial law was applied only in exceptional civil and criminal cases. The Gacaca system 
became more institutionalised during the colonial period, but was at the same time used and abused 
by the Tutsi elite to reinforce their dominance over the Hutu (Sahinkuye 2000: 65-66). Belgian-
appointed Tutsi administrators were given the responsibility of selecting the elders and judges 
overseeing Gacaca courts. The local courts were still operating by unwritten laws, but their activities 
became more frequent as the administrators arranged for politically appointed judges to hold weekly 
sessions (Clark 2010: 53). Following increasing success in maintaining social order under the 
politicised Gacaca, the Belgians launched a hybrid legal system in the early 1940s by recognising the 
community court system as a legitimate judicial mechanism. Colonial authorities encouraged 
Ruandans to compare the speed and convenience of Gacaca with the greater sophistication of official 
courts when choosing where to have their cases heard. Unsurprisingly, rural Ruandans with more 
straightforward issues – e.g. land rights issues, inheritance and personal disputes – opted for the 
Gacaca while urbanites with more complex cases – e.g. work contracts – favoured the official courts 
(Clark 2010: 53-54). 
 
With the help of the Belgians, the Tutsi also made several notable changes to traditional land rights 
(Klein-Arendt 2004: 1299). The traditional ubuhake system was transformed into a structure more 
reminiscent of feudal France during the 1700s as western capitalism entered the Tutsi culture. 
Previously, ubuhake took on several forms that reflected the Tutsi's aim of obtaining labour, military 
recruits and tithes, among other things, from the Hutu (Prunier 1995: 28-30). Under Belgian 
influence, grazing land rights moved towards private property for the Tutsi, which limited 
opportunities for social mobility for the Hutu. This ubuhake-a-l’europeene derivative enforced a 
social pyramid structure that the Belgians believed existed in the country (Overdulve 1995: 9).69 
Another form of political alienation of the Hutu was the decision in 1929 to abolish the system of 
having separate incumbents for the three chiefly functions. Hutu previously had some influence in 
chiefly matters as Hutu were often the chiefs of land holdings. When three jobs fused into one, around 
19 out of 20 were given to Tutsi (Prunier 1995: 26-28).  
 
                                                          
69 The Belgians had intentions during the 1920s and 1930s to improve the living standards of the Hutu. However, the 
Tutsi, whose political administration Brussels was dependent on to manage Ruanda, opposed this. Good intentions 
therefore came to naught (Overdulve 1995: 12-13). 
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F) Incremental changes 
 
The Belgians and Catholic missionaries were far from fond of the king and his mother, and after 
several years of slowly eroding support for Musinga amongst the elite, were able to lobby for his 
replacement by prince Rudahigwa (who ruled as Mutara) in 1931. Musinga was offered the 
opportunity to resign and designate a successor from amongst his sons but lacked faith in all of them 
(Des Forges 2011: 216). Mutara was a much better fit with the European values that were then being 
accepted more broadly amongst the country’s elite (practicing monogamy and Christianity, for 
example). Hence, he was crowned without much fanfare. His ascension to the throne was not 
accompanied by the usual rites, which led to many Ruandese seeing Mutara as the king of the white 
people and not theirs. This was part of a process of incremental change that the Belgians – who were 
already included in the dominant network – implemented to mould Ruandese society into a more 
European one.  
 
Being Christian was a prerequisite for membership of the new Ruandese elite that the Belgians was 
creating. Tutsi flocked to the Catholic Church, which assumed an even more important role in the 
political reorganisation in Ruanda – Catholicism became the quasi-official religion (Prunier 1995: 
30-31). The missionaries’ personal relationship with Mutara and other high-ranking officials 
cemented the church’s role in Ruandan politics. By the early 1930s, the Catholic missions were 
considered the country’s state church (Court 2016: 62) – there was no formal constitution to enshrine 
this. The enthroning of Mutara and the growing strength of the church in everyday politics also 
marked the start of a gradual strengthening of Belgian control in the country. Conversely, the mwami 
became less powerful. Mutara undoubtedly had several windows of opportunity to show leadership 
towards rolling back the influence of the Belgians, but failed to do so (Sahinkuye 2000: 80). 
 
The Belgians also wrought another key incremental change to institutions: progressive hardening of 
dividing lines between the broad concepts of belonging to the Tutsi and Hutu groupings. While the 
Germans favoured the Tutsi based on the Hamitic hypothesis, they did not tinker too much with the 
pre-colonial practice of allowing social and economic mobility. In practice, this meant scope for Tutsi 
and Hutu to move from one classification to the other. The Belgians, however, simplified the 
distinction between Tutsi and Hutu in intellectual and administrative terms. Their beliefs in Tutsi 
superiority and their dependence on the kingship to administer the colony required guarantees to the 
Tutsi elite of continued preferential treatment and exclusion of Hutu.  
 
The introduction of identity cards in the early 1930s supported a system of internal discrimination 
(Jones 2001: 18-19). A decade earlier, the Belgians started registering adult men in order to collect 
taxes. The system was expanded in 1931 to include women and children. This process, which 
recorded a total of 3.45 million people, was the basis for the issuance of identity cards (Blankoff-
Starr 1960: 33-34). The cards specified which tribe the holder belonged to according to appearance 
and proof of ancestry – lacking this, all men who owned more than ten cattle were classified as Tutsi 
(Reader 1998: 615-616). This resulted in a marked sharpening of the ethnic distinction that limited 
the scope for upward social mobility. The adjustment to rights based on tribal classification made it 
possible for both the Ruandan and Belgian components of the dominant network to retain their 
supremacy by enforcing the rights of the elite Tutsi (Diamond 2005: 316).  
 
The creation of new chief-like titles and associated powers by the Europeans further marginalised the 
Hutu as these hereditary positions were allocated exclusively to Tutsi (Gahamanyi 2003: 278). The 
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economic and political outcomes created by this institutional setup enriched the Tutsi-Belgian elite 
leading into the 1940s and encouraged continued incremental change to uphold the system. At the 
time, the Belgians had made tribal identity the defining feature of ordinary life in Ruanda (Meredith 
2014: 519). By the time the Second World War erupted in Europe, the increasing friction between 
Hutu and Tutsi was a ticking time bomb, with the only question being when it would happen 
(Sahinkuye 2000: 80). 
 
However, the post-war period heralded a change in Europe. Belgian society adopted new ideas about 
political governance and egalitarianism during the Second World War. In Ruanda, the Belgian 
administration started to open government doors to Hutu, resulting in the creation of an emerging 
modern elite among Hutu during the 1940s and 1950s (Jones 2001: 19). This increased the political 
representation of Hutu in the Belgian Trusteeship Territory of Ruanda-Urundi (Straus 2006: 21). 
Belgium took the task given to it during the Berlin Conference, namely to guide Ruanda to 
independence by managing its economic, political and social development (Blankoff-Starr 1960: 73), 
much more seriously than it did before the war. However, Belgium was burning bridges with the 
Tutsi elite by increasingly leaning towards the Hutu majority. It was the former that lobbied in the 
mid- to late-1950s for Ruanda’s independence from Belgium, motivated by the desire to salvage what 
they could of their eroding political influence (Gahamanyi 2003: 252). To stem the tide against them, 
the ubuhake and uburetwa systems were slowly rolled back in order to appear more accommodative 
to Hutu dignity (Overdulve 1995: 13). 
 
During this time, the missionary-educated Hutu elite formed the Parti du Mouvement de 
l'Emancipation Hutu (PARMEHUTU) with the backing of the Catholic Church (Overdulve 1995: 
14).70 The Hutu had gained growing support from the church since the Second World War. The post-
war period witnessed the arrival of a new generation of missionaries who were troubled by the poverty 
of the Hutu. These new arrivals used the networking system of the church to encourage the formation 
of a new Hutu elite-in-waiting. White Father missionaries would typically develop their own 
networks of clientage relationships as a method of being involved in political life outside of the central 
government. These pro-Hutu networks were often in competition with the Tutsi royal court and 
colonial administrators (Court 2016: 61-62). The church’s growing support for the Hutu was 
confirmed in 1956 when the White Fathers started to donate land to Hutu to establish and expand the 
coffee cooperative Trafipro. Hutu businessman Gregoire Kayibanda became the head of the 
cooperative in 1957 and from this basis launched the Mouvement Social Muhutu (MSM) – a precursor 
to PARMEHUTU (Kamola 2007: 579).  
 
The Tutsi, in turn, formed the Union Nationale Rwandaise (UNAR) to campaign for independence 
(Gahamanyi 2003: 278). This political organisation suggested a new dominant network (and 
associated beliefs) in waiting, pending sufficient change to ruling structures. Of course, the Belgians 
aimed to maintain their colonial rule. In a belated response to a March 1957 manifesto by Hutu 
intellectuals seeking political equality for all Ruandese, Brussels suggested in December 1958 that 
the identity card system should be scrapped. However, at that time the Hutu were already 
contemplating their own political future and had come to view the classification of Tutsi and Hutu in 
a positive light: the view was that an identifiable majority ethnicity amongst them would mobilise 
political support (Meredith 2014: 578). The high point of growing ethnic tension was during the 1950s 
when Hutu membership of the elite expanded markedly. Once politically organised, they used Tutsi 
                                                          
70 So strong was the influence of the church that Sellstrom and Wohlgemuth (1997: 17) suggested that “it would be more 
appropriate to characterise the colonisation of Ruanda as a venture by the … White Fathers than by the German Empire”. 
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dominance as a rallying cry. By rejecting the proposed elimination of the identity cards, the Hutu 
emboldened their campaign to abolish the Tutsi monarchy – who opposed the scrapping of the cards 
– and establish a republic. The desire for such a form of statehood was shared between the Hutu and 
Tutsi, because both groups expected it to solve some of their respective problems (Jones 1999: 57).  
 
G) Shock – deviated outcomes 
 
It was during the violent late 1950s and early 1960s that four shocks to the country’s economic and 
political outcomes fundamentally disrupted the autopilot situation and created a window of 
opportunity for leadership. Firstly, Brussels bowed to pressure from the UN and effectively switched 
allegiance from the Tutsi minority to the Hutu majority (Pottier 2002: 15).71 Despite Tutsi opposition 
to democracy and Hutu emancipation (Overdulve 1995: 15), the latter quickly secured significant 
political power on the back of support from the colonial power and the international community as 
well as new regulations that allowed for increased political organisation and more democratic 
practices. Brussels favoured a step-wise move towards independence that would have included 
democratic voting. However, the Belgians were also aware that the Hutu would soon have secured a 
political majority if this was implemented, and chose to switch allegiance to the majority. Several 
books on this period (e.g. Reader 1998: 665) cited the following statement by a Belgian officer to his 
superiors: “Because of the force of circumstances, we have to take sides. We cannot remain neutral 
and passive.” Turning words into action, Brussels started dismissing Tutsi chiefs in early 1960 and 
replaced them with Hutu. This reformed the dominant network so that the country’s political elite 
contained a significantly larger Hutu complement. 
 
A second factor was the chaos created by a short period of bloody uprisings against the Tutsi 
monarchy that continued until the Belgians switched sides (Reid 2009: 271). The combative 
relationship between the Hutu and Tutsi elite resulted in the Rwandan Revolution, also known as the 
Social Revolution. This process included violent clashes to determine who would control the process 
of decolonisation. Modern historians agree that violent tactics were seen on both sides of the conflict 
and that the bloodshed emanated from UNAR plans to crush the emergent Hutu elite (Jones 2001: 
20). The strategy was doomed to failure as it soon became apparent that Belgium – that had switched 
sides – would not support the campaign. The threatened Hutu retaliated and killed thousands of Tutsi 
in the capital and caused many thousands more to flee to neighbouring countries.72 This violence 
continued for some months after independence (Klinghoffer 1998: 8).  
 
The third shock factor was Mutara's death in July 1959, which has been attributed to more than one 
cause (De Lame 2004: 1301).73 With no direct heirs, the king was replaced (without consultation with 
Belgium) by his young half-brother Jean-Baptiste Ndahindurwa, who ruled as Kigeri V (Prunier 
1995: 54). However, the country’s last monarch ruled for only a year and a half. He was exiled to 
                                                          
71 Most historical writings on this change suggest an abrupt switch in allegiance. However, Straus (2006: 183) warned 
against this perspective and suggested a more gradual shift. Belgium was said to have supported economic and political 
change, which UNAR opposed. These and other acts eroded Belgium’s support for the Tutsi and gradually shifted loyalty 
to the Hutu.  
72 According to Van Dijk (2006: 195), two million Hutu peasants rose up against the 300,000 Tutsi living in the country. 
In "an orgy of violence” the peasants set alight the homes of their former masters and killed their cattle, murdered at least 
50,000 Tutsi and forced another 50,000 to flee the country to avoid death. However, Diamond (2005: 314) warned that 
the exact numbers of deaths and refugees are uncertain. Klinghoffer (1998: 8) put the number of refugees at the time of 
independence at 120,000, while Overdulve (1995: 15) stated that it exceeded 150,000.  
73 Possible causes that have been mentioned have included suicide, poisoning, an adverse reaction to medication, and 
murder (Straus 2006: 177).  
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Uganda in January 1961 as a post-colonial government assumed control and brought an end to four 
centuries of royal rule (Klinghoffer 1998: 8). 
 
The fourth important factor that shocked the established political outcome was the country's first-ever 
local government elections in June-July 1960. Fully 211 out of the 229 elected town mayors were 
Hutu (Sellstrom and Wohlgemuth 1997: 29). This was a significant departure from the political 
outcomes in previous eras. PARMEHUTU secured about three-quarters of the votes and formed a 
new government in October 1960 with six Hutu and two Belgian ministers. However, Brussels 
reneged just weeks ahead of the poll date on a pledge to hold elections on 28 January 1961. In 
response, Hutu political parties and 25,000 of their followers met at Gatarama in the Southern 
Province on the election day to dispose of Kigeri V, establish a republic without Belgian control, and 
call a national referendum for later that year to decide on the fate of the mwami (M’bokolo 2003: 
212-214). Collectively, Belgium's allegiance change, violent ethnically-driven conflict, the crowning 
and disposition of Kigeri V, local government elections, and the declaration of a free republic 
combined to entirely transform the country’s political outcomes. Viewed from the perspective of the 
critical transitions framework, this created a new political outcome that deviated significantly from 
the established norm.  
 
H) Window of opportunity for leadership 
 
When the Belgian book translated by Blankoff-Starr (1960: 33) was published a year after the 
revolution, the influence of the Tutsi over the Hutu was said to be “non-existent”. This state of affairs 
contrasted starkly with that of the preceding 300 years, during which Tutsi influence was 
overwhelming. According to Reader (1998: 666), official statistics showed that only 9% of the 
population were Tutsi, while others such as Overdulve (1995) and De Lame (2004: 1301) referred to 
a higher figure of 15%. With the country’s governance now in the hands of the Hutu, a leader was 
needed to develop the new republic and to avoid further bloodshed – Kigeri V and other Tutsi were 
plotting in exile for their return. The dominant network had already changed, and the beliefs held by 
the majority Hutu were in force. The critical transitions framework suggests that the situation required 
the identification of a leader to complete the process of institutional change. PARMEHUTU 
Chairman Kayibanda, who belonged to the Hutu elite before independence, took this torch (Pottier 
2002: 123). Born in Gitarama, he was at the helm of the meeting that declared the sovereign Republic 
of Rwanda (Reader 1998: 666).  
 
3.4 The First Republic: 1961-1973 
 
A) Economic and political outcomes 
 
According to Reader (1993: 626), only 2.4% of Rwanda’s population resided in urban areas when the 
First Republic came into being; Blankoff-Starr (1960: 40 & 49) suggested that the proportion may 
have been even lower. Agriculture was therefore still the dominant form of economic activity at the 
time of independence. However, the political revolution of 1959-1961 was also the start of a socio-
economic revolution. The result was an altered economic outcome to coincide with the new political 
outcome. The socio-economic revolution liberated the majority of the population from a regime that 
had increasingly resorted to suppression and exploitation. The revolution and subsequent 
independence from Belgium largely eliminated the suppressive factors that were the reasons for 
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structural poverty. For example, the Hutu government liquidated all pastoral serfdom contracts in 
1959 (Huggins 2013: 189).  
 
Yet these same policies have also been interpreted as a pro-Hutu affirmative action campaign that 
effectively side-lined the Tutsi. One historian even referred to these measures as a “quasi-apartheid 
system of decimation” that excluded the Tutsi from employment, public life, and political as well as 
military power (De Lame 2004: 1302). This forced educated Tutsi – many of whom had lost their 
land – to join foreign-owned companies or to start new businesses, sometimes with international 
support. This, in turn, influenced trade and commerce in the rural areas: while most shop owners in 
the rural areas were now Hutu, importers and wholesalers were Tutsi. Ironically, while the economic 
and political outcomes for the Hutu were better after independence, they still felt that they were 
disadvantaged compared to the Tutsi (Overdulve 1995: 17-18). 
 
Nonetheless, poverty remained rife. In Kayibanda’s “land of virtue”, hard-working peasants “toiled 
the land without asking too many questions,” and poverty was “borne with dignity, according to the 
president” (Prunier 1995: 59). While labour was no longer indentured to chiefs and landlords, the 
government remained hamstrung by the small tax base and forced Rwandans to work on road 
construction, reforestation, and other state-organised projects (Leurquin 1963: 87). A lack of broad-
based economic development during the first decade after independence resulted in 93.8% of the 
population still being dependent on farm employment by 1970. Only 3.2% of the population were 
living in urban areas at the time. As in many other newly independent countries in SSA, economic 
development was slow. Rwanda faced the same challenges as its neighbours: limited physical 
infrastructure, weak capacity amongst those employed by the state, significant dependence on 
agriculture for employment, and weak adjacent economies. Nonetheless, some members of the Hutu 
elite benefitted greatly in financial terms from incorporation into the new dominant network.  
 
B) Dominant network 
 
PARMEHUTU embraced the idea that the Hutu were not indirectly oppressed by Belgium but 
directly by the Tutsi (De Lame 2004: 1302). As a result, the new dominant network of the first post-
independence regime was made up of Hutu elites, mainly from the southern parts of Rwanda where 
Kayibanda hailed from, with the president surrounding himself with trusted allies. The patronage 
system in the dominant network of the First Republic was therefore not dissimilar in nature from 
those in many other African governance structures (Jones 2001: 25). Kayibanda was by no means a 
liberator; in fact, he established a regime “of such stifling authoritarianism that even its primary 
beneficiaries, the Hutu elite, found cause for complaint” (Reader 1998: 667). Brown (2011: 108) also 
criticised his authoritarian rule, while the UN stated that “[a]n oppressive system has been replaced 
by another one” (Prunier 1995: 53).  
 
C) Beliefs 
 
The beliefs of the new elite were the exact opposite of those of their Tutsi predecessors: while pre-
independence client-patron relationships were based on the Tutsi's need to dominate the Hutu in order 
to lessen the perceived threat of the group's minority status, the Kayibanda regime believed that the 
majority should rule over the minority group. However, the dominant network was aware of the strife 
in other post-colonial countries and the internal conflict caused by the exit of European powers. 
Kayibanda believed that multiple political parties distracted the population and hampered progress 
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(Sahinkuye 2000: 106). Hence, his regime used negotiation, intimidation, and violence in the years 
after independence to eliminate other parties. The final demise of the UNAR in 1963, for example, 
coincided with the arrest and execution of some of its top leaders. The country became a de facto one-
party state in 1965 (Klinghoffer 1983: 8). While this was never formalised in law, PARMEHUTU 
referred to itself as the ‘national’ party. In fact, PARMEHUTU was the only political grouping of the 
13 that had existed at independence that took part in the 1965 elections. It secured more than 98% of 
the vote – the remaining votes were cast for individuals.  
 
D) Constitutional-level institutions 
 
The country’s first formal constitution, which was adopted in November 1962, abolished the 
monarchy. The constitution enshrined the power of the people by establishing a representative 
parliament but also limited certain human rights. While the UN Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights74 was recognised, the exercising of individual rights was limited by Rwandan law and 
regulations. Thus, authorities were able to abuse internationally-recognised human rights by means 
of local decrees. Freedoms of assembly, expression, and from discrimination were violated. Notably, 
the violation of rights affected Hutu and Tutsi alike (Sahinkuye 2000: 102-103).  
 
The Catholic Church’s influence over politics and society was also quite visible. Kayibanda was a 
former editor of the influential Catholic newspaper ̔Kinyamateka and a one-time personal secretary 
to the Archbishop of Kabgayi.75 Collaboration between the state and church was found at all levels 
of the governing hierarchy, from local councils to the formulation of development programmes for 
the entire country. The Catholic Church also continued its ethnic politics by supporting the Hutu 
government instead of challenging the ethnic divisiveness of Ruandan politics. This proved to be an 
internal challenge for the church: while the international Catholic Church supported the Hutu-run 
government, the majority of the church’s missions served Tutsi converted during the colonial period. 
This resulted in ethnic tensions within local communities, sometimes resulting in ethnically-driven 
attacks on church schools and lower ranking clergy (Court 2016: 62-63).  
 
The education system changed abruptly after independence, yet in many ways remained the same. 
While access to schooling for Hutu improved significantly, Tutsi access to secondary education was 
limited. Kayibanda prioritised education in the southern regions, to the detriment of other areas. 
Pupils from Gikongoro were clearly favoured in the late 1960s when the incumbent minister of 
education was a native of that area. Similar benefits accrued to those from Gitarama in the early 1970s 
on account of it having been the birthplace of his successor. The history curriculum portrayed the 
Tutsi as immigrants from Ethiopia who oppressed the Hutu. Fictitious historical narratives were even 
drafted and incorporated into the educational curriculum, although it should be said that the Tutsi did 
this too before independence (Mafeza 2013: 3-4). Children were sorted and seated along ethnic lines 
in classes. While there was a reversal of the order in the colonial doctrine in favour of the Hutu, 
children were still being taught that one group was good and the other bad (Moshman 2015: 2-3).  
 
E) Laws and enforcement 
 
Laws and enforcement under the one-party state were authoritarian. The Kayibanda regime instilled 
a quota system (also referred to as ‘ethnic proportionality’) within schools and the civil service to 
                                                          
74 Adopted in 1948, this declaration formed the basis of international human rights law. 
75 Carney (2012: 86) argued that Kayibanda was a prominent example of a seminarian turned journalist turned politician. 
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limit the numbers of Tutsi employees to the groups' population share. This so-called purification 
campaign was vigorously enforced in urban areas (Straus 2006: 190). The result was a large increase 
in the numbers of refugees – some claimed hundreds of thousands, while Diamond (2005: 314) 
suggested a million – that left Rwanda for Burundi76, Tanzania and Uganda. Especially the border 
areas witnessed continued skirmishes between the state and Tutsi militia that eventually led to 
Kayibanda’s downfall (Reader 1998: 667-668).  
 
After independence, the Gacaca developed into a system with more extensive administrative duties. 
This happened because Rwandans developed a better understanding of judicial processes. Defendants 
increasingly turned to superior administrative officials to appeal Gacaca sanctions. When elders of a 
cell (the smallest administrative unit within local government, overseeing on average 800 people) 
decided on a punishment, these defendants then turned to a mayor or prefect who presided over up to 
ten cells for a more authoritative view on the matter. This eventually resulted in elected judges using 
the Gacaca as evidence collecting processes in order to hand down formal judgements (Clark 2010: 
53-54). The formalisation of the community court system continued as a result of official intervention.  
 
F) Incremental changes 
 
Returning to political matters, tinkering became necessary to maintain the dominance of the 
concentrated power base built by Kayibanda by the mid-1960s. From the late-1960s, the 
concentration of power within PARMEHUTU increased little by little as a result of internal conflicts 
and divisions. By 1972, a small group of politicians from Kayibanda’s home region had usurped 
power, marginalising Hutu from the northern and central parts of the country (Sahinkuye 2000: 109-
110). The side-lined politicians grew isolated from the president and distant from the economic and 
political power he controlled (De Lame 2004: 1302). Arguably, Kayibanda ruled with the same style 
of leadership and remoteness as a mwami. His control over the public administration grew to such an 
extent that he decided on all appointments within the government – even at the lowest levels –.by the 
early 1970s He also worked hard to mobilise international support for his regime in order to legitimise 
his actions. Prunier (1995: 57-59) indicated that the country’s “egalitarian racial ideology” buttressed 
an “elitist and secretive authoritarian government” that found support among Christian Democrats in 
Germany and Belgium. 
 
The chink in Kayibanda’s one-party armour was his inability to retain control over the military. 
Control was in the hands of the Minister of Defence, Major General Habyarimana, and his allies in 
the northern and western parts of the country (De Lame 2004: 1302). As political power became 
increasingly concentrated in the hands of southern politicians in PARMEHUTU, northerners became 
more organised in opposing political exclusion (Overdulve 1995: 19). Increasing domestic unrest in 
the early 1970s, which stemmed from the conflict between the state and Tutsi insurgents, eroded the 
power of the Kayibanda administration by emboldening its growing opposition. Northerners were 
also exposed to attacks from Tutsi refugees based in Uganda (Prunier 1995: 54). Politicians and 
citizens alike turned to army strongman Habyarimana for protection as Kayibanda failed to act 
decisively on the turmoil he had caused (Van Dijk 2006: 195). This divided the previously united 
Hutu people and enabled Habyarimana to build a power base for his friends, family and other allies 
from the Gisenyi region in the northwest.  
 
 
                                                          
76 The name was changed from Urundi to Burundi at independence on 1 July 1962.  
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G) Shock – deviated outcomes 
 
While little has been written in most history books about the spark behind the eventual uprising by 
Habyarimana and his supporters, it has been well-documented that the killings of Hutu in Burundi 
during April 1972 triggered ethnic violence in Rwanda’s schools, universities, public administration 
and private enterprise during 1973 (Sahinkuye 2000: 110). The emotional impact of these killings 
was a final rallying cry for Kayibanda who organised vigilante committees to scrutinise the public 
and private sectors for the implementation of racial quotas. Ethnically-motivated expulsions were the 
chosen strategy for the government; Kayibanda was trying to rid the country of Tutsi as a way of 
quelling his unpopularity in the north (Prunier 1995: 60). This policy was not well thought through, 
and the country was moving into a state of chaos in which state control became precarious. Rwanda 
had descended into a situation in which northerners were attacking southerners; the poor were 
attacking the rich, and politicians were in fear of being killed (Sahinkuye 2000: 110).  
 
H) Window of opportunity for leadership 
 
Rwandans in the north were conspiring how to replace the Kayibanda regime due to the apparent 
inability of the president to protect them from cross-border Tutsi attacks. The northerners claimed 
that the Kayibanda regime was unable to protect Rwanda from attacks by bands of exiles or to 
guarantee peace and stability in a climate of “sectarian revenge” within its borders (De Lame 2004: 
1302). The country was in a deep crisis. This descent into chaos77 was the shock to Rwandan society’s 
autopilot situation that opened a window of opportunity for Habyarimana to show the leadership 
required for institutional change. Indeed, after a bloodless coup d’état by Habyarimana during July 
1973, Kayibanda was placed under house arrest, and he died in 1976. Some 55 members of his 
dominant network were executed in an “extermination of the southern political elite” (Gasana 2002: 
29). 
 
3.5 The Second Republic: 1973-1994 
 
A) Economic and political outcomes 
 
The initial period of Habyarimana’s rule was noted among historians as one of calm, prosperity, and 
relative tolerance between ethnic groups (Jones 2001: 25). Rwanda prospered for 15 years after the 
1973 coup d’état and the country became a favoured destination for aid from overseas donors. The 
donors, in turn, could claim that their support benefitted a peaceful country with improving health, 
education, and economic indicators (Diamond 2005: 315). The president’s self-proclaimed selfless 
commitment to public administration (so that his people could farm) was indeed successful and raised 
questions about the necessity of democracy for economic growth (see sub-section C below).78 The 
country improved its formerly very low position in international GDP per capita rankings, secondary 
and tertiary activities grew from 20% of gross national product (GNP) in the mid-1960s to more than 
50% in the mid-1980s, and indicators of health, hygiene and education improved dramatically despite 
rapid population growth. Compared to neighbouring Burundi, Uganda, Zaire and Tanzania, Rwanda 
was portrayed as a comparatively stable destination for donor aid.79 The country was soon labelled 
                                                          
77 This was similar in character to the 1994 genocide, according to Straus (2006: 175). 
78 Sahinkuye (2000: 123) was emphatic that the system was undemocratic. 
79 Bilateral and multilateral donor aid accounted for 22% of GNP and 60% of government development expenditures, 
which was higher than SSA averages (Sellstrom and Wohlgemuth 1997: 37).  
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the ‘Switzerland of Africa’ – admittedly in part because of its small size and mountainous terrain 
(Prunier 1995: 78-79). It had one of the lowest public debt burdens (as a percentage of GDP) on the 
continent. The country’s currency was relatively stable and served as a unit of exchange in 
neighbouring countries as well (Sellstrom and Wohlgemuth 1997: 34).  
 
Rwanda and several other African countries sharply increased their food production in aggregate and 
per capita terms between 1960 and 1980 (Owusu 2003: 332). Calculations based on data from the 
Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) indicate that green coffee production was 10,000 tonnes 
(3.3 kg per capita) in the year of independence, had risen to 15,000 tonnes (3.9 kg per capita) in 1971 
and was almost 20,000 tonnes (4.9 kg per capita) in the year of the bloodless coup. Coffee output 
then spiked to nearly 30,000 tonnes (5.6 kg per capita) in 1981 and peaked at 43,000 tonnes (7.1 kg 
per capita) in 1985. Apart from a shock to international coffee prices in late 1970, which the country 
was able to compensate for with increased tin exports, the economic outcomes during the first decade 
of the Habyarimana regime were very favourable for the average Rwandan peasant. All arable land 
outside of national parks was under cultivation by the middle of the 1980s (Diamond 2005: 320).  
 
For the akusa, the grouping at the apex of Rwanda’s dominant network, the political outcomes were 
favourable. The ruling elite made money from coffee, tea and tin exports, as well as some pilfering 
of donor aid. With the economy briefly in trouble during the late-1970s and the dominant network 
pressured by lower earnings, former security chief Theoneste Lizinde mounted an unsuccessful coup 
d’état in April 1980. This was the only unsavoury episode from 1973 to 1988 (Prunier 1995: 84). 
Apart from this event, the Habyarimana regime kept a tight rein on power. This close control of the 
economic and political space kept Rwandans in the fields – cultivating crops that enriched leaders of 
the Mouvement Républicain National pour la Démocratie et el Développement (MRND) –and helped 
build a society with improving economic and social indicators. Habyarimana quickly side-lined 
anyone in the ruling structures of the country that did not align with his political philosophy 
(Overdulve 1995: 20). This reinforced the akusa’s power although the one-party system failed to build 
national unity despite being more accommodative to Tutsi than the First Republic was (Sahinkuye 
2000: 123).  
 
Rwanda joined the International Coffee Agreement (ICA) in 1962, which enabled it to partake in a 
much more controlled global coffee economy. However, the coffee-focused agricultural system also 
reinforced ethnic divisions. Rising international coffee prices encouraged the akusa to gain greater 
control over the industry. Consequently, coffee cooperative Trafipro was turned into a state-run 
monopoly marketing board. By 1966, the marketing entity had 27 national shops and 70 coffee 
purchasing points that favoured coffee production by Hutu. In its new guise, Trafipro fostered 
“regional bias, corruption and [a] climate of terror” as the organisation became “the backbone of an 
authoritarian [Hutu] regime” (Kamola 2007: 581).  
 
B) Dominant network 
 
It can be argued that Habyarimana was already a member of the country’s dominant network under 
Kayibanda because he had control of Rwanda’s military and a top government job. However, the 
political spectrum changed entirely with the new regime. At the start of the Second Republic, the new 
dominant network comprised Habyarimana, his wife and their close family members, who henceforth 
controlled the ruling party as well as state finances and security. They were referred to as the akusa, 
or ‘small house’ (Overdulve 1995: 19), and surrounded themselves with a political retinue (Bates 
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2008: 51 & 72). The one-party system continued: in fact, Habyarimana soon declared all citizens 
members of MRND from birth (Van Dijk 2006: 195), which meant that babies and the elderly became 
liable for membership fees (Overdulve 1995: 20). The akusa’s leadership during the first decade of 
the rule was mild compared to that of the First Republic, though (Prunier 1995: 75).  
 
C) Beliefs 
 
The Habyarimana elite believed, as did the Kayibanda, Musinga and Tutsi regimes before them, that 
state power should be concentrated in a small circle of allies. In turning the tables on the Kayibanda 
government, political power was moved away from the southern and central areas to the north. Cadres 
from Gisenyi filled most key positions in the cabinet, public administration, church and the military 
and security services; furthermore, they gained access to many lucrative economic opportunities 
(Meredith 2014: 639). By 1980, some 80% of command positions in the armed forces were filled 
with members of Habyarimana’s clan (Jones 2001: 26). The president declared that he and his 
comrades would carry the burden of public administration and that they would manage the country’s 
politics so that ordinary Rwandans could devote themselves entirely to agricultural activity. Peasants 
“were hard-working, clean living and suitably thankful for their social superiors” who helped them 
(Prunier 1995: 81). The Habyarimana regime used this economic and political structure to build 
legitimacy in the wake of the bloodless coup d’état that replaced a democratically elected government. 
 
D) Constitutional-level institutions 
 
The Habyarimana government suspended 31 articles of the 1962 constitution, including provisions 
for the creation and amendment of laws. This made presidential decrees the only form of legislative 
activity – a situation reminiscent of the power of the mwami. A new constitution was only adopted 
in December 1978 and was certainly not progressive. The significant differences from the 1962 
constitution were the inclusion of legislative provisions for a one-party state, a nearly complete 
absence of mechanisms for holding the president accountable, and the introduction of unlimited 
consecutive terms of re-election for the head of state. Human rights were again weakened with the 
elimination of direct application of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in domestic law 
(Gahamanyi 2003: 254). Some political scientists argue that the 1978 constitution was influenced by 
the Zairian model of governance, which is not farfetched considering that Zairian President Mobutu 
Sese Seko is seen as Habyarimana’s mentor. However, the reality that the president ruled by decree 
meant that the constitution was not as important in day-to-day life as his speeches and MRND bylaws. 
The racial quota system, for example, was not stipulated in any formal law but was encapsulated in a 
presidential address and MRND bylaw (Gahamanyi 2003: 256). While the quota policy was 
maintained it was only loosely enforced for as long as Tutsi refrained from interfering in Hutu politics 
(Prunier 1995: 75).  
 
For the Tutsi, de jure membership of the MRND restored some rights that were void during the First 
Republic. Allegiance to the ruling party could bring economic success, which meant that everyday 
life under the Habyarimana regime being “quite tolerable” for the Tutsi (Van Dijk 2006: 195). Some 
Tutsi businessmen had amassed fortunes and were on good terms with the ruling regime (Prunier 
1995: 76). Nonetheless, administrative control of everyday life was “probably the tightest in the world 
under non-communist countries”. Everything was “carefully controlled, clean and in good order” 
(Prunier (1995: 77 & 81). An assessment by Sahinkuye (2000: 123-153) of the impact of the one-
party state on democracy, political rights and civil society found the following features of the polity: 
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 Presidential elections were held to affirm, and not potentially replace, the incumbent 
 The president appointed members of MRND's Central Committee and the country's National 
Congress 
 Campaigning for parliamentary seats was strictly controlled 
 Freedom of expression was under pressure, both in public and within government 
 Restrictive bylaws marred constitutionally-enshrined freedoms of association and assembly 
 Labour strikes were nearly impossible 
 Freedom of the press existed only in theory 
 Academic freedom was absent 
 
The reforms brought by the Public Education Law of 1978 changed the education system, though not 
for the better. The legislation added further administrative measures to the divisive force of the 
education system. The law determined that progression from primary to secondary education was 
determined not only by examination results and continuous assessment, but also by ethnic and 
regional considerations. The system lacked transparency and was used to discriminate against Tutsi 
pupils (Mafeza 2013: 3). Teachers reported that brilliant students would fail exams simply because 
they had to include their ethnicity in their submissions. This strategy systematically reduced the 
percentage of pupils from Tutsi origins from 36% in 1962 to 12% in 1981 (Ntirenganya 2016).  
 
The discriminatory policy in the education system reinforced divisionism and hatred among 
Rwandans of different ethnic groups (Mafeza 2013: 4). This was also reinforced by religious factors. 
The Catholic Church welcomed the formation of the Second Republic and moved the seat of its 
archbishop to Kigali in 1976 to facilitate cooperation between the church and government. Under 
Habyarimana, the state and church strengthened their mutually reinforcing relationship of power and 
authority. The state and church’s respective patronage networks continued, based on a shared ethnic 
solidarity that reinforced ethnic divisions between the Hutu and the Tutsi (Court 2016: 63-64). 
 
E) Laws and enforcement 
 
The Gacaca system was becoming less important as a forum for community-based dispute resolution 
and was increasingly a formalised structure integrated into the formal judicial process (Clark 2010: 
54). To be clear, settling local disputes was still a vital function of the Gacaca system, but this was 
then subject to review by formal courts (Schabas 2008: 222). The Gacaca were also still hearing the 
same kinds of cases as during the First Republic and were far from unimportant. The system continued 
to thrive throughout the 1980s, with over 90% of cases in rural areas being heard in Gacaca courts 
(O’Reilly and Zhang 2015: 4). However, the formal judiciary faced many challenges. For example, 
political disagreements led to periodic closures of the Ministry of Justice, which weighed heavily on 
judicial independence.80 For the same reasons, the 1979 Constitution abolished the Supreme Court 
and replaced it with four separate courts. The Supreme Court was only reintroduced around the time 
of the genocide (The Judiciary of Rwanda 1991: 1).  
 
 
 
                                                          
80 Rule of law and judicial independence support economic development. When citizens believe that the court system can 
resolve their disputes fairly and impartially, and that these decisions are enforced by the state, the citizens are more 
inclined to obey the law. In such a system, there is no incentive for citizens that are unhappy with government to take the 
law into their own hands and thus disturb the peace. In turn, peace and political stability encourages investment and 
innovation, and hence economic development (Rugege 2007: 414-415).  
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F) Incremental changes 
 
It was not until later in the 1980s that the Habyarimana government felt any real social and political 
pressure to effect change. The dominant network was doing well in financial and political terms as 
long as international coffee prices supported their belief that prosperous farmers would guarantee 
their continued rule. Coffee production had become increasingly important to Rwandan farmers due 
to coercive and non-coercive incentives that encouraged cultivation of the crop. During the coffee 
boom of the 1970s and early 1980s, the state provided a substantial boost to household incomes by 
increasing prices paid to farmers for coffee beans. Combined with laws restricting the use of fertiliser 
to coffee and tea production, as well as rules restricting multi-cropping, Rwandan farmers had little 
reason not to adopt a coffee-oriented production system (Kamola 2007: 581-582). By 1986, coffee 
accounted for 82% of Rwanda's export earnings (Andersen 2000: 447).  
 
Coffee prices declined notably during the late 1980s and the total value of the crop fell from RwF14 
billion in 1986 to RwF5 billion in 1987. This resulted in a large drop in household incomes 
accompanied by a decreased volume of domestic food production. In 1989-1990, the country was hit 
by the combined effect of falling coffee prices and a local drought. In the absence of sufficient food 
reserves, this resulted in the deadly ruriganiza famine that killed hundreds and forced more than 
10,000 (mostly Tutsi) refugees to Burundi and Tanzania. The drought was concentrated in the 
southern Gikongoro prefecture that was seen as a stronghold for the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). 
As a result, Habyarimana withheld food aid to the region and retained supplies for his army in case 
the RPF invaded from Burundi (Kamola 2007: 582-583). 
 
The informal agreements between northern clans that enabled their benefactor Habyarimana to rule 
as long as coffee profits were available, began to unravel as competition increased for the only other 
secure form of income: donor aid.81 To benefit from this, an individual had to be a major player in 
government circles. Hence, with power struggles erupted (Prunier 1995: 84). By the mid-1980s, the 
country’s economic and political outcomes were starting to diverge from the dominant network’s 
expected results, and, by 1988, the skimming of donor funds was the only viable source of revenue 
for the dominant network. The country was also hit by severe droughts in 1989-1990, 1991 and 1993, 
with diseases affecting staple crops like cassava and sweet potatoes (Sellstrom and Wohlgemuth 
1997: 37).  
 
However, while a window of opportunity was undoubtedly opening in the late 1980s, no one showed 
effective leadership to initiate political change. Some historians highlight the death of Colonel 
Stanislas Mayuya in April 1988 as the spark that kindled conflict among northern clans. Mayuya was 
rumoured to have been selected by Habyarimana as his eventual successor. This did not sit well with 
the latter’s wife, Agathe. She was from the influential Kanzinga family (a northern Hutu lineage that 
ruled independent territories well into the 1920s), and her network provided legitimacy to the rule of 
Habyarimana who did not descend from a prominent lineage. Agathe’s close family and allies – 
whom the president relied on as his eyes and ears – orchestrated Mayuya’s death in order to maintain 
their positions in the upper echelons of government. The first lady was nicknamed Kanjogera after 
the former queen mother.82 Agathe’s circle of allies became more influential within the dominant 
network while the economy weakened. This further buttressed the ruling elite (Prunier 1995: 84-86). 
                                                          
81 There was very little surplus value that could be extracted from the Rwandan economy due to the large role played by 
peasant subsistence farming. World Bank data indicated that agriculture accounted for 40% of GDP in 1985.  
82 She was the real power behind Musinga’s throne earlier in the century 
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The MRND was hard at work in the late-1980s and early 1990s to make incremental changes to its 
governing style in order to prevent a further widening of the disparity between expected and actual 
economic and political outcomes in the wake of the coffee price decline. Despite progress since 
independence, Rwanda was still amongst the poorest countries in the world, with a vulnerable, 
socially strained, and environmentally destitute economy that also had to cope with the highest 
population density in the world.83 Another decline in coffee prices during 1989 and drought-induced 
food shortages during 1989-1990 could not entice back donor agencies who by the late 1980s had 
rolled back their support for the oppressive government (Jones 2001: 27). The MRND became more 
and more ruthless as it attempted to “make up through moralistic hypocrisy for what it lost regarding 
blood and financial scandals”. This included the creation of re-education camps for unemployed 
youth (Prunier 1995: 88-89). More seriously, dissent was sometimes silenced by violent means. The 
country was “close to collapse” by the late 1980s (Reader 1998: 668), and the political scene fell into 
a “deep and pervasive crisis” in early 1990 (Prunier 1995: 90). The Habyarimana regime called in the 
World Bank and IMF to help with the country’s strained financial situation. Habyarimana even went 
as far as acknowledging the need for a multi-party state early in 1990.  
 
At this stage, the post-coup d’état dominant network was still in place. The turbulent late 1980s did 
not deliver a new leader or leadership in the country as the political climate was too constrained – 
nobody was able to utilise the window of opportunity. The change had to come from another external 
shock. The Burundi-based RPF, created in 1987 by Tutsi refugees, was informed in 1990 by 
dissidents from Kigali that the Habyarimana government was on the verge of collapse, and that a 
strong push from abroad could complete its demise (Prunier 1995: 90). Both the Rwandan and 
Burundian governments were aware of the RPF’s military preparations and the support it was 
receiving from the Ugandan military, though its leaders in the capitals Bujumbura and Kampala did 
not officially endorse this campaign (Klinghoffer 1998: 15). Other foreign governments offered 
financing and military training, albeit unofficially (Overdulve 1995: 22).  
 
Under Paul Kagame (then a major-general84) the RPF crossed the northern border in October 1990 in 
an attempt to gain control over some of the Rwandan land area. Although the Habyarimana regime 
deflected the poorly supplied initial onslaught towards Kigali with the aid of a few thousand French, 
Belgian and Zairian troops, sporadic fighting continued during 1991-1993. According to Jones (2001: 
28), the violence had three immediate and notable impacts on the country beyond the apparent 
outbreak of what was primarily a civil war: 
 
 The economic situation deteriorated further and drained the government's coffers 
 Social order was placed under further strain 
 The country’s once-positive international image degraded and stimulated international 
pressure for reform 
 
 
                                                          
83 The only reason why Rwanda could support such a dense population is the fertility of its rich volcanic soils (Griffiths 
1993: 124). Mountainous areas were also natural fortresses against hostile intruders – e.g. 19th century Swahili slave 
traders from the Indian Ocean coast (Sellstrom and Wohlgemuth 1997: 16).  
84 Kagame gained his military experience in the Ugandan bush war (1981-1986) and was the counter-intelligence chief 
of the country’s National Resistance Army (NRA). His experiences in Uganda facilitated the development of the RPF 
into a military power.  
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The civil war in Rwanda from 1990 to 1994 received much less attention abroad than the 1994 
genocide did.85 However, the impact of the RPF invasion was nontrivial since it was the precursor to 
a change in local politics in the run-up to the genocide. Notably, it contributed to increased external 
political pressure: with the end of the cold war, Western governments were no longer willing to 
support one-party African states (Jones 1999: 53-55). The Habyarimana regime had to intensify its 
incremental changes to retain power.  
 
External pressure (led by the French government) forced Habyarimana to formally end the MRND’s 
monopoly on political power in 1991. While a commission was established in September 1990 to 
investigate this issue, and was given a two-year mandate to do so, the attack by the RPF less than a 
month later pushed Habyarimana to allow multiple political parties in November of that year. This 
immediately resulted in the establishment of a robust Hutu opposition movement. The Republican-
Democratic Movement (RMD) was formed as a successor to PARMEHUTU. The MRND also 
created a new party constitution in June 1991, and changed its name to the Mouvement Républicain 
National pour la Démocratie et le Développement to formalise the shift from a one-party to a multi-
party state. Habyarimana quickly organised elections, but opposition parties boycotted this in the 
belief that the timeframe favoured the incumbent. Protests followed in November 1991 and January 
1992. Eventually, in the face of a political attack from the opposition parties emanating from the 
south, a recurring military onslaught from the north, and escalating external diplomatic pressure, 
MRND formed a coalition government in April 1992 with all opposition parties (Sahinkuye 2000: 
159-161). 
 
On face value, this could be interpreted as a change in the dominant network and a subsequent change 
to constitutional-level institutions, as envisaged in the critical transitions framework. However, this 
interpretation would be incorrect. While a more open political space increased the nominal 
representativeness of the Rwandan government, the coalition government was established with a mere 
12-month lifetime. In addition, while the post of prime minister was created and given to an 
opposition leader, Habyarimana still wielded almost all the power – including the authority to veto 
decisions by the prime minister (Klinghoffer 1998: 20). Habyarimana’s move to create a new 
coalition government was only a tactic to bide time until he could resolve the RPF threat. Most of the 
provisions in the 1991 document were similar to those of the one-party constitution adopted in 1978 
(Sahinkuye 2000: 160). This implies that the nominal changes in the country's laws masked the extent 
to which the dominant network remained a MRND-dominated group with established beliefs about 
appropriate economic and political outcomes. The developments in June 1991 and April 1992 were 
therefore only a start to (and not a complete period of) change in the dominant network and 
constitutional-level institutions.  
 
G) Shock – deviated outcomes 
 
With so many challenges to the country’s economic and political outcomes since the mid-1980s, the 
dominant network (and its beliefs) entered a period of flux during 1992 that would not see any real 
resolution until 1994. At the start, there was the MRND-only government. This was followed by the 
coalition government that nominally included opposition parties. The akusa still manoeuvred to hold 
on to power during this second period as they were not willing to relinquish the rents that they were 
able to secure under the previous system (Straus 2006: 25). Stoking racial hatred was part of their 
tactics: uniting local Hutu against the Tutsi-led RPF was a rallying cry for the MRND to try to retain 
                                                          
85 Prunier (1995) and Jones (1999) provided detailed overviews of the war.  
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its power. Limited success with this propaganda and a military stalemate against the RPF convinced 
the Habyarimana regime to enter into peace talks after a ceasefire was agreed to by both parties. 
International mediation sought to include the RPF in the coalition government (and by implication 
the dominant network). Many international observers attended the talks, which began in August 1992 
in Arusha, Tanzania (Sahinkuye 2000: 161-163). An African peacekeeping force was deployed under 
the control of the Organisation for African Unity (OAU). The country was at that stage afflicted by a 
widening trade deficit, weakening exchange rate, rising consumer price inflation, and dwindling 
foreign reserves (Prunier 1995: 159-160). 
 
The Arusha negotiations took over a year to conclude. During this period, the Rwandan government 
was in varying degrees of shambles, with no explicit dominant grouping. Habyarimana struggled to 
balance the demands of his loyalists, opposition groupings, renegade northern groupings previously 
loyal to the MRND, the RPF and international stakeholders. Rwandan politicians opposed the 
transitional government proposed in the Arusha Peace Agreement (Klinghoffer 1998: 26-29). The 
13-month negotiating process witnessed the signing of six highly detailed agreements between Kigali 
and the RPF that became known as the Arusha Peace Agreement (or Arusha Accords) when 
concluded in August 1993. These included agreements on ceasefires, the rule of law, repatriation of 
refugees, and integration of armed forces. The Arusha Peace Agreement superseded many articles in 
the 1991 constitution dealing with government (Gahamanyi 2003: 257-258).  
 
The future makeup of the dominant network would be directly affected by the protocol agreement on 
broad-based power sharing – the longest of all the protocols – signed in January 1993. The 
negotiations around this pact were surprisingly smooth (Prunier 1995: 166). The protocol stipulated 
reduced presidential powers and increased powers for the prime minister and Council of Ministers 
(Gahamanyi 2003: 260-261). Importantly, the new Council of Ministers would make decisions by 
consensus. The 21-member council would include the following role players:  
 
 five representatives from MRND,  
 five from the RPF,  
 four from the Mouvement Démocratique Républicain (MDR),  
 three from the Parti Social Démocrate (PSD),  
 three from the Parti Libéral (PL), and  
 one from the Parti Démocrate Centriste (PDC). 
 
Under another protocol, RPF members were integrated into the national military. The respective 
Arusha protocols would have realigned the political system and structure in Kigali, i.e. the dominant 
network (Jones 1999: 68). However, the protocol was not fully implemented, with Sahinkuye (2000: 
163-170) identifying several reasons: 
 
 RPF unhappiness with the inclusion of French troops in a Kigali-based international peace 
force 
 Divisions in the MDR made it impossible for the party to provide its three ministers 
 The PL split into two factions 
 The RPF refused to sit next to the Coalition for the Defence of the Republic (CDR) delegate 
due to ethnic issues 
 More ethnic tension stirred by the assassination of Burundian President Melchior Ndadaye (a 
Hutu) in October 1993 
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Although several ministers were appointed, the Broad-Based Transitional Government (BBTG) was 
not fully constituted, the inauguration of the new parliament never took place, and political violence 
continued during late 1993 and early 1994.86 A nominal coalition government existed in which the 
opposition held key portfolios; in reality, however, there was a major political impasse. In other 
words, the dominant network had still not stabilised, the public sector was paralysed (Straus 2006: 
31), and the economy was in shambles. Multilateral organisations attempted to resolve the country’s 
economic and political problems with Structural Adjustment Programmes, a multiparty 
democratisation process, and peace negotiations. All three strategies were intended to contribute to 
the restoration of stability and to serve as bases for further development in the country (Andresen 
2000: 446).  
 
The multilateral efforts spearheaded by the World Bank and United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) failed, however, and actually caused the country to plunge into deeper disarray. 
Andersen (2000) showed that the three strategies had contradictory and mutually conflicting effects. 
Firstly, economic SAPs and multiparty democratisation clashed from a policy-making perspective. 
Adjustment strategies were imposed from outside the country and not through internal democratic 
processes. Thus, one part of the international community wanted to impose stabilisation policies while 
the other called for democratisation and indigenous decision-making. Secondly, adjustment 
programmes and peace processes divided the beliefs of the dominant network. The reality that 
disbursement of finances associated with adjustment programmes was tied to the implementation of 
the Arusha Accords left Habyarimana torn between the donor aid-hungry akusa and the need to find 
other forms of external financing to stabilise the country. Thirdly, multiparty democratisation and 
peace processes undermined each other. The aims of multiparty democratisation included 
fragmentation of the existing political groupings and stimulation of electoral competition, while peace 
processes involved unification of and cooperation between political fractions (Andersen 2000: 446). 
 
Andersen (2000: 446-447) found that these three strategies jointly contributed to a weakening of the 
akusa, and made it impossible for Habyarimana to comply with the repeated demands of the UN to 
implement the Arusha Accords. As a result, there was a growing sense of insecurity among the elite 
that stoked further conflict. In the early part of 1994, the peak of what Rwandans refer to as the period 
of “hesitation and uncertainty” (Prunier 1995: 210), an external solution to Rwanda’s problems 
remained elusive, while armed conflict escalated. The spark that lit the genocide fuse was the death 
of Habyarimana – the biggest player in Rwanda’s dominant network – in a plane crash on 6 April 
1994. Within hours of the plane being shot down by unknown attackers87, presidential guards and 
militia in the capital were killing people deemed to oppose the MRND rule. This included the prime 
                                                          
86 The UN was supposed to ensure that the BBTG became and remained operational. The international peacekeeping 
force that deployed in Kigali was smaller than pledged by international stakeholders, arrived later than the unrealistic 
timelines demanded, and had to redeploy some members to Burundi following the assassination of Ndadaye (Jones 1999: 
72-73).  
87 Habyarimana and Burundian President Cyprien Ntaryamira shared an aircraft home following a regional political 
gathering in Dar-es-Salaam. A French-piloted, four-year old Dassault Falcon 50 intended to drop Habyarimana in Kigali 
and continue with Ntaryamira to Bujumbara. On approach to Kigali International Airport, two missiles fired from just 
outside the airport’s perimeter struck the aircraft. The plane crashed in the garden of Habyarimana’s house and both 
presidents were killed (Prunier 1995: 231-232). The wreckage was not thoroughly investigated (Klinghoffer 1998: 41) 
and the attackers never claimed responsibility. Speculation about the identity of the attackers continues to this day. It was 
thought at the time of the event that elements within the akusa were responsible (Overdulve 1995: 27). Some blamed the 
Presidential Guard for the act, for example, ostensibly because of fears that that the unit might be dissolved (Sellstrom 
and Wohlgemuth 1997: 50). 
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minister (and his Belgian guards), the president of the constitutional court, as well as several other 
former and serving ministers and their families. Both Hutu and Tutsi were killed.  
 
Journalists, priests and business people who were not known to be MRND supporters were also 
targeted. The FAR, in turn, took up arms to try to stop the killings (Prunier 1995: 29-32). The 
dominant network was being slaughtered to make way for a new ruling elite. By April 9, military 
colonels Theoneste Bagosora and Pierre-Celestin Rwagafilita declared a new cabinet – the so-called 
Crisis Committee – with the MRND, MDR, PSD, PDC and PL represented at the executive level. 
The ageing akusa heavyweight Theodore Sindikubwabo took over as interim president, but was 
widely seen as a puppet of the military leaders. The opposition parties were represented in the new 
cabinet by delegates favouring the so-called “final solution” of Tutsi killings. The more moderate 
ministers did not express any opposition (Prunier 1995: 29-33).  
 
The genocide started in the second week of April and continued for three months. Only 100,000 
bodies were officially counted and buried in the Rwandan capital and western Uganda (the 
neighbouring country counted the bodies that floated across Lake Victoria). The UN estimated that 
500,000 Rwandans were killed, though estimates based on census data, refugee centre records and 
population growth trends suggest that up to 850,000 Tutsi and 30,000 Hutu were killed (Reader 1998: 
670 & 672). These numbers imply that seven out of every eight Tutsi were killed in 100 days. Some 
10% of the population died from this conflict while another 30% went into exile.88 Straus (2006: 222) 
listed five principal sources of state power in the country that enabled mass civilian mobilisation 
during the genocide: 
 
 A high degree of institutional continuity over the preceding century 
 The persistence of pre-colonial collective labour mobilisation into the post-colonial period 
 Dense human settlement 
 Human and physical geography that enabled close monitoring of people 
 The high cost of disobedience 
 
Immediate international response to the genocide was virtually non-existent (Jones 1999: 77). The 
OAU tried to organise a ceasefire between the groups during June 1994, but it was never 
implemented. The new government’s headquarters in Gitarama fell to the RPF on June 13, and the 
cabinet fled to a new installation at Gisenyi near the Zaire border. The RPF seized Kigali on July 4 
while the Gisenyi facility was secured on July 17 (Klinghoffer 1998: 58-59). At times during this 
period, more than 10,000 people per hour crossed the north-eastern border of Rwanda into Zaire 
(Wagner 2004: 1306).  
 
H) Window of opportunity for leadership 
 
The civil war was won by combat and certainly not through resolutions or negotiations: Although 
Western governments were aware of the extent of killing between April and July 1994, they failed to 
take adequate steps to prevent it. The genocide stopped only when a Tutsi army led by Kagame fought 
its way through northern Rwanda to the capital and captured other extremist strongholds (Meredith 
2014: 640). A new government ostensibly based on the Arusha Peace Agreement – the Broad-Based 
                                                          
88 Refugee numbers were not precise. However, different sources – the UN, US government and Medicines Sans 
Frontieres (MSF) – suggested that some 60% fled to Zaire. Other destinations included Burundi, Tanzania and Uganda, 
while an additional 1.3 million Rwandans were displaced within the country (Prunier 1995: 312). 
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Government of National Unity – was declared on July 18. A five-party coalition formed a new cabinet 
that excluded the MRND and CDR and included several Hutu ministers. The portfolio allocations 
adhered to the specification in the Arusha Accords. However, the cabinet was far from efficient. Only 
two out of the 22 ministers had previously held cabinet or similar level posts. Furthermore, most of 
the ministers lacked proper offices, administrative personnel, basic stationery and electricity (Prunier 
1995: 300),  
 
The top leadership of the RPF, who deviated from the Arusha Peace Agreement by taking up the 
cabinet positions that the accords allocated to the MRND, was firmly in the driving seat (Gahamanyi 
2003: 264). Nonetheless, the new government was certainly exclusively Tutsi, as was suggested by 
some international media outlets at the time. Many top positions were held by Hutu and opposition 
party members (Gahamanyi 2003: 285). Vice President Kagame produced the kind of leadership 
required by the critical transitions framework during windows of opportunity to establish a 
meaningful change in the structure of government. For example, he guided the protocol agreement 
between political parties that confirmed a partnership between the RPF and most other political 
parties (Gahamanyi 2003: 264).  
 
3.6 Post-Genocide Rebuilding: 1994 onwards 
 
A) Economic and political outcomes 
 
The new government faced daunting economic challenges. The conflict that began in 1990 and ended 
in 1994 destroyed the physical and institutional infrastructure necessary for development in modern, 
market-based economies. Almost all economic sectors in Rwanda collapsed in the year of the 
genocide (Kimanuka 2009: 12, 45).89 World Bank data indicate that real activity (measured at factor 
cost) in the crucial agricultural sector dropped by a cumulative 43% during 1993-1994 as death ripped 
through the country’s rural areas.90 The small manufacturing sector contracted by almost 63% during 
the two-year period while industrial activity as a whole declined by more than 70%. The output of 
the tertiary sector dropped by more than 56% as government services shut down and private sector 
professionals fled the country. On aggregate, IMF data indicate that real GDP practically halved 
during 1993-1994, while government spending and the volume of merchandise exports both dropped 
by almost two-thirds. The fiscal deficit jumped to more than 10% of GDP in 199491 and consumer 
price inflation reached nearly 50% on a year-on-year basis by December of that year. It is therefore 
not surprising to read Kelsall (2013: 120) claim that decades of progress in the small economy were 
wiped out by the end of the genocide.  
 
However, it must be stressed that the genocide was also a watershed moment for the country’s 
economy after an already challenging period during the 1980s and early 1990s. IMF data indicate that 
the loss in real economic activity (as measured in constant local currency prices) during 1993-1994 
was recovered by 2000. Real GDP increased by an average of 17% p.a. from 1995 to 1997 followed 
                                                          
89 Using econometric methods, Kaberuka, Ocaya and Ruranga (2014) found a structural break in key macroeconomic data 
between the pre- and post-genocide periods. 
90 The drop in food production severely affected nutrition. By 1993, one in three Rwandans were consuming less than 
1,000 calories per day compared to 15% some five years earlier (Sellstrom and Wohlgemuth 1997: 37).  
91 This was also due in part to a quadrupling in military spending (as percentage of GDP) between 1989 and 1992 
(Sellstrom and Wohlgemuth 1997: 39). 
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by an average of 7.5% p.a. from 1998 to 201592, from a mean of just 1.7% p.a. from 1980 to 1992. 
The economic recovery was exceptional (Ansoms 2011: 241). Importantly, the country’s economic 
prospects remained bright even after the 1995-2000 catch-up period following the 1990-1994 war. 
Data from the African Centre for Economic Transformation (ACET) for the period from 2000 to 2010 
indicate that Rwanda recorded the largest diversification of domestic production and exports amongst 
21 African countries surveyed. It also recorded the most significant increase in productivity amongst 
these states and the second-largest improvement in technological capability (ACET 2014: 196). 
Against the background of the destruction from the genocide and the post-war resource constraints, 
Rwanda is a case study of success in post-conflict reconstruction. As indicated in Section 1.1, the 
country is considered to have displayed one of the most impressive examples of post-conflict 
reconstruction in human history. Invigorated by its leadership's ability to guide national development, 
Rwanda has made great strides in improving the business environment for private enterprises. 
 
For the average Rwandan, the post-genocide period has also meant a transformation of socio-
economic conditions. Data collected by the UN as part of its Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
campaign indicate that the share of underweight children dropped from 24.3% in 1992 to 11.7% some 
18 years later as the share of the population classified as undernourished dropped from 53.9% before 
the genocide to 37.3% in 2010. Mortality of children under the age of five jumped from 170 per 1,000 
live births in 1992-1993 to an average of 230 during 1994-1999 before gradually declining to just 50 
by 2015. Infant mortality displayed a similar trend. The proportion of the urban population living in 
slums declined from 87.9% immediately after the genocide to 53.2% in 2014. Real private final 
consumption (i.e. inflation-adjusted household spending) increased by an average of 7.1% p.a. from 
2000 to 2014, according to data from Business Monitor International (BMI).  
 
To be sure, some socio-economic indicators have not shown marked improvements in the post-
genocide period. Literacy rates amongst young adults and the share of women in wage employment 
in the non-agricultural sector, for example, have changed little. Still, from a socio-economic 
perspective, Kagame’s high approval ratings do not appear farfetched given his successes. A 2014 
study by the Institute for Policy Analysis and Research (IPAR) Rwanda found that the president had 
an approval rating of 98.7% (Rutayisire 2014). Even critics like Reyntjens (2013: 97) believe that 
Kagame should be congratulated on his goal of improving social and economic indicators as a strategy 
to add legitimacy to its rule. 
 
Agricultural production in the country has benefitted from the increased use of fertiliser and improved 
seeds, amongst other reforms. Nonetheless, in reaching socio-economic goals, Kagame has been 
reducing the country’s dependence on agriculture, specifically subsistence farming. This resulted in 
agricultural jobs declining from 89% of employment before the genocide to 79.6% in 2010. 
Furthermore, urbanisation increased from 5.4% to 24% over the same period. The government has 
made many good decisions to support the development of a diversified, market-based and competitive 
economy. These have included the implementation of robust anti-corruption measures, removal of 
bureaucratic barriers for private business, growing regional integration, liberalisation of trade, and 
respect for property rights (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2014a: 14). Because of the country’s limited natural 
resources (apart from fertile soils and hydroelectric potential), the RPF has focused on 
technologically-driven development for the country. The UN (2011) acknowledged that thoughtful 
policies were transforming the country from an agrarian-based society into a knowledge-based 
                                                          
92 This was the fifth-highest average for the period amongst SSA economies after Sierra Leone, Angola, Ethiopia and 
Mozambique. 
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economy. These policies – including the aim of transforming the country into a regional technology 
hub – were stimulating entrepreneurial activity.  
 
On the fiscal front, the central government recorded an average budget deficit equal to only 0.05% of 
GDP during the 2002-2013 period – the finance ministry strives for a balanced budget – compared to 
a SSA average shortfall of 1.3% of GDP (IMF 2016). This was achieved through financial control as 
well as the mobilisation of substantial international donor assistance – in the 2009/10 fiscal budget, 
for example, receipts from abroad accounted for just over half of the total revenue (Kelsall 2013: 
142). This enabled the country to limit gross government debt to an average of 46.6% of GDP during 
2002-2013 compared to the SSA average of 67.1% of GDP. The country secured significant debt 
relief under the Highly-Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) programme and Multilateral Debt Relief 
Initiative (MDRI), with gross government debt dropping from more than 100% of GDP in 2002-2003 
to less than 30% of GDP by 2006 – and maintained below this level until 2013 (IMF 2016). The 
effective use of state resources has extended to effective anti-corruption processes. The Rwandan 
government was recognised for its fight against corruption, with some state workers removed from 
office because of possible involvement in corruption (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2016a: 39-40). 
 
By 2014, the country’s economic indicators looked robust, its political stability was unrivalled in a 
regional context, and international goodwill has not diminished significantly. While anxiety, 
pessimism and uncertainty persist both locally and abroad, the regime’s determination and resolve 
are unshaken. The Kagame administration is “convinced in its almost biblical call to lead its people 
out of the political abyss” (Kiwuwa 2012: 138). Many of the RPF’s actions have been directed by the 
desire to continue this ‘biblical call’. At the helm of this political machine has been long-serving 
Kagame. Following the genocide, he moulded state machinery with a decentralised distribution of 
management power by expanding the responsibilities given to district governments during the era of 
the Second Republic. A key aim of the decentralisation philosophy has been to enable district 
governments to have a greater involvement in and control over agricultural modernisation 
(Bertelsmann Stiftung 2012a: 24). The longevity of the RPF’s de facto one-party rule has been heavily 
dependent on maintaining Kagame’s direct control over this decentralised state. The greatest enigma 
to those who wonder about Rwanda’s prospects has been Kagame himself – a visionary endowed 
with enormous energy and ambition. Because he so totally dominates Rwandan life, his choices are 
decisively shaping the country’s future (Kinzer 2008: 4-5). 
 
B) Dominant network 
 
The RPF was the only source of real power in the country at the start of this epoch, with Alexis 
Kanyargwenge as its leader and mouthpiece (Prunier 1995: 300). However, Kagame immediately 
became the most important person in the new government and the mastermind of RPF economic 
policy (Overdulve 1995: 28). A position of vice president was created for Kagame in order to place 
him in a position of general oversight and control of the government without making him president. 
The latter title went to Pasteur Bizimungu; a Hutu businessman and figurehead for the RPF regime 
whose primary job was to execute decisions made by other state organs. Kagame was the real leader: 
he was now the de facto head of the ruling party, the head of the army, defence minister, and deputy 
president as well. The position of deputy president was also not answerable to the country’s new 
legislature, according to the July 17 declaration (Sahinkuye 2000: 282-283). In Kagame’s own words, 
he was a leader “[n]ot by design, however, more by default.” He still believes that people were under 
the impression that he was the country’s leader and that he could not change this perspective. Even 
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when foreign ministers and diplomats arrived, they asked to speak to him and not the president. 
Kagame, the leader of the revolution, did not envision this system when he chose to not take the post 
of a national leader (Soudan 2015: 76-77).  
 
Kagame’s dominant network consisted of the RPF Political Bureau; this body of political 
heavyweights appointed the president who, in turn, could dismiss the cabinet and prime minister 
(Gahamanyi 2003: 264). The grouping was able to function without disruption when Bizimungu 
resigned in 2000. The RPF Political Bureau’s monopoly over the country’s political system 
consolidated quickly (Clark 2010: 22). Even though there were some changes in the cabinet due to 
infighting in the ruling party, including resignations by the president, prime minister and speaker, 
Kagame and his core network remained in charge. This remained the case when political and military 
leaders from the Habyarimana regime joined the regime in the early 2000s (Kelsall 2013: 123). At 
the helm remained Kagame and his RPF Political Bureau. 
 
The new government was not stagnant in its governance style during the first decade of its rule and 
experienced a period of transition that culminated in the 2003 presidential and parliamentary elections 
(Clark 2010: 19). The Transitional National Assembly was, as suggested by its name, responsible for 
managing the country until multiparty elections could be held. The RPF elite tightly controlled the 
process, and the communal elections held in 1999 and regional elections in 2001 were elements of an 
effort to identify support bases for different parties in order to manage the outcome of the national 
elections in 2003. As a result, Kagame easily won this communal and regional poll with 95% of the 
vote as well as the national elections in 2010 with 93% of the vote (Daley 2009: 176-177). Reyntjens 
(2013: 55-56) claims that every election in Rwanda in the new millennium has been “deeply flawed” 
and that the government, Rwandan citizens and the international donor community are well aware of 
this. Nonetheless, Kagame’s approval ratings have been exceptionally high, as was indicated above.  
 
While Kagame’s electoral successes might be tainted, his endorsement by the electorate reflects 
“more than anything else, an appreciation of the peace, security and broad social and economic 
progress that has accompanied his rule” (Kelsall 2013: 123). While tight legislative and political 
control may have undermined the depth of democracy, the elections legitimised the RPF’s political 
strategy over the preceding nine years (Kiwuwa 2012: 158). It must also be stressed that, despite the 
approval given to the ruling party, the country’s post-election governments have not been winners-
take-all affairs dominated by the RPF. Ministerial posts – which cannot be held by Members of 
Parliament (MPs) – are shared between the ruling and opposition parties on a proportional basis. 
Opposition representatives also occupy the positions of prime minister and speaker. Essentially, post-
2003 governments have been coalition-style outfits similar to the post-1994 unity government. This 
made governance more inclusive and allowed political parties to work towards long-term goals 
(Kelsall 2013: 124). The presidency regards it as consensus rule rather than majority rule (Kiwuwa 
2012: 117).  
 
C) Beliefs 
 
The Kagame regime believes that a non-ethnic ethos is needed for a prosperous future. The RPF 
wants the words ‘Hutu’ and ‘Tutsi’ relegated to the past, and questions about someone’s ethnicity are 
seen as being “divisionist” (Dowden 2008: 252). In a wide-ranging self-assessment as part of the 
African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), the government declined to comment at all on ethnic 
relations in post-genocide Rwanda (Gruzd and Herbert 2008: 228). Instead, it has focused on fostering 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
69 
 
a new ‘Banyarwanda’ identity (Kiwuwa 2012: 119). The post-genocide government “has promoted 
an idealised, socially harmonious vision” of pre-colonial Ruanda while preferring the term “cultural 
communities” when speaking of ethnic groupings (Daley 2009: 169).93 The Kagame government has 
also rejected the previous regime’s style of public management in favour of a style that has 
accommodated more input from citizens about things that affect their day-to-day lives. A people-
focussed system with broad-based participation by the public is seen as a requirement for economic 
development in the 21st century. In addition, the RPF believes that a vibrant economic climate with 
private sector growth and increased rural economic activity is needed to strengthen the process of 
national reconciliation (Kimanuka 2009: 13, 15). 
 
The new government has also favoured a decentralised administration – through the devolution of 
decision-making to the five subnational governments – to achieve its economic and political 
outcomes. This has contrasted with the centralised decision-making that authorities maintained for 
several centuries before that. Nevertheless, this should not come as a surprise: under the old order, 
accountability in the public sector was towards the top leadership of the country, and not to the 
citizens as Kagame desired. In addition, the highly centralised nature of the previous government was 
said to have been at the core of the organisational ability that enabled it to plan and implement the 
genocide. The decentralised structure, therefore, has played a critical role in the country’s economic, 
political and social transformation (Kimanuka 2009: 43, 49-50). 
 
Nonetheless, the scope for decision-making in the civil service and public entities has been limited 
by a system of performance targets and related contracts determined by the RPF. This has meant that 
the dominant network has been able to coerce lower levels of government to address the issues that 
they deem important (Kelsall 2013: 126). The state has had a “top-down developmental agenda” of 
reshaping the rural environment to move the country to ‘medium human development’ status 
(Ansoms 2011: 240, 248). This has left very little room for bottom-up feedback mechanisms.  
 
D) Constitutional-level institutions 
 
The Transitional National Assembly approved the next constitution on 5 May 1995. Known as the 
Basic Act, the legislation consisted of the previous constitution (1991), the Arusha Peace Agreement 
(finalised in 1993), the RPF Declaration on the Establishment of Institutions (July 1994), the Protocol 
Agreement Between the Political Powers (November 1994), and the Fundamental Law of the 
Rwandan Republic (1995). The new legislature also introduced some amendments to these texts, in 
the form of the Basic Act Revision (January 1996), to adapt constitutional-level institutions to the 
realities of the country. Officially, the latest text prevailed whenever there were instances of conflict 
between these documents (Gahamanyi 2003: 257 & 264). In reality, the RPF declaration was 
considered the apex of the hierarchy of constitutional documents (Sahinkuye 2000: 282). The 1995 
constitution provided “a legal and practical framework to a new political landscape that aimed at 
healing Rwanda’s divided past and stitching its shredded social tapestry back together” (Kiwuwa 
2012: 133).  
 
                                                          
93 While the Rwandan government has constrained meaningful debate on ethnicity with this strategy, the state cannot 
erase the discussion and can only send it underground. Kiwuwa (2012: 161-162) warned that repression of personal voices 
was a dangerous path to take, as these voices may temporarily disappear only to reappear at some point in time with much 
more intensity and rigor. The reason behind this is simple: “To many, ethnicity and ethnic identification is not just felt or 
seasonal, it defines their everyday life chances. It determines who gets what, when and where, in short, it defines and 
determines their very existence” (Kiwuwa 2012: 161-162). 
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Early in 2003, some 93% of Rwandans voted in a referendum to accept a new and more people-
centred constitution. The document provided a clear demarcation of the powers held by the executive, 
legislature and judiciary (Kiwuwa 2012: 134). The new constitution was adopted in May 2003 and 
was followed by multiparty parliamentary and presidential elections in August and September, 
respectively (Kimanuka 2009: 41). In keeping with the RPF’s beliefs, the new constitution prohibited 
political mobilisation based on race, ethnic group (e.g. tribe or clan), region, religion, or any other 
division which may give rise to discrimination (Du Toit 2009: 32). The constitution institutionalised 
RPF dominance (Reyntjens 2010: 16) to such an extent that the country was deemed under 
authoritarian rule (Longman 2011: 27). While acknowledging that the 2003 document is an imperfect 
manifestation of the democratic ethos, Kiwuwa (2012: 137) explained that it represents an innovative 
solution to the challenges of modern-day Rwanda. He believed that opportunities may arise for 
constitutional adjustment that could eventually align the document with generally recognised 
democratic parameters. At the very least, the 2003 constitution restored electoral democracy, which 
was missing under Habyarimana.  
 
Regarding other top-level incentive structures, the Kagame regime viewed private-sector-led 
economic growth and development as critical for the country’s future, and implemented a hybrid 
approach to investment promotion. On the one hand, it implemented policies and established 
institutions promoted by multilateral agencies as best practice for promoting private sector investment 
and activity. Conventional arms-length investment promotion and facilitation was headed by the 
Rwanda Development Board (RDB), which clearly has been successful. Rwanda was singled out by 
the World Bank as having made more reforms to improve its business environment than any other 
country in the 15-year period until 2013 (Kelsall 2013: 126-127). According to the World Bank 
(2013: 37), these changes transformed the private sector. On the other hand, Kagame also followed a 
more activist approach with the formation of the RPF holding company, Tri-Star Investments, and 
the army’s investment arm, the Horizon Group. These entities are tied to state structures but run as 
commercial enterprises. Both have facilitated private sector investments as shareholders (for example, 
by initiating the entry of mobile telecommunications giant MTN into the country). Tri-Star and 
Horizon have also taken responsibility for addressing shortcomings in the domestic economy after 
the genocide by resuscitating the construction industry, among other things. There was little evidence 
that the two have crowded out competitors (Kelsall 2013: 127-134, 143).  
 
The education system also experienced significant change when schools reopened in September 1994 
(Moshman 2015: 3). Teaching moved away from the ethnically divisive curriculum of the pre-
genocide period. In line with the ‘Banyarwanda’ identity and in recognition of its healing potential, 
education in Rwanda was converted to a tool of reconciliation. Discrimination at higher levels of 
education was replaced by merit-based structures. Pupils are informed about peace, justice, tolerance, 
reconciliation and national unity, and are exposed at different levels of education to the genocide 
history. To prevent a recurrence of the genocide, it is believed to be crucial that all young Rwandans 
should know the country’s history leading up to the 1994 massacre. To this end, the National 
University of Rwanda offers a Master’s degree in Genocide Studies and Prevention (Mafeza 2013: 
5). Despite significant progress, however, the education system remains exclusionary. For example, 
the policy of funding education for genocide survivors is systematically favouring Tutsi over Hutu 
(Moshman 2015: 3).  
 
The Catholic Church has played a much smaller role in education after the genocide and has focussed 
more on its core functions as a religious entity. In the immediate aftermath of the genocide, many in 
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the RPF saw the Catholic Church as a threat to their new roles in government. Many churches (and 
other civil society groups) were forced to elect new leadership structures for approval by the ruling 
party (Reyntjens 2013: 57). Having lost its political power, the church has seen its role in post-conflict 
reconciliation as that of being a safety hub, provider of emergency relief and humanitarian assistance, 
promoter of constructive political dialogue, as well as an engine of democratisation and institution-
building (Katunga 2008). In 2017, Pope Francis apologised in a meeting with Kagame for the failings 
of the church and for the missionaries who “succumbed to hatred and violence” during the genocide 
(Wooden 2017). The Catholic Church is no longer the dominant Christian denomination: only 44% 
of the population was classified as Catholic in 2012, while nearly 50% self-identified as Protestants 
(Fried 2017).  
 
E) Laws and enforcement 
 
The post-1994 period has been difficult for Rwanda because infrastructure, institutions and trust had 
to be rebuilt (Gruzd and Herbert 2008: 215). The genocide resulted in the destruction of the country’s 
social fabric, its human resource base, institutional capacity, and economic and social infrastructure 
(Kimanuka 2009: 39). The impact of fatalities on the normal functioning of the public sector was 
inflated by the centralised nature of decision-making in the country: once the government fell, the 
entire system of governance was also decimated. Only a third of civil servants and a mere 3% of 
professional staff were back at their desks by the end of 1994 (Kimanuka 2009: 45). The judiciary 
was all but destroyed, with judicial infrastructure decimated and most of the country’s judges either 
killed or in exile (Clark 2009: 248). There were only 12 prosecutors and 244 judges left in the country 
by November 1994 compared to 70 prosecutors and 758 judges a year earlier (Brehm, Uggen and 
Gasanabo 2014: 335). The police force was non-existent, few lawyers remained, and no bar 
association existed to manage the profession. The head prosecutor in Kigali retuned to an office 
without door frames, and a journalist had to provide him with a copy of the penal code (Melvern 
2004: 252). Nonetheless, despite the physical and human capital shortcomings, there was a desperate 
need for justice.  
 
One of the things the government to did get the paralysed judicial system back on its feet was to relax 
the requirement that superior court justices should hold bachelor’s degrees (Gahamanyi 2003: 263, 
265). The deterioration in the quality of jurisprudence during the 1980s and early 1990s was turned 
around in 1996 when the Kagame administration (with help from the UN and foreign governments) 
started a massive overhaul of the judiciary that included training of new judges and lawyers and 
construction of new courthouses across the country. International observers soon praised the court 
system for its speed and quality of legal standards (Clark 2010: 21). Donors spent some $100 million 
from 1996 to 2000 on justice-related projects, and some 80% of the justice ministry’s budget was 
funded from abroad. Donors were also at the forefront of the campaign for the resuscitation of the 
old-style Gacaca system (Daley 2009: 179). It was notable that Rwanda became increasingly 
dependent on aid from the US and the United Kingdom and distanced itself from the French, who 
had backed the Habyarimana regime (Kelsall 2013: 122).94 By 1996, legal staff had expanded to 210 
prosecutors and 841 judges. Nonetheless, even at full capacity, the justice system was struggling as 
it had to deal with claims against one in eight Rwandans (Brehm, Uggen and Gasanabo 2014: 335). 
 
                                                          
94 Over the period 1994-2002, the US and United Kingdom contributed $294 million in donor aid to Rwanda, which 
represented 46.3% of the country's receipts from bilateral donors. France, in turn, provided only $19.8 million (2.3%) 
(McCreless and Porter 2008: 23).  
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The state mandated the prosecution of genocide-related crimes to three different organisations: the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), the country's resuscitated national courts, and 
the tens of thousands of Gacaca courts. The Organic Law of 1996 distinguished four categories of 
genocide-related crimes. The various organisations had distinct jurisdictions with regards to the 
different types of crimes. Clear principles, however, did not exist to deal with instances when more 
than one court claimed jurisdiction over a case. This was especially problematic when local courts 
wanted to try cases where the death penalty could be applied – the ICTR did not want to deliver 
suspects to domestic courts in such circumstances. However, this was overcome in 2007 with the 
abolishment of the death penalty (Clark 2009: 247-248, 253-254 & 264). 
 
The Gacaca system can be interpreted as “the use of peaceful means of mediation, negotiation, 
arbitration and reconciliation” (Seleti 2004: 28-29), and its viability demonstrated how African 
judicial processes could coexist with international institutions such as the ICTR. The reinvented 
Gacaca system has been referred to as a state-sponsored quasi-legal mechanism (Du Toit 2009: 75). 
Almost every Rwandan adult has taken part in at least one Gacaca case as a witness or accused. 
Communities elected some 250,000 male and, for the first time, female judges. The judges were not 
formally trained and were appointed on the basis of four criteria: a visible commitment to justice, no 
record of previous criminal convictions or suspicion of crimes during the genocide, a minimum age 
of 21, and no leadership roles in government or in politics. They had to act in more than 10,000 
jurisdictions to prosecute genocidaires and to start to rebuild the country’s social fabric (Brehm, 
Uggen and Gasanabo 2014: 336).  
 
Clark’s (2008: 193 and 2010: 342) ethnographic investigation into the Gacaca system found that the 
core aims and expectations of the modern Gacaca were truth, peace, justice, healing, forgiveness, 
reconciliation, clearing the backlog of genocide cases95, improving conditions in prisons, and a 
somewhat unreasonable aim of supporting economic development.96 By 2010, as the courts were 
wrapping up their activity after having judged more than 1.2 million people, Clark (2010: 342-343) 
found that Gacaca had delivered highly variable results as far as these aims were concerned, but that 
substantial achievement should be recognised given the complexity of achieving so many objectives. 
Two shortcomings were the inability of these courts to legally deal with evidence (Daley 2009: 179) 
and the absence of legal representation for the accused (Kiwuwa 2012: 134).  
 
The legal and judicial environment was described by Reyntjens (2013: 74) as a “major instrument for 
redefining collective identities in a way rarely seen elsewhere”. To this day, legal and enforcement 
agencies actively entrench the Kagame regime’s beliefs regarding the damaging impact that anything 
related to genocide ideology could have on Rwandan society. This could include any ethnic discourse, 
political criticism, and the mention of human rights abuses (Waldorf 2009: 111). The country’s 
judicial framework is deliberately vague in order to enable the government to criminalise criticism 
and dissent under a banner of ethnic issues (Amnesty International 2010: 7), The RPF has controlled 
all elements of the judiciary, and no real independent adjudicator can determine the difference 
between divisive speech and genuine debate. The UN has also expressed concern about ill-defined 
laws and the need for urgent redefinition to ensure that the activities of the legitimate political 
                                                          
95 More than 135,000 genocide suspects were incarcerated by October 1997 in 19 prison facilities built for only 45,000 
inmates. The country’s prisons were operating at more than 200% capacity (Brehm, Uggen and Gasanabo 2014: 335) and 
up to ten inmates died every day (Wagner 2004: 1308). 
96 “Even champions of the Gacaca courts argue that it has failed to promote economic development. Most commentary 
has focused on the economic benefits of increasing the labour force by trying suspects, reducing the cost of keeping 
suspects in jail, and the potential compensation of genocide victims” (O’Reilly and Zhang 2015: 6).  
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opposition are not stifled. Interviews by Human Rights Watch with Rwandan jurists have indicated 
that broad and ill-defined charges of ‘divisionism’ and genocide ideology have frequently been used 
to serve political interests. This has raised serious questions about the separation of power between 
the legislature and the judiciary (Reyntjens (2013: 77-78). 
 
F) Incremental changes 
 
In May 2015, the country’s parliament started receiving formal petitions from citizens requesting a 
change to the constitution to allow Kagame to serve for a third term. As with other aspects of the 
tightly controlled political system, these petitions were orchestrated by the RPF Political Bureau. 
Soon after these petitions started surfacing, the parliament launched national consultations on the 
matter and in October 2015 voted in favour of changing the stipulations in the constitution on 
presidential terms. While these terms have been shortened to five (from seven) years, and a president 
can henceforth only be re-elected once, a special clause stipulated that Kagame could be re-elected 
for another seven-year term in 2017 (the next scheduled elections). Only after this term ends in 2024, 
would the five-year terms commence. However, Kagame would also be eligible for re-election for a 
second five-year term in 2029. These amendments have therefore enabled Kagame to extend his rule 
to 2034, i.e. to a term of up to 34 years (NKC African Economics 2015: 12). The solidification of 
Kagame’s future at the head of the RPF would remove one of the two potential threats to the country’s 
future development prospects identified by Kelsall (2013: 144): succession uncertainty and donor 
support. 
 
Given that the current period of institutional change has not reached an autopilot situation and that 
no observable deviations in the desired economic and political outcomes had occurred by 2014, 
Section 3.6 does not end with a description of a shock or window of opportunity.  
 
3.7 Conclusions 
 
This chapter used Alston et al.'s (2016) critical transitions framework to delineate five epochs of 
institutional change in Rwanda: pre-colonial times, colonial times, the two republics after 
independence, and the current period since the genocide. The first four eras all exhibited processes of 
institutional change akin to those in the critical transitions framework. The fifth era, which is ongoing, 
started when Kagame took control of the government after the genocide in April 1994. The former 
general showed leadership, identified by Alston et al. (2016) as a critical aspect of institutional 
change, by seizing a window of opportunity in 1994 during a period of flux in the country’s dominant 
network. A myriad of factors resulted in a sharp divergence between the economic and political 
outcomes expected by the former Habyarimana regime and the reality it experienced in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s.  
 
The most recent period of institutional change witnessed the Habyarimana akusa replaced by Kagame 
and the RPF elite. The country’s current institutional trajectory originated from the changes set in 
motion after the genocide, with incremental changes still taking place to maintain the autopilot 
situation. The Kagame government manufactured a significant change in the country’s dominant 
network and has maintained this position over the past two decades with ongoing processes of 
institutional change that have been solidifying his popularity amongst Rwandan voters. The changes 
put in place by the new movement have allowed the Rwandan economy to bounce back from a 
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challenging period in the late 1980s and early 1990s and to become a star performer amongst African 
countries. 
 
The purpose of the strict demarcation of elements in the discussion of each epoch of institutional 
change in Rwanda was to identify the critical factors associated with the country’s economic 
development over time. These factors were summarised in Table 3.1. As discussed throughout the 
chapter, the demarcation of the factors associated with institutional change highlighted that outcomes 
since the genocide have been markedly different from the agricultural-focussed ones of earlier 
epochs. The fifth and current period of institutional change brought a significant decline in 
agricultural employment (as a percentage of total employment) and a significant rise in the urban 
population (as a percentage of the total population). Rwanda was for most of its history an agricultural 
economy, and this changed markedly in the post-genocide period. One of the focus points of 
Kagame’s rebuilding plan was to improve the operating and investment environment for private 
enterprise in the secondary and tertiary sectors (a core theme of Chapter 5), with employment and 
economic growth seen as antidotes to the country’s history of ethnic divisions.  
 
This chapter also verified the generalisability of the critical transitions framework beyond Brazil and 
Argentina. A growing list of applications suggests that the critical transitions framework is useful not 
only for studying individual case studies of institutional change, but also for exploring concurrent 
institutional change in groups of countries. Moreover, the framework introduces two critical concepts 
related to processes of institutional change that this chapter found to be very relevant to the history 
of institutional change in Rwanda. The first of these is the notion of windows of opportunity for 
change. Such windows can be extended periods (as opposed to the fleeting critical junctures provided 
for in the collective action model). Secondly, the critical transitions framework incorporates the 
concept of leadership – the ability to perceive an opportunity for change and to harness the resources 
to effect it – as a prerequisite for putting such change in motion. Alston et al. (2016) showed that both 
concepts have been instrumental in institutional change in Brazil and Argentina. This chapter 
demonstrated that they were equally important in Rwanda.  
 
Alston et al. (2016: 208) stated that such applications of their model would produce more general 
lessons about the dynamics of the interplay of beliefs, power, leadership, institutions, and policies. 
This chapter also aimed to confirm these core elements of the critical transitions framework to identify 
theoretical underpinnings for some of the hypotheses formulated in Section 5.2. Using ideas about 
post-genocide institutional change in Rwanda from this chapter as well as the empirical tools 
discussed in Chapter 4, Chapter 5 of this dissertation examines recent changes in Rwanda’s business 
and investment environment to provide a richer perspective on the ongoing shift to a lesser 
dependence on agriculture.  
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CHAPTER 4: IDENTIFYING TOOLS FOR UNDERSTANDING 
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter 2 identified the critical transitions framework and case study research as tools for studying 
periods of institutional change. Chapter 3 applied these tools to Rwanda’s history and identified five 
epochs of change. The most recent epoch (the period after Rwanda's genocide) brought a dramatic 
turnaround in the country’s economic and political outcomes (see Section 1.1). The Kagame regime, 
which has held power throughout this period, has viewed private sector-led economic growth and 
development as the bedrock for the country’s future. Hence, it has implemented an economy-focussed 
governance model to establish a vibrant business and investment climate that contributes to national 
reconciliation by reducing poverty. This has included the creation of policy structures and institutions 
regarded as best practice by multilateral agencies (Kelsall 2013: 126-127). For example, Rwanda is 
one of more than 50 economies worldwide that have established dedicated government structures to 
design and implement business regulation reforms (World Bank 2014: 22). Moreover, the World 
Bank's Doing Business publications determined that Rwanda has made more reforms to improve the 
local business environment over the past decade and a half than any other country. Success has been 
forthcoming. According to the Mo Ibrahim Foundation (2017), Rwanda now has the most supportive 
business environment for the private sector on the African continent. The success of Rwanda's 
reforms efforts has underpinned Glazova's (2015) claim that the country has been an example of 
successful institutional transformation since the early 2000s. 
 
The Doing Business project has focused on encouraging institutional change in the shape of business 
environment reforms. Recognising the value of benchmarking for generating interest in reform among 
policymakers, the World Bank decided in 2005 to rank economies on the basis of the ease of doing 
business (World Bank 2014: ix). Extensive academic research and existing literature on the enabling 
role of institutions in economic development informed the design of reform-tracking indicators 
developed for the Doing Business project (World Bank 2014: 16). It could be argued that this 
collected information has an underlying association with institutional reform.  
 
Across the world, the Doing Business project has found many supporters in the highest echelons of 
government. Governmental reform committees regularly use the Doing Business database as an input 
to inform their programmes for improving business environments. The government structures 
identified above are most often inter-ministerial committees that report directly to heads of 
government to coordinate efforts to improve business environments across agencies (World Bank 
2014: 22). Doing Business publications have reflected specifically on successful reform efforts in 
SSA countries, including Botswana, Burundi, the Central African Republic (CAR), the Comoros, the 
DRC, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Nigeria, Republic of Congo, Rwanda, 
Sierra Leone, Togo and Zambia have formed top-level government committees to steer such efforts.97 
                                                          
97 African countries have for quite some time been a popular focus area for NIE research. Du Plessis (2005: iii-iv), for 
example, investigated how the influence of informal institutions formed during the colonial period on post-independent 
formal institutions contributed to the contrasting economic growth and development trajectories of Botswana and Zambia. 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001: 1372) analysed the influence of settler mortality rates in European colonies on 
the creation of different institutions. Their study included a large sample of African economies, and one of the findings 
was “that Africa is poorer than the rest of the world not because of pure geographic or cultural factors, but because of 
worse institutions”. 
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The SSA region also included five of the top ten reformers during the 2013-2014 survey period, which 
provided the data for the 2015 edition of the Doing Business report (World Bank 2014: 1).  
 
In 2008, the World Bank’s own Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) concluded that the project’s 
findings “have been highly effective in drawing attention to the burdens of business regulation”, but 
cannot by themselves capture other key dimensions of countries’ business climates (IEG 2008: xv). 
Given this tension between objective and subjective assessments of business environments, it is 
understandable that the Doing Business project has attracted criticism. Acemoglu, Collier, Johnson, 
Klein and Wheeler (2013) reviewed the debate about the project, the criticisms levelled against it, and 
recommendations for improving it. This document was written in support of their campaign to keep 
the Doing Business project going at a time when it was feared that the World Bank might scrap the 
endeavour entirely.  
 
Despite endorsements by some prominent institutional economists, Doing Business data have yet to 
win much favour from many of their colleagues. Menard and Shastitko (2017: 202), for example, 
described the Doing Business database as a controversial tool for comparative analysis of institutional 
alternatives. Arrunada (2007 and 2009) has been a particularly strident critic of the Doing Business 
project. His criticism, however, did not specifically focus on the measurement of institutions and 
institutional change by the Doing Business project. Arrunada (2007) primarily warned against the 
misuse of this data by governments to deflect attention from more important matters (policymakers 
might launch reform campaigns to improve their Doing Business scores, for example, instead of 
undertaking broader institutional reforms). He argued that an exclusive emphasis on reducing specific 
costs (i.e. the volume of paperwork) would be harmful to economic development because it disregards 
the importance of the broader institutional matrix. Arrunada (2009) also warned against simplification 
of business registration procedures to make them quicker, instead of carefully considering trade-offs 
in the design of broader institutions affecting the formalisation of businesses.  
 
Taken at face value, Du Marais and Menard (2008) also appeared to criticise the measurement of 
institutions, especially those linked to legal and enforcement mechanisms, by the Doing Business 
project. However, their point was very similar to that of Arrunada (2007 and 2009): the data must be 
used correctly, and not discarded. Their findings indicated that Doing Business indicators were not 
serving the purpose intended by the World Bank, namely to measure the impact of specific legal 
instruments on economic efficiency. Instead, they argued, these indicators merely ranked details and 
properties of legal systems. Put differently, their argument was that the Doing Business data identified 
countries' ability to reform the legal institutions used in transacting, rather than the effects of legal 
systems on business environments and investment.  
 
In sum, many critiques are targeted at dubious uses of the Doing Business data, not the quality or 
usefulness of the data per se. Nonetheless, there remains a perception that the information in the 
database is not suitable for academic research. In essence, the Doing Business database contains case 
studies of small- to medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in almost every country that provide 
information about aspects of establishing and operating such companies. Section 2.5 argued that case 
studies are very useful for identifying the determinants and consequences of institutions and 
institutional change. It also showed, however, that contemporary economic scholarship makes limited 
use of case studies, partly because of the popularity of regression analysis. To utilise Doing Business 
data to study questions such as the reasons for Rwanda's reform success, social scientists might need 
to consider other, less familiar techniques of analysis. One such option is the set-theoretic technique 
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QCA. Over the past two decades, this technique has grown in popularity amongst social scientists 
studying quantitative questions for which regression techniques are less well suited. Despite its basis 
in Boolean algebra, the mathematical roots of which are almost a century old, some scholars still 
describe QCA as “novel” (see, for example, Muñoz and Kibler 2016). 
 
The purpose of QCA is to identify the influence of combinations of causal conditions (the set-
theoretic equivalents of the independent variables in regression analyses) on outcomes (the set-
theoretic equivalents of the dependent variables in regression analyses). To this end, QCAs identify 
set-theoretic associations between outcomes and combinations of causal conditions. Importantly, the 
technique can cope with equifinality, that is, instances in which more than one combination of factors 
explain the achievement of an outcome.98 Knowing how countries with sound institutional 
environments arrived at this position is essential for designing strategies for other countries with the 
same goal. Historically, however, countries have followed multiple paths to reach such positions. 
Standard econometric methods are not ideal for identifying all such paths. Many users of QCA argue 
that the ability to cope with equifinality makes the technique particularly useful for analysing groups 
of cases. 
 
This dissertation works with factors influencing a particular type of institutional change, namely 
reforms to improve operating environments for businesses. These factors are the environmental 
conditions influencing institutional change, not the specific policymaking processes that establish and 
change institutions. The reason for the focus on these factors was the perceived need to add an 
additional layer of analysis to the attempt to untangle how policies were made and implemented in 
Rwanda. Formal economic institutions are the outcomes of collective choices shaped by political 
processes. More specifically, such institutions are determined by the influence of political power on 
the balance of different preferences (Acemoglu and Robinson 2010). An alternative perspective on 
this issue is that the policymaking and implementation processes that change institutions constitute a 
game in which the dominant network and governance structures interact with various stakeholders in 
the private sector (Romp 1997: 5). 
 
The remainder of Chapter 4 explores the Doing Business data and QCA technique as tools for 
studying institutional change. The exposition is structured as follows. Section 4.2 provides an 
overview of the Doing Business project and the theoretical underpinnings of the data, with a particular 
focus on identifying elements of NIE. Sections 4.3.1-4.3.2 discuss the theoretical background and 
key concepts of QCA, while Section 4.3.3 outlines fsQCA. Section 4.3.3 revisits the arguments in 
favour of using set-theoretic techniques for analysing case studies and explains the suitableness of 
the method for the analysis in this dissertation. Section 4.4 concludes.  
 
4.2 The World Bank’s Doing Business data  
 
4.2.1 Background 
 
The World Bank launched the Doing Business project in the early 2000s to monitor economic issues 
affecting SMEs in the largest business cities of countries. The Doing Business database is a freely 
accessible online resource with time-series information for a large number of countries. It remains a 
                                                          
98 The presence of equifinality was not unique to QCA and was also found in, for example, logit models (Goertz and 
Mahoney 2006: 237) 
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leading source of qualitative and quantitative information on reforms to countries’ business 
environments. The expansive content of the database is categorised into 11 pillars: 
 
 Registering a business 
 Dealing with construction permits 
 Getting an electricity connection 
 Registering property 
 Obtaining credit 
 Protecting minority investors 
 Paying taxes 
 Trading across borders 
 Enforcing contracts 
 Resolving insolvency 
 Employing workers99 
 
The first six pillars have to do with the complexity and cost of regulatory processes, and the last five 
with the strength of legal institutions.100 The Doing Business database provides objective quantitative 
information on investment climates and business environments for private investors. It presents 
quantitative indicators of the regulations that apply to private firms at different stages of their life 
cycle. To collect information for the Starting a Business category, for example, the World Bank asks 
its network of respondents to consider the experience of a small- or medium-sized limited liability 
company operating in the largest business city of their respective economies. This hypothetical 
enterprise has the following characteristics:  
 
 five owners 
 a start-up capital equal to ten times the country’s gross national income (GNI) per capita 
 between ten and 50 employees 
 involvement in general industrial or commercial activity 
 does not qualify for investment incentives 
 only trades locally 
 does not own real estate (World Bank 2012: 56).  
 
To attract interest from governments to participate in efforts to improve their business environments, 
Doing Business publications offer authorities a benchmarking tool to compare regulatory 
environments across economies. The World Bank has aimed since the start of the project to exploit 
the desire for change that could be stimulated by the transparent scoring of economic and social 
indicators and the opportunity to benchmark data against those for other countries. The influence of 
the UNDP Human Development Index (HDI) in the spheres of healthcare and education is an example 
of the changes that can be encouraged by opportunities to make such comparisons.  
 
The desire to measure characteristics of business environments follows from the World Bank’s view 
that economic activity benefits from clear and coherent rules. “Governments play a crucial role in 
supporting a dynamic ecosystem for firms. They set the rules that establish and clarify property rights, 
                                                          
99 The section on employment dynamics was removed from the last several Doing Business publications, as the World 
Bank could no longer ignore mounting opposition from labour organisations to the notion that relaxation of rules that 
protect workers is an appropriate method for stimulating employment creation. 
100 The methodology that informed the collection of information for these ten pillars can be found on the Doing Business 
website: http://www.doingbusiness.org/methodology.  
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reduce the cost of resolving disputes and increase the predictability of economic transactions. Without 
good rules that are evenly enforced, entrepreneurs have a harder time starting and growing the small 
and medium-size firms that are the engines of growth and job creation for most economies around 
the world” (World Bank 2013: v). World Bank Senior Vice President and Chief Economist Kaushik 
Basu argued that the best-performing countries in a Doing Business context are those where 
governments were able “to create rules that facilitate interactions in the marketplace without 
needlessly hindering the development of the private sector” (World Bank 2014: vii). Basu’s view on 
these rules is very similar to the NIE scholars' emphasis on the importance of the ‘rules of the game’. 
 
Researchers who have attempted to demonstrate the importance of institutions have relied on a myriad 
of approaches. Irrespective of the approach, however, reliable ways to identify and measure 
institutions are essential for attempts to demonstrate the salience of institutions (Voigt 2013: 2). There 
is indeed no single agreed upon best practice or data source for representing institutions and 
institutional quality. Kuncic (2013: 9) identified three well-known organisations that aim to quantify 
institutional quality, albeit with different objectives and methods. These are the World Economic 
Forum (WEF), the Quality of Government Institute at the University of Gothenburg, and the Centre 
for Economic Studies (CES)/Ifo Institute in Munich. Broadly speaking, the data provided by these 
entities are grouped into three categories, namely economic, political and legal institutions. However, 
the limited number of countries included in these databases markedly reduce their usefulness. Using 
hierarchical clustering, Kuncic (2013: 12) created institutional proxies for only 111 countries from 
this data. While he could increase the list of countries to 126 by using a variant of the nearest-
neighbour matching method to fill some data gaps, two out of every five African countries remained 
excluded.  
 
Unsurprisingly, the World Bank’s much larger 215-country WGIs dataset is the most popular and 
widely used basis for measuring institutional quality, especially that of political institutions (De Dios, 
Lagman-Martin and Zhuang 2010: 7). The WGIs database is considered the most respected measure 
of institutional quality and is used for country screening by the Millennium Challenge Corporation 
(MCC) (Bustos, Coscia, Hausmann, Hidalgo, Simoes and Yildirim 2013: 35). The WGIs is a long-
standing research project to develop cross-country indicators of governance and institutions. The 
project measures six dimensions of governance on an annual basis: voice and accountability, political 
stability and absence of violence or terrorism, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, the rule 
of law, and control of corruption. Several hundred variables obtained from 30 different sources are 
used to calculate these six aggregate scores.  
 
Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2011: 222-223) defined governance as “the traditions and 
institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. This includes (i) the process by which 
governments are selected, monitored and replaced, (ii) the capacity of the government to effectively 
formulate and implement sound policies, and (iii) the respect of citizens and the state for the 
institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them.” From this definition, they 
constructed two measures of governance corresponding with each of the three areas. A broad 
spectrum of sources reports this information, including surveys (e.g. the Institute for Management 
Development’s World Competitiveness Yearbook), non-governmental organisations (e.g. the 
Bertelsmann Stiftung), business information providers (e.g. IHS Global Insight), and multilateral 
development agencies (e.g. World Bank). The information was standardised in the WGIs into 
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comparable units using an unobserved components model (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2011: 
220-221 & 225).101  
 
There are many examples of research utilising the WGIs data as a broad representation of countries' 
institutional quality, (that is, as more than indicators of political institutions). Amoros (2009), for 
example, used the WGIs data to help explain determinants of new business creation and its effect on 
the economy, with results indicating that institutional quality is an influential factor in the distribution 
and type of entrepreneurial activities. Buchanan, Le and Rishi (2012) used WGIs data as measures of 
institutional quality in a panel dataset of developed and developing economies and found that good 
institutional quality mattered for foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows from 1996 to 2006. Azman-
Saini, Ibrahim and Law (2013) examined whether the impact of financial development on economic 
growth differs in countries with different levels of institutional quality, and found that the growth 
impact becomes positive only after attainment of a certain threshold level of institutional quality. 
Alvarez, Barbero, Rodríguez-Pose and Zofio (2015) examined the impact of differences in 
institutional quality on bilateral trade, and found that the level of institutional quality in the destination 
market as well as the distance in quality between trading partners markedly influence the volume and 
composition of trade.  
 
The WGIs have provided aggregated and disaggregated indicators for six dimensions of governance 
in 215 countries and territories for the period 1996 to 2014. The information has been provided in 
percentile rank form (ranging from 0 to 100) and as scores ranging from -2.5 to +2.5. These scores 
have provided a surfeit of data for comparing the quality of institutions across countries. Yet the data 
have limited value for tracking changes in country-specific institutions over time. This is because the 
World Bank has based its estimates for each country’s observations on data ranges rather than single 
points. The World Bank has reported margins of errors in its data, reflecting the inherent difficulty of 
measuring governance. Real changes in a country’s governance indicators over time cannot be 
identified unless the reported scores move outside these margins. For example, if a country’s score is 
reported as +1 with an error range between +0.5 and +1.5, institutional change cannot be identified 
as such unless the new reported score moves below +0.5 or higher than +1.5 at a later period. The 
error ranges are vast for some economies with poor-quality data, including several SSA countries. 
Thus, institutional changes may well remain obscured if WGIs data are used to track movements. 
 
The reality that it is difficult to identify institutional change with WGIs data puts the spotlight on the 
Doing Business indicators as alternative measures of institutions that allow for the observation of 
institutional change. The absence of literature on the relationship between the ideas of NIE and the 
data offered by the Doing Business project could be ascribed to the easy acceptance of a connection. 
Mohando (2009: 204), for example, indicated that the Doing Business project was related to NIE, but 
did not expand on this topic in any significant detail. It should be noted that the Doing Business 
publications were not produced with academic audiences in mind. Hence, the World Bank does not 
necessarily apply the linguistic and academic rigour in its reports required by some members of the 
academic community.  
 
                                                          
101 The WGIs “are based on data sources that include expert judgement and surveys of households and businesses. Thus, 
they reflect the quality of institutions as perceived by expert professionals and economic agents more generally, rather 
than take a narrow view of the laws on the books” (Lehne, Mo and Plekhanov 2014: 3). This implies that the WGIs 
account for information about de jure and de facto characteristics. 
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4.2.2 Links with NIE concepts 
 
Nonetheless, Doing Business data can be linked to various core concepts in the study of institutions. 
The foundation of the Doing Business project “is the notion that economic activity, particularly 
private sector development, benefits from clear and coherent rules: Rules that set out and clarify 
property rights and facilitate the resolution of disputes. And rules that enhance the predictability of 
economic interactions and provide contractual partners with essential protection against arbitrariness 
and abuse” (World Bank 2012: 16, underlining added). The underscored text refers directly to 
property rights and enforcement mechanisms and indirectly to transactions costs – three core concepts 
discussed in Section 2.2.102 According to the World Bank, such rules and instruments are “much more 
effective in shaping the incentives of economic agents in ways that promote growth and development” 
(World Bank 2012: 16) when they are efficient and can be implemented at a reasonable cost. This 
statement is strongly reminiscent of North’s (2005) argument (identified in Section 2.2) that the 
institutional framework determines a society’s incentive structure and shapes the features of its 
economy.  
 
It follows that the relationship between Doing Business and NIE cannot be ignored, and is worthy of 
further analysis. The following paragraphs find links between the categories of quantitative 
information provided in the Doing Business database and critical NIE concepts like property rights, 
transaction costs, enforcement mechanisms and informal institutions. These factors were set out in 
Figure 2.1, which illustrated how institutions affect economic performance. To recap, institutions 
determine the economic performance of organisations and countries. Formal and informal institutions 
determine property rights that shape technology, with property rights enabling transactions in 
technology and appropriation by developers of the productivity gains of technological progress. 
Technology then determines transformation costs that, together with internal production costs, 
determine transaction costs. The processes involved in transacting then determine the cost of 
enforcement of transactions. Ultimately, these factors all influence the performance of the economy, 
including the private sector. 
 
The Doing Business project concerns itself with property rights in a quest to encourage business 
environment reforms aimed at shaping the incentives of economic agents in ways that promote growth 
and development. This is confirmed by the declared intention of the Doing Business publications to 
present “quantitative indicators on business regulations, and the protection of property rights” (World 
Bank 2013: iii). To be sure, the documents seem somewhat narrowly focussed on the administrative 
process of registering property and not too concerned with the broader legislative basis of countries’ 
property rights regimes. Nonetheless, the ten main categories of collected data contain many 
references to procedures and factors linked to the presence of property rights and the ability to use 
and transfer property.  
 
The following are examples of procedures and factors linked to property rights:  
 
 ‘Starting a Business’ includes registering an enterprise, checking the availability of and 
securing the rights to a company name, registering a company’s unique bylaws and statutes, 
                                                          
102 Regarding transaction costs: an agent that is able to accurately predict a counterparty’s knowledge and actions will 
require less time and fewer resources to conduct a transaction. This familiarity will enhance the predictability of economic 
interactions, hence reducing the cost of said transaction.  
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receiving permission to run the undertaking’s operations, legalising the holding of inventory, 
and recording the company seal.  
 ‘Dealing with Construction Permits’ includes proving the title of the property, securing 
approval of building plans and a building permit, obtaining an occupation certificate, 
connecting to publicly-owned utilities (electricity, water, sewerage, and telecommunications), 
and registering of the property at a public registry.  
 ‘Getting Electricity’ includes receiving an electricity meter and an external connection from 
the power utility, and receiving permission for the building of a single transformer or 
substation.  
 ‘Registering Property’ includes the lodging of a title deed (or the deed of transfer) at a public 
registry, and registration of a sale and purchase agreement. 
 ‘Getting Credit’ contains standardised information on the use of movable assets as collateral, 
and the protection of lenders and borrowers with collateral laws that allow the lender to act 
outside of the courts.  
 ‘Protecting Minority Investors’ contains standardised information on shareholders’ ability to 
sue directors and approving bodies for damages to a company related to misconduct and 
conflict of interest. 
 ‘Paying Taxes’ contains standardised information on payment of property taxes, property 
transfer tax, capital gains tax, land tax, building tax, and property transfer tax.  
 ‘Trading Across Borders’ does not contain any information particular to property rights.  
 ‘Enforcing Contracts’ includes enforcement of a judgement on a disputed product sales 
contract.  
 ‘Resolving Insolvency’ includes claimants’ recovery rates on claims on an insolvent firm.  
 
The above information shows that elements of property rights can be found in nine of the ten 
categories of the Doing Business project – and this is consistent with the World Bank’s (2013: iii) 
stated intention of providing cross-section information on property rights. Having established the 
links between NIE ideas on property rights and the information provided by the Doing Business 
project, attention is now given to the association between the latter and transaction costs.  
 
The following are examples of Doing Business information related to transaction costs: 
 
 ‘Starting a Business’ includes costs for registration with the tax authority, a company seal, 
attorney or lawyer service, advertising fees, and certificates about business licenses, 
operations and incorporation.  
 ‘Dealing with Construction Permits’ includes costs for building and land use permits, 
inspections by public officials, clearance from and connections to public utilities, 
environmental impact studies, occupation permit, and property title registration.  
 ‘Getting Electricity’ includes costs for the external connection of a building to the main power 
grid, the services of a private contractor, and related inspections.  
 ‘Registering Property’ includes costs for legal services, notary fees, stamp duties, transfer 
duties, conveyancer fees, deed transfer costs and property valuation, the payment of capital 
gains tax, as well as obtaining certificates related to ownership, tax, and rates clearance.  
 ‘Getting Credit’ includes costs incurred by borrowers to inspect their credit data.  
 ‘Protecting Minority Investors’ includes the allocation of legal expenses in shareholder 
litigation.  
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 ‘Paying Taxes’ includes estimates of the time (days) and the number of procedures involved 
in paying various taxes and other mandatory contributions, as well as an estimate of the total 
tax rate on commercial profit103.  
 ‘Trading Across Borders’ includes estimates of the time (days) and costs involved in 
importing and exporting a 20-foot shipping container, including customs clearance, technical 
control, port and terminal handling, as well as inland transportation and handling.  
 ‘Enforcing Contracts’ includes costs for estimates of the time (days), some procedures and 
costs associated with enforcing a contract via a judicial process, including attorney, court, 
enforcement and other judicial fees.  
 ‘Resolving Insolvency’ includes estimates of the time (days) and costs involved in closing a 
business, including court, lawyer or advocate, assessor, auctioneer and related fees. 
 
This list indicates that elements of transaction costs can be found in eight of the ten categories of the 
Doing Business project and is consistent with the World Bank’s (2013: iii) stated intention to explain 
the cost and complexity of government procedures. Having established the links between NIE ideas 
on property rights and transaction costs and the information provided by the Doing Business project, 
the next part of this section considers the association between the latter and enforcement mechanisms.  
 
The following are examples of Doing Business information related to enforcement costs:  
 
 ‘Starting a Business’ does not contain specific information about enforcement mechanisms.  
 ‘Dealing with Construction Permits’ does not contain specific information about enforcement 
mechanisms. 
 ‘Getting Electricity’ does not contain specific information about enforcement mechanisms. 
 ‘Registering Property’ does not contain specific information about enforcement mechanisms. 
 ‘Getting Credit’ includes an assessment of whether parties are allowed to agree to permit the 
lender to exert security rights on collateral outside of the judicial system.  
 ‘Protecting Minority Investors’ contains standardised information on disclosure requirements 
on executives, the review of transactions by an external body, legal remedies for damages, the 
ability of shareholders to sue a company director, the court’s ability to void a transaction, and 
access to documentation during a legal trial. 
 ‘Paying Taxes’ does not contain specific information about enforcement mechanisms. 
 ‘Trading Across Borders’ does not contain specific information about enforcement 
mechanisms. 
 ‘Enforcing Contracts’ contains information on time involved in enforcing a contract via a 
judicial process, e.g. the filing of a court case, completion of the trial, receiving a judgement, 
and executing the judge’s decision, as well as attorney, court and implementation costs.  
 ‘Resolving Insolvency’ contains information on time (years) and cost (percentage of the 
estate’s value) involved in judicial bankruptcy proceedings.  
 
The above information shows that elements of enforcement mechanisms can be found in four of the 
ten categories of the Doing Business project; this was consistent with the World Bank’s (2013: 2) 
aim of measuring the transparency and enforceability of rules. This confirms the presence of 
enforcement mechanisms in the mix of Doing Business variables.  
                                                          
103 This calculation considered the value of taxes payable by a medium-sized company in the second year of incorporation 
as a percentage of commercial profits. This includes corporate income tax, labour taxes, property and property transfer 
taxes, dividend and capital gains taxes, transaction taxes, vehicle and road taxes, and other smaller taxes and fees. 
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None of the Doing Business categories provides information about informal institutions. This echoes 
the admission that Doing Business did not measure the full range of factors influencing the quality 
and competitiveness of countries' business environments (World Bank 2013: 22).104 The absence of 
informal institutions is worrisome given the recognition by many authors of the important roles of 
these rules of the game alongside formal institutions. Williamson (2000) and Nunn (2012), for 
example, underscored the importance of informal institutions in long-term economic development.  
 
However, these informal features are much more difficult to quantify (see Section 8.3) and suffer 
from stickiness, i.e. an inability to change quickly. In addition, most informal institutions are found 
in the private realm, an area mostly outside the control of public policy (Williamson 2009: 372). 
Nonetheless, the interaction between formal and informal institutions cannot be ignored. Shared 
culture (an informal institution) contributes to the level of trust between contracting parties. In turn, 
the trust has a positive and statistically significant bearing on the probability of becoming an 
entrepreneur (Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales 2006: 34-37). A comparatively poor institutional setting, 
as measured by Doing Business, might not pose a threat to an entrepreneur given the informal 
institutions prevalent in the community. Chapter 8 returns to the issue of informal institutions when 
offering suggestions for future research.  
 
The focus now returns to formal institutions. The next part of this section considers academic research 
underpinning the Doing Business methodology to determine the influence, if any, of NIE on the 
foundations of the project. It now has been established that NIE ideas feature prominently in the data 
collected and reforms supported by the Doing Business project, albeit not ideas related to informal 
institutions. This suggests that academic research used by the World Bank personnel as the basis of 
the Doing Business methodology could have a basis in institutional economics. The Doing Business 
website105 lists eight peer-reviewed papers that developed or supported the methodology employed 
in surveying eight of the ten pillars. In addition, it lists examples of the survey documents provided 
to respondents. The Doing Business categories related to these papers and their respective references 
are as follows:  
 
 Starting a Business – Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2002) 
 Getting Electricity – Geginat and Ramalho (2015)106 
 Getting Credit – Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer (2007) 
 Protecting Minority Investors – Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2008) 
 Paying Taxes – Djankov, Ganser, McLiesh, Ramalho and Shleifer (2010) 
 Trading Across Borders – Djankov, Freund and Pham (2010) 
 Enforcing Contracts – Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2003) 
 Resolving Insolvency – Djankov, Hart, McLiesh and Shleifer (2008) 
 
                                                          
104 This should be expected. Doing Business surveys cannot quantify informal institutions in a way that, for example, the 
World Values Survey (WVS) can, as the Doing Business processes do not include a representative population from each 
country. A glance at the network of regular respondents (World Bank 2013: 250-306) indicates that these are most 
definitely not a representative subsection of each country’s population, thereby blocking the World Bank's efforts to 
measure aspects of culture. The respondents are “legal experts, business consultants, accountants, freight forwarders, 
government officials and other professionals routinely administering or advising on the relevant legal and regulatory 
requirements in the 189 economies covered” (World Bank 2013: 248). 
105 Available online at http://www.doingbusiness.org/methodology 
106 Not yet published in an academic journal at the time of writing this chapter.  
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A priori, one would expect some direct or indirect elements of NIE in these papers. The multi-
disciplinary nature of institutional thinking suggests that searching for these connotations with NIE 
is not a bogus endeavour – the field is broad enough to encompass many ideas from other branches 
of economic theory. This cross-border research in social sciences is what Byrne (2009: 6) referred to 
as ‘post-disciplinary’ study – i.e. research that transcends traditional interdisciplinary work. The 
Doing Business database contains data relevant to the study of economics, law, logistics, finance, and 
public administration, amongst other fields. Hence, it would be ideal for scholars undertaking post- 
or cross-disciplinary research if the information’s associations with NIE can be established.  
 
The bibliographies of these eight papers were scrutinised in search of NIE-related literature. The 
results of these reviews are encouraging for identifying associations with institutional economics. Six 
of the eight papers have direct and indirect links to NIE: 
 
 Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2002) considered two strands of public 
choice theory with direct connections to institutional thinking. The theory of regulatory 
capture has to do with formal institutions created by market players that define barriers to 
entry, while the tollbooth theory argues that the polity creates institutions to ring-fence 
markets for the benefit of the polity.  
 Geginat and Ramalho (2015) used the methods developed by Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes and Shleifer (2002) as the basis of their theoretical framework for collecting data on 
the procedures, time and cost involved in getting an electricity connection.  
 Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer (2007) considered two economic concepts related to the 
volume of credit extended to the private sector. The power theory of credit holds when lenders 
depend on transaction-related enforcement mechanisms, while the information theory of 
credit holds when information about borrowers is incomplete and transaction costs positive.  
 Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2008) based their research methodology 
on previous work by themselves and other researchers, with six papers standing out as 
providing the theoretical underpinnings. Five of these six studies have links to NIE. These are 
(i) La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997); (ii) Shleifer and Vishny (1997); 
(iii) La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998); (iv) La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes 
and Shleifer (2006); and (v) Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer (2007). 
 Djankov, Ganser, McLiesh, Ramalho and Shleifer (2010) did not reveal any substantial direct 
or indirect connection with institutional economics in their methodology.  
 Djankov, Freund and Pham (2010) took methodological guidance from Hummels (2007 and 
2012) who in turn delved into less apparent barriers to trade. These factors helped to explain 
transaction costs and the process of transacting. Also, Djankov, Freund and Pham (2010) cited 
Levchenko (2007), who considered the effect of institutions on trade as a methodological 
influence.  
 Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2003) investigated the measurement of 
institutions, and specifically legal institutions. Their case study analysed the legal processes 
required for the enforcement of eviction and collection on a bad debt.  
 Djankov, Hart, McLiesh and Shleifer (2008) did not reveal any substantial direct or indirect 
connection with institutional economics in their methodology.  
 
In short, six of the eight paper displayed direct or indirect connections to NIE theory.107  
                                                          
107 This does not suggest that the authors consider themselves, or that others should consider them to be institutional 
researchers. It merely identifies the theory utilised by the researchers.  
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4.3 Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA)  
 
The set-theoretic technique QCA has over the past two decades grown in popularity amongst social 
scientists interested in specific types of quantitative questions. Thiem (2014: 625) observed an 
“exponential increase” in the application of fuzzy-set methods with the development of new dedicated 
software contributing to lowering the computational costs of the method. Charles Ragin pioneered 
the QCA technique during the 1980s and 1990s as an alternative to regression analysis.108 Ragin 
(1987: vii) found that conventional quantitative analysis rooted in linear algebra were ill-suited for 
exploring some of the questions that interested him and other social scientists. He argued that research 
questions were being reformulated by social scientists to fit the demands of regressions techniques. 
QCA, in turn, was set-theoretic and therefore more suitable for analysing certain social phenomenon. 
Ragin (2006: 291) explained that the bulk of social science theory was verbal. Verbal theories 
describe ideal cases that provide substance for researchers’ formalisation of theories as hypotheses 
about empirical patterns and connections. Verbal theory is also largely set-theoretic in nature: set 
relations are the building blocks of verbal statements.  
 
The COMPArative Methods for Systematic cross-caSe analySis (COMPASSS) network, a worldwide 
network of scholars and practitioners devoted to the theoretical, methodological and practical 
development of various forms of QCA, listed 569 empirical applications and 141 methodological 
contributions to the field published in academic journals by March 2016 (COMPASSS 2016). The 
analytical techniques employed in these writings were split almost evenly between crisp-set and 
fuzzy-set QCA methods (discussed below). The website classified the 569 empirical studies into 15 
categories (in alphabetical order):  
 
 agenda-setting109 (61 articles),  
 business and economics (99 articles),  
 communication and media (9 articles),  
 comparative politics (98 articles),  
 education (18 articles),  
 environmental sciences (18 articles),  
 evaluation (12 articles),  
 governance and administration (31 articles),  
 health research and policy (33 articles),  
 international relations (25 articles),  
 legal studies and criminology (13 articles),  
 management and organisation (43 articles),  
 sociology (76 articles),  
 urban and regional studies (10 articles), and  
 other areas110 (23 articles).  
 
                                                          
108 QCA is rooted in systematic comparative procedures that originated in natural sciences such as botany and anatomy 
during the 1700s and 1800s. Hume (1758) and Mill (1843) laid the “logical foundations” for the method (Berg-Schlosser, 
DeMeur, Ragin and Rihoux 2009: 2). 
109 This field of study focusses on the ability of players in the social and political spheres to influence the importance 
placed on media topics. 
110 For example, police services, community engagement, workplace conflict, customer service quality, and 
neighbourhood recovery in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina. 
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The subject matter had become more diverse over the preceding decade. In the mid-2000s some two-
thirds of QCA-related studies explored topics in political science and sociology (Rihoux 2006: 697), 
compared to the present-day ratio of around one third. 
 
A wide range of economic issues have been explored using QCA. Siebrits (2014: 27), for example, 
listed welfare state reform, economic performance, labour market policy and performance, regulatory 
agencies, and determinants of FDI. Other economics-related topics listed in the COMPASSS (2016) 
bibliography include industrial cooperatives, export performance, healthcare expenditure, 
employment rates and trade reform. QCA was used to explore the following aspects: 
 
 institutions affecting labour union growth and declined in Western Europe (Ebbinghaus and 
Visser 1999), 
 the tremendous economic reversal in Spanish America (Katz, Mahoney and Vom Hau 2005), 
 determinants of poor employment performance in low-end, private sector service jobs in 
developed economies (Duerr, Epstein, Kenworthy and Ragin 2008),  
 FDI by multinational enterprises (Pajunen 2008), 
 national development in Latin America (Portes and Smith 2010),  
 political development in post-communist countries (Krasnozhon 2013),  
 coalition-forming in decision-making processes in Swiss politics (Fischer 2015), and  
 social entrepreneurship in the United Kingdom (Muñoz and Kibler 2016). 
 
However, most economists remain unfamiliar with QCA (Siebrits 2014: 27). Even amongst other 
social scientists, among whom there is more enthusiasm for qualitative methods, QCA was not yet a 
mainstream method in the early 2010s (Vogt and Williams 2011: 98). More recently, in the context 
of research in the economic sciences, Muñoz and Kibler (2016) referred to QCA as a “novel analytical 
approach”. Several reasons have been suggested for the unfamiliarity of QCA to economists and other 
social scientists. Arguably, the strongest reason is that social scientists strongly prefer techniques that 
identify causal relationships between dependent and independent variables to ones such as QCA that 
merely identify connections between attributes. Nevertheless, the reality that the technique remains 
unfamiliar to economists makes an explanatory overview essential.  
 
4.3.1 Theoretical background  
 
Ragin (1987) produced the seminal publication on QCA methodology. This volume outlined the 
principles of Boolean algebra that underpin QCA. George Boole reduced logic to a simple algebra 
involving only two states: present (1) and absent (0). These binary options operate in three 
derivations: ‘and’, ‘or’ and ‘not’. Thus, the use of Boolean algebra in statistical analysis requires the 
observation of information about presence (1) and absence (0) in order to quantify variables on a 
nominal scale (Ragin 1987: 85-86). QCA aims to establish connections between outcomes (the 
equivalents of dependent variables in regression analyses) and causal conditions (the equivalents of 
independent variables in regression analyses).111  
 
The suitability of the technique for institutional analysis is enhanced by its ability to accommodate 
equifinality. Scope to study multiple routes to specific institutional setups is attractive to institutional 
scholars because a definitive recipe for effecting change that establishes sustainable economic and 
                                                          
111 Ragin (1987: 85-102) gave an overview of this algebra, while Whitesitt (2010) provided a more advanced discussion. 
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political institutions does not exist. As was pointed out in Section 1.1, modern perspectives on 
development theory have departed from the ideas encompassed in the rigid SAPs propagated by 
multilateral organisations in the 1980s. As Evans (2010: 37) emphasised, these perspectives have 
rejected the notion of a fixed, universal model for creating a development state. Economic growth 
and development cannot be created with a ‘one size fits all’ approach, and are elements of multiple 
routes towards prosperity. As such, the construction of a developmental state, for example, can only 
be successful if the process is flexible and creative, and based on exploration and experimentation 
that is attentive to local institutions. QCA assists scholars in their attempts to untangle the different 
combinations of factors that are associated with long-term economic development.  
 
Ragin’s comparative method offered a new tool for discovery that was not intended to supplant 
established quantitative methods. In the social sciences, the term ‘discovery’ refers to the dynamic 
interplay between theory and data, with the primary goal of generating new insights. The method can 
also be seen as a dialogue between ideas and evidence (Ragin 2000: xiv-xv, 7). As such, it aligns with 
Evans (2010: 37) ideas about an approach for devising a development strategy. While standard 
regressions fit data to theories and hypotheses, QCA allows for a feedback system between observed 
trends and theory. Ragin offered QCA in its various forms as a case-oriented technique for analysing 
an intermediate-N group of cases (i.e. between five and 100 cases). In essence, QCA charted a middle 
path between qualitative and quantitative research methods that was not necessarily a compromise 
between the two approaches (Ragin 2008: 1).  
 
4.3.2 Key concepts  
 
QCA treats cases as configurations of attributes, while regression analysis and other variable-oriented 
approaches focus on collections of individual attributes (Ragin 2000: 71). In the latter, independent 
variables are regarded as analytically separable causes of the dependent variable, each able to 
influence the outcome independently. The purpose of QCA is to identify the combined influence of 
causal conditions and to establish whether more than one such combination of factors could explain 
the outcome. These combinations can be seen as causal recipes for the outcome (Ragin 2008: 122-
124). Complex causation (or equifinality) means that an outcome can result from more than one 
combination of causal conditions (Ragin 2008: 23). This is common in the social sciences. However, 
these combinations do not necessarily indicate correlations; instead, they identify associations 
between outcomes and causal conditions.  
 
In any given research study, such associations are limited to the few sampled cases. Generalisability 
of findings to other settings is invariably a challenging aspect of case study research: maximising the 
volume and depth of information for a given case can compromise the scope for using the findings to 
study other cases. To assess the generalisability of case study findings, QCA users must consider the 
necessity and sufficiency of causal conditions. Assessment of necessity is conducted from the 
outcome side: a causal factor is a necessary condition for an outcome when instances of the outcome 
constitute a subset of instances in which specific causal characteristics are present. In turn, sufficiency 
is gauged from the causal condition side: a causal factor is a sufficient condition for an outcome when 
a specific combination of causal characteristics constitute a subset of instances of an outcome. In 
QCA methods, the existence of subset relations is the foundation for identifying connections between 
outcomes and causal conditions (Ragin 2000: 90-91).  
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Set-theoretic analysis broadly considers casual conditions as subsets of the outcome. Set theory is 
used to group combinations of causal conditions into a smaller number of broad groupings that 
embrace as many combinations as possible, expressed as set membership scores (Ragin 2000: 83). 
These factors are assessed in terms of their degrees of membership of specific attributes. For example, 
Siebrits (2014: 48) measured as the outcome the degree of compliance (on a scale of zero to 14) of 
European Union (EU) countries with medium-term budgetary rules from 1998 to 2004. One of the 
causal conditions measured the strength and institutional coverage of country-specific numerical rules 
(quantitative restrictions on changes in fiscal aggregates) based on several design aspects. The 
variable identified as a causal condition is an imperfect subset of the outcome and can be a necessary 
or sufficient cause for the outcome to occur. Conventional methods like interval and ratio-scale 
variables cannot be used to analyse set-theoretic relationships (Ragin 2000: 11). 
 
A necessary causal condition is present whenever an outcome occurs. Put differently, all instances of 
the outcome are associated with that specific causal condition. To test necessity, the researcher works 
backwards from the outcome to determine the associated causal conditions and identify which causes 
were present in these cases. If all cases with the same outcome have the same causal condition, the 
condition is a necessary cause for the outcome (Ragin 2000: 90-91). It must be emphasised, however, 
that necessary conditions are often not sufficient to explain an outcome and that other factors are also 
at play. In turn, a sufficient causal condition can on its own (i.e. without the presence or absence of 
other factors) cause the outcome. Put differently; the outcome is present whenever a sufficient causal 
condition occurs. The prevalence of a certain cause across cases is compared to the outcomes to 
determine whether the specific cause can be associated with the same outcome across more than one 
case. If this is established, the causal condition is sufficient to contribute towards a certain outcome 
(Ragin 2000: 92-93).  
 
Figure 4.1 illustrates subset relationships that are fully consistent with causal necessity and causal 
sufficiency as well as imperfect subset relationships. In a sample of cases, instances of the outcome 
are a subset of instances of a configuration of causal conditions, and the latter is deemed a necessary 
condition for the outcome when all cases that display the outcome also display the configuration of 
causal conditions. A necessary causal condition or combination of causal conditions has a 
membership score equal to or larger than the corresponding membership scores on the outcome. In 
Figure 4.1, this implies all observations are located on or below the 45-degree diagonal. In a sample 
in which all cases that display a particular configuration of causal conditions also display the outcome, 
instances of the configuration of causal conditions are a subset of instances of the outcome and the 
configuration is deemed a sufficient condition for the outcome. A sufficient causal condition or 
combination of causal conditions has a membership score equal to or smaller than the corresponding 
membership scores on the outcome. In Figure 4.1, this implies all observations are located on or above 
the 45-degree diagonal. A causal condition or combination of causal conditions is not fully necessary 
or fully sufficient if the observations lie above, on and below the 45-degree line. More often than not 
this is the case: subset relationships that are fully consistent with sufficiency or necessity are rare. 
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Figure 4.1: Subset relationships and their consistency with necessity and sufficiency criteria 
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Ragin (2008: 44-68) suggested measures to determine the strength of complex set-theoretic 
connections. The two key concepts here are consistency and coverage. Firstly, ‘consistency’ 
demonstrates the significance of set-theoretic relationships and identifies whether the empirical 
connection is worth the attention of the researcher. A consistency reading of 0.80, for example, would 
mean that a causal combination is a subset of the outcome some 80% of the time, which implies that 
the combination is almost always sufficient to bring about the outcome (Kent 2009: 199). Hence, a 
researcher’s theory about the determinants of an outcome is not viable if the identified connection 
between the outcome and the hypothesised determinants is not consistent enough. The mathematical 
equation for consistency assessment is: Consistency (Xi ≤ Yi) = Σ [min (Xi, Yi)] / Σ (Xi), where X is 
a causal condition and Y an outcome. The term ‘min’ indicates that the lower of the two values is 
selected (Ragin 2008: 52-53).  
 
Secondly, ‘coverage’ measures the degree to which identified configurations of causal conditions 
account for instances of the outcome. In contrast to the statistical nature of the consistency measure, 
coverage measures empirical importance (Ragin 2008: 54-55). It shows the extent to which these 
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configurations explain different instances of the outcomes in the study. A low coverage score would 
suggest that the identified connections do not do a good job as far as explaining the full set of observed 
outcomes is concerned. The mathematical equation for coverage assessment is: Coverage (Xi ≤ Yi) = 
Σ [min (Xi, Yi)] / Σ (Yi), with the terms meaning the same as those in the consistency equation (Ragin 
2008: 57-61). There is often a trade-off between consistency and coverage scores. A high level of 
consistency is often associated with a precisely specified causal combination that explains only a few 
of the cases in the analysis. Due to this trade-off, consistency must first be assessed before coverage 
is gauged. Logically, there is no need to calculate the coverage of a combination of causal conditions 
if these are not a consistent subset of the outcome (Ragin 2008: 55).  
 
4.3.3 Fuzzy-Set QCA (fsQCA)  
 
The use of absolute presence/absence information in QCA is described as the crisp-set methodology. 
This approach can be criticised for forcing observations into polar categories (Kogut 2011: 163). 
While classical two-valued logic was based on absolute ‘1’ (full membership) and ‘0’ (non-
membership) values, fuzzy-logic made allowance for a continuous range of values between these 
absolutes. Lotfi Zadeh developed the fuzzy logic methodology in the 1960s and 1970s (Pickover 
2009: 430). Researchers in the so-called ‘hard’ sciences initially frowned upon his use of the word 
‘fuzzy’, though the modern-day usage of the term was far removed from the original meaning of 
something imprecise. The modern-day interpretation implies varying degrees of membership rather 
than uncertainty over the nature of membership (Ragin 2000: 3). In a literature review, Mello (2013: 
3) identified a sharp increase in fsQCA publications in the preceding years and suggested that the 
technique would replace the crisp-set approach as the most widely used variant of QCA. The 
COMPASSS (2016) website listed even numbers of crisp-set and fuzzy-set studies (about 250 each), 
and 13 multi-value studies112 by the time this functional classification feature was discontinued.  
 
Kogut (2011: 145) provided a nine-point methodology for QCA based on Ragin’s (2000 and 2008) 
writings. In turn, Lobe and Rihoux (2009: 230-237) listed 15 practical operations in the process of 
performing QCA, also based on the work of other researchers. The first five steps are performed 
before using any analytical software, while the next five (points 6 to 10) are the computer-aided part 
of the analysis. The last five steps (points 11 to 15) complete the process and may well involve 
revisiting elements of the first two phases. Schneider and Wagemann (2010b: 398-399) referred to 
these three phases as happening before, during, and after the analytical moment:  
 
1. Research design and case selection. Case selection should be based on common background 
features (this could be the outcomes) or differences (causal conditions). The choice of 
meaningful features will depend on the research question.  
                                                          
112 Haesebrouck (2016) explained multi-value QCA (mvQCA) as offering multi-value conditions for variables. “In 
mvQCA, each category is represented by a natural number (0, 1, 2, 3 ...). For example, a traffic light can be transformed 
into a multi-value condition by assigning a value of 2 to cases if the light was green, a value of 1 if it was orange and a 
value of 0 if it was red. In contrast, crisp-set QCA only allows assigning a value of either 1 or 0, which indicate that a 
condition is present or absent, respectively. fsQCA allows for every possible value between 1 and 0. However, these 
values represent the extent to which a single category is present in a given case, not whether a specific category of a 
condition is present.” Haesebrouck (2016) associates the unpopular nature of mvQCA with a lack of decent coverage in 
theoretical texts and scepticism amongst leading methodologists about the value that it adds over and above crisp-and 
fuzzy-set methods.  
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2. Gaining case knowledge. This involves data collection and accumulation of knowledge about 
the key case or cases. Depending on the variables considered, there is inevitably a trade-off 
between the number of cases and the depth of knowledge about each of them.  
3. Defining the outcome of interest. A combination of factors (theory, the research question and 
knowledge of the case set) determine the purpose of the comparative analysis. Fine-tuning the 
definition of the outcome could also occur later in the QCA process after initial results are 
obtained. 
4. Model specification and selection of conditions. The motivation for using QCA is the key 
element influencing this phase. For theory testing, direction from background knowledge will 
determine the ingredients of the analysis. For exploratory purposes or simple synthesis, case-
driven specification is relevant. 
5. Visualising cases and models. A global view of the cases under consideration helps the 
researcher to absorb the data more intuitively. A graphical representation provides a visual 
summary of the information and offers a degree of simplification of cross-case differences 
and commonalities.  
6. Dichotomisation and threshold setting. For fsQCA, knowledge and information about the 
cases under investigation must be transformed into values ranging from 0 to 1. Threshold 
setting is determined by theory and case-driven; it should not be determined informally or 
arbitrarily.  
7. Truth table exploration and contradiction solving. Compiling a truth table will identify 
similarities between cases regarding causal conditions, and point to contradictory 
configurations (ones with different outcomes in spite of similar causal conditions).  
8. Minimisation and logical remainders. This involves making decisions about the inclusion or 
exclusion of hypothetical cases (these are based on combinations of the causal conditions that 
are not present among the actual cases). The researcher can use case expertise to identify the 
potential outcome values of such casual factor combinations.  
9. Solving contradictory simplifying assumptions. Case knowledge may imply outcomes of 1 
and 0 for identical causal combinations. This could suggest the absence of important casual 
conditions and point to the need for rethinking the classification of outcomes of logical 
remainders.  
10. Minimisation (arbitrating between different minimal formulae). QCA software cannot 
arbitrate between two or more parsimonious connections. In such cases, the researcher should 
use case knowledge to choose the most apt assessment, which be theory- or case-driven.  
11. Factoring out conditions in the minimal formulae. This does not entail the removal of an 
element but rather the factoring out of an element found to be present in the largest number 
of cases or parsimonious connections. This step further summarises the minimal formula 
provided by the software.  
12. Case-by-case interpretation. This involves comparing the common conditions identified by 
the minimal formula to the characteristics of and other information about a case. Individual 
case narratives are compared to a causal narrative by transforming the minimal formula into 
a storyline.  
13. Interpreting cross-case patterns. This step identifies similarities and differences between 
cases. Common bits of narrative also make it possible to identify new elements of 
correspondence not previously considered.  
14. Limited historical generalisation. QCA results generate prepositions that can be used (with 
caution) to make inferences about other cases not included in the comparative analysis. The 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
93 
 
scope of such inferences, however, is markedly more modest than that associated with large-
N statistical inference.  
15. Cumulation. Results are suitable for cumulation because of the high levels of transparency 
required of users. The researchers who conducted the original analysis as well as others can 
revisit and reinterpret the results that could with some adjustment yield different cross-case 
inferences.  
 
Broadly speaking, these 15 steps will be applied in the following QCA. Importantly, earlier chapters 
have already partially addressed the first four steps of this process. Firstly, Chapter 1 identified the 
SSA countries as the area of focus. Secondly, the World Bank Doing Business database was identified 
in Chapter 2 as the key data source for this research, while Rwanda was identified as the key focus 
of this study. Thirdly, it was stated that the desired outcome of the analysis is a better understanding 
of institutional change in the country. Fourthly, the decision to use QCA (as discussed in more detail 
below) was motivated in Chapter 2 by the desire to use a technique that offered the ability to allow 
for equifinality in the analysis of connections between outcomes and causal conditions. Identifying 
equifinality is very important to institutional economists as a single explanation of a phenomenon 
might not suffice. The fifth step will receive more attention elsewhere in this chapter.  
 
The ‘analytic moment’ starts with the sixth step in this process. The Windows-based ‘fsQCA Version 
3.0’ package is used for an estimated 80% of QCAs (COMPASSS 2016). As an illustration of the 
sixth step (dichotomisation), Table 4.1 illustrates the membership values of various crisp and fuzzy 
sets. The crisp set contains only two options based on the presence (1) and absence (0) principle 
discussed earlier. A three-value fuzzy set incorporates a mid-point (0.5) along the distribution that 
reflects a point of ambiguity – it is assigned when a specific feature is neither fully in nor fully out of 
the two states of presence or absence. The five-value set includes another two points (0.25 and 0.75) 
between the mid-point and two extremes to account for more degrees of set membership. However, 
a midpoint is not a necessity. In the case of a four-value set, the midpoint is absent, while the extremes 
were joined by two other points (0.33 and 0.67). Beyond the five-point set are infinite options of 
graded membership.  
 
Regarding the seventh step: in situation in which the number of cases provides a limited number of 
causal connections, fsQCA offers researchers the option of counterfactual analysis, also known as 
thought experiments.113 A study with five causal conditions implies 32 (2^5) possible causal 
conditions. However, the empirical world very seldom provides researchers with such a full cascade 
of realities. In general, empirical cases are limited in diversity. This forces researchers to consider 
alternative scenarios not covered by the cases at hand. This, however, must be based on theoretical 
and substantive knowledge of the subject at hand (Ragin 2007: 74-75). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
113 Counterfactuals make QCA researchers aware of possible worlds that are not observable. This could be due to the 
incompleteness of the researcher’s observations or the absence of such cases (Kogut 2011: 149). In the study of history, 
counterfactuals are not stories of fiction, but rather narratives that “eschew imagination in favour of computation” 
(Ferguson 1999: 17). Nobel laureate Robert Fogel is a prominent economic historians who uses counterfactuals to test 
hypotheses in their cliometric (econometric history) research.  
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Table 4.1: Membership values for crisp- and fuzzy-sets 
 
Crisp Set Fuzzy Set 
Two-value Three-value Four-value Five-value Continuous 
1 = fully in 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 = fully out 
1 = fully in 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.5 = neither fully 
in nor fully out  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 = fully out 
1 = fully in 
 
 
 
 
0.67 = more in 
than out 
 
 
 
 
0.33 = more out 
than in 
 
 
 
 
0 = fully out 
1 = fully in 
 
 
 
0.75 = mostly but 
not fully in 
 
 
0.5 = neither fully 
in nor fully out  
 
 
0.25 = mostly but 
not fully out 
 
 
 
0 = fully out 
1 = fully in 
 
 
 
0.5 < x < 1 = more 
in than out 
 
 
0.5 = neither fully 
in nor fully out  
 
 
0 < x < 0.5 = more 
out than in 
 
 
 
0 = fully out 
Source: Derived from Ragin (2008: 31) 
 
4.3.4 Choosing between set-theoretic and regression techniques 
 
Ragin “[d]efied the doctrines of the two major parties” (qualitative and quantitative) to offer a 
principled alternative for users of both techniques. The vast majority of QCA adherents value the 
technique for how it is better suited to casework than other quantitative approaches are. Put 
differently, QCA is used instead of single-equation models because the former is more applicable to 
the subject matter at hand and the questions asked in the research (Vaisey 2009: 308). Goetz and 
Mahoney (2006: 227) might have described the difference between the two approaches most 
accurately as a tale of two cultures with different values, beliefs, and norms. Due to this need to speak 
to two cultures, Vaisey (2009: 309) contended that Ragin’s (1987 and 2000) earlier work was aimed 
at comparative-historical or other case-focused researchers, while his most recent book (2008) was 
aimed at convincing so-called “quantoids” to invest in QCA. 
 
The primary motivations for using QCA in this dissertation are two need: to allow for equifinality, 
and to compare the cross-sectional findings to individual case characteristics. Standard regression 
methods – which are predicated on the idea that each outcome has a specific cause or set of causes – 
are not be able to satisfy these needs. By contrast, QCA embraces causal complexity, with the truth 
table being the primary tool by means of which the researcher identifies causation in all its 
complexity. The truth table identifies all logical combinations of factors – a census of all possible 
cases – while regression models pre-specify and then test the connection between the independent 
variable and the dependent variable. This research aims to provide a more complete account of 
institutional change in Rwanda. This requires a data tool that keeps all the cases in the analysis as 
separate entities and amenable to comparison with cross-sectional findings. The QCA approach does 
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not reduce each case to a statistical regularity, and retains the rich information contained in each unit. 
This allows for a comparison between the minimal formula and each case while also enabling 
comparisons between pairs of cases.  
 
Vaisey (2009: 311) identified three reasons why QCA is not more widely used despite its positive 
attributes. Firstly, QCA is a demanding method because it forces the user to present the analysis 
transparently. Secondly, institutional inertia has locked out new ideas and methodologies in graduate 
student training, and academic writing has been simplified by the dependence on familiar techniques 
that do not require detailed explanatory by users. Schneider and Wagemann (2010a: 377), for 
example, speculated that the wider adoption of QCA techniques in Europe than in North America 
have reflects the more fragmented academic circle with weaker methodological cleavages in the 
former. This situation has given European researchers more scope to explore this alternative to 
conventional qualitative and quantitative methods. Finally, well-intentioned but misguided advocates 
have alienated some potential users committed to conventional quantitative methods by offering QCA 
as a panacea to overcome various defects of such methods. Ragin (2008: 1) admitted that attempts to 
obtain general acceptance of the method would take many decades of hard work by thoughtful 
scholars.  
 
4.4 Conclusions 
 
This chapter discussed two tools for studying institutions and institutional change: Doing Business 
data and the fsQCA method. Firstly, it reviewed the Doing Business indicators and found that the 
data can be used as indicators for institutions and institutional change, including reforms to improve 
business environments. The widely used WGIs data, by contrast, are found to be ill-suited for tracking 
institutional change over relatively short periods. The foundations of the World Bank project strongly 
align with NIE ideas about the functioning and governance of economies. Although data about 
informal institutions are absent, the various pillars of the Doing Business database have extensive 
information about property rights, enforcement mechanisms and transaction costs. Six of the eight 
peer-reviewed papers that provide the theoretical underpinnings for the Doing Business methodology 
also have direct or indirect links to NIE theory. 
 
QCA is relatively unknown amongst economists and NIE scholars, most of whom make extensive 
use of regression techniques. QCA is well-suited for case study analysis, however, as it can cope with 
various aspects of the complex relationships between outcomes and causal conditions. The variant 
known as fsQCA quantifies attributes of cases as degrees of set membership on a scale between 0 and 
1. The results of fsQCAs include pathways that represent possible explanations for outcomes, and 
these can be used as the study each of the cases included in the analysis in more depth. This is not 
always possible with regression techniques. The reason why fsQCA is well-suited for analysing 
institutional change is that it accommodates equifinality. This feature is essential for institutional 
analysis, because countries often follow different institutional paths to reach a similar end point. 
fsQCA is chosen for use in Chapter 5 because it makes it possible to study the effects of combinations 
of factors on institutional changes in SSA countries and to undertake case-specific analysis. Chapter 
5 will use the Doing Business data, fsQCA and other data to explore institutional change to improve 
business environments in SSA countries from 2002 to 2013. Chapters 6 and 7 will discuss the results 
for Rwanda and Burundi, respectively. 
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CHAPTER 5: A SET-THEORETIC ANALYSIS OF INSTITUTIONAL 
CHANGE IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA (2002-2013) 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The Kagame regime has taken Rwanda from a failed state in the mid-1990s to a case study in quality 
African governance some two decades later. This period witnessed significant change in the country: 
from taking delivery of 581,000 machetes in 1992-1993 to arm Hutu for the coming genocide 
(Diamond 2005: 315) to preparing itself in 2014 for the opening of a facility that will eventually 
produce 700,000 tablet computers per annum (The New Times 2014). In reflecting on the country’s 
progress from weapons importer to computer exporter, the Clinton Foundation (2009) commented 
that the current polity had “forged a strong, unified and growing nation with the potential to become 
a model for the rest of Africa”. Kagame has achieved international recognition for his achievements 
in bringing Rwanda back from beyond the brink. Even Reyntjens (2013: xvi), an influential critic of 
the Kagame regime, was unable to dismiss the fact that the country’s economic and social indicators 
have improved significantly during the first 20 years of Kagame’s leadership. 
 
As indicated in Section 1.1, there are only a few examples of scholarly work on institutions in 
Rwanda. However, this body of writing focussed mainly on institutions in static situations or periods 
of only a few years, and did not take a broader perspective on institutions over extended periods. 
Understanding Rwanda’s institutions since coming back from beyond the brink is far from trivial. 
Growth under the extractive political institutions operated by the Habyarimana regime was not 
sustainable as a situation of profoundly unequal political power incentivised conflict. For Rwanda 
and many other African countries, situations of this nature manifested in civil wars, economic ruin, 
and vast human suffering (Acemoglu and Robinson 2013: 344, 441). The ruling RPF, however, was 
able to replace the Habyarimana regime in 1994 and instilled broader political rights and more 
significant economic opportunity for Rwandans heading into the current millennium. Developed 
economies are rich because, at some stage in their histories, citizens were able to create for themselves 
societies in which political rights were more evenly distributed, governments became accountable to 
the people, and majorities of people could take advantage of economic opportunities (Acemoglu and 
Robinson 2013: 3).  
 
The Kagame government appears to have made some of the institutional changes associated with the 
historical progression seen in some developed economies. Chapter 4 motivated the use of Doing 
Business data as a tool for understanding such institutional changes. This World Bank dataset has 
already been utilised to analyse institutions by, for example, Lerner and Schoar (2005), Antunes and 
Cavalcanti (2007), Galindo and Micco (2007), Nunn (2007), Dabla-Norris, Gradstein and Inchauste 
(2008), and Bae and Goyal (2009). These articles, however, were all large-N, cross-section studies of 
static environments. The use of Doing Business data to understand institutional change in a narrower, 
country-specific setting is comparatively rare in the academic literature. The goal of Chapter 5 is to 
use a method of data analysis to find causal conditions associated with institutional change in SSA 
countries. Specifically, the aim is to use the Doing Business reform data as an indicator of pro-
business institutional change, as motivated in Chapter 4. This will enable more fundamental analysis 
of recent institutional change in Rwanda in Chapter 6. 
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With the goal of Chapter 6 in mind, this chapter analyses recent institutional change in a group of 35 
SSA economies. This group comprises all countries for which observations are available for the 
period 2002-2013. This cluster constitutes an intermediate-sized sample of cases, a number that 
Moses and Knutsen (2007: 96) deemed ideal for QCA. The method appears well suited for studying 
institutions and institutional change due to the ability to account for equifinality. While regression 
analysis tends to yield a single explanation for a phenomenon, QCA allows for multiple paths to a 
single outcome. Equifinality is a challenge for institutional economists. There are many examples of 
countries that have reached a state of high -quality institutions, but this has been associated with just 
as many different combinations of possible causal factors. While the goals of comparative analysis 
are similar to those of variable-oriented analysis (Ragin 2007: 67), QCA can give more possible 
answers about the connections between an outcome and combinations of causal conditions.  
 
The remainder of Chapter 5 is structured to present the details and results of such a QCA in the SSA 
context. Section 5.2 identifies and discusses the raw data used to measure the outcome and causal 
conditions, with the latter based on four hypotheses about important aspects of institutional change. 
Section 5.3 calibrates the data according to fsQCA requirements and assesses the quality of the 
information with relevant analyses. Section 5.4 uses fsQCA software to construct a truth table of the 
calibrated data, determines the pathway solutions, and comments on these results. Section 5.5 
concludes. These elements of the analysis will identify key aspects of Rwanda’s reform experience 
that will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6.  
 
5.2 Data and model specification 
 
This QCA focuses on institutional change in SSA countries during the first 11 years of the Doing 
Business project. Hence, it spans the annual Doing Business reports dated from 2004 to 2014, which 
contained information for the years from 2002 to 2013. The 2015-2019 editions of the Doing Business 
report incorporated methodological changes that made it impossible to compare the information 
collected for these editions with those in the reports for earlier years. For this reason, this analysis is 
limited to the 2002-2013 period covered by the 2004-2014 reports. The analysis covers a sample of 
35 of the 49 SSA countries – this grouping generated 90% of the region’s GDP in 2014. The countries 
(and their respective abbreviations114) are: Angola (AGO), Benin (BEN), Botswana (BWA), Burkina 
Faso (BFA), Burundi (BUR), Cameroon (CAM), the Central African Republic (CAR), Chad (CHD), 
the DRC (DRC), Eritrea (ERI), Ethiopia (ETH), Ghana (GHA), Guinea (GUI), Kenya (KEN), 
Lesotho (LST), Liberia (LBR), Madagascar (MDG), Malawi (MWI), Mali (MAL), Mauritania 
(MRT), Mauritius (MUS), Mozambique (MOZ), Namibia (NAM), Niger (NIG), Nigeria (NGA), the 
Republic of the Congo (ROC), Rwanda (RWA), Senegal (SEN), Sierra Leone (SLE), South Africa 
(ZAF), Tanzania (TZA), Togo (TGO), Uganda (UGA), Zambia (ZMB) and Zimbabwe (ZWE).115  
 
To identify causal conditions, four hypotheses were formulated about influences on SSA countries’ 
decisions to implement pro-business institutional reforms. The first two hypotheses are rooted in the 
roles that leadership and economic and political outcomes played in institutional change in Alston et 
al.'s (2016) critical transitions framework. The third hypothesis is based on writings (e.g. Smith and 
Todaro 2015) about connections between economic outcomes and democratic and autocratic political 
                                                          
114 Abbreviations sourced and partially adapted from the UN (2013).  
115 This group includes 15 countries identified that have established high-level regulatory reform committees that reported 
directly to their respective presidencies. These are Botswana, Burundi, CAR, DRC, Ivory Coast, Guinea, Kenya, Liberia, 
Malawi, Mali, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Togo, and Zambia (World Bank 2013: 26). 
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systems. The NIE view that institutional change could be path dependent influenced the fourth 
hypothesis. As observed in the preceding chapters, and highlighted again below, all four hypotheses 
reflect factors found to influence institutional change in theoretical and empirical writings.   
 
Hypothesis 1 is that strong leadership is required to implement institutional change such as reforms 
to improve business environments. Section 2.4 explained the critical transitions framework and the 
role that leadership plays in institutional change. Leaders with the ability to engineer change can place 
a country on a new institutional trajectory. By realigning the dominant network’s beliefs, effective 
leadership will also result in changes to institutions that align these new beliefs to a new set of 
economic and political outcomes. If all goes according to the theoretical plan, a new set of institutions 
will align with the new set of beliefs and move the country’s institutional setup into a new autopilot 
situation. For some societies, this would give rise to a more open economic and political environment 
that is more accommodating to private enterprise.  
 
Hypothesis 2 is that economic and political trends threatening the longevity of the dominant network 
would cause institutional changes such as pro-business reforms to improve economic outcomes. 
Section 2.4 explained the view that strong leadership during a window of opportunity is the catalyst 
for the process of institutional change. The source of such a window of opportunity is a deviation 
between actual and expected economic and political outcomes due to an endogenous or exogenous 
shock stemming from diverse sources, e.g. economics, politics, climate change, military action, 
disease, hunger, etc. These jolts can bring the core beliefs of members of the dominant network into 
question through the processes in the critical transitions framework and their ability to sustain their 
longevity at the top of the polity, inter alia. A highly fragile state, i.e. one at risk of becoming a failed 
state due to economic and political developments, are a threat to the longevity of the dominant 
network. At this juncture, Alston et al. (2016) identified a window of opportunity for changes in a 
country’s economic and political outcomes via a significant adjustment in beliefs and institutions to 
ensure longevity.  
 
Hypothesis 3 states that institutional reforms to improve the business environment for the private 
sector are possible under democratic and autocratic political dispensations. There is no consensus 
in the academic community about the extent to which democracy and autocracy (and their constituent 
elements) contribute to economic outcomes.116 The results of empirical studies of the effects of 
political systems on economic development are split evenly: roughly a third of studies found a 
positive effect of democracy, a third suggested a neutral effect, and the remaining third found adverse 
effects (Smith and Todaro 2015: 569). Nonetheless, most donors, policymakers and the general public 
in the West believe that democracy and improved economic outcomes go hand-in-hand and should 
be pursued together in African countries. In this view, democracy is strongly associated with liberal 
economic policies envisioning a small state and a dominant role for the private sector in the economy. 
However, contrary to this view, some autocratic regimes in Asia (including China, Singapore and 
South Korea) and Africa have outperformed electoral democracies in terms of economic development 
                                                          
116 In an empirical evaluation of the much-studied relationship between regime type and economic development, 
Coppedge, Gerring, Knutsen, Lindberg, Maguire, Skaaning and Teorell (2016) found that only election‐centred indicators 
are robustly associated with economic development. Other components deemed integral to democratic regimes do not 
show a clear relationship with economic development. The authors argue that these findings point to inconsistencies in 
the results of earlier studies of this relationship. 
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outcomes.117 In substantive democracies, institutional change often take long and require significant 
resources. In principle, autocracies may be able to undertake such process more quickly. 
 
Hypothesis 4 states that a business environment that is already supportive of private enterprise offers 
the foundation for implementing further institutional reforms to improve business environments. 
Section 2.3 explained the concept of path dependence, according to which institutions that govern 
day-to-day interactions are set on a specific trajectory. While the critical transitions framework 
focussed on a shock-induced change to institutions, the alternative view of institutional stickiness 
implies that institutional change follows a particular path without much deviation from the trend. As 
stated in Section 2.3, this dissertation accommodates both slow and fast-moving changes to 
institutions stemming from internal and external sources. Path dependence implies that long-term 
interaction between business environment regulations and organisations, as opposed to abrupt events, 
determines reforms to business environments. This perspective on institutional change implies that 
business-friendly institutional setups are products of evolutionary processes of business environment 
improvements over time (put differently, a history of change matters for further change). It follows 
that pro-business institutional reforms stem from an already-positive business environment before 
these changes. Alternatively, a lack of reforms stems from a weak initial business environment.  
 
Based on these four hypotheses, the fsQCA below seeks to identify the influence of strong leadership, 
state fragility, autocratic and democratic political systems, and the initial quality of the business 
environment on the extent of pro-business institutional reforms implemented by SSA countries from 
2002 to 2013. The set-theoretic model postulates that pro-business institutional reforms are functions 
of strong leadership, state fragility, a strong initial business environment, and the influences of 
autocracy and democracy. This specification with five causal conditions aligns with Ragin’s (2008: 
142) suggestion of a ‘modest’ list of causal conditions ranging between three and eight. The following 
sections outline the data sources and the methods employed to construct the outcome and causal 
conditions used in the fsQCA. The data were selected on the basis of Collier and Adcock’s (1999: 
561) recommendation that the tools used (in this case, fsQCA) and the questions at hand (in this case, 
the four hypotheses) should determine how concepts are measured. The purposes of this dissertation 
necessitated the use of graded instead of dichotomous set membership values.  
 
5.2.1 The outcome: extensive pro-business reforms 
 
The outcome variable is the number of pro-business reforms made in each SSA country from 2005 
to 2013. Section 4.2 provided a general introduction to the Doing Business project and data. That 
section showed that the Doing Business dataset was useful for deriving empirical measures of formal 
institutions. Data collected by this World Bank project measure the complexity and cost of regulatory 
processes and the strength of legal institutions. Many elements of the dataset have to do with property 
rights, transaction costs and enforcement mechanisms. Section 4.2 also argued that the information 
in the Doing Business dataset is more suitable for studying institutional change than, for example, the 
WGI dataset. Furthermore, some of the academic research that formed the theoretical underpinnings 
of the Doing Business indicators have direct or indirect links to the NIE.  
                                                          
117 In a study of the contribution of democracy to economic development in African countries, Cilliers (2016: 3) stated 
that democracy generally functions better in countries that have achieved minimum levels of income and education. In 
these instances, the countries’ institutions are able to limit the misuse of state resources. Democracy can be fragile – and 
largely a nominal feature of politics – in low income countries if their formal institutions are insufficiently developed to 
accommodate liberal democratic processes. 
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The Doing Business website provides a list of reforms undertaken by each country from 2008 to 2013. 
The World Bank (2006) also listed reforms in 2005 and 2006 in the annual Doing Business 
publication for 2007. Earlier reports were unclear about the exact nature of reforms. The Bank 
classified each country's reforms from 2005 to 2013 (as reported in the 2007-2014 editions of the 
annual Doing Business report) as simplifying or complicating business activity. For example, the 
2014 edition of the project’s annual report indicated that Rwanda simplified the process for corporate 
tax payments, and also implemented an electronic single-window system at the Rusumo border post 
that is used to access the port of Dar es Salaam in Tanzania (World Bank 2013: 10). Such information 
was used to record and sum reforms that improved business environments over all ten pillars in the 
years from 2005 to 2013. Rwanda (31 reforms, as listed in Section 6.2), Mauritius (22), Burkina Faso 
(20), Sierra Leone (20) and Burundi (19) headed the list of African countries while Eritrea (1), 
Zimbabwe (3), Namibia (3), Ethiopia (6) and Chad (6) made up the bottom five countries. On average, 
the 35 SSA countries each recorded 11 reforms during the nine-year period.  
 
The World Bank’s criteria for qualifying these reforms as meaningful for affecting structural 
improvements in business environment are rooted in standardised case scenarios. As discussed 
previously, the choice of indicators and, therefore, the identification of reforms, is guided by 
economic research and firm-level data about the main obstacles to business activity. The Doing 
Business project also benefits from continuous feedback from governments, academics, practitioners 
and independent reviewers. These factors have resulted in a robust design for identifying qualitative 
and quantitative information captured by the Doing Business project and reforms associated with 
changes in these observations (World Bank 2013: 20-21). While it cannot be denied that all reforms 
will not necessarily improve a country’s business climate to the same extent, the premise of this 
section is that the number of reforms is a useable measure of the overall scope and strength of each 
country's reform efforts.  
 
It might not be obvious that Doing Business reforms can be associated with the type of institutional 
reform in Alston et al.'s (2016) critical transitions framework. The critical transitions framework 
works with high-level developments such as changes in the dominant network and revisions to 
constitutional level institutions. Business environment reforms seem less significant, especially in the 
context of the entire complex of economic and political institutions. However, the business 
environment reforms recorded by the Doing Business project are examples of changes to laws and 
enforcement processes; hence, these are examples of the incremental changes to the ‘rules of the 
game’ identified in the critical transitions framework. Furthermore, such reforms can be products of 
changes to constitutional-level institutions. As explained in Section 2.4, these changes are much more 
commonplace than large-scale constitutional-level changes and are required to counterbalance 
changes in either beliefs or outcomes. These reforms also add up to structural reform of an economy, 
if implemented in sufficient numbers.  
 
5.2.2 Causal condition 1: Effective transactional leadership 
 
The study by political scientists of leadership dynamics is cyclical, and the subject has become 
fashionable again after the 2008 global financial crisis (Ahlquist and Levi 2011: 1). As discussed in 
Section 2.4, Alston et al. (2016: 187) made an essential contribution to knowledge about the origins 
of institutional change by arguing that windows of opportunity for reforms require individuals with 
strong leadership abilities to evoke this change. An effective show of leadership results in tangible 
institutional change and the ability to affect incremental change to maintain the leadership position 
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of the dominant network. In effect, this assessment includes two classifications of leadership that can 
be traced back to early work by Hargrove (1989). Firstly, Schofield (2006) identified ‘transformative’ 
leadership as being the catalyst for discontinuous change at pivotal moments. This is linked to the 
actions of individuals during window of opportunity, as identified by Alston et al. (2016). 
Transformative leadership can be associated with the ‘great man’ [sic] perspective, which suggests 
that the evolution of history is primarily determined by the idiosyncratic, causative influences of 
certain individuals (Jones and Olken 2005: 838). For example, Keegan (2003) argued that the political 
history of the 20th century can be written as the biographies of just six men, namely Vladimir Lenin, 
Joseph Stalin, Adolf Hitler, Mao Zedong, Franklin Roosevelt, and Winston Churchill.  
 
Secondly, Northouse (2004) described leadership as a process involving influence in a group context 
to attain a common goal, e.g. economic development. In this regard, Canes-Wrone (2006) identified 
‘transactional’ leadership in which a leader manages and attempts to implement policy within a larger 
economic, social and political context. This includes adjustments to laws and enforcement processes 
and incremental changes, as identified in Alston et al.'s (2016) critical transitions framework. In 
discussing public sector leadership, De Groot, Edelenbos, Meijerink, Scholten and Teisman (2009) 
took as their departure point a perspective from Marion, McKelvey and Uhl-Bien (2007) that frames 
transactional leadership as a complex interactive dynamic from which adaptive outcomes emerge. De 
Groot et al. (2009: 5) interpreted effective transactional leadership as the successful development and 
implementation of processes of interaction and cooperation with stakeholders, in which (sometimes 
harsh) decisions are made to accommodate different interests in a coherent policy deal. Strict 
procedures and rules of conduct structure the involvement of stakeholders such as citizens, opposition 
parties, civil society organisations, and international entities. This type of interaction invariably 
results in compromises between policy goals and outcomes because conflicting objectives are 
common. 
 
Several easily accessible sources of data on the quality of public governance are available, including 
the WGIs and Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG). It is tempting to use these data sources 
as measures of the quality of leadership. Governance, however, is not the same thing as transactional 
leadership. Governance is the delivery of political goods (such as human rights, sustainable economic 
opportunities, human development, the rule of law, and safety and security) to citizens. Hence, the 
quality of governance improves when a system delivers more and better quality political goods to 
citizens (Rotberg 2009: 113). The WGIs and IIAG data are apt measures of governance. By contrast, 
Canes-Wrone (2006) and De Groot et al. (2009) define transactional leadership as the development, 
management and implementation of policy in a complex governance system with the aim of 
structuring government activity for the delivery of political goods. Because of this distinction between 
governance and transactional leadership, a more focused definition of the latter is required here in 
order to pair the concept with appropriate data.  
 
Effective transactional leadership involves three key components. Firstly, leaders enable the process 
of decision-making by dialogue and mutual exchange of ideas and opinions to gain understanding of 
the perspectives and demands of other stakeholders. This implies that solutions are not determined 
early on, as leaders first seek to balance the competing policy goals of stakeholders. Secondly, leaders 
establish and maintain systems to ensure alignment between desired outcomes and actions to 
implement agreed-upon policies. Such systems coordinate different stakeholders to achieve policy 
implementation and attainment of policy goals. Thirdly, leaders motivate stakeholders to commit 
themselves to the chosen policies, with project implementation preceded by collaborative decision-
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making. Leaders' efforts to establish strict rules and procedures for interaction between stakeholders 
make this approach cooperation-oriented and focused on conflict avoidance (De Groot et al. 2009: 5-
6). Although these theoretical components have been clarified, empirical research on transactional 
leadership in the public sector remains in its infancy.118 
 
Transactional leadership is characterised by continuous change; in transformative leadership, by 
contrast, change occurs in a discontinuous manner during specific windows. Given that the outcome 
variable for the fsQCA (reforms to improve business environments recorded over time by the Doing 
Business project) could not be associated with specific events of transformative leadership and 
policymaking, transactional leadership is the more relevant dimension to consider. In this regard, the 
Bertelsmann Stiftung's Transformation Index (BTI) provides a bi-annual assessment of the 
management quality of countries’ public leadership, defined as the capacity, performance, and 
accountability of the political actors who have the power and responsibility to shape or determine 
public policy in a society (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2016a: 5). This Management Index is aligned with 
the concept of transactional leadership as it considers the day-to-day practices of the polity. 
 
The BTI publishes scores on 20 management components (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2016a: 36-45). 
Country experts and ‘blind’ experts (external specialists who are used to avoid in-country bias) 
evaluate qualitative and quantitative country information and assign numerical ratings on a scale from 
one to 10. The resulting scores are averaged to obtain management performance scores. Each 
country's score is then weighted by a level of difficulty measure that indicates the extent to which 
structural difficulties constrain governance capacity. Such difficulties include poverty, a poorly 
educated workforce, and natural disasters. The management performance scores of countries that face 
many difficulties are adjusted upwards to reflect success under challenging conditions (Bertelsmann 
Stiftung 2016a: 7, 35). The BTI Management Index reflects the difficulty-adjusted management 
performance of a government.  
 
Comparable bi-annual BTI data are available for the years from 2003 to 2014, which closely match 
the period studied in this chapter. The BTI’s component that assesses ‘policy coordination’ scores the 
extent to which governments can coordinate the transformation of conflicting objectives into coherent 
policies. As many policies have conflicting objectives, reflect competing political interests, and affect 
other policies, governments have to ensure that their policies are coherent. Of course, various policy 
coordination styles are possible, e.g. centralised or decentralised ones. The critical factor is the impact 
of these styles on policy coherence. According to the Bertelsmann Stiftung (2016c: 40), successful 
policy coordination encompasses the following: 
 Ensuring that trade-offs between policy goals are well balanced 
 Introducing forms of coordination to mediate between different departments of the state 
administration 
                                                          
118 Academic research on transactional leadership has focussed overwhelmingly on the management of private sector 
companies. While Canes-Wrone (2006), Marion et al. (2007) and De Groot et al. (2009) opened the door for such research 
by developing the narrower concept of ‘transactional’ leadership, academics have not reached consensus about the 
characteristics of leaders and leadership. The authors of these theoretical papers have subsequently not published research 
specifically devoted to transactional leadership. Hence, a clearly defined collection of empirical research focussed on 
transactional leadership does not exist. While it seems very important in governance, the lack of research on transactional 
leadership probably reflects a common perception among researchers about the notion. Some authors, such as Han (2008: 
204-205), suggest that transactional leadership has to do with the day-to-day activities of leaders. This implies that it 
comes with leadership positions and represents “nothing exceptional”. Schofield’s (2006) ‘transformative’ leadership 
clearly seems a much more attractive research topic. 
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 Transparently ascribed responsibilities to avoid negligence of tasks, redundancies or friction 
between stakeholders 
 
These components align very strongly with the three key requirements for effective transactional 
leadership identified by De Groot et al. (2009: 5-6). In sum, the Bertelsmann Stiftung’s experts 
consider trade-offs between competing policy goals, coordination to reach desired policy objectives, 
and processes to avoid negligence and conflict when they assess the quality of policy coordination. 
The BTI’s policy coordination index is used in this dissertation as a measure of effective transactional 
leadership because it is strongly aligns with De Groot et al.'s (2009) definition of the concept. 
Furthermore, the raw scores for policy coordination are weighted with the BTI’s level of difficulty 
index to incorporate the disparate policy implementation challenges in the various countries.119 The 
final scores derived from this process represent the effectiveness of transactional leadership in the 
sample of SSA countries, with high scores indicating high levels of success in transforming 
conflicting objectives into coherent policy outcomes. Botswana (7.73), Mauritius (6.78), Ghana 
(6.33), Niger (6.17) and Rwanda (6.17) top the list, while the DRC (1.78), Zimbabwe (2.00), Chad 
(2.26), Republic of the Congo (2.81) and Burundi (3.19) make up the bottom five countries.  
 
5.2.3 Causal condition 2: State fragility 
 
Alston et al. (2016: 190-191) argued that the beliefs of a country’s leadership about the functioning 
of the economy can be affected if economic and political outcomes are sufficiently different from the 
expectations of the dominant network. This is evident from their examples of institutional change in 
Brazil and Argentina. The assessment of the same process in Rwanda in Chapter 4 confirmed this. A 
country’s institutions are structured to realise the economic and political outcomes desired by the 
elites and to sustain the dominant network at the helm of the polity. Deviated outcomes may be caused 
by macroeconomic and political instability, for example, and can place the longevity of the dominant 
network in jeopardy. When economic and political outcomes no longer align with the beliefs of the 
dominant network and are no longer sustainable, polities could be forced to implement institutional 
changes (e.g. business environment reforms). The aims of such reforms could be to stimulate 
economic growth or to consolidate the status of dominant networks by improving socio-economic 
and political conditions. In sum, the dominant network is in jeopardy when the state is unable or 
unwilling to generate the desired economic and political outcomes to sustain the polity, and this may 
necessitate reforms to realign beliefs and outcomes.  
 
This perspective suggests that state fragility is an umbrella term for deviated economic and political 
outcomes. Engberg-Pedersen and Stepputat (2008: 22) cited a definition of a fragile state from the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD): a country where state power is 
unable or unwilling to deliver core functions to the majority of the people. These functions include 
security, protection of property, essential public services and essential infrastructure. The essence of 
state fragility is socioeconomic and political instability that could result in a collapse of the polity or, 
put differently, a descent into state failure. The dominant network is at risk of losing its elevated 
position when it cannot provide public goods. To quantify this risk of state failure, the Fund for 
Peace’s (FFP) Fragile States Index (FSI) combines six socio-economic and six political indicators 
                                                          
119 The leadership measure was based on the following formula: Quality of transactional leadership = [raw BTI policy 
coordination score] x [1 + (BTI level of difficulty – 1) x (0.25 / 9)] x [10 / 12.5]. Six components determined the level of 
difficulty: physical constraints (e.g. infrastructure and geography), civil society traditions (e.g. social trust), conflict 
intensity, GNI per capita, levels of education, and rule of law.  
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into a measure of the risk of state inability to perform its basic tasks. The Institute for the Study of 
Diplomacy (ISD) at Georgetown University developed the rigorous, social science-based 
methodology for compiling the index. The organisation indicates that the basic data used to compile 
the FSI is publically available and that the integration of data from many sources is the main strength 
of the methodology used to construct the index (FFP 2016). 
 
The FFP uses its proprietary Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST) to triangulate and review 
qualitative and quantitative information. It further generates an average of 14 sub-scores for each of 
the following categories: (i) demographic pressures, (ii) refugees and IDPs, (iii) group grievances, 
(iv) human flight and brain drain, (v) uneven economic development, (vi) poverty and economic 
decline, (vii) state legitimacy, (viii) public services, (viii) human rights and rule of law, (x) security 
apparatus, (xi) factionalised elites, and (xii) external intervention. Through the use of specialised 
algorithms and search parameters to separate relevant from irrelevant data, each category is given a 
score out of 10 that is aggregated to a final score out of 120. The higher the score, the more fragile 
the state and the more susceptible the polity to loss of control (FFP 2016). Although FSI data are 
available for the period 2003-2015, this analysis uses information from 2003 to 2013 to match the 
focus period. The DRC (average annual score of 108.77 out of 120), Chad (108.76), Zimbabwe 
(107.28), CAR (103.24) and Guinea (101.48) were classified as being the most fragile SSA states in 
this period. Mauritius (43.75), South Africa (63.54), Ghana (65.58), Botswana (66.64) and Namibia 
(72.03) were the most stable states. Rwanda (90.49) was near the median of the group.  
 
5.2.4 Causal condition 3: Strong initial business environment 
 
The reforms recorded by the Doing Business project do not portray the overall quality of a country’s 
business environment. The World Bank project is restricted to the operating landscape of SMEs; 
furthermore, Chapter 4 pointed out that the recorded reforms are institutional changes to support 
private firms. Hence, an alternative indicator of the strength of countries’ business environments is 
required. It is well-established that institutions often change slowly and in a path-dependent manner 
(see Section 2.3). This reality makes it important to test whether and, if so, to what extent a weak 
initial business environment constrains subsequent reforms. An indicator of the strength of the 
business environment before the launch of the Doing Business project can be used for this purpose.  
 
Few of the many cross-country indicators of business environment strength are available in time-
series form for all African countries. The IIAG was created for the Mo Ibrahim Foundation by 
researchers at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government. It is intended to be a measure 
of the performance of all African polities based on six criteria: 
 
 Safety and security 
 The rule of law 
 Transparency and corruption 
 Participation and human rights 
 Sustainable economic opportunity 
 Human development 
 
Under the sustainable economic opportunity pillar, the Foundation provides an index of the strength 
of countries' business environments. Scores out of 100 assess the following aspects: (i) the 
competitiveness of the business environment, (ii) the overall investment climate, (iii) the investment 
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climate for rural businesses, (iv) the development of rural financial services, (v) levels of red tape and 
bureaucratisation, (vi) customs procedures, and (vii) the soundness of banks (Gisselquist and Rotberg 
2008). High business environment scores point to welcoming investment climates, competitive 
domestic economies, limited red tape, efficient customs procedures, sound banking systems, and deep 
regional integration. Observations for 2002 are incorporated into the analysis in this chapter as a 
measure of initial business environments at the launch of the Doing Business project. Mauritius 
(77.27), South Africa (76.71), Botswana (73.81), Namibia (66.17) and Rwanda (59.22) had the best 
business environments in 2002, while Eritrea (7.50), Zimbabwe (18.27), the DRC (23.70), Angola 
(24.41) and Togo (25.28) had the poorest ones.  
 
5.2.5 Causal conditions 4 & 5: Full autocracy and full democracy 
 
The establishment and reform of formal institutions depend on the core beliefs of the polity. One 
would expect the beliefs of those in power in democratic societies to produce institutions that benefit 
more individuals and organisations than the beliefs of autocratic leaders would. In a comprehensive 
literature review, Coppedge, Gerring, Knutsen, Lindberg, Maguire, Skaaning and Teorell (2016: 3) 
found that many academic studies report a causal connection between democracy and economic and 
human development. These studies suggest that fully-fledged democratic systems empower citizens 
and organisations. Competitive elections, for example, should pressure newly elected politicians to 
institute redistributive policies to address social inequality. In turn, voters should reward incumbents 
at the next election for resisting predation and successfully providing public goods (Coppedge at al 
2016: 5, 7).  
 
Similarly, it is widely believed that individuals and organisations in autocratic societies whose desires 
do not align with the beliefs of the polity would not necessarily benefit from economic and political 
outcomes. In such cases, those in control of political institutions may create economic institutions 
that enrich themselves at the expense of others in society (Acemoglu and Robinson 2013: 80). 
Autocracies were found in significant numbers in Africa following decolonisation. Globally, 
autocratic regimes outnumbered democratic ones three to one by the mid-1970s (Gurr, Jaggers and 
Marshall 2013: 9). While various measures suggest that the gap between the prevalence of electoral 
democracies in Africa and other parts of the world has narrowed over the past three decades, 
democracy is still not the dominant form of government in Africa. Depending on which definition of 
democracy was used, between nine and 23 African countries were considered democratic in 2015 
(Cilliers 2016: 14, 18).  
 
Most scholars regard contemporary Rwanda as an authoritarian, high modernist state. At the same 
time, however, the country has a neoliberal economic policy orientation that grants an elevated role 
in policy reform to non-state actors – a feature that seems more likely in democracies (Huggins 2013: 
6). It seems intuitive to associate an autocratic government with heavy-handed intervention in the 
economy, state-led industrialisation, and a small role for the private sector, whereas one would expect 
more participatory processes in democracies (Alston et al. 2016: 33-35). Hence, the presence in 
Rwanda of an autocratic governance style as well as strong input from the private sector on critical 
policy issues seems somewhat of a contradiction. 
 
To resolve this conundrum, it is necessary to transcend the traditional association of autocracy with 
non-democratic policymaking processes and, especially, dictatorships. Misconceptions about 
dictators and autocracies abound, because political scientists have paid far less attention to these types 
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of political regimes than to democracies (Frantz 2016: 2). Munck and Snyder (2008: 543) suggested 
that autocracies are by far the most understudied phenomena in comparative politics and that political 
scientists need to think much more about them. Quite understandably, it is more challenging to study 
autocracies, as the internal politics of these governments are deliberately hidden from public view. 
Nonetheless, recent scholarship in political science has illuminated many features of authoritarian 
regimes. Political scientists now know that autocracies frequently implement the same economic 
institutions that academics have historically viewed as hallmarks of democratic regimes. Leaders’ 
positions are most secure when selectorates (the bodies of persons or organisations responsible for 
selecting) are large. By contrast, autocrats cannot rely on the legitimacy conferred by the selectorate 
via free and fair elections to defend their right to rule (Frantz 2016: 11).  
 
These inherent uncertainties of autocratic rule have moved some modern autocrats to use policies and 
policymaking styles usually associated with democracies to remain in power for longer (Frantz 2016: 
1-3).120 However, this should not come as a surprise. Many developmental states, for example, have 
been authoritarian but have achieved excellent economic development results (Mkandawire 2010: 
69-70). For example, the governments of the East Asian Tigers, a group of 20th century developmental 
states that include Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan, transformed their economies 
during the second half of the previous millennium within the context of relatively autocratic political 
systems (see Section 1.1). Their bureaucracies were highly efficient and based on meritocratic 
recruitment processes. In South Korea and Taiwan, for example, autocrats introduced economic 
institutions like private property rights. This removed the powerful landed class that stymied previous 
development efforts (Evans 2010: 45-47).121 
 
In a paper on the protracted tenure of some autocrats, Gandhi and Przeworski (2007: 1292) found that 
positive economic and political institutions in autocracies are not merely window-dressing. Instead, 
autocrats maintain institutions often associated with democracies to solicit cooperation or to extend 
their tenure. Such instruments of cooperation include policy concessions which, in turn, require some 
form of forum to which access can be controlled – autocrats usually refuse to give unbridled access. 
Within these forums, stakeholders can reveal their demands without appearing to be aggressive or 
resistant, compromises can be hammered out without undue public scrutiny or open conflict, and 
resulting agreements can be legally formalised and communicated as such (Gandhi and Przeworski 
2007: 1282). Such structures fuse an autocratic governance style with strong input from the private 
sector on key policies.122 
 
                                                          
120 Political scientists have very little insight into the conditions that channel autocracies onto the path from collegial to 
strongman rule (Frantz 2016: 1). 
121 Although a significant number of autocratic governments have employed developmental state policies, it would be 
incorrect to infer that the adoption of a developmental state approach requires the rejection of democracy. Chang (2010: 
86) made reference to Scandinavian developmental states that certainly cannot be accused of having autocratic political 
systems.  
122 There is an inherent tension between the two components: the one tends to require coercive practices while the other 
usually requires inclusive processes. For example, while the Rwandan government has demanded that farmers abide by 
its crop specialisation policy, use specific fertiliser and seeds, and sell their produce to particular firms or cooperatives, it 
has also desired to foster entrepreneurship and innovation among farmers (Huggins 2013: 221-222). Thus, non-state actors 
have been incorporated into the architecture of the agricultural system more and more. For example, local companies that 
won government contracts to distribute fertiliser in Kirehe District profited from the specialisation policy (Huggins 2013: 
375). Clearly, the country’s process of state building – aimed at creating a Rwanda without ethnic divisions – was 
intimately linked to neoliberal capitalist notions of economic development, with an emphasis on commodification and 
commercialisation (Huggins 2013: 222-223). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
107 
 
Data from the Centre for Systematic Peace’s (CSP) Polity IV Project (referenced here as Polity IV 
2015) are often used in political science research to create indicators of degrees of democracy and 
autocracy in political systems.123 The CSP data cover 167 countries with populations larger than 
500,000, with some series starting in the year 1800. The data are often used to develop measures of 
political institutions (e.g. by Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson and Yared 2005, and Collier and Rohner 
2008), and are used in this dissertation because of the multitude of aspects incorporated in the final 
assessments. The measures of the degrees of autocracy and democracy are based on the openness and 
competitiveness of recruitment of members of the executive, constraints on the country’s leadership, 
regulation of political competition, and the extent to which alternative policies and representation can 
be pursued in the political arena (Gurr, Jaggers and Marshall 2013: 14-17). Polity IV refrains from 
specifying an unambiguous cut-off point between autocracy and democracy, with the scores reflecting 
differences in the degrees of autocracy and democracy. This feature make the data ideally suited for 
use in fsQCA.  
 
In the Polity IV database, a high score for democracy indicates strong civil liberties for all citizens in 
their daily lives, robust processes to effectively express preferences about alternative policies and 
leaders, as well as strong institutional constraints on the exercise of power by the executive. 
Alternatively, a low score indicates limited civil liberties and scope for expression of preferences, as 
well as few limits on executive power. Polity IV scoring implies that there are no necessary conditions 
for characterising a political system as democratic and that democracy should rather be treated as a 
spectrum variable. In turn, a high score for autocracy indicates restricted or suppressed political 
participation and few constraints on chief executives' exercising of power. Conversely, a low score 
for autocracy indicates more competitive political participation and more constraints on the power of 
the chief executive, but with high levels of directiveness over social and economic activity (Gurr, 
Jaggers and Marshall 2013: 14-17).  
 
Note, however, that a low score for democracy does not necessarily imply a high autocracy score. In 
the case of the scores for ‘constraints on the chief executive’, for example, ‘slight to moderate 
limitations’ (the weakest score on the autocracy scale for this category) is not the opposite of 
executive parity (the strongest score on the democracy scale for this category).124 Table 5.1 lists the 
Polity IV component scores for autocracy and democracy. Indicators for the underlying political 
dimensions used to compile the autocracy and democracy scores are assessed and weighted 
differently by Polity IV.125 Hence, high autocracy scores are often but not invariably associated with 
high non-democracy scores. Burkina Faso, for example, has low scores on both indicators. In other 
words, Polity IV treats full democracy and full autocracy not as opposites, but as two types of regimes 
with varying and overlapping elements. Indicators for both types of regimes are included in the 
analysis in this chapter, because the two concepts are not mutually exclusive.  
                                                          
123 Harford and Klein (2005: 2) argued that the Polity IV project quantifies political institutions like democracy and 
autocracy as objectively as possible. Alternative data sources include the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) database, 
Freedom House, and the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU). These datasets are all updated annually, have time series 
observations, and are widely used in the academic and policy communities (Cilliers 2016: 3). Polity IV and V-Dem have 
most country-years of observations and the two datasets overlap more than the other data sources do. The Polity IV and 
V-Dem data that classify political systems overlap by 92%, and this rises to 94% when ambiguous cases are removed 
(Lindberg, Lührmann and Tannenberg 2018: 70). The two datasets tell very similar stories about the evolution of 
democracy and autocracy over the past century, and both find a decreasing chasm between global and African scores for 
electoral democracy over the past few decades (Cilliers 2016: 13-14). 
124 Here, accountability groups have as least as much or more effective authority in most areas of state-related activity 
than the executive does (Gurr, Jaggers and Marshall 2013: 25). 
125 See Table 6.4 for these dimensions.  
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Table 5.1: Polity IV components for democracy and democracy scores  
 
Democracy Score Autocracy 
Competitiveness of executive recruitment 
Election +2 Selection 
Transitional +1  
Openness of executive recruitment 
Dual/election +1 Closed 
Election +1 Dual/election 
Constraint on chief executive 
Executive parity or subordination +4  
Intermediate category +3 Unlimited authority 
Substantial limitations +2 Intermediate category 
Intermediate category +1 Slight to moderate limitations 
Competitiveness of political participation 
Competitive +3  
Transitional +2 Restricted 
Factional +1 Sectarian 
Regulation of participation 
 +2 Repressed 
 +1 Suppressed 
Source: Gurr, Jaggers and Marshall 2013: 15-16 
 
Chapter 4 showed that Rwanda has had a mostly autocratic regime since obtaining independence in 
1961, albeit more moderately since the year 2000. Its autocracy score averaged 3.33 (out of a 
maximum of 11) during the period from 2002 to 2013. Based on the Polity IV data, Eritrea (7.00), 
Cameroon (5.00), Angola (4.00), the Republic of the Congo (4.00), and Togo (3.83) most closely 
approximated full autocracies. Benin, Botswana, Kenya, Mauritius, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South 
Africa and Zambia all scored 0 on this metric, which implied that these countries were classified as 
non-autocratic. Mauritius (10.00), South Africa (9.00), Lesotho (8.17), Botswana (8.00), Ghana and 
Kenya (both 7.83) had the highest democracy scores (i.e. most closely approximated full 
democracies), while Eritrea, the Republic of the Congo and Rwanda scored 0 on this metric and were 
classified as non-democratic.126 
 
5.3 Analysis 
 
Table 5.2 contains the raw data observations discussed in Section 5.2. Each variable in Table 5.2 has 
a one-word descriptive name, which will be used throughout the remainder of this dissertation. These 
descriptive names, however, are derived from membership definitions as required by the set-theoretic 
nature of fsQCA. Table 5.3 lists these definitions. As described in Section 4.3.3, one of the steps in 
an fsQCA is the transformation of raw data scores to set-membership scores ranging from 0 to 1. In 
principle, the calibrated scores can assume any value between zero and one, but the fsQCA software 
usually assigns scores ranging from 0.05 to 0.95. The crossover point of a data series (represented by 
a set-membership score of 0.5) is the point of maximum ambiguity between full membership and full 
non-membership of a set. Researcher should preferably use external criteria to determine points of 
                                                          
126 See the discussion in Section 6.4.2 for more information on Rwanda’s democratic credentials.  
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full membership and full non-membership as well as crossover points for each series. Figure 5.1 
depicts the data from Table 5.2 and the chosen cut-off points for the calibration exercise.  
 
Table 5.2: Raw data scores 
 
Country Reforms Leadership Fragile Autocracy Democracy Business 
Angola 9.000 4.501 85.730 4.000 2.000 24.410 
Benin 14.000 4.864 75.360 0.000 6.667 54.700 
Botswana 8.000 7.733 66.640 0.000 8.000 73.810 
Burkina Faso 20.000 4.647 89.620 2.000 2.000 48.740 
Burundi 19.000 3.194 96.590 1.100 6.400 42.040 
Cameroon 8.000 3.560 91.870 5.000 1.000 45.490 
CAR 7.000 3.733 103.240 1.833 1.333 36.110 
Chad 6.000 2.257 108.760 3.000 1.000 28.190 
DRC 12.000 1.776 108.770 0.792 4.750 23.700 
Eritrea 1.000 4.141 90.310 7.000 0.000 7.500 
Ethiopia 6.000 3.993 96.500 3.500 1.500 50.850 
Ghana 11.000 6.326 65.580 0.167 7.833 53.740 
Guinea 7.000 3.930 101.480 1.833 1.750 31.820 
Kenya 13.000 3.497 96.380 0.000 7.833 45.190 
Lesotho 9.000 3.683 80.670 0.167 8.167 51.770 
Liberia 15.000 4.420 94.260 1.417 6.167 36.480 
Madagascar 15.000 4.325 80.200 0.750 5.583 46.830 
Malawi 10.000 4.332 91.040 0.250 6.000 45.320 
Mali 16.000 5.276 79.460 0.083 6.917 45.010 
Mauritania 7.000 3.414 88.650 3.417 0.333 42.920 
Mauritius 22.000 6.778 43.750 0.000 10.000 77.270 
Mozambique 11.000 5.907 81.310 0.083 5.000 44.910 
Namibia 3.000 5.859 72.030 0.000 6.000 66.170 
Niger 11.000 6.169 94.690 1.167 6.000 35.000 
Nigeria 8.000 4.555 97.140 0.000 4.000 35.020 
Republic of the Congo 9.000 2.806 91.910 4.000 0.000 29.070 
Rwanda 31.000 6.166 90.450 3.333 0.000 59.220 
Senegal 10.000 6.003 73.910 0.000 7.417 49.980 
Sierra Leone 20.000 4.099 93.390 0.583 6.750 33.040 
South Africa 11.000 6.049 63.540 0.000 9.000 76.710 
Tanzania 9.000 4.637 81.360 3.000 2.000 48.400 
Togo 9.000 4.017 87.000 3.833 1.000 25.280 
Uganda 9.000 6.110 95.850 2.500 0.750 49.890 
Zambia 10.000 4.555 83.200 0.000 6.000 54.980 
Zimbabwe 3.000 2.002 107.280 3.667 2.000 18.270 
Source: Own calculations and sources as described in Section 5.2. 
 
Table 5.3: Full membership and full non-membership classifications 
 
 Reforms Leadership Fragile Autocracy Democracy Business 
Full membership 
Extensive 
pro-business 
reforms 
Effective 
transactional 
leadership 
State 
fragility 
Full 
autocracy 
Full 
democracy 
Strong initial 
business 
environment 
Non-membership 
Limited pro-
business 
reforms 
Ineffective 
transactional 
leadership 
State 
stability 
Non-
autocratic 
Non-
democratic 
Weak initial 
business 
environment 
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Figure 5.1: Raw scores and calibration cut-off points 
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Crossover points are not necessarily the middle values of data series. It does not matter if a majority 
(or all) of the set membership values of a series are above or below its crossover point, because the 
quantification of crossover points is determined by criteria set by the investigator based on his or her 
theoretical and substantive knowledge of the issues at hand. The purpose of the assigned values is to 
indicate degrees of set membership (Ragin 2000: 168-169) and to distinguish between different 
characteristics of the observations in the dataset. Objective criteria for determining crossover points 
for the causal conditions used here do not exist. This necessitated the use of standard descriptive 
statistics to determine the crossover points. This dissertation considered midpoints between the 
maximum and minimum values in each series as well as averages and medians of the data series 
(excluding outliers) as crossover points. Series medians (excluding outliers) were selected. Medians 
are often more suitable than averages or midpoints when data series are not normally distributed and 
contain outliers, which happen to be the case with the data used in this dissertation. Two outliers were 
identified: Rwanda’s high score for extensive pro-business reforms and Eritrea’s high autocracy 
score. Table 5.4 shows the resulting fuzzy membership scores. 
 
Table 5.4: Calibrated fuzzy membership scores 
 
Country Reforms Leadership Fragile Autocracy Democracy Business 
Angola 0.46 0.52 0.43 0.91 0.14 0.16 
Benin 0.75 0.60 0.28 0.05 0.73 0.71 
Botswana 0.37 0.95 0.18 0.05 0.86 0.94 
Burkina Faso 0.93 0.55 0.49 0.69 0.14 0.58 
Burundi 0.91 0.20 0.74 0.53 0.70 0.44 
Cameroon 0.37 0.27 0.56 0.95 0.08 0.51 
CAR 0.29 0.31 0.89 0.66 0.10 0.33 
Chad 0.23 0.08 0.95 0.82 0.08 0.21 
DRC 0.65 0.05 0.95 0.38 0.46 0.15 
Eritrea 0.05 0.42 0.50 0.99 0.05 0.05 
Ethiopia 0.23 0.38 0.73 0.87 0.11 0.63 
Ghana 0.59 0.85 0.17 0.08 0.85 0.69 
Guinea 0.29 0.36 0.86 0.66 0.12 0.26 
Kenya 0.70 0.26 0.73 0.05 0.85 0.50 
Lesotho 0.46 0.30 0.35 0.08 0.87 0.65 
Liberia 0.79 0.50 0.66 0.59 0.67 0.33 
Madagascar 0.79 0.47 0.34 0.35 0.59 0.54 
Malawi 0.53 0.48 0.53 0.10 0.65 0.50 
Mali 0.83 0.68 0.33 0.06 0.76 0.50 
Mauritania 0.29 0.24 0.47 0.86 0.06 0.45 
Mauritius 0.95 0.89 0.05 0.05 0.95 0.95 
Mozambique 0.59 0.79 0.36 0.06 0.50 0.49 
Namibia 0.09 0.79 0.24 0.05 0.65 0.88 
Niger 0.59 0.83 0.67 0.54 0.65 0.31 
Nigeria 0.37 0.53 0.75 0.05 0.35 0.31 
Republic of the Congo 0.46 0.14 0.56 0.91 0.05 0.22 
Rwanda 0.99 0.83 0.51 0.85 0.05 0.79 
Senegal 0.53 0.81 0.26 0.05 0.81 0.61 
Sierra Leone 0.93 0.41 0.62 0.24 0.74 0.28 
South Africa 0.59 0.81 0.15 0.05 0.92 0.95 
Tanzania 0.46 0.55 0.36 0.82 0.14 0.57 
Togo 0.46 0.39 0.45 0.89 0.08 0.17 
Uganda 0.46 0.82 0.71 0.76 0.07 0.61 
Zambia 0.53 0.53 0.39 0.05 0.65 0.71 
Zimbabwe 0.09 0.06 0.94 0.88 0.14 0.11 
Source: Own calculations based on data in Table 5.2 
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The fsQCA software provides a default consistency threshold of 0.8, but this is adjustable. Ragin 
(2008: 136) suggested that a threshold of less than 0.75 should be avoided as this may imply the 
retention of weak connections, especially in small sample studies. In general, the sample size is 
important for determining the consistency threshold, with a smaller sample of cases necessitating a 
higher threshold. However, while researchers generally follow Ragin’s (2008: 136) suggestion that 
thresholds below 0.75 should be avoided, more specific benchmarks or rules-of-thumb do not exist. 
In fact, researchers have used different thresholds for similarly sized samples of cases. For example:  
 
 Fischer (2015) used a threshold of 0.75 on a sample of 11 cases 
 Siebrits (2014) used a threshold of 0.85 for a slightly larger sample of 14 cases 
 Duerr, Epstein, Kenworthy and Ragin (2008) used various thresholds between 0.85 and 0.95, 
also for a sample of 14 cases 
 
This dissertation used the default consistency threshold of 0.8 to avoid retaining weak connections in 
the analysis. A threshold of 0.8 is well suited to an intermediate-N sample of 35 cases. Table 5.5 
provides the results of a superset analysis that attempted to identify the necessary conditions for the 
outcome. Neither the presence nor the absence of any individual causal condition proved to be 
necessary for the outcome. The fsQCA software enables the researcher to negate fuzzy membership 
scores to test the influence of the absence of a characteristic represented by a causal condition. This 
can be done by subtracting the original score from one. For example, a country that has a membership 
score of 0.8 on the causal condition ‘full democracy’ would have a membership score of 0.2 on the 
causal condition ‘not full democracy’.127 Note that from this point forward, the standard data readings 
for all the causal conditions are written in capital letters (i.e. REFORMS, LEADERSHIP, FRAGILE, 
AUTOCRACY, DEMOCRACY, BUSINESS) while the negated versions is written in lower case 
letters (reforms, leadership, fragile, autocracy, democracy, business). 
 
Table 5.5: Necessary conditions for the outcome REFORMS 
 
Causal condition Consistency Coverage 
LEADERSHIP 0.747 0.787 
BUSINESS 0.742 0.807 
Autocracy 0.731 0.715 
Fragile 0.726 0.802 
FRAGILE 0.689 0.705 
DEMOCRACY 0.688 0.819 
Business 0.676 0.702 
Leadership 0.642 0.688 
Democracy 0.602 0.578 
AUTOCRACY 0.491 0.572 
Source: Own calculations based on data in Table 5.4. 
 
The consistency scores for the lower-case versions of the causal conditions in Table 5.5 indicate that 
none of the causal conditions were necessary in negated formats either. These results suggest that 
causal complexity may well have been present – i.e. that combinations of the causal conditions may 
have influenced the outcome. Another valuable finding is that leadership (0.747) had the highest 
consistency score. This suggests that effective transactional leadership was associated more strongly 
                                                          
127 Negation effectively switches a score from a range of 0 to 1 to a range of 1 to 0. Researchers should negate set 
membership scores when they have reason to believe that membership of a specific set would detract from the outcome 
or, to put is differently, when non-membership of a set would contribute to the outcome. 
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with reform outcomes than the other causal conditions were. This is consistent with the discussions 
of  the role of leadership in institutional change in Sections 2.4 and 5.2.2. Nonetheless, the consistency 
score of less than 0.8 shows that effective transactional leadership per se cannot explain reform 
performance. This is not problematic, however, because this study has consistently emphasised the 
importance of considering combinations of factors associated with institutional change. In sum, the 
relatively low consistency scores are neither surprising against the backdrop of earlier theoretical 
discussions, nor problematic in view of the possibility of causal complexity. 
 
Using the consistency threshold of 0.8, the subset analysis reported on in Table 5.6 identified strong 
set-theoretic relationships between the outcome and several combinations of the causal conditions. 
The coverage scores indicate that 25 of the 31 subset configurations accounted for at least a quarter 
of instances of the outcome. This and other information generated by the sufficiency analysis can be 
used to evaluate the four hypotheses in Section 5.2. This is done by determining the extent to which 
configurations of the causal conditions were sufficient conditions for extensive pro-business reforms 
in the period from 2002 to 2013.  
 
Table 5.6: Sufficiency analysis for the outcome REFORMS 
 
Terms Consistency Coverage 
LEADERSHIP*FRAGILE*AUTOCRACY*DEMOCRACY*BUSINESS 1.000 0.195 
LEADERSHIP*AUTOCRACY*DEMOCRACY*BUSINESS 1.000 0.196 
LEADERSHIP*FRAGILE*AUTOCRACY*DEMOCRACY 1.000 0.217 
LEADERSHIP*AUTOCRACY*DEMOCRACY 1.000 0.217 
AUTOCRACY*DEMOCRACY*BUSINESS 0.995 0.216 
FRAGILE*AUTOCRACY*DEMOCRACY*BUSINESS 0.995 0.215 
AUTOCRACY*DEMOCRACY 0.990 0.259 
FRAGILE*AUTOCRACY*DEMOCRACY 0.990 0.258 
LEADERSHIP*FRAGILE*DEMOCRACY*BUSINESS 0.977 0.347 
FRAGILE*DEMOCRACY*BUSINESS 0.977 0.383 
LEADERSHIP*FRAGILE*DEMOCRACY 0.971 0.380 
FRAGILE*DEMOCRACY 0.969 0.480 
LEADERSHIP*FRAGILE*AUTOCRACY*BUSINESS 0.950 0.326 
LEADERSHIP*FRAGILE*BUSINESS 0.950 0.478 
LEADERSHIP*AUTOCRACY*BUSINESS 0.941 0.351 
FRAGILE*BUSINESS 0.904 0.534 
LEADERSHIP*FRAGILE*AUTOCRACY 0.890 0.376 
LEADERSHIP*FRAGILE 0.889 0.540 
FRAGILE*AUTOCRACY*BUSINESS 0.882 0.366 
AUTOCRACY*BUSINESS 0.877 0.391 
LEADERSHIP*AUTOCRACY 0.876 0.404 
LEADERSHIP*DEMOCRACY*BUSINESS 0.868 0.511 
LEADERSHIP*BUSINESS 0.856 0.666 
DEMOCRACY*BUSINESS 0.848 0.566 
LEADERSHIP*DEMOCRACY 0.846 0.554 
DEMOCRACY 0.819 0.688 
BUSINESS 0.807 0.742 
LEADERSHIP 0.787 0.747 
FRAGILE 0.705 0.689 
FRAGILE*AUTOCRACY 0.690 0.454 
AUTOCRACY 0.572 0.491 
Source: Own calculations based on data in Table 5.4.  
 
The consistency scores of the five causal conditions associated with the four hypotheses either barely 
exceeded the 0.8 consistency threshold (democracy and business) or, more often, failed to reach it 
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(leadership, fragile and autocracy). In fact, the individual causal conditions filled five of the bottom 
six places in Table 5.6 because of their relatively low consistency scores. Crucially, this included the 
causal condition ‘effective transactional leadership’: countries with such leadership did not 
necessarily have extensive pro-business reforms as well. The most significant deduction to be made 
from the low consistency scores is that the individual causal conditions are neither necessary nor 
sufficient to explain the outcome. This suggests that combinations of these factors should be 
investigated. These findings underscored the value of fsQCA, which works with combinations of 
causal conditions, for analysing the data collected and propositions formulated in this chapter.  
 
Hypothesis 1 states that strong leadership is required to implement institutional change. Section 5.2.2 
clarified this assertion by introducing and defining the concept of transactional leadership. The 
consistency score of the causal condition ‘effective transactional leadership’ (0.787) fell short of the 
threshold of 0.800. Nonetheless, the consistency scores of all the combinations that included effective 
transactional leadership exceeded 0.8. For example, the consistency score of the combination of 
effective transactional leadership and the fragile state (0.889) was markedly higher than those of the 
individual causal conditions (0.787 and 0.705, respectively). Hence, the findings are consistent with 
the emphasis on the role of leadership in institutional change in the critical transitions framework and 
in Section 5.2.2. Furthermore, the results in Table 5.6 confirmed the explanatory power of 
combinations of causal conditions.  
 
The above paragraph underscores two key themes of this dissertation, namely that transactional 
leadership is an important factor in institutional change, and that its influence is strengthened by 
combining it with other causal conditions. Hypothesis 1 received qualified support from the presence 
of effective transactional leadership in configurations of causal conditions with consistency scores 
ranging from 0.800 to1.000. In fact, four of these combinations had consistency scores of 1.000. Such 
scores imply perfect consistency, i.e. combinations that were present whenever the outcome occurred. 
The realities that all four of these combinations included effective transactional leadership and that 
none of the other causal conditions was present in all four combinations, again underscored the 
salience of leadership in institutional change in SSA.  
 
The impact of combinations of factors that include effective transactional leadership is an important 
aspect of institutional change in SSA countries that requires further study. Effective transactional 
leadership was absent in most polities in post-colonial Africa. Many post-independence governments 
on the continent repeated the abuses of their predecessors, and in this way continued to undermine 
the weak incentives that colonial economic institutions provided for investment and economic 
development. In turn, extractive economic institutions supported extractive political institutions 
(Acemoglu and Robinson 2013: 112-113, 343). These extractive political institutions fostered 
leadership styles that were the antitheses of De Groot et al.'s (2009: 5-6) effective transactional 
leadership. More specifically, extractive political institutions did not support dialogue and mutual 
exchange of ideas and opinions, could not achieve policy coordination goals because they failed to 
coordinate the actions of stakeholders, and were not cooperation-oriented or focused on conflict 
avoidance.  
 
The ineffective transactional leadership legacy of these extractive post-independence governments 
remain in many countries in Africa. The transactional leadership scores calculated for this dissertation 
points to ineffective transactional leadership in some of the region’s most fragile states, including 
Chad, the DRC and Zimbabwe. These countries also had the weakest initial business environments 
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in 2002. In contrast, several SSA countries have developed high-quality institutions, including 
Botswana, Ghana, Mauritius and South Africa. Botswana, for example, quickly developed inclusive 
institutions after independence, and retained these traits even after the potentially destabilising effects 
of the discovery of diamonds. This was partly a product of positive political institutions before 
colonisation surviving relatively unscathed, as well as the effective transactional leadership of top 
officials in the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) who led the country to independence (Acemoglu 
and Robinson 2013: 409-413).  
 
Table 5.7 reflects the additive explanatory value of including effective transactional leadership in this 
analysis. The consistency scores of combinations of effective transactional leadership and other 
causal conditions are higher than those of the individual conditions. For example, a substantial 
increase occurs when full autocracy is combined with effective transactional leadership. This reflects 
the ability of an autocratic government with effective transactional leadership to make positive 
institutional changes, as stated in Hypothesis 1. The result is consistent with the discussion in Section 
5.2.5 and, specifically, with the arguments of Huggins (2013) and Frantz (2016), who claimed that 
autocracies could implement policies that were generally associated with democracies, including pro-
business institutional reforms. The coverage score for the combination of effective transactional 
leadership and full autocracy suggests that this relationship can explain around 40% of the instances 
of extensive pro-business reforms.128 To be sure, one reason for the high coverage score is that the 
SSA region still has many autocratic governments. Of course, this does not detract from the value of 
democratic governments for positive institutional change, as discussed below.  
 
Table 5.7: Subset analysis – the additive value of leadership 
 
Terms Consistency Coverage 
LEADERSHIP*FRAGILE 0.889 0.540 
LEADERSHIP*AUTOCRACY 0.876 0.404 
LEADERSHIP*BUSINESS 0.856 0.666 
LEADERSHIP*DEMOCRACY 0.846 0.554 
DEMOCRACY 0.819 0.688 
BUSINESS 0.807 0.742 
FRAGILE 0.705 0.689 
AUTOCRACY 0.572 0.491 
Source: Selected content from Table 5.6 
 
Hypothesis 2 states that economic and political trends that threaten the longevity of the dominant 
network would cause institutional changes to improve economic outcomes. Represented here by state 
fragility, this factor in isolation also fell short of the consistency threshold of 0.80. This could indicate 
that state fragility was either incorrectly measured or was an inappropriate proxy for deviated 
economic and political outcomes (see Section 6.3.1). Alternatively, and more likely, it could indicate 
that state fragility did not stimulate extensive pro-business reforms in the absence of other factors, 
but was influential in combination with some of them. For example, the consistency score for full 
democracy of 0.819 increased significantly to 0.969 when this causal condition was combined with 
state fragility. Similarly, the consistency score of 0.846 of the combination of full democracy and 
effective transactional leadership increased to 0.974 when state fragility was added to the 
configuration. Combining state fragility with full autocracy also yielded a higher consistency score. 
                                                          
128 Buchanan and Tullock (1999: 77-78) found that dictatorship is “the most efficient rule for collective decision-making” 
when transaction costs are positive, provided that the “single decision-maker” behaves benevolently enough to minimise 
external costs imposed to private individuals by collective action. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
116 
 
Furthermore, the consistency score of 0.868 for the combination of effective transactional leadership, 
full democracy and a strong initial business environment increased to a very high 0.977 when state 
fragility was added to the configuration. The logical deduction from this is that state fragility added 
impetus to the dominant network’s motivation for extensive pro-business reforms. Evidently, the 
alternative interpretation that a state needed to be made fragile to achieve institutional change did not 
make sense. As a result, Hypothesis 2 received qualified support from the fact that state fragility made 
a substantial contribution to the consistency scores of several configurations.  
 
Hypothesis 3 states that an autocratic polity could implement institutional reforms aimed at improving 
the business environment for the private sector. ‘Full autocracy’ has the lowest consistency score of 
all the causal conditions in Table 5.5 and fell far below the threshold of 0.800. This causal condition 
appeared insignificant in isolation but did appear in some significant combinations with other factors. 
For example, the consistency score of 0.807 for a strong initial business environment improved to 
0.877 when this causal condition was combined with full autocracy. Similarly, the combination of 
effective transactional leadership and a strong initial business environment had a consistency score 
of 0.856 which increased to 0.941 when full autocracy was added to the combination. In view of the 
contribution that full autocracy made to the consistency scores of several combinations of causal 
conditions, it could be argued that Hypothesis 3 also received qualified support. 
 
It is notable that the consistency scores of the combinations of full autocracy and effective 
transactional leadership and of full democracy and effective transactional leadership were quite 
similar. The orthodox, liberal democracy view associates full democracy and effective transactional 
leadership with positive economic outcomes. As discussed in Section 5.2.5, the argument is that 
democratic polities are more likely to be held to account by the electorate, which forces leaders to 
make good decisions that support citizens and organisations in economic development. Hence, this 
perspective emphasises the potential influence of democratic institutions on pro-business institutional 
reform, while downplaying the quality of leadership in autocracies. However, as discussed in Section 
5.2.5, autocracies frequently implement the same economic institutions that academics have 
historically viewed as hallmarks of democratic dispensations. This, however, requires effective 
transactional leadership. It follows that autocracies and democracies can implement pro-business 
institutional reforms when aspects such as effective transactional leadership are present.  
 
Hypothesis 4 states that an institutional environment already supportive of private enterprise offers 
the foundation for the implementation of more reforms to improve business environments. The 
consistency score for the causal condition for a strong initial business environment (0.807) exceeded 
the threshold of 0.800, while the coverage score (0.742) was relatively high. Furthermore, strong 
initial business environments apparently also strengthened the significance of various causal 
combinations. The consistency score of 0.875 for a combination of effective transactional leadership 
and full autocracy, for example, increased to 0.941 when the influence of strong initial business 
environments were also taken into account. This finding was consistent with the hypothesis discussed 
in the preceding paragraph: autocratic regimes can implement positive economic institutions to foster 
benign business environments. Hence, the causal condition of a strong initial business environment 
also received qualified support for inclusion in this analysis.  
 
On balance, the results in Table 5.7 suggested that the hypotheses are worthy of further consideration 
and that the stated premises are not undermined by contradictions. Hence, the results provided support 
for the theoretical ideas that informed the hypotheses and indicated that appropriate data sources were 
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selected to quantify the outcome and causal conditions.129 The importance of effective transactional 
leadership for institutional change to improve business environments is apparent in this sample of 
SSA countries: the addition of effective transactional leadership significantly increases the 
consistency ratios of several combinations of causal conditions, which implies that such leadership 
strongly influenced institutional change. In addition, effective transactional leadership appeared in 
six of the 10 combinations with the highest coverage scores. This also suggested that effective 
transactional leadership was a significant factor in pro-business institutional reforms in SSA 
countries.  
 
The results about Hypotheses 1, 3 and 4 found resonance with the ideas about recent institutional 
change in Rwanda developed in Chapters 1 and 3. As highlighted in Section 5.2, the country's scores 
on autocracy, transactional leadership and the initial business environment were high in the SSA 
context. The preceding paragraph suggested that the influence of effective transactional leadership 
on reform success may well have been as crucial as Friedman (2012: 256) and Nsanzabaganwa (2012: 
134) had suggested (see Section 1.1). The analysis conducted in this section not only yielded initial 
findings on the four hypotheses about institutional change in SSA countries but also provided support 
for the earlier narrative about recent institutional change in Rwanda. The next step in the identification 
of solution pathways for Rwanda and for SSA countries more generally is to construct a truth table. 
 
5.4 Pathways to institutional change in SSA countries 
 
The truth table is one of the key analytic elements of QCA as it examines cases sharing specific causal 
combinations to determine if they share a common outcome (Ragin 2008: 24-25). The truth table 
analysis simplifies the results from the subset analysis of sufficiency and generates pathway solutions 
that are possible explanations for institutional change. To this end, Table 5.8 contains 13 rows that 
each represent a combination of the causal conditions found in the data set. The five causal conditions 
define a five-dimensional vector space with 32 corners that each represents a logically possible 
configuration of the causal conditions. Although five causal conditions imply 32 (2^5) possible 
combinations, only 13 of these are present in the data set.130 A score of 1 indicates membership while 
a score of 0 indicates non-membership in the sets associated with the causal conditions. The number 
of cases relevant to every row – each with a fuzzy membership score larger than 0.5 for that 
combination of causal conditions – is also listed.  
 
The truth table indicates that three of the rows (representing 11 cases) reflect the orthodox view that 
associates extensive pro-business reforms with a democratic government and the absence of features 
of autocracies. Another six rows (representing 14 cases) reflect autocratic governments and the 
absence of democratic features. The latter is explored further in Section 7.4.4. Transactional 
leadership is present in six rows that represent 15 cases. In three of these rows, which represent 5 
cases, effective transactional leadership combined with full autocracy to reach the outcome. One row, 
which represents eight cases, contains combinations of effective transactional leadership and full 
democracy. These results underscore the complexity of the connections between political systems 
                                                          
129 To avoid a double error in quantification, whereby incorrect theoretical considerations are exacerbated by inappropriate 
data, Sections 6.2-6.4 and 7.3-7.4 review the data for Rwanda and Burundi, respectively. These reviews evaluate the 
appropriateness of the data for measuring the outcome and causal conditions.  
130 The objective of comparative research is to investigate truth claims across subsets of all possible worlds (Kogut 2011: 
139). The 13 rows are the truth claims (realities) amongst the 32 possible worlds.  
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and pro-business institutional change. This is in line with Smith and Todaro's (2015) discussion of 
the ambiguity of empirical results on the impact of political systems on economic progress.  
 
Table 5.8: Truth table 
 
Row LEADERSHIP FRAGILE AUTOCRACY DEMOCRACY BUSINESS 
No. 
of 
cases 
Consistency 
ratio 
1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1.000 
2 0 1 0 1 0 1 0.992 
3 0 1 1 1 0 1 0.989 
4 1 0 1 0 1 2 0.978 
5 0 1 0 0 0 1 0.963 
6 1 1 0 0 0 1 0.962 
7 0 0 0 1 1 2 0.954 
8 1 1 1 0 1 2 0.950 
9 1 0 1 0 0 1 0.925 
10 0 1 1 0 1 2 0.887 
11 0 0 1 0 0 2 0.870 
12 1 0 0 1 1 8 0.868 
13 0 1 1 0 0 5 0.694 
Source: Own calculations based on data in Table 5.4 
 
The consistency ratios in Table 5.8 identified the degrees to which the various configurations of 
conditions were consistent subsets of the outcome. Row 13 was dropped from the remainder of this 
analysis as it was the only row that did not satisfy the consistency threshold of 0.8. None of the 
remaining 12 combinations, not even the rows that accounted for only one case, could be excluded 
from the remainder of this analysis. The economic and political experiences of countries in the SSA 
region were simply too diverse to have excluded a solution pathway because it was a possible 
explanation for only one case. After the researcher had identified the truth table configurations that 
were included in the remainder of the analysis, the software generated the pathway solutions. These 
solutions were obtained by using the Quine-McCluskey algorithm to simplify the Boolean functions 
depicted in Table 5.8.131 
 
The resulting software output has two sets of solution pathways and the option of specifying a third 
set of pathways, with the different sets based on remainder combinations (Davey and Ragin 2008: 
81). The remainders, which are also known as counterfactuals, are all the possible combinations that 
do not manifest in the dataset. Firstly, the complex solution does not use any remainders. The software 
simplifies only the combinations in rows 1 to 12 in Table 5.8. Secondly, the parsimonious solution 
includes all logical remainders (that is, all 32 possible configurations of the causal conditions) without 
any evaluation of their plausibility. Thirdly, the intermediate solution includes all remainders that the 
researcher identified as plausible. This solution relies on assumptions by the researcher about the 
nature of the relationship between the outcome variables and some or all of the causal conditions 
                                                          
131 To derive solution pathways from the truth table, the fsQCA software uses the Quine-McCluskey algorithm to 
minimise the Boolean functions. This process is also known as the method of prime implicants and is functionally identical 
to Karnaugh mapping. If two Boolean expression differ in only one causal condition while at the same time producing 
the same outcome, the causal condition that distinguishes the two expressions from each other is removed in the 
minimisation process. The omission of the irrelevant causal condition creates a simpler combined expression (Ragin 1987: 
93). 
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(Berg-Schlosser, DeMeur, Ragin and Rihoux 2009: 111). This dissertation does not consider any 
counterfactual cases, and reports only the complex solution.132  
 
Table 5.9 reports these solutions, with the seven pathways arranged in descending order based on 
their consistency scores. The consistency score of the full complex solution exceeds the threshold of 
0.8, and its coverage score of 0.827 suggests that the results provide plausible explanations for more 
than four-fifths of the cases – an excellent outcome. Individually, the seven pathway solutions also 
satisfy the consistency requirement. Furthermore, the coverage scores of all the pathways are non-
trivial. The complex solution confirms the complexity and causal heterogeneity of factors influencing 
extensive pro-business reforms in SSA countries.  
 
Table 5.9: Solutions of the truth table analysis 
 
Model: Reforms = f [Leadership, Fragile, Business, Autocracy, Democracy] 
 Consistency Coverage 
Complex solution 0.801 0.827 
FRAGILE*AUTOCRACY*DEMOCRACY*business 0.990 0.259 
FRAGILE*autocracy*democracy*business 0.943 0.388 
LEADERSHIP*AUTOCRACY*democracy*BUSINESS 0.941 0.351 
LEADERSHIP*fragile*AUTOCRACY*democracy 0.917 0.334 
FRAGILE*AUTOCRACY*democracy*BUSINESS 0.880 0.358 
fragile*AUTOCRACY*democracy*business 0.865 0.344 
fragile*autocracy*DEMOCRACY*BUSINESS 0.850 0.524 
Source: Own calculations undertaken using the fsQCA software package. 
 
The pathway solution with the highest consistency score (0.990) is 
FRAGILE*AUTOCRACY*DEMOCRACY*business. It is immediately apparent that this pathway 
solution includes full autocracy as well as full democracy. As indicated in Section 5.2.5, countries 
can have high set membership scores for both types of political regimes. Liberia and Niger, for 
example, have set membership scores on ‘full democracy’ and ‘full autocracy’ that both exceed the 
medians for these causal conditions, while Nigeria and the DRC have below-median set membership 
scores for both. This could indicate mixed political regimes or political systems in transition between 
the two types of systems. The existence of such mixed cases may be one of the reasons for the diverse 
empirical results on the impact of political systems on economic development. Smith and Todaro 
(2015: 569) found that a third of the empirical studies found no clear effect of democracy on 
development.133 However, the low coverage of the pathway indicates that it explained the outcomes 
of few SSA countries.  
 
The pathway solution with the highest coverage score (0.524) is 
fragile*autocracy*DEMOCRACY*BUSINESS. At first glance, this combination seems intuitive. It 
represents countries with strongly democratic political systems, few characteristics of autocracy, 
strong initial business environments, and no threats to the polity from state fragility. As indicated in 
Section 5.2, democracy is often strongly associated with liberal economic policies, a small state and 
a dominant role for the private sector. Some of the SSA countries with the most benign business 
                                                          
132 Counterfactual analysis is often at the centre of case-oriented enquiry because such research will generally focus on a 
handful of cases. When only a few real-world cases exist, it may be beneficial to researchers to include hypothetical cases 
in their analyses (Ragin 2008: 150). However, the sample of cases in this dissertation is substantial enough to make it 
unnecessary to use remainders.  
133 It may be the case that observed variations in democracy used in empirical research ignore features of autocracies also 
prevalent in their political systems. If so, this would undermine the quality of empirical results.  
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environments have this configuration of causal conditions, including Mauritius, South Africa, 
Botswana and Namibia. This pathway also confirms David’s (1985) notion of path dependence in the 
context of business environment reform: a strong initial business environment is conducive to further 
structural reform. It is this model of institutional change that donors, policymakers and the general 
public in the West have advocated for the development of SSA countries.  
 
Although the highest-coverage pathway solution possibly confirms the notion of path dependence in 
business environment reform, the overall results are ambiguous. Three pathways contain a strong 
initial business environment, while three others contain a weak initial business environment. Benin 
and Mauritius, for example, had strong initial business environments and continued to make extensive 
pro-business reforms in the study period. Sierra Leone and Liberia also made many pro-business 
institutional changes, but had weak initial business environments to start with. These results distance 
some SSA countries from the path-dependence perspective and link their experiences with changes 
in institutions as proposed by Alston et al. (2016): some countries with weak initial business 
environments, which may have been symptoms of deviated economic and political outcomes, 
possibly experienced critical transitions in their institutional setups that resulted in pro-business 
reforms.  
 
Effective transactional leadership is present in two of the seven pathways (unsurprisingly, ineffective 
transactional leadership does not feature at all). Both include full autocracy and non-democratic 
features and have relatively high consistency scores. This is consistent with the claim in Section 5.2.5 
that an autocratic government with effective transactional leadership could implement institutions 
that favour the private sector. Rwanda and Uganda are two of the countries whose reform experiences 
may be explained by a pathway consisting of strong transactional leadership, high levels of autocracy 
and few democratic features. The solution LEADERSHIP*AUTOCRACY*democracy*BUSINESS 
adds a strong initial business environment to these three factors. This .pathway indicates that some 
autocracies with few features of democracy but with effective transactional leadership have had 
success in implementing extensive pro-business reforms, before as well as after the commencement 
of the Doing Business project. The other solution that incorporates effective transactional leadership 
(LEADERSHIP*fragile*AUTOCRACY*democracy) includes a stable state. In this case, fully-fledged 
autocracies with few characteristics of democratic regimes required effective transactional leadership 
to implement extensive pro-business reforms.  
 
A highly autocratic regime is associated with extensive pro-business reforms in five of the pathway 
solutions: 
 
 FRAGILE*AUTOCRACY*DEMOCRACY*business 
 LEADERSHIP*AUTOCRACY*democracy*BUSINESS 
 LEADERSHIP*fragile*AUTOCRACY*democracy 
 FRAGILE*AUTOCRACY*democracy*BUSINESS 
 fragile*AUTOCRACY*democracy*business 
 
While this should not be surprising given that the majority of African countries are still autocratic, 
the individual pathways usefully identify causal conditions associated with structural reform. Put 
differently; the solution pathways associate autocracy not only with reforms but with extensive pro-
business reforms. This is in line with the claim in earlier sections of this chapter that an autocratic 
polity can implement pro-business institutional reform for various reasons. Frantz (2016) pointed out 
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that positive economic institutions are not limited to democracies. Cilliers (2016: 3) argued that 
autocracy could be useful for economic development off a low base, i.e. in poorer economies with 
lower levels of education. This is supported by the presence of full democracy in only two pathway 
solutions; including the ambiguous solution with the highest consistency score, namely 
FRAGILE*AUTOCRACY*DEMOCRACY*business. The presence of both democratic and autocratic 
features could signify that different processes may be needed to initiate and sustain extensive pro-
business reforms. 
 
The other pathway with full democracy is fragile*autocracy*DEMOCRACY*BUSINESS. This 
pathway, too, lacks effective transactional leadership. In this case, a reform process may already be 
underway and may have resulted in a strong initial business environment. Moreover, the absence of 
state fragility allows the democratic regime to sustain these reforms without the need for effective 
transactional leadership. In practice, this combination of factors is not unheard of. Countries like 
Lesotho, Kenya and Burundi have high set membership scores for ̔full democracy’ but also have low 
scores for ̔effective transactional leadership’. While consistent with the neoliberal view of 
democracy-supporting economic development via a supportive environment for private enterprise, 
the viability of a system of governance that implements institutional changes without the capacity to 
form and implement policy (the essence of effective transactional leadership) seems questionable. An 
alternative explanation for the existence of this pathway may be that leadership and democracy are 
poorly measured. This possibility is explored further in Chapters 6 and 7.  
 
While Hypotheses 1 to 4 are also explored in more detail in Chapters 6 and 7, it is worthwhile to 
indicate here that the pathway solutions are broadly consistent with several hypotheses. The 
combinations in Table 5.9 indicate that (i) effective transactional leadership plays a role in most 
episodes of institutional change; (ii) state fragility does not necessarily lead to reforms to improve 
business environments; (iii) autocracies can definitely implement institutional reforms aimed at 
improving the business environment for the private sector; and (iv) a strong initial business 
environment can, but does not necessarily, stimulate future pro-business institutional reform. The 
seven pathway solutions validate the two hypotheses regarding effective transactional leadership and 
the ability of autocracies to implement pro-business reforms. The other two hypotheses, which have 
to do with the initial business environment and state fragility, receive only qualified support.  
 
These findings do not invalidate the theoretical ideas that served as the bases of the partially supported 
hypotheses. They do suggest, however, that further analysis of the theory may be required to refine 
the hypotheses in future research. All the findings in this section are for the entire sample of SSA 
countries. This suggests that it may be necessary to review Alston et al.'s (2016) critical transitions 
framework to determine whether other vital factors that influence institutional change have been 
omitted. This is not to say that the critical transitions framework has evident shortcomings, but that 
additional factors may be of importance in the SSA context. As was the case with the findings 
summarised in Section 3.7, this again reflects Alston et al.'s (2016: 208) view that applications of 
their model will yield more general lessons about the dynamic interplay of beliefs, power, leadership, 
institutions, and policies.  
 
It is now possible to link specific countries to specific solution pathways. A pathway’s explanatory 
power for a particular country is higher the closer that country's fuzzy membership score for the 
pathway is to the 45-degree lines in the graphs in Figure 5.2. Such lines through the origin identify 
perfect correspondence between countries' membership scores on particular solution pathways and 
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their membership scores on extensive pro-business reforms. A case's fuzzy membership score for a 
pathway given by its lowest calibrated score for any of the causal conditions included in that pathway. 
Equality between its outcome score and its pathway score would place a case on the 45-degree line. 
In principle, the pathway then provides an excellent explanation for that case (Siebrits 2014: 76-77).  
 
A perfect fit is uncommon and is achieved only four times (1.6% of instances) in this analysis. Hence, 
the problem facing the analyst when associating cases with pathway solutions is as follows: how far 
from the 45-degree lines do the explanatory power of the pathway solutions stretch? The fsQCA 
literature does not provide standard criteria for answering this question, and researchers have to apply 
their discretion (Duerr, Epstein, Kenworthy and Ragin 2008: 81-82). For the purposes of this 
dissertation, points on and within the parallel lines that lie 0.2 units above and below the 45 degree 
lines through the origins of the graphs are deemed indicative of strong associations.  
 
Based on this, around one in three of the cases in each graph may be explained by the associated 
pathway solution. As indicated by the seven diagrammes in Figure 5.2, the first pathway solution 
FRAGILE*AUTOCRACY*DEMOCRACY*business provides possible explanations for the outcome 
scores of eight countries: the CAR, Chad, Eritrea (a perfect fit), Ethiopia, Guinea, Namibia, Niger 
and Zimbabwe. Of all the pathways, this one provides a possible explanation for the reform 
experiences of the smallest number of countries. Nonetheless, its consistency score is the highest 
amongst the seven pathways and none of the others offers possible explanations for Niger. 
 
The second pathway solution FRAGILE*autocracy*democracy*business has a higher coverage score 
and provides possible explanations for the outcome scores of 10 countries: the CAR, Chad, DRC, 
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea, Malawi, Mauritania, Namibia and Zimbabwe. Uganda is excluded from 
this list as it falls marginally outside the parallel lines. This is the only pathway solution that could 
explain the reform experience of the DRC. The solution emphasises the role that state fragility can 
play as a spur for extensive pro-business reforms. 
 
The third pathway solution LEADERSHIP*AUTOCRACY*democracy*BUSINESS is the first to 
include leadership as a causal condition and provides explanations for the outcome scores of 12 
countries: Cameroon, CAR, Chad, Eritrea (a perfect fit, as in the first pathway solution), Ethiopia, 
Guinea, Mauritania, Namibia, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda and Zimbabwe. Importantly for the further 
analysis in Chapter 6, this is the only pathway that could explain Rwanda’s outcome. It provides 
possible explanations for calibrated outcome scores ranging from Eritrea’s 0.05 to Rwanda’s 0.99.  
 
The fourth pathway solution LEADERSHIP*fragile*AUTOCRACY*democracy provides possible 
explanations for the outcome scores of 12 countries: Angola, Cameroon, CAR, Chad, Ethiopia, 
Guinea, Mauritania, Namibia, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda and Zimbabwe. While this solution has a high 
consistency score and a higher coverage score than those of the first, second and third solutions, the 
countries it could explain all have outcome scores below the point of maximum ambiguity (0.5). 
Nonetheless, the third and fourth pathway solutions link the impact of transactional leadership to the 
reform outcomes of 14 countries: Angola, Cameroon, CAR, Chad, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea, 
Mauritania, Namibia, Rwanda, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda and Zimbabwe. 
 
The fifth pathway solution FRAGILE*AUTOCRACY*democracy*BUSINESS provides explanations 
for the outcome scores of 10 countries: Cameroon, CAR, Chad, Eritrea (a perfect fit), Guinea, 
Mauritania, Namibia, Tanzania, Uganda and Zimbabwe. Hence, the first, third and fifth pathway 
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solutions provide potentially powerful explanations for Eritrea's reform experience: the country's 
weak initial business environment made its fuzzy membership score for the pathway solution (0.05) 
identical to its fuzzy membership score on the outcome (0.05). However, this has little value for 
explaining the outcome score of Eritrea, which was the lowest of all the SSA countries in the sample. 
As was the case with the fourth pathway, the fifth solution generally have more explanatory power 
for countries with low outcome scores. 
 
The sixth pathway solution fragile*AUTOCRACY*democracy*business provides possible 
explanations for the outcome scores of 12 countries: Angola, Cameroon, CAR, Chad, Ethiopia, 
Guinea, Namibia, the Republic of the Congo, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda and Zimbabwe. This is the 
only pathway solution that could explaining the reform experience of the Republic of the Congo. This 
solution, like the fourth and fifth ones, only offer possible explanations for countries with low 
outcome scores.  
 
The seventh pathway solution fragile*autocracy*DEMOCRACY*BUSINESS provides possible 
explanations for the outcome scores of 15 countries: Benin, CAR, Chad, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ghana, 
Guinea, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius (a perfect fit), Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe. This solution explains the largest number of countries and its coverage score is the highest 
of the seven pathways. The explanatory power of this pathway extends to several countries that cannot 
be explained by any of the others, namely Benin, Ghana, Lesotho, Mauritius, Mozambique, Nigeria, 
Senegal and Zambia. 
 
In sum, the seven pathway solutions provide one or more possible explanations for the reform 
experiences of 26 of the 35 SSA countries. Despite the substantial number of pathways, however, 
only one possible explanation emerged for the following 12 countries: Benin, the DRC, Ghana, 
Lesotho, Mauritius, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, the Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Senegal and 
Zambia. The nine countries whose reform experiences cannot be explained by any the pathways 
generated from the truth table are Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, 
Mali, Sierra Leone and South Africa. This once again underscores the complexity of institutional 
change in SSA countries.  
 
Returning to the main focus country of this dissertation, only the third pathway solution 
(LEADERSHIP*AUTOCRACY*democracy*BUSINESS) provides a possible explanation for the 
reform experience of Rwanda. This is a good result: it is advisable to focus analytical work on less 
ambiguous results, i.e. countries that cannot be associated with too many pathways. Despite the 
importance of equifinality, the value of further analysis may have been undermined if countries with 
multiple pathway solutions were studied. As indicated in Section 1.1, many commentators regard the 
strong leadership characteristics of Kagame as the basis of Rwanda’s economic and political 
turnaround since the genocide in 1994. His steering capability enabled him to reform the country’s 
operating environment even before the start of the Doing Business project. This drive has made the 
country a top performer with regards to Doing Business reforms to establish or strengthen institutions 
conducive to private sector growth. Chapter 6 will discuss these reforms in more detail.  
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Figure 5.2: Explanatory power of complex solution pathways 
 
 
               
               
               
               
               
               
               
               
               
               
               
               
               
               
               
               
               
               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own calculations undertaken using the fsQCA software package 
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5.5 Conclusions 
 
Following the motivation in Chapter 4 for using Doing Business data and the fsQCA method to 
explore recent institutional change, this chapter implemented these tools to explain institutional 
changes to improve business environments in SSA countries. The analysis was based on a set of four 
hypotheses grounded in theoretical and empirical considerations about institutional change. These 
were: 
 
 Hypothesis 1: strong leadership is required to implement institutional changes such as pro-
business reforms.  
 Hypothesis 2: economic and political trends that threaten the longevity of the dominant 
network will cause institutional changes to improve economic outcomes.  
 Hypothesis 3: institutional reforms to improve the business environment for the private sector 
are possible under democratic and autocratic political dispensations. 
 Hypothesis 4: a business environment that is already supportive of private enterprise offers 
the foundation for implementing further pro-business institutional reform. 
 
Data to test these four hypotheses were collected from the BTI, FFP, Polity IV and IIAG and used to 
construct measures of causal conditions that may have been associated with the outcome, pro-
business institutional reform. These causal conditions were transactional leadership, state fragility, 
autocracy and democracy, and the nature of the business environment before the commencement of 
the Doing Business project. The data for transactional leadership were based on the ability of a polity 
to coordinate the planning, implementation and monitoring of policy, and were weighted with 
difficulty factors based on the extent to which structural factors complicated policymaking in the 
various countries. The fsQCA software made it possible to transforming the raw data into usable set 
membership scores. Analysis of this data indicated that none of the individual causal conditions was 
necessary or sufficient to guarantee the outcome. This result underscored the importance of 
considering the effects of combinations of causal conditions. Subset analysis confirmed the additive 
value of these elements, in particular, transactional leadership. In addition, interpretation of the results 
from the subset/superset analysis also yielded qualified support for the four hypotheses.  
 
In the next step of the fsQCA, a truth table established that the data exhibit 13 of the theoretically 
possible 32 combinations of the causal conditions. The fsQCA software simplified the truth table to 
produce a complex solution consisting of seven pathways to structural, institutional reform. The 
consistency scores of all the results indicated significant set-theoretic relationships. Effective 
transactional leadership was present in two of the pathways alongside full autocracy and non-
democracy. Full autocracy appeared in five of the seven pathways. On this score, the findings were 
consistent with the argument that autocratic governments, which remain more prevalent than 
democratic ones in Africa, sometimes incorporate input from the private sector into policymaking 
processes (see Sections 5.2 and 5.4). The influence of the strength of the initial business environment 
on pro-business reforms during 2002-2013 varied. 
 
The fsQCA results underscored the diversity of the institutional reform experience of SSA countries: 
the analysis yielded seven pathways that constituted possible explanations for the reform experiences 
of 26 of the 35 countries. The findings implied strong set-theoretic relationships between transactional 
leadership and the outcomes of 14 countries. The pathway solution that seemed most appropriate for 
explaining Rwanda's experience was LEADERSHIP*AUTOCRACY*democracy*BUSINESS. This 
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solution identified four causal conditions associated with the extensive pro-business reform in 
Rwanda, namely effective transactional leadership, full autocracy, a non-democratic political order, 
and a strong initial business environment. The solution pathway did not contain the causal condition 
‘state fragility’. Chapter 6 will provide a more detailed analysis of recent institutional change in 
Rwanda and the influence of transactional leadership. 
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CHAPTER 6: THE ROLE OF LEADERSHIP IN PRO-BUSINESS 
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN RWANDA (2002-2013) 
 
 
6.1 Introduction  
 
Chapter 1 highlighted the dramatic change in Rwanda’s economic and political outcomes after the 
1994 genocide. Several scholars have attributed this to the strong leadership shown by President Paul 
Kagame. A key aim of this dissertation is to explain the role of leadership in institutional change in 
Rwanda. To this end, Chapter 2 identified Alston et al.'s (2016) critical transitions framework as a 
tool for delineating epochs of institutional change and identifying moments of effective leadership. 
The application of this framework to Rwanda's history in Chapter 3 identified five distinct eras of 
institutional change. These included the most recent post-genocide period. The results also showed 
that the post-1994 period brought notably different economic and political outcomes in Rwanda, 
especially with regards to the role of agriculture in the economy.  
 
The RPF’s focus on private sector-led growth has been an important factor in the growth of non-
agricultural GDP since 1994. The ruling party views economic development and poverty alleviation 
as key to dismantling the ethnic divisions in the country. Chapter 4 discussed data collected by the 
World Bank Doing Business project on reforms that make the business environment more business-
friendly. From 2002 to 2013, Rwanda performed very well with regards to such reforms. Chapter 4 
also explained why QCA is a suitable method for analysing institutional change in SSA countries. 
The fsQCA in Chapter 5 identified several pathways that might explain the relationship between 
institutional change (such as extensive pro-business reforms) and a number of causal conditions.  
 
The set-theoretic analysis in Chapter 5 associated Rwanda’s pro-business institutional reforms from 
2002 to 2013 with effective transactional leadership, a governance style with few democratic features 
and many autocratic elements, and an already-supportive business environment at the start of the 
period. This suggests that the polity could implement pro-business reforms even though the country 
already offered an attractive business climate to the private sector in the early 2000s. Chapter 6 
discusses Rwanda's reform experience in more detail. Such case studies are used by QCA researchers 
to verify aspects of set-theoretic analyses, including the specification of the causal conditions, the 
accuracy of the quantitative measures of these conditions, the degree of fit between the solution 
pathways and qualitative information, and the relevance of hypotheses for specific countries.  
 
The following three sections discuss the data values assigned to Rwanda (as summarised in Table 
6.1), whether qualitative information verifies or challenges the accuracy of the data, and the 
implications of the results for the hypotheses. The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. 
Section 6.2 reviews the outcome variable with the aid of these criteria, while Section 6.3 evaluates 
state fragility – the causal condition excluded from the pathway solution identified for Rwanda in 
Chapter 5. Section 6.4 evaluates the causal conditions included in Rwanda’s pathway solution, 
namely a strong initial business environment, full autocracy and democracy, and effective 
transactional leadership. The discussion focusses on the influence of transactional leadership. Section 
6.5 links the included causal conditions to Rwanda’s ethnic challenges. The section also discusses the 
problem of rebuilding trust amongst Rwandans. Nsanzabaganwa’s (2012) connectedness model is 
used to explore the importance of trust (an informal institution) and relationships in policymaking 
concerned with institutional reform. Section 6.6 concludes.  
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Table 6.1: Rwanda outcome and causal condition data (raw and calibrated) 
 
 Reforms Leadership Fragile Autocracy Democracy Business 
Raw data 31.000 6.166 90.450 3.333 0.000 59.220 
Calibrated score 0.99 0.83 0.51 0.85 0.05 0.79 
Sources: Tables 5.1 and 5.3 
 
6.2 The outcome: extensive pro-business reforms 
 
Table 6.2 provides a verbatim list of Rwanda’s 31 pro-business reforms recorded by the Doing 
Business project in the years from 2005 to 2013. The country was placed in the top 10 of reformers 
worldwide in the 2010, 2011 and 2014 editions of the annual Doing Business report and made the 
most reforms of all countries since the project was launched in 2002. The World Bank (2012: 37) 
observed that Rwanda has made private sector development a priority, and that it is one of the 35 
countries that established government structures with the primary purpose of designing and 
implementing business regulation reforms. Along with Cambodia, Georgia, Kenya, Liberia and 
Yemen, Rwanda specifically identified regulatory reforms as an important part of the country’s 
development strategy. This placed investment and business climate reforms at the top of the economic 
policy agenda for promoting private sector development (World Bank 2008: 11, 16).  
 
As the custodian of the Doing Business project, the World Bank is actively involved in many 
countries' business environment reforms. The multilateral organisation noted that Rwanda started a 
comprehensive and ambitious reform programme in 2000. The World Bank set up a Competitiveness 
and Enterprise Development Project (CEDP) in 2001 aimed at helping Kigali to establish a favourable 
business environment for private sector growth. Apart from updating the country’s commercial laws, 
supporting the state’s privatisation programme, and assisting in overhauling the financial sector, the 
CEDP also collaborated with the World Bank’s Rwanda Investment Climate Reform Programme to 
set a reform agenda for the overall business environment. This led to the establishment of Rwanda’s 
Doing Business Unit, which was tasked with spearheading the country’s reform initiatives. The unit 
is located within the RDB (the country’s investment promotion agency) and is responsible for 
identifying and monitoring the implementation of reform opportunities. The unit has a small, full-
time team that coordinates the activities of all stakeholders in the reform process (World Bank 2012: 
37-38).  
 
Recommendations from the Doing Business Unit are sent to the Doing Business Steering Committee. 
The latter oversees a technical task force made up of six working groups that focus on different areas 
of reform. This task force crucially includes private sector representatives, which ensures that private 
business can to share experiences and opt into the reforms. The task force creates annual plans for 
regulatory reforms, which are communicated to the cabinet. The reform plans are then discussed and 
accepted by attendees of the annual leadership retreat. The Doing Business Unit monitors the 
implementation of these plans and reports back about progress to the steering committee, the prime 
minister (who is ultimately responsible for implementation), the RDB, and the head of the Strategy 
and Policy Unit (SPU) in the Office of the President (World Bank 2012: 38). A critical success factor 
in this process is the assignment of responsibility for Rwanda’s performance under various Doing 
Business pillars to specific ministers. Each minister’s performance is critically reviewed during the 
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annual Government Leadership Retreat with rewards to officials where appropriate.134 Hence, the 
cabinet is accustomed to having and achieving targets under the supervision of Kagame (Alpert 2012). 
 
Table 6.2: Pro-business reforms in Rwanda (2005-2013) 
 
Doing 
Business 
publication 
Pillar Reform 
2014 
Starting a Business 
Rwanda made starting a business easier by reducing the time required 
to obtain a registration certificate. 
Dealing with Construction 
Permits 
Rwanda made dealing with construction permits easier and less costly 
by reducing the building permit fees, implementing an electronic 
platform for building permit applications and streamlining procedures. 
Registering Property 
Rwanda made transferring property easier by eliminating the 
requirement to obtain a tax clearance certificate and by implementing 
the web-based Land Administration Information System for 
processing land transactions. 
Getting Credit 
Rwanda strengthened its secured transactions system by providing 
more flexibility on the types of debts and obligations that can be 
secured through a collateral agreement. 
Protecting Minority Investors 
Rwanda strengthened investor protections through a new law allowing 
plaintiffs to cross-examine defendants and witnesses with prior 
approval of the questions by the court. 
Paying Taxes 
Rwanda made paying taxes easier and less costly for companies by 
rolling out its electronic filing system to the majority of businesses and 
by reducing the property tax rate and business trading license fee. 
Trading Across Borders 
Rwanda made trading across borders easier by introducing an 
electronic single-window system at the border. 
Resolving Insolvency 
Rwanda made resolving insolvency easier through a new law 
clarifying the standards for beginning insolvency proceedings, 
preventing the separation of the debtor’s assets during reorganisation 
proceedings, setting clear time limits for the submission of a 
reorganisation plan, and implementing an automatic stay of creditors’ 
enforcement actions. 
2013 
Enforcing Contracts 
Rwanda made enforcing contracts easier by implementing an 
electronic filing system for initial complaints. 
Getting Electricity 
Rwanda made getting electricity easier by reducing the cost of 
obtaining a new connection. 
2012 
Starting a Business 
Rwanda made starting a business easier by reducing business 
registration fees. 
Registering Property 
Rwanda made transferring property more expensive by enforcing the 
checking of the capital gains tax. 
Getting Credit 
In Rwanda the private credit bureau started to collect and distribute 
information from utility companies and also started to distribute more 
than two years of historical information, improving the credit 
information system. 
Paying Taxes 
Rwanda reduced the frequency of value added tax filings by 
companies from monthly to quarterly. 
2011 
Dealing with Construction 
Permits 
Rwanda made dealing with construction permits easier by passing new 
building regulations at the end of April 2010 and implementing new 
time limits for the issuance of various permits. 
Getting Credit 
Rwanda enhanced access to credit by allowing borrowers the right to 
inspect their own credit reports and mandating that loans of all sizes 
be reported to the central bank’s public credit registry. 
Trading Across Borders 
Rwanda reduced the number of trade documents required and 
enhanced its joint border management procedures with Uganda and 
                                                          
134 Rewards for public sector workers include receiving up to 5% of annual salary as a prize (Leaver, Ozier, Serneels and 
Zeitlin 2014: 2). 
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Doing 
Business 
publication 
Pillar Reform 
other neighbours, leading to an improvement in the trade logistics 
environment. 
2010 
Starting a Business 
Rwanda made starting a business easier by eliminating the notarization 
requirement; introducing standardised memoranda of association; 
putting publication online; consolidating name-checking, registration 
fee payment, tax registration and company registration procedures; 
and reducing the time required to process completed applications. 
Registering Property 
Rwanda reduced the time required to transfer property through 
ongoing improvements in the property registration process. 
Getting Credit 
Rwanda strengthened its secured transactions system by allowing a 
wider range of assets to be used as collateral, permitting a general 
description of debts and obligations in the security agreement, 
allowing out-of-court enforcement of collateral, granting secured 
creditors absolute priority within bankruptcy and creating a new 
collateral registry. 
Protecting Minority Investors 
Rwanda strengthened investor protections through a new company law 
requiring greater corporate disclosure, increasing director liability and 
improving shareholders’ access to information. 
Trading Across Borders 
Rwanda reduced the time required for trading across borders by 
introducing administrative changes such as expanded operating hours 
and enhanced border cooperation and by eliminating some 
documentation requirements. 
Resolving Insolvency 
Rwanda improved its insolvency process through a new law aimed at 
streamlining reorganisation procedures. 
2009 
Dealing with Construction 
Permits 
Rwanda made dealing with construction permits easier by streamlining 
project clearances for the second year in a row – combining the 
procedures for obtaining a location clearance and a building permit in 
a single application form – and by introducing a single application 
form for water, sewerage and electricity connections. 
Registering Property 
Rwanda reduced the cost and time to register property by replacing the 
6% registration fee with a flat rate, regardless of the property value, 
and by creating a centralised service in the tax authority to speed up 
the issuance of the certificate of good standing. 
Trading Across Borders 
Rwanda reduced the time for exporting and importing by extending 
the opening hours of customs points, implementing or improving 
electronic data interchange and risk-based inspection systems and 
making improvements in the transport sector. 
Enforcing Contracts 
Rwanda made enforcing contracts easier by launching three 
commercial courts – in Kigali, in Northern Province and Southern 
Province. 
2008 
Dealing with Construction 
Permits 
Rwanda made dealing with construction permits easier by 
decentralising the permit system—which reduced the time for getting 
a building permit and an occupancy permit—and by reducing the time 
for obtaining an electricity connection. 
Trading Across Borders 
Rwanda made trading across borders easier by expediting the 
acceptance of customs declarations and liberalising the warehouse 
services market. 
2007 
Starting a Business 
Rwanda scrapped a law, originally adopted by King Leopold of 
Belgium during colonial times, which allowed only one notary in the 
entire country. Now 33 notaries are working throughout the country, 
reducing start-up delays. 
Paying Taxes Rwanda reduced profit tax rates. 
Enforcing Contracts Rwanda introduced or expanded the scope of specialised courts. 
Source: Doing Business website, World Bank (2006: 40, 49, 77) 
 
The reforms that have resulted from this process have been diverse, and ministers have achieved 
improvements in all facets of the business environment. The reforms captured by Doing Business 
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reports are found under all 10 of the project’s pillars. The outcome was that Rwanda had the second-
best Doing Business rating amongst African countries in 2014 behind Mauritius. The World Bank 
(2012: 41) argued that the reforms contribute substantially to the government’s overarching goals of 
promoting national reconciliation and prosperity. The country’s poverty rate declined from 56.7% in 
2005-2006 to 44.9% in 2010-2011, according to the National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda (NISR) 
(2012). Collier described these outcomes as “deeply impressive” and attributed Rwanda's success to 
it being more akin to an East Asian-style developmental state than any other African country (Alpert 
2012). This type of state is characterised by a government focused on growing the economy and a 
president managing a “tight ship” based on performance rather than patronage. Collier observed that 
the improved business environment had enabled the capital Kigali to grow and provide poverty-
alleviating benefits to rural areas. 
 
Section 4.2 discussed various aspects of the Doing Business data in detail, including the motivation 
for using this data as an indicator of institutional change to improve the business environment. The 
data on Rwanda’s reform achievements were compiled systematically by the World Bank, and there 
is no reason to believe that factual errors were made. The comments by Collier, reports by the World 
Bank, and assessments from the Mo Ibrahim Foundation indicate that the country’s business 
environment has indeed improved immensely. This confirms the appropriateness of the outcome 
score for Rwanda in the set-theoretic analysis in Chapter 4. 
 
6.3 Excluded causal conditions 
 
The subset analysis in Table 5.5 indicated that none of the causal conditions was necessary or 
sufficient for achieving the outcome, which suggested that factors omitted from the model might have 
influenced the scope of pro-business reforms in SSA countries. Based on the information in the truth 
table, the pathway solution that provided the most likely explanation for the pro-business institutional 
reforms in Rwanda (LEADERSHIP*AUTOCRACY*democracy*BUSINESS) excluded the causal 
condition state fragility. The calibrated score on this causal condition (0.51) was too close to the point 
of maximum ambiguity to have made a meaningful contribution to an explanation of the country's 
reform success. It is now necessary to determine whether the calibrated set membership score was 
accurate, especially given its closeness to the crossover point. Furthermore, this factor is a vital 
element of the country’s economic and political context from 2002 to 2013. State fragility in Rwanda 
includes various ethnic dimensions that have been important in the process of institutional change, as 
discussed in Chapter 3. Hence, understanding state fragility in Rwanda enhances understanding of 
the country’s reform trajectory. It is also crucial in the further evaluation of Hypotheses 1 to 4.  
 
6.3.1 State fragility 
 
Reyntjens (2013: xvi) expressed concern that the country’s “dangerously flawed political 
governance” was stoking the risk of renewed ethnic violence in the country. Turner (2013: 8) also 
warned of the risk of renewed violence. Likewise, the FFP classified Rwanda’s state fragility in the 
‘alert’ category with an average reading of 90.45 from 2005 to 2013 – a score between 80 and 90 was 
placed in the ‘high warning’ category. The average score for the period was 7.5 out of 10 for each of 
the 12 components of the FSI (higher scores denoted less favourable assessments). The calibrated 
score on the 90.45 figure was a very ambiguous 0.51, in part because a large number of SSA countries 
had very high FSI scores above 100. According to the fsQCA analysis, state fragility did not feature 
in potential explanations of Rwanda’s stellar reform performance. To provide important background 
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information about the country and to verify the accuracy of the score, the remainder of this section 
touches on some factors incorporated in the FSI, including demographic pressures, human rights and 
the rule of law, uneven economic development, human flight and brain drain, and the security 
apparatus.  
 
Rwanda is one of the most densely populated countries in the world and has very little undeveloped 
land. Apart from swamps and a few nature reserves, the landscape is dominated by hills and cultivated 
lands. The visibility of people due to the physical topography and lack of geospatial “exit options” 
contributed significantly to the extent of the genocide killings. In post-genocide society, the high 
population density has facilitated effective use of state power (Straus 2006: 8, 214-215). Nonetheless, 
overpopulation has also undermined the quality of service delivery by the government. The Rwandan 
population increased from 8.36 million in 2002 to 10.50 million in 2013, that is, by 2.5% per annum 
on average. Hence, population density increased from 346 people per km2 to 449 people per km2. The 
demographic problems has apparently had adverse effects on food security, especially if the land 
inheritance system, according to which farms are divided between all male descendants, is also taken 
into consideration.135 While off-farm income could help mitigate these problems, opportunities are 
limited in the context of the overall size of the labour force (Pottier 2002: 184). Overall, the FFP 
scored demographic pressures 8.90 out of 10 (higher FFP scores consistently indicate weaker 
performance).  
 
Reyntjens (2013: 98, 122), who reported an appalling record of abuses, criticised the Rwandan 
government for its dismal human rights record. For the most part, the country's positive international 
image has remained untainted by this because the RPF has limited information and independent 
investigations into human rights issues. Human rights organisations have been obliged to join the 
country’s National Civil Society Platform, which the government has side-lined in political and social 
matters. Major donor countries and international organisations have either ignored the country’s 
human rights violations or have only expressed their concerns diplomatically behind closed doors 
(Bertelsmann Stiftung 2014a: 8, 28). The constitution provides for separation of powers, though 
Kagame has had decisive power over military and administrative entities. Parliament has had limited 
counterbalancing powers. The judiciary has also been independent in a formal sense, but in reality it 
has been subordinated to the will of the executive, especially in politically sensitive matters 
(Bertelsmann Stiftung 2014a: 9). Overall, the FFP scored human rights and the rule of law 7.72 out 
of 10. 
 
Rwanda is an unequal society: according to the World Bank, the country’s Gini coefficient has 
exceeded 0.50 since the early 2000s. The wealthiest 10% of the population received nearly 45% of 
the country's income in 2010, while the poorest 10% received only 2%, according to the BMI. Poverty 
is most acute in the more remote and rural provinces in the south and west of the country and generally 
lower in Kigali and the Eastern Province (NISR 2012: 5). While rapid economic growth has been a 
state priority, uneven economic development has been present in Rwanda as in most other SSA states. 
Rural areas have largely remained excluded from progress, which is particularly concerning given 
that farming in those areas generates some 75% of the country’s employment and 35% of its GDP 
(these World Bank was the source of these statistics). The slow pace of formal employment creation 
– only around 5% of the more than five million members of the labour force in 2010 had formal jobs 
(UN Conference on Trade and Development [UNCTAD] 2014: 7) – has led to the expansion of the 
                                                          
135 Some 90% of farms were smaller than one hectare due to this tradition (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2003: 6).  
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informal sector. The informal nature of the economy helps explain the country’s weak domestic tax 
revenue performance. Overall, the FFP scored uneven economic development 7.56 out of 10.  
 
The Rwandan government has limited migration from rural to urban areas to avoid the growth of 
slums, while member states of the East Africa Community (EAC)136 have restricted cross-border 
movements to professionals and academics for fear of uncontrolled immigration by unskilled workers 
from Rwanda (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2014a: 13, 15). As a result, only educated Rwandans have had 
real freedom of movement, with associated negative effects on the skills of the domestic labour force. 
The country’s brain drain has been an acute concern for the state, who knows that neither good 
governance nor poverty reduction will be achieved without an adequate supply of skilled workers. 
The goals set out by the Vision 2020 to transform the country into a knowledge-based economy are 
very dependent on the quality of the country’s human resources (Kimanuka 2009: 15, 72, 80-81). 
Consistent with this aim, the state has given incentives for educated members of the diaspora to return 
home, and has encouraged an exchange of skills by opening the labour market to immigrants from 
other economies within the EAC (World Bank 2012: 40). Overall, the FFP scored human flight and 
brain drain 7.40 out of 10.  
 
Rwanda’s best category score from the FFP has been for the security apparatus. The influence of the 
military on public life has been significant, and the country’s authoritarian rule has been described as 
a mix of military and entrepreneurial leadership (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2014: 25). This partly reflects 
the reality that the president is a former general who remains the head of the country’s armed forces. 
Kagame has used the security establishment so effectively as a tool to solidify the RPF’s rule that 
Sidiropoulos (2002) referred to the political system as a ‘securocracy’. In fact, Reyntjens (2013: 71) 
described Kagame and the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF) as an army with a state rather than a state 
with an army. Irrespective of the terminology used, the RDF has been an effective security force 
despite the low level of government spending on the military. Dubious sources of income is a near 
certainty. Many military personnel are also involved in the economy by directly securing funding 
from donor organisations. Overall, the FFP scored the security apparatus 5.15 out of 10.  
 
The above discussion did not identify any problems with the quality of the FFP's data for state fragility 
in Rwanda. While the international image of Rwanda is that of a peaceful country, underlying 
challenges like population density, human rights abuses, inequality, restricted freedom of movement 
and the militarised nature of society place pressure on the country and the stability of the state. The 
premise of Hypothesis 2 is that economic and political trends that threaten the longevity of the 
dominant network will cause institutional changes to improve economic outcomes. However, the 
results of this discussion show that this does not hold true for Rwanda. This may be because of 
changes affected by the genocide and before 2002, when state fragility almost certainly played a 
significant role in institutional reform. Furthermore, the omission of state fragility from the solution 
pathway also reflected the country's ambiguous set membership score on that causal condition. 
Rwanda’s calibrated score for state fragility of 0.51 was virtually identical to 0.5 – the score that 
indicates maximum ambiguity between membership and non-membership of a set. 
 
                                                          
136 At the time of writing, these were Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda. 
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6.4 Included causal conditions 
 
The preceding section reflected on Rwanda’s challenges regarding the fragility of the state. The 
government has been highly successful at implementing pro-business reforms despite these issues, 
which have included limited influence from civil society organisations (CSOs), human resource 
weaknesses, and extensive involvement of the military in the economy. The reforms have helped the 
state to effect a significant reduction in poverty. The following three sub-sections examine the validity 
of the pathway solution suggested for Rwanda by the fsQCA in Chapter 5. These sub-sections discuss 
the initial business environment, the autocratic and democratic features of the political system and, 
crucially, the role of transactional leadership.  
 
6.4.1 Strong initial business environment 
 
Rwanda had a relatively positive operating environment for private enterprise even before the Doing 
Business project released its first major report in October 2002. The IIAG ranked the country’s 
business environment in the eight position out of 52 African countries in 2002 (in the sample of 35 
SSA countries analysed in Chapter 5, Rwanda ranked seventh behind Mauritius, South Africa, 
Botswana, Namibia, Tunisia and Cape Verde). The foundation’s score of 59.22 for 2002 represented 
a calibrated fsQCA score of 0.78. What made the strong foundations for a competitive market 
economy at the time so surprising was that the country’s economy remained dominated by families 
practising subsistence agriculture on small patches of land. The post-independence republics had 
championed the country as an agrarian society; thus, Habyarimana – who often referred to himself as 
a peasant – credited farmers for making Rwanda a developmental success story (Ansoms 2011: 242). 
By 1993, some two-thirds of the economy’s land area was dedicated to agriculture, and more than 
90% of Rwandans lived in rural areas. The government focussed as much as possible on promoting 
agricultural exports, given the political turmoil in the country. 
 
In contrast, the post-genocide political and military elite of the RPF grew up in exile and had little 
working knowledge of the farming sector. Official policy formulations insisted that “past delusions 
of viable subsistence-based agriculture” had to be transcended and that the family farm unit was no 
longer viable. Instead, the RPF favoured a decline in the population’s reliance on subsistence 
agriculture alongside increases in commercial mono-cropping and off-farm employment (Ansoms 
2011: 243-244). This was part of the higher goal of national reconciliation: the RPF believed that 
greater private sector activity and employment creation would have accelerated the resolving of ethnic 
divisions and lack of trust within the country (Kimanuka 2009: 15). Kagame has been acutely aware 
that the country needs economic development to avoid another bloodbath (Soudan 2015: v). Social 
science research since the 1950s has shown that economic development is positively correlated with 
trust between stakeholders, although the direction of causality has remained controversial. Kiwuwa 
(2012: 31), for example, found a positive relationship between trust within Rwanda, as measured by 
the 1990 edition of the WVS, and the level of economic development.  
 
The Mo Ibrahim Foundation’s annual assessment of a country’s business environment considers a 
multitude of factors. These include customs procedures, the investment climate, bureaucracy and red 
tape, the soundness of banks, and the investment climate and development of financial services in 
rural areas. The foundation obtains information on these factors from various entities, including the 
African Development Bank (AfDB), Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) and the International Fund 
for Agricultural Development (IFAD). After a period of post-conflict reconstruction, rehabilitation 
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and reforms from 1994 to 2002, and even before the World Bank launched its Competitiveness and 
Enterprise Development Project, these assessments reflected relatively positively on Rwanda’s post-
genocide progress. In addition, the AfDB’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) 
ranked the country in the top 10 of African states in 2002.137 In light of the leadership and state 
fragility challenges discussed above, the government should be credited with considerable progress 
in a short space of time, especially as far as the country’s economic transformation was concerned. 
Table 6.3 provides the component scores used by the Mo Ibrahim Foundation for Rwanda for 2002.  
 
Table 6.3: Business environment component scores (out of 100), 2002 
 
Competitive environment 66.53 
Customs procedures 79.22 
Investment climate 33.33 
Bureaucracy and red tape 66.67 
Soundness of banks 50.34 
Rural business climate 69.17 
Investment climate for rural businesses 78.33 
Rural financial services development 66.67 
Overall 59.22 
Source: Various sources collected by the Mo Ibrahim Foundation 
 
The pro-business reforms between the genocide and the first Doing Business publication are not well 
documented, because the Doing Business project and other sources of data used in this research were 
launched in the early 2000s. Nonetheless, it is well documented that the Rwandan government 
embarked on a three-pronged strategy to promote investment and private sector development soon 
after the genocide. Firstly, the government took an activist approach with the establishment of the 
RPF holding company Tri-Star Investments late in 1994. This organisation was created to pioneer 
investment and business activity for which there was no appetite from the domestic private sector. 
Secondly, the government privatised nearly all the parastatals inherited from the Habyarimana regime 
during the late 1990s and early 2000s (Kelsall 2013: 127, 131). Finally, the government adopted a 
policy framework paper (PFP) in 1998 that outlined its existing economic policy goals in support of 
its ongoing reconciliation goals (Kimanuka 2012: 15).138 By 2002, the IIAG scored the competitive 
environment 66.53 out of 100 (a higher IIAG score indicates a more favourable assessment).  
 
Tri-Star Investments (which was later renamed Crystal Ventures Limited and which is now the 
country’s second-largest employer after the state) developed subsidiaries in the areas of construction, 
telecommunications, security, property development, media, printing, construction, international 
trade and manufacturing (Reyntjens 2013: 73). Initial funding for the enterprise came from RPF 
supporters, including those in the diaspora, and from the ruling party. The organisation undoubtedly 
benefitted from unhindered access to the government and aid-related contracts. Many of its 
subsidiaries were not exorbitantly profitable, however, because they were managed by technocrats, 
not business people. Nonetheless, the full backing by the RPF and the state machinery endowed Tri-
Star Investments with considerable political and financial power, which it used to fund investments 
with expected high socio-economic returns (Kelsall 2013: 127-129). While this arrangement was 
controversial in the eyes of some donors, it provided the country with early-stage venture capitalism 
                                                          
137 The CPIA provides an annual assessment of the quality of policies and the performance of institutional frameworks in 
African countries. 
138 Kagame’s business-mindedness is said to have come from his father who was a farmer and business man. Kagame 
senior founded the country’s first coffee cooperative (Soudan 2015: 14-15). 
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required to lift the economy from its 1994 lows. Tri-Star Investments generated respectable rates of 
investment and socio-economic progress under otherwise unfavourable conditions. In the late 1990s 
and early 2000s, the company was the largest domestic firm and largest local investor in almost all 
the sectors in which it operated (Booth and Golooba-Mutebi 2012: 388).  
 
Public enterprises have played an important role in Rwanda’s economic development since the 
colonial era. However, the privatisation of state entities put the private sector at the forefront of 
economic development in post-genocide Rwanda. With the aid of multilateral organisations, the 
government restructured these entities during the latter part of the 1990s by providing equity 
injections and reducing subsidies. Dozens of parastatals were privatised within the first decade after 
the genocide in a well-supervised process – when privatised companies failed to remain afloat; the 
state re-privatised them to new buyers (Kelsall 2013: 131). A strict set of procedures were put in place 
to promote success and public support. The authority to negotiate with buyers, process sales, and 
oversee the privatisation campaign was separated to enhance the transparency of the process 
(UNCTAD 2006: 62). The success of the scheme quickly drowned dissenting voices. Between 1996 
and 2005, more than 40 of the planned 75 public enterprises were privatised, which generated 
approximately $20 million for the government (Kimanuka 2012: 64- 66). With parastatals privatised, 
the government could concentrate on policy matters while the private sector took the lead in creating 
jobs.  
 
The government sought to diversify economic activity and to build an open and inclusive economic 
system that would benefit the broader population. The RPF aimed to establish a liberal, private sector-
led, market-oriented economy by creating the legal, institutional and infrastructure frameworks 
needed to stimulate private sector activity and to achieve external competitiveness (Kimanuka 2012: 
15). Economic reforms, which started early in 1995, were diverse: 
 
 Monetary and financial regimes were liberalised 
 Import tariffs were reduced 
 Trade operations were liberalised 
 Restrictions on capital flows were reduced 
 A flexible exchange rate was introduced 
 The marketing of crops was liberalised 
 
The government's commitment to trade, financial and exchange reform from 1994 to 2002 resulted 
in cost- and value-reflecting prices instead of arbitrary ones imposed by the government (Malunda 
2012: 12). Further progress was achieved under a PFP developed with the support of the World Bank 
and IMF. Donors and multilateral agencies pledged $250 million in support of the programme. After 
adoption of the PFP, the World Bank observed accelerated reforms in key areas such as privatisation, 
the civil service, trade, fiscal policy and budgetary management (World Bank 1999: 2, 7, 12). 
Administrative efficiency was a key focus as well. The ministerial structure was reorganised from 
1997 to 1999 to rationalise the functions of the civil service. During this process, public sector 
employment was reduced by about 10% by removing 3,576 ghost employees from the payroll, while 
2,086 unqualified civil servants were retrenched. In turn, some 300 qualified former civil servants 
who had returned from exile were reabsorbed into the public sector. Other improvements included 
upgraded recruitment processes, the establishment of an anti-corruption bureau to help the Office of 
the Auditor-General, and the creation of the Central Tender Board (World Bank 1999: 9-11). By 
2002, the IIAG scored bureaucracy and red tape 66.67 out of 100.  
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The reform process during the second half of the 1990s and early 2000s was formalised in a Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) completed in June 2002. PRSPs were introduced in the mid-1990s 
as mechanisms to link poverty reduction to debt relief under the HIPC initiative. These programmes, 
which set out macroeconomic, structural and social policies as well as programmes aimed at 
promoting economic growth and poverty reduction, are created by national governments through a 
participatory process involving donors, civil society, the IMF and World Bank. Rwanda’s PSRP 
prioritised agro-processing, garment exports, commercial services, information and communication 
technology (ICT) services, tourism, mining, and skills export in the East African region (Musoni 
2004: 63). When assessing the PSPR at its completion in mid-2002, the IMF found that the 
programme and its premises had been an encompassing and innovative private sector-led growth 
strategy. Its elements included structural and institutional reforms to facilitate private investment, 
enterprise development, exports, and market-based agriculture (IMF 2002: 1, 6). By 2002, the IIAG 
scored the investment climate for rural businesses 78.33 out of 100. The IIAG also scored the rural 
business climate 69.17 out of 100. 
 
The involvement of the private sector was a notable factor in this reform process. Unlike the previous 
government, the Kagame regime has realised the importance of involving the populace in policy 
processes that affect their day-to-day lives. For example, the government hold annual leadership 
retreats attended by the president, the heads of ministries and parastatals, and representatives from 
the private sector. (See Section 6.5.1 for more detail on these retreats.) The retreats address priority 
issues aimed at achieving private sector-led growth in Rwanda (Malunda 2012: 49), including 
discussions of reforms emanating from the Doing Business Unit. Kagame is committed to open lines 
of communication with entrepreneurs, civil society and other stakeholders (World Bank 2012: 41). 
The 11th leadership retreat held in March 2014 included more than 250 attendees from the public and 
private sectors, for example, and the three days of discussions generated more than 40 
recommendations that were selected for implementation to boost the country’s economic 
development.139 
 
As a final positive point regarding the business and investment environment for private enterprise, it 
is important to note the property rights regime – a critical factor in NIE. The RPF ensured that 
property rights on capital (especially land) were respected in the aftermath of the genocide. Observers 
noted that few local and foreign investors faced difficulties in reclaiming movable assets that were 
seized during the conflict. Returning refugees also had the right to reclaim their property within ten 
years. This strong stance on property rights minimised the potential disruption that the return of 
refugees could have had on the economy, and contributed significantly to a quick recovery in food 
production. According to the FAO, food crop production dropped from nearly 18 million tonnes in 
1992 to less than 10 million tonnes in 1994, but subsequently recovered steadily to reach more than 
18 million tonnes by 2000. Robust property rights also facilitated the return of foreign investors 
whose activities had been interrupted by the genocide. The majority of large foreign firms present in 
Rwanda before the genocide did not divest from the country after the conflict (UNCTAD 2006: 18). 
Overall, the IIAG scored the business environment 59.22 out of 100.  
 
                                                          
139 While this involvement of the private sector could suggest a more democratic state than Rwanda’s autocracy scores 
indicate, it should be noted that a private-sector led economic recovery after the genocide has been at the core of RPF 
economic policy. It has formed part of the country’s ‘consociational democracy’ – a form of government that aims to 
regulate the sharing of power amongst groups by allocating equal rights to these groups, or proportionally more extensive 
rights to minorities. Consociationalism stands in contrast to the concept of 'majoritarian’ democracy. See Section 5.2.5 
for a discussion of the relationship between this apparent democratic process and the autocratic nature of the polity.  
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The two weaknesses identified by the Mo Ibrahim Foundation were the investment climate and the 
soundness of banks. On the first point, the Heritage Foundation gave Rwanda a score of 30 out of 
100 for investment freedom, but did not explain this score in qualitative terms. UNCTAD (2006: 29) 
commented in 2006 that a significant portion of investment-related laws retained from the pre-
genocide period were “either outdated or not adapted to a market economy”, and that significant work 
remained by 2005 “to establish a modern and fully operational legal and regulatory framework for 
investment”. By 2002, the IIAG scored the investment climate 33.33 out of 100. On the second point, 
Rwanda’s banks were in trouble during the early 2000s, with almost half of the loans classified as 
‘weak’ during 2001-2002 (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2003: 7). In 2002, the IMF expressed concern about 
the precarious health of the country’s banking sector. The reasons for the significant volume of non-
performing loans – according to the World Bank, more than 70% of gross loans fell in this category 
during 2001 – included the effects of the genocide on household finances and the influence of political 
decisions on the activities of public and semi-private banks (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2006: 9). By 2002, 
the IIAG scored the soundness of banks 50.34 out of 100.  
 
The above review of the business environment at the hand of qualitative information did not identify 
any problems with the quality of data provided by the Bertelsmann Stiftung. While such an 
assessment is mostly based on a composite of variables, which includes strong and weak assessments, 
the majority of Rwanda’s component scores were positive in 2002. This resulted in a positive business 
environment ranked amongst the top 10 on the continent. The robust reform performance after 2002 
appears to have been a consequence of the turnaround in the country’s business climate after 1994. 
This is consistent with the premise of Hypothesis 4: a business environment that already supports 
private enterprise offers the foundation for implementing further pro-business institutional reform. 
Rwanda’s strategy to support private sector activity as a conduit towards a more prosperous and less 
divided society was implemented throughout the two decades after the genocide, with the Doing 
Business reports reflecting an ongoing process of institutional change.  
 
6.4.2 Full-autocracy and non-democracy 
 
Amongst the 35 SSA countries considered in this dissertation, Rwanda had the ninth-highest average 
autocracy score (3.33) for the period 2002-2013 from Polity IV (2015), and the joint lowest score (0) 
for democracy along with Eritrea and the Republic of the Congo. Principles of democracy are legally 
enshrined in the Constitution of 2003, but the post-genocide period witnessed the concentration of 
power in the hands of a powerful clique. This difference between the de jure system and the de facto 
regime can be traced back to the RPF’s progressive marginalisation of opposition voices in the 1994-
2003 transitional government and restrictions on the formation of opposition parties. While the local 
government elections in 1999 were ostensibly used to identify levels of support at the local level, this 
information was used to further the RPF’s control of the political space. Similar trends were seen with 
the district elections in 2001. By the time the presidential and parliamentary elections were held in 
2003, the RPF was able to paralyse opposition forces through various tactics (Daley 2009: 168, 172, 
176-177).140 Instead of being a constitutionalised democracy, Rwanda by 2003 was ruled by an 
autocratic government. Table 6.4 lists the data used by Polity IV (2015) to construct the autocracy 
measure.  
 
 
                                                          
140 These presidential and parliamentary elections were originally scheduled to take place in 1999. However, it appears 
that the RPF first wanted to ensure an electoral landslide before holding polls.  
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Table 6.4: Polity IV scores for autocracy components (1994-2014) 
 
Year Regulation 
of Chief 
Executive 
Recruitment 
Competitive-
ness of 
Executive 
Recruitment 
Openness of 
Executive 
Recruitment 
Executive 
Constraints 
Regulation 
of 
Participation 
Competitive-
ness of 
Participation 
Autocracy 
1994 1 0 0 2 4 1 6 
1995 1 0 0 2 4 1 6 
1996 1 0 0 2 4 1 6 
1997 1 0 0 2 4 1 6 
1998 1 0 0 2 4 1 6 
1999 1 0 0 2 4 1 6 
2000 1 0 0 2 3 2 4 
2001 1 0 0 2 3 2 4 
2002 1 0 0 2 3 2 4 
2003 2 0 0 3 3 2 3 
2004 2 0 0 3 3 2 3 
2005 2 0 0 3 3 2 3 
2006 2 0 0 3 3 2 3 
2007 2 0 0 3 3 2 3 
2008 2 0 0 3 3 2 3 
2009 2 0 0 3 3 2 3 
2010 2 0 0 3 4 2 4 
2011 1 0 0 3 4 2 4 
2012 1 0 0 3 4 2 4 
2013 1 0 0 3 3 2 3 
2014 1 0 0 3 3 2 3 
Source: Polity IV (2015) 
 
Polity IV (2015) classified the regulation of Rwanda’s chief executive recruitment in the period from 
1994 to 2002 as “through forceful seizures of power”. As discussed in Section 3.5, Kagame used 
military action to seize control of the chief executive position in July 1994. The Polity IV database 
maintains the "through forceful seizures of power" classification until the de facto leader of a coup 
d’état is replaced by a head of government chosen either through designative or competitive modes 
of executive selection (Gurr, Jaggers and Marshall 2013: 20). Polity IV (2015) changed this 
assessment in 2003 to classify chief executive recruitment as being driven by the political elite 
without formal competition, i.e. a one-party system or a rigged multiparty election (Gurr, Jaggers and 
Marshall 2013: 21). Multi-party elections held in 2003 were seen as the country’s first substantive 
post-genocide political test as it would have been a departure from the country’s autocratic past. 
However, the polls were not in any meaningful way considered to have been competitive (Kiwuwa 
2012: 140, 149), with the run-up to the elections on August 3 marred by arrests, disappearances and 
intimidation. Transparency International argued that the RPF “stage-managed” the pre-election 
period, and the US National Democratic Institute (NDI) called the elections “significantly flawed”. 
A European observer mission also lamented the undemocratic nature of the poll that gave 95% of the 
vote to Kagame. This was achieved through a rigged multiparty election that recorded a staggering 
voter turnout of 96.55% (Reyntjens 2013: 37-38).  
 
The local government elections of 2006 and the parliamentary elections in 2008 were similarly 
cosmetic from a democratic perspective (Reyntjens 2013: 44). For the period from 2011 to 2014, 
Polity IV (2015) again classified Rwanda’s chief executive recruitment as “through forceful seizures 
of power”. This classification can also include countries experiencing periods of so-called guided 
democracy (transitions from military to civilian rule) or regimes securing electoral victories through 
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the intimidation of opposition leaders or by declaring ‘states of emergency’ before elections (Gurr, 
Jaggers and Marshall 2013: 21). The 2010 elections in Rwanda were associated with significant levels 
of intimidation: a Commonwealth observer mission – the only significant observer grouping – found 
a lack of notable opposition voices on the campaign trail due to various forms of intimidation 
(Reyntjens 2013: 54).141 Longman's (2011: 26) assessment, which was based on widely recognised 
elements of democratic governance, concluded that Rwanda fell far short of the standards of liberal 
democracy. Not surprisingly, the repeated non-democratic nature of chief executive recruitment 
during 1994, 2003 and 2010 resulted in Polity IV (2015) also classifying the competitiveness and 
openness of executive recruitment as uncompetitive. 
 
Polity IV classified constraints on executive authority in the period from 1994 to 2002 as being 
between the categories of ‘unlimited authority’ and ‘slight-to-moderate limitation’. The RPF 
militarised the political landscape and suspended the activities of political parties from 1994 to 2003. 
The Republican-Democratic Movement (MDR) was the main opposition party but was virtually silent 
from 1995 onwards while civil society progressively disappeared. As was the case under the 
Habyarimana regime, Parliament was largely sidelined and a small ruling-party elite took significant 
decisions in an opaque manner (Reyntjens 2013: 21, 23, 25). For the period from 2003 to 2014, Polity 
IV classified the constraints on executive authority as slight to moderate, with some real but limited 
restraints on the executive. This was only slightly better than the classification for the 1994-2003 
period. The constitution of 2003 institutionalised the Forum of Political Parties as a mechanism for 
joint decision making between the RPF and the remnants of the opposition parties. The unlimited 
authority that characterised the decade after the genocide hardly changed, however, because the RPF 
still controlled the multi-party forum – which had the power to remove any Member of Parliament 
(MP) at any time (Mullane and Sebarenzi 2011: 346).  
 
Polity IV (2015) categorised the situation in Rwanda from 1994 to 1999 as one in which some 
organised political participation was permitted, albeit with regular exclusion from the political 
process of significant stakeholders, pertinent issues, and types of conventional participation (Gurr, 
Jaggers and Marshall 2013: 26). Rwandan political parties were suspended during this period, but not 
banned outright (Reyntjens 2013: 21). The switch by Polity IV (2015) to classify the country as 
‘sectarian’ from 2000 to 2009 was questionable. This classification involves multiple identity groups, 
factionalism, a group securing power and excluding another, as well as political groups based on 
restricted membership. The RPF has suppressed ethnicity-related rhetoric in the country because of 
its pivotal role in the genocide, and continues to believe that ethnic divisions have to be quashed to 
prevent reversal of the country's progress since the genocide. All citizens are officially known as 
Rwandans only, and distinctions such as Hutu, Tutsi and Twa no longer exist (Daley 2009: 169). 
Membership of the country’s leading political group is also far from restricted: affiliation to the RPF 
is mandatory, while membership of other parties is restricted. Polity IV (2015) classified political 
participation in the periods 2010-2012 and 2013-2014 as similar to that in the 1994-1999 and 2000-
2009 periods, respectively, namely ‘restricted’ and ‘sectarian’. The ‘sectarian’ classification for 2013 
and 2014 was equally dubious.  
 
The Polity IV rating for the competitiveness of political participation was an apt assessment of the 
autocratic nature of the political system in Rwanda from 2002 to 2013. When considering the extent 
                                                          
141 Kagame’s three rivals in the 2010 elections were part of a long-standing tactic in Rwandan elections of placing 
opponents merely for show. These candidates are known as “bridesmaids” and accepted that they are not actually 
supposed to garner many votes (Reyntjens 2013: 51). 
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to which alternative preferences for policy and leadership could have been pursued in the political 
arena, no significant opposition activity was permitted from 2000 to 2014. In theory, such situations 
were associated with totalitarian party systems, authoritarian military dictatorships, and despotic 
monarchies (Gurr, Jaggers and Marshall 2013: 26) – the first two were specifically associated with 
Rwanda. Ever since its first report on Rwanda in 2003, the Bertelsmann Stiftung has lamented the 
autocratic political system in the country. The current government and the ruling elite stand for an 
authoritarian developmental state, firmly believing that the reconstruction of state and society requires 
strong, authoritative leadership. The developmental state approach in Rwanda has left no room for 
the opposition and a viable multiparty system. Donor organisations have described the political space 
as being “controlled” (Hayman 2011: 125).  
 
In contrast, the RPF sees the political system as a “consociational democracy” or “power-sharing 
consensus democracy” (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2014a: 2, 7). Kagame has admitted that this form of 
representation does not conform to the standards of liberal democracy, but added that there was no 
one-size-fits-all strategy for implementing democracy. He regards the architecture of the country’s 
representative system as a product of Rwanda’s history, traditions and culture, and as one of many 
possible types of democracies. In his own words: “A democracy must reflect the aspirations, history, 
and culture of the people within which it is attempting to take root; otherwise it is bound to fail. This 
is what we are trying to accomplish in Rwanda” (Soudan 2015: 92-93). Kagame’s leadership style 
has been likened to that of a corporate leader with a comprehensive vision, a knack for details, and a 
drive for execution by his subordinates (Crisafulli and Redmond 2014). The Institute of Management 
and Leadership believes that Kagame is “running the country like a CEO of a company” and ensures 
“that every director is accountable for their department” (Smith 2012).142  
 
His autocratic governance system has allowed for tight control of the economy from the highest levels 
of government. As discussed in Section 3.6, the government has indicated a preference for a 
decentralised administration as opposed to the centralised decision-making system that authorities 
had maintained for several centuries before that. However, the decision-making abilities of the civil 
service and public entities have been limited by a system of performance contracts set by the RPF. 
Because ministers and mayors are directly responsible for the performance of their offices, the 
dominant network have been able to coerce lower levels of government to address the issues that they 
have deemed essential (Kelsall 2013: 126). Accordingly, the state has had a “top-down developmental 
agenda” that has left very little room for bottom-up feedback mechanisms (Ansoms 2011: 240, 248). 
The government believes that the system had “undoubtedly played a significant role” in the country’s 
development progress (IPAR 2015: 3).  
 
This structure has allowed Kagame to impose his vision of private sector development on the process 
of policy reforms. This ability to affect change has enabled rapid change in the business environment. 
As discussed in Section 5.2.1, the same conclusion holds when the reform process is scrutinised. The 
executive branch has made private sector development a priority and an essential part of the country's 
development strategy. Investment and business climate reforms have been at the top of the economic 
policy agenda as decided on by the dominant network.143 While reform ideas and processes have 
                                                          
142 This perspective on what is needed for economic development – an authoritative government with an efficient 
bureaucracy – is a philosophy and approach shared with many of the East Asian Tigers.  
143 Along with Cambodia, Georgia, Kenya, Liberia, and Yemen, Rwanda specifically identified regulatory reforms as an 
important part of the country’s development strategy. This placed pro-business reforms high on the economic policy 
agenda for promoting private sector growth and development (World Bank 2008: 11, 16).  
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originated from the Doing Business Unit, steering committee and technical working groups, the 
cabinet has had the final say on implementation. In addition, progress has been reported directly to 
the prime minister and high-level officials in the president’s office. As confirmed by Rwanda's status 
as the most active Doing Business reformer, this system has enabled the dominant network to 
implement significant numbers of reforms.  
 
The above analysis of Polity IV data at the hand of information about the country’s political sphere 
has broadly verified the data. The only exception was the classification of ‘regulation of participation’ 
during certain times, specifically the periods from 2000 to 2009 and from 2013 to 2014. However, 
the difference in the scores of restricted and sectarian societies is only one point, and this affected 
only one of the six elements used to calculate the autocracy score. Hence, the impact on the overall 
autocracy score was limited, and it is most unlikely that the questions raised about the classification 
of ‘regulation of participation’ had a meaningful impact on the outcome of the fsQCA in Chapter 5. 
In general, the measure of the autocratic nature of Rwanda’s governance reflected an authoritarian 
political system that has been downplayed by supporters and highlighted by critics. This system has 
enabled Kagame to enforce his vision of private sector-led economic development and the pro-
business institutional change needed to achieve this. This affirms the premise of Hypotheses 3 that 
an autocratic polity can implement institutional reforms aimed at improving the business environment 
for the private sector. 
 
6.4.3 Effective transactional leadership 
 
The ability of the state to manage reforms and achieve its strategic objectives has attested to the 
quality of transactional leadership, while the ability to realise policy objectives has attested to the 
quality of management by the executive and legislature (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2016a: 38). As 
discussed in Section 5.2.2, this dissertation uses the Bertelsmann Stiftung measure of policy 
coordination as a proxy for transactional leadership. This component of the BTI matched the 
definitions of transactional leadership by De Groot et al. (2009: 5-6). Furthermore, the policy 
coordination data are weighted by a level of difficulty index to reflect the policy coordination 
challenges faced by the polity. Application of the level of difficulty index, which was 7.7 out of 10, 
reduced Rwanda's unadjusted average transactional leadership score of 6.50 out of 10 to an adjusted 
mean of 6.17. This notable adjustment suggested that knowledge of the level of difficulty data is a 
prerequisite for understanding leadership in Rwanda. The following two sub-sections provide 
separate discussions of policy coordination and issues related to the level of difficulty measure. 
 
6.4.3.1 Policy coordination 
 
Rwanda’s adjusted score for policy coordination implied a set membership score of 0.83. This ranked 
the country fifth in the sample of SSA countries after Botswana, Mauritius, Ghana and Niger, and 
ahead of Uganda, Senegal, South Africa and Mozambique. Unlike the IIAG and Polity IV, the 
Bertelsmann Stiftung does not give component scores for the three factors considered by its analysts 
when they quantify the quality of policy coordination. It does provide component scores for the level 
of difficulty measure, though. The lack of detail about the policy coordination score makes a review 
of this causal condition even more important. The criteria set by the Bertelsmann Stiftung and the 
definition of transactional leadership provided by De Groot et al. (2009) suggest that the following 
three factors are important for assessing leadership in Rwanda:  
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 Dialogue and engagement with stakeholders outside of the ruling party in order to balance 
policy goals and agree on trade-offs in the decision-making processes.  
 Coordination of actions amongst state departments and other stakeholders to ensure that 
policy implementation is aligned with and succeeds in achieving agreed-upon policy goals. 
 Creation of an environment of commitment amongst stakeholders to implement projects and 
policies, including assignment of responsibilities and evaluation of performance.  
 
The following three examples illustrate Rwanda’s experience in this regard by discussing ongoing 
actions taken by the country’s leadership. These examples of successful transactional leadership at 
the highest level demonstrate the hands-on philosophy of the Kagame regime. The focal points of the 
examples are dialogue and engagement, coordination, and commitment and accountability.144 These 
solutions to macro-level policymaking problems draw on aspects of Rwandan culture and tradition; 
as such, they are examples of what the Rwanda Governance Board (RGB) refers to as home-grown 
solutions.145  
 
A) Dialogue and engagement in the decision-making processes 
 
The mid-2000s witnessed several innovations in Rwanda that were aimed at strengthening the 
relationship between politicians and other stakeholders in the policymaking and implementation 
process. These included the creation of the National Dialogue Council, Government Leadership 
Retreat and public sector performance contracts (Nsanzabaganwa 2012: 144). The National Dialogue 
Council (umushyikirano) was established by the Constitution of 2003 and convenes annually. Chaired 
by the president, the council brings together ministers, MPs, legal entities, delegates from the 
diaspora, as well as representatives of all 416 sectors in the 30 districts of the country. Meetings of 
the council are opportunities for all stakeholders in the country to build consensus around important 
development programmes (Nsanzabaganwa 2012: 17, 144-145). The umushyikirano (meaning ‘a 
meeting where participants can exchange ideas, share experiences and question each other’) acts as a 
forum for stakeholder debate about the state of the nation. To broaden the inclusiveness of the process, 
those who are unable to attend in person at the parliament building can participate via electronic 
media (telephone, text message, Twitter and Facebook) and follow the debates live on radio, 
television and the internet (Government of Rwanda 2017).146  
 
The 11th National Dialogue Council held in December 2013, for example, accommodated more than 
1,000 representatives. The aim of the dialogue was to refine the strategic national orientation for 
sustainable development, and it generated 20 resolutions for implementation over the next 12 months. 
Participants agreed on the following points about the economy: 
 
 
                                                          
144 Section 2.5 discussed the value of case study examples for deepening understanding of a specific concept. Case studies 
can enable analysis of the determinants as well as the consequences of events. Case studies are particularly important in 
interdisciplinary research, which is common in NIE. This is true for this dissertation as well, especially at a time when 
social science is increasingly becoming ‘post-disciplinary’ in conceptualisation and practical application. 
145 The RGB, which is the country’s centre of excellence in governance policy, focusses on research, application of 
innovations, and provision of services to foster accountability in governance and sustainable development. 
146 While it is reasonable to expect that such interaction in a tightly controlled political space will allow limited debate 
and disagreement, the Girinka programme discussed C below illustrates that views contrary to those of the state can be 
aired and can have a meaningful impact.  
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 To improve awareness of and capacity to deliver services by the Business Development Fund 
(BDF) 
 Mobilise local investors to operate under grouped investment schemes to increase 
productivity 
 Sensitise Rwandans about the operations and benefits of the capital and stock markets 
 Promote a culture of savings 
 Develop strategies to sensitise Rwandans about avoiding unnecessary expenditures 
 Encourage Rwandans in the diaspora to open saving accounts in Rwandan banks and assist 
them in doing so 
 Sensitise Rwandans – in particular, farmers and business people – to optimally use the number 
of working hours 
 Put in place measures to eradicate tax evasion, especially in the informal sector (Government 
of Rwanda 2014: 7-8) 
 
The annual National Dialogue Council is more than a talk shop: the government reported 12 months 
after the 11th umushyikirano that implementation of 85% of all resolutions was on track (Government 
of Rwanda 2015b: 6). The ability of the political leadership to create a broad consensus about strategic 
economic goals has supported policymaking, policy implementation, and institutional change more 
generally. Such consensus has included support from all stakeholders, including political parties, 
interest groups, and economic actors (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2016a: 41). The RPF, international 
donors, multilateral organisations and the private sector have all been in favour of a market-oriented 
economy.  
 
Another example of dialogue and engagement – albeit of a once-off nature – was the creation of the 
Vision 2020 plan, which outlines the country’s strategic development priorities. During the period 
from 1997 to 2000, a broad-based national consultative process took place to formulate this vision, 
with consensus building mechanisms used to determine the goals (Nsanzabaganwa 2012: 135). 
Stakeholders that provided input into the vision included civil society organisations, private 
businesses, government departments, donor agencies, experts from China, Singapore and Thailand 
(Kinzer 2008: 226-227), academics, multilateral organisations like the World Bank, and consulting 
firms (McCreless and Porter 2008: 11). What makes this list significant is that such a wide variety of 
inputs in policymaking would not be expected in a post-conflict, authoritarian African government. 
The short-term objectives of the Vision 2020 economic plan included the promotion of 
macroeconomic stability as a foundation for private sector confidence. The focus of its medium-term 
aims was transformation of the country from a predominantly agrarian society to a knowledge-based 
economy, while creation of SMEs through the development of entrepreneurship was one of the long-
term goals. Ultimately, Vision 2020 attempted to move Rwanda to middle-income country status by 
2020 (Nsanzabaganwa 2012: 135-136).147  
 
B) Coordination of actions for policy implementation alignment 
 
Kagame launched the annual Government Leadership Retreat (umwiherero) in 2004. Chaired by the 
president, the week-long event brings together top officials from government ministries, district 
governments, state entities and agencies, ambassadors, army leaders, as well as representatives from 
                                                          
147 The pillars of the strategy include government and administrative efficiency, agricultural productivity, private service 
sector competitiveness, human resource development, modern infrastructure and regional integration (Bertelsmann 
Stiftung 2012a: 19).  
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the legislature, the judiciary, and the private sector (Nsanzabaganwa 2012: 17). Traditionally, the 
umwiherero was a retreat during which Rwandan leaders assembled to reflect on issues affecting their 
communities. The modern version of the retreat have consisted of discussions of policy 
implementation challenges that aim to rectify these issues. Topics covered have included a broad 
range of development challenges, including the economy, governance, justice, infrastructure, 
healthcare, and education (Government of Rwanda 2017). The retreat was designed mainly to address 
the coordination challenges policymakers and stakeholders face when attempting to reach relevant 
goals. By reviewing policy progress, the retreats have focused on ironing out shortcomings and 
obstacles that hinder effectiveness and efficiency in the delivery of public goods by all levels of 
government (Nsanzabaganwa 2012: 17, 149). 
 
Cluster working groups identified policy gaps, implementation gaps and strategy gaps before the 
Government Leadership Retreat in 2010. The three clusters (economic, social and governance) each 
delivered presentations and recommendations on their respective topics.148 This was followed by 
several hours of open debate and brainstorming about the proposals. Based on the presentations and 
stakeholder interaction, the SPU in the presidency and the retreat steering committee made extensive 
notes that were returned to the cluster representatives. In the evenings and early hours of the mornings, 
clusters revised their proposals and determined outlines for relevant action plans (Iyer 2012: 8). On 
the final day of the retreat, the clusters again presented proposals based on initial work and the 
feedback received. Where necessary, Kagame questioned what he called “somehow” attitudes, which 
referred to the attitudes of government officials who expected policy outcomes to somehow realise 
without driving implementation in a direct manner. In the month after the retreat, clusters honed 
action plans that detailed the implementation of policies to address each of the retreat priorities. These 
plans included measurable outcomes and indicators, stated the actions that ministries had to take each 
quarter, and identified the people responsible for actions. The president then assigned measurable 
outcomes that were specified in delivery contracts between himself and the ministers (Iyer 2012: 9). 
 
C) Creation of commitment and accountability of performance 
 
The imihigo performance contracts are based on an ancestral cultural practice whereby a subject 
would set performance goals in the presence of the master (Nsanzabaganwa 2012: 3). In the modern 
era, this values-based concept has served as a management tool for politicians to address the principal-
agent problem.149 The contracts are performance-based, results-oriented statements of priorities 
signed between the president and mayors. The mayors sign on behalf of other civil servants in their 
districts, which enhances ownership of the contracts and on-the-ground cooperation. Furthermore, 
the private sector is empowered to contribute to and demand accountability for these goals by 
opportunities to make inputs into these contracts (Nsanzabaganwa 2012: 150). The contracts outline 
the priorities that district governments aim to achieve within one year. In turn, these priorities are 
aligned with national objectives (Nsanzabaganwa 2012: 3). The performance contracts are reviewed 
                                                          
148 The 11 priorities preselected by the clusters were: increase energy production and distribution; significantly reduce the 
trade deficit; increase the number of viable SMEs, increase agricultural productivity through crop intensification 
programmes; accelerate Doing Business reforms; develop Rwanda’s strategic position within the EAC and the Economic 
Community of the Great Lakes Countries (ECGLC); improve land use management administration; improve public 
service delivery, especially at the local government level; deliver the nine-year basic education programme; increase the 
provision of skills development through initiatives for youth and employment promotion programs; and sustain campaigns 
to reduce malnutrition focussed on at-risk groups (Iyer 2012: 7-8). 
149 In the governance context, the principle-agent problem has to do with information asymmetries between politicians 
(the principals) and civil servants (the agents) due to the cost to the former of monitoring the latter. 
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every six months, while a main review once every year ranks districts according to their 
performance.150 The principal annual evaluation is followed by a ceremony (which is broadcast live 
via radio, television and the internet) during which the best performers are rewarded and the next 
year's performance contracts are signed (Nsanzabaganwa 2012: 150).151  
 
The National Dialogue Council is an annual opportunity to hold leaders and civil servants to account 
for their performance on the imihigo contracts. For example, the aim of the Girinka (“to own a cow”) 
programme of the Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Resources was to provide each needy family 
with a cow to improve income opportunities, nutrition and agricultural productivity (Nsanzabaganwa 
2012: 144-145).152 Local government leaders were responsible for implementation of the programme 
and distribution of the cows. Although intended for poor households, local leaders distributed the 
animals to relatively well-off families. The rationale for this decision was the belief that the latter 
would take better care of the cows because they have access to land for growing fodder and resources 
for building stables. Moreover, some local leaders allocated cows to themselves. At the National 
Dialogue Council in 2009, Kagame allowed ordinary Rwandans to provide feedback on the Girinka 
programme. Via telephone calls broadcast live during the session, citizens publically denounced local 
leaders who misallocated the cows (Nsanzabaganwa 2012: 145-146).  
 
The president instructed the local leaders to find solutions to the inability of the poor households to 
care for cows, such as the construction of community cowsheds, and ordered the relevant minister to 
correct the misallocations. This happened “in record time” after the poor evaluation of local leaders’ 
performance and the intervention of the president (Nsanzabaganwa 2012: 145-146). Non-deserving 
beneficiaries returned their animals to the common pool from where the cows were reallocated to 
poor households. The cows given to poor families did not suffer as was feared, because local leaders 
constructed community cowsheds and other cooperative structures. The result of the communal 
rearing strategy was that the Girinka programme reached its intended policy goals: the availability of 
manure increased, the delivery of extension services and access to milk collection facilities improved, 
and communities could share the costs of hiring community veterinarians (Nsanzabaganwa 2012: 
146-147).  
 
6.4.3.2 Level of difficulty 
 
A level of difficulty score weights the raw policy coordination data to generate a final adjusted reading 
for effective transactional leadership. The level of difficulty score reflects the policy coordination 
challenges faced by the polity. Where challenges are few, the level of difficulty adjustment reduces 
                                                          
150 Reyntjens (2013: 182-183) expressed concern about the accuracy of performance reporting in Rwanda. Citing 
anecdotal evidence, he indicated that feedback from district level highlighted good performance and underplayed poor 
performance, which resulted in overly positive evaluations and raised questions about the data generated from the 
information. Such problems are not limited to Rwanda’s performance contracts, however, and are risks in all feedback 
systems. Incorrect reporting can also be a symptom of societal factors and the political system in general, and not 
necessarily of the imihigo system. The anecdotal evidence did not indicate that the imihigo system was less effective than 
similar systems found elsewhere. Importantly, the anecdotal evidence did not prove that an excessively positive image of 
the extent of consultation and efficacy of policy implementation was being presented. 
151 Prior to 2014, performance evaluations were conducted by a committee comprised of representatives from the 
presidency, the prime minister’s office, the Ministry of Local Government, and the Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Planning. (The IPAR took over this responsibility in 2014 to provide independent performance analyses.). The first step 
in the imihigo process is the defining of objectives based on the quantifiable indicators. The second step involves the 
implementation of plans to attain these goals. The third step involves scoring and grading the outcomes to determine the 
overall quality of performance (Ndahiro 2015: 16-21).  
152 As indicated in Section 3.2, cattle farming formed the basis of Rwanda’s pastoral agriculture since the 15 th century. 
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the raw policy coordination score by a large margin. For example, in Mauritius, the country in the 
SSA sample with the lowest level of difficulty reading (3.13), the adjustment reduces the raw policy 
coordination score of 8.00 by a significant margin to 6.78. In the case of the CAR, the country with 
the highest level of difficulty score (8.81), the process effects a small reduction from a raw policy 
coordination score of 3.83 to an adjusted score of 3.73. The Bertelsmann Stiftung’s level of difficulty 
index has several components: 
 
 Stateness and the rule of law 
 GNI per capita scaled according to purchasing power parity (PPP) 
 UN education index 
 Physical constraints (e.g. infrastructure and geography) 
 Conflict intensity 
 Civil society traditions (e.g. social trust) 
 
Table 6.5 contains the component scores for Rwanda. With regards to human rights and the rule of 
law, Section 6.3.1 pointed out that the judiciary is formally independent but in actual fact 
subordinated to the will of the executive, especially when it comes to politically sensitive matters. 
However, Haverman (2012: 7) emphasised that the rule of law is a contentious topic in Rwanda and 
pointed to the existence of some positive factors. These include low levels of corruption, the 
redevelopment of the judiciary after its implosion during the genocide, and ready access to justice 
through legal aid. Stateness, which is defined as the ability of a state to deliver on its fundamental 
tasks, is the outcome of state strength. This ability enhances containment of anti-systemic forces and 
management of socioeconomic and security-related crises (Andersen 2017: 19). Hence, stateness is 
interpreted as the direct opposite of state failure. As discussed in Section 6.3.1, the pathway solution 
associated with Rwanda does not contain state fragility. Nonetheless, it is a factor in the calculation 
of the level of difficulty score. As was the case with the rule of law, the result of the attempt to 
measure the degree of fragility of the Rwandan state was ambiguous – the calibrated score of 0.51 
was virtually identical to the point of maximum ambiguity between set membership and set non-
membership. The Bertelsmann Stiftung scored stateness and the rule of law 5.063 out of 10. Higher 
scores on components of the level of difficulty index consistently indicated more significant strains 
on leadership.  
 
Table 6.5: Level of difficulty component scores – Rwanda  
 
Stateness 
and the rule 
of law 
GNI per 
capita 
Level of 
education 
Physical 
constraints 
Conflict 
intensity 
Civil society 
traditions 
Overall 
5.063 9.167 7.500 9.000 7.000 8.500 7.70 
Source: Own calculations based on data from the Bertelsmann Stiftung 
 
GNI per capita and the level of education in the country are used as proxies for human development. 
As indicated in Section 3.6, the socio-economic conditions experienced by Rwandans have improved 
markedly since the genocide. For example, the country made significant progress as far as reducing 
malnourishment, infant and child mortality, and the share of the population living in urban slums was 
concerned. Following the elimination of tuition fees in 2003, primary school enrolment reached more 
than 90% by the mid-2000s. In spite of this progress, World Bank data for 2010 indicated that 60.4% 
of the population subsisted on less than $1.90 a day (at 2011 international prices). Furthermore, the 
UNDP ranked Rwanda 166th out of 187 countries based on its HDI for 2011. Extreme poverty 
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remained very high and affected men and women equally (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2014a: 13, 21). The 
progression from primary to secondary education was also troubling: World Bank data indicated that 
secondary school enrolment rates were less than 30% in the mid-2000s. As a result, the UNDP 
classified Rwanda as a ‘low human development country’. This makes leadership particularly 
challenging. The Bertelsmann Stiftung scored GNI per capita and the level of education 9.167 and 
7.500, respectively, out of 10. 
 
The physical constraints to transactional leadership in Rwanda are formidable. More than 60% of the 
country’s high-density population live below the poverty line (Kimanuka 2009: 42, 75) in a small 
landlocked territory with few natural resources apart from fertile soil (Kelsall 2013: 120) and 
underutilised hydroelectric potential (Sellstrom and Wohlgemuth 1997: 19). The genocide decimated 
the country’s human resource base through the killing and displacement of many educated people 
(Kimanuka 2009: 39). This left Rwanda with a poorly qualified workforce and insufficient 
employment creation outside the agricultural sector (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2014a: 3). While health 
pandemics are under control, Rwanda’s health care system was inefficient until a compulsory system 
of health insurance was introduced in 2008. The involvement of CSOs in political processes is limited 
outside of public forums like the National Dialogue Council due to a fear of the consequences for 
expressing strong opinions (Gruzd and Herbert 2008: 224). The Bertelsmann Stiftung scored physical 
constraints 9.000 out of 10.  
 
Although Rwanda has projected an image of calm and unity, conflict and structural violence have 
remained (Reyntjens 2013: xiii). One of the critical issues in the small, densely populated country is 
access to land. Most inhabitants of the rural areas lack employment opportunities and enough arable 
land. While urban dwellers have a better chance of finding jobs, migration controls have prevented 
urbanisation by landless and jobless peasants in rural areas (see Section 6.3.1). To deal with land 
conflict, the government is strongly promoting an agricultural modernisation process that involves 
the formation of cooperatives, land sharing, specialisation in certain crops, the increased use of 
fertiliser, and the terracing of land (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2014a: 13, 20).153 More generally, freedoms 
and civil rights in Rwanda remain vulnerable to vigilante justice and violence against women, as well 
as the absence of effective accountability for these violations (Haverman 2012: 74). Ethnic tensions 
are buried beneath the surface due to the prohibition of discussions of the issue. Some believe that 
this situation threatens a renewed outbreak of large-scale violence (Reyntjens 2013: xvi, 200-201). 
The Bertelsmann Stiftung scored conflict intensity 7.000 out of 10.  
 
Institutional trust (a civil society tradition) is a requirement for moving from positions of dissensus 
to ones of consensus. Institutional trust “is based on the conviction that the system in place is effective 
enough to address the trustor’s interests”. An open society “makes a good citizenry and, within the 
context of transition, a resource. On the other hand, the absence of trust can be detrimental to the 
stability and viability of transition” (Kiwuwa 2012: 32, 34). Inter-group trust as well as the macro-
level trust between citizens and the government were “completely obliterated” in Rwanda during the 
Second Republic. Crucially, the lack of trust has also adversely affected political competition and 
cooperation in post-genocide Rwanda (Kiwuwa 2012: 30, 90). Cultural theory hypothesises that trust 
in institutions – the basis for consensus building – is rooted in cultural norms determined by 
socialisation over time. The dominant cultural and ethnic norms in Rwanda are those of hostility 
between citizens as well as between citizens and the state. This has created an environment in which 
generalised trust – also called ‘blind trust – is absent beyond immediate familial relations (Kiwuwa 
                                                          
153 Section 6.5 refers to this modernisation programme. 
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2012: 33-34). This has complicated consensus-building. The Bertelsmann Stiftung scored civil 
society traditions 8.5 out of 10. The issue of trust – an informal institution – is discussed further in 
Section 6.5.1 and again in the context of suggestions for future research in Section 8.3.  
 
Overall, the Bertelsmann Stiftung scored level of difficulty 7.70 out of 10. The qualitative information 
in this section did not contradict its data for Rwanda, and the level of difficulty score appears correct. 
The six component scores of the index reflect a very challenging environment for transactional 
leadership in Rwanda. In fact, Rwanda’s difficulty score was the seventh highest amongst those of 
the 35 SSA countries considered in Chapter 5 (the countries with higher scores were the CAR, DRC, 
Chad, Burundi, Ethiopia and Eritrea). In combination with the policy coordination data, the country’s 
transactional leadership score was a relatively high 6.17 out of 10. Hypothesis 1 states that strong 
leadership is required to implement institutional changes such as business environment reforms. The 
data and narrative for Rwanda in Section 6.4.3 has supported this assessment. This underscores the 
importance of effective transactional leadership in the recent institutional change in Rwanda. 
 
6.4.3.3 Moral authority 
 
It is vital also to reconsider some of the other elements of leadership identified in earlier chapters in 
order to further understanding of this factor in Rwanda. For example, Kagame exhibits the main 
characteristics of leadership that Ahlquist and Levi (2011: 5) suggested most scholars are likely to 
agree on (see Section 2.4). He also exhibits at least two of the three leadership aspects identified by 
Alston et al. (2016: 15) and discussed in Section 1.1: identifying and understanding the problem 
facing society, and the ability to coordinate others in affecting changes. It is the third aspect identified 
by Alston et al.'s (2016: 15) – having the moral and ethical authority to make all stakeholders accept 
the implemented changes –.that requires further discussion There are no guarantees that a leader will 
be able to convince others to accept his or her new ideology (Storr 2009: 104). Such an ideology will 
be inextricably interwoven with stakeholders' moral judgements about the truthfulness of the leader, 
which implies that adoption of the ideology depends on its moral and ethical implications (North 
1981: 49).  
 
Internationally, Kagame’s moral authority rests on several factors, namely his leadership of a group 
(the RPF) that stopped the 1994 genocide; his status as the ruler of a poor country that was decimated 
by human suffering; and the global promotion of a favourable image of his leadership by the “Friends 
of the New Rwanda”. While this has nothing to do with his ideology, the external perception of the 
man is that of a leader with substantial moral authority.154 This has placed the country in good 
standing with most international donors. The extent of bilateral, regional and multilateral international 
cooperation has reflected the willingness and ability of the political leadership to work with external 
supporters and organisations (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2016a: 44). To be fair, Rwanda has had little 
choice but to accept money from abroad because the domestic revenues of the government have 
barely covered public sector wages; furthermore, Vision 2020 would have had no credibility without 
money from abroad (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2012a: 29). However, it must be emphasised that the 
government has done a laudable job in using donor funding and support. Britain’s Department for 
International Development (DfID), the country’s largest bilateral donor, has provided several positive 
                                                          
154 Nelson Mandela, for example, had moral authority because of his time spent in prison (Alston et al. 2016: 188) and 
his forgiveness of the apartheid regime in order to build a new South Africa. 
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reviews of the results Rwanda has achieved by using donor money to support pro-poor growth 
(Kimanuka 2009: 74).155 
 
At home, Kagame also built his moral authority on these genocide-related credentials. In the years 
after 1994, the RPF based its moral authority on the contempt for the international community and 
its role in allowing the country to descend into chaos. Kagame’s moral authority have grown less 
robust over time both at home and amongst many Rwanda scholars. These dissenting voices have 
denounced the dominant network for its autocratic rule, flawed elections, human rights abuses, 
growing economic inequality, victimisation, injustice, limited press freedom and control of 
information (Reyntjens 2013: xiii-xvii). Because such dissenting opinions have been muted in the 
country, however, few challenges to Kagame’s moral authority from within Rwanda have reached 
the international community. The freedom of the press and dissemination of information have been 
contingent on the official interpretation of ‘national unity’. Any criticism of the president and other 
high-ranking officials can be interpreted as a violation of this principle. As a result, both state-owned 
and private media outlets have been forced to practice self-censorship to avoid government 
interventions (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2014a: 9). 
 
Quotes about the quality of transactional leadership in Rwanda are more common in international 
media: “Rwanda continues to demonstrate its significance because of its forward-thinking, results-
orientated leadership that has moved the country from poverty to prosperity”, wrote Musiitwa and 
Sodipo (2012: 114). Politicians such as Bill Clinton and Tony Blair have also complimented the 
country’s leadership. At the same time, critics such as Reyntjens (2013: xiii-xvii) have highlighted 
the country’s abuses and shortcomings. Nonetheless, Section 6.4.3 showed that theoretical 
considerations as well as qualitative and quantitative assessments have confirmed the high quality of 
transactional leadership in Rwanda. This leadership has manifested in home-grown, context-specific 
strategies rooted in the country’s culture – an informal institution. As a result, Rwanda’s leadership 
score was 6.17 out of 10.  
 
6.5 The role of trust in Rwandan policymaking 
 
Sections 6.3 and 6.4 assessed the causal conditions identified by the fsQCA as possible causes of 
Rwanda’s success in undertaking reforms to improve the business environment. These influential 
factors were many elements of autocracy, few characteristics of democracy, a strong initial business 
environment at the start of the Doing Business project, and effective transactional leadership. A 
common denominator behind these factors is the country’s violent ethnic conflict that culminated in 
the 1994 genocide.156 The motivation behind economic reforms to improve the business environment 
was to support national reconciliation through poverty alleviation. The government believes that it 
can suppress the shared memory of ethnic divisions by creating a better economic future for all 
Rwandans. In the same way, the motivation for having an autocratic governance system with limited 
democracy elements has been to prevent the re-emergence of ethnic problems in an open political 
sphere. For this reason, dissenting voices are strongly controlled. In short, business reforms as 
recorded by the Doing Business project are implemented to stave off the single biggest threat to the 
country’s stability: the return of ethnic violence. According to the Political Instability Task Force 
                                                          
155 This is a much better situation compared to that in the late 1980s. As indicated in Section 3.5, the country’s finances 
were in such disarray at the time that skimming donor funds was basically the only viable source of revenue for the 
dominant network. 
156 Sections 3.2 and 3.3 discussed the country’s ethnic origins.  
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(2017) Worldwide Atrocities Dataset, Rwanda has not experienced any ethnic-related conflict since 
2001.  
 
The reality that many changes in the country's governance revolved around ethnic factors explains 
the important role of such elements in pro-business institutional change in Rwanda. Chapter 3 used 
Alston et al.'s (2016) critical transition framework to identify five epochs of institutional change in 
Rwanda, and noted significant influence from ethnic factors in these periods of change. It is with 
these often-violent changes in mind that Kagame and the RPF formulated the policy of downplaying 
ethnic factors, growing the economy to the benefit of all Rwandans, and structuring the political 
environment in such a way that these goals overshadow any simmering ethnic problems.157 The main 
difference from the past has been that the Kagame regime appears to have learned a lot more from 
the country’s history than, for example, the Habyarimana regime did. It could also be argued that 
Rwanda’s past ethnic divisions are for the first time being used as a source of motivation for creating 
a uniting governance style.  
 
In downplaying ethnicity, Kagame has undoubtedly followed a similar line of thought to that of North 
(1990: vii), who wrote: “History matters. It matters not just because we can learn from the past, but 
because the present and the future were connected to the past. The past shaped today's and tomorrow's 
choices.” The need to rebuild trusting relationships between Rwandans has been at the centre of this 
process. As discussed in Section 2.2.3, more trusting relationships between individuals and 
organisations reduce the need for complex contracts, increase information sharing, and decrease the 
cost of transactions by reducing searching, contracting, monitoring and enforcement costs. Rwanda's 
institutions had to be rebuilt post-1994 after the genocide had destroyed the country’s social fabric 
(see Section 3.6). While the preceding sections of this chapter outlined the causal conditions 
associated with institutional rebuilding in Rwanda, the micro-level human interaction process of 
policymaking has also influenced the outcome of the institutional change process.  
 
Rwanda’s policymaking processes are very country specific (Kigabo 2010: 95-96). An additional 
layer of analysis is required to untangle how policies are made and implemented, i.e. how Rwandan 
institutions are changed by human interaction. As was pointed out by Acemoglu and Johnson (2010), 
economic institutions are collective choices that are outcomes of political processes of human 
interaction (Acemoglu and Johnson 2010). These interactions are at the core of institutional change. 
The continuous interaction between institutions and organisations (groups of individuals held 
together by some common objectives) is the key to both deliberate and evolutionary institutional 
change (North 2005: 22). Policymaking and implementation, the processes whereby institutions are 
changed, can be interpreted as processes in which dominant networks and governance structures 
interact with various stakeholders in the private sector (Romp 1997: 5). It is in these processes where 
informal institutions like trusting relationships matter Extra-economic variables such as trust play an 
important role in determining the behaviour of individuals in policymaking (Eggertsson 1990: 35).  
                                                          
157 Ironically, the state’s underplaying of ethnicity in the country has masked this key reason behind the reform process. 
The Kagame regime has been accused (with significant evidence) of creating an image of the country and its politics that 
has eschewed ethnic differences. Carefully controlled media and a political system that has limited dissenting voices have 
caused the virtual disappearance of the country’s ethnic history – a primary driver in its political history – from the eyes 
of international observers. There may also be an element of guilt involved: it has been argued that the rest of the world 
has been plagued by guilt for not doing enough to stop the genocide. Frankly, there has been no real need for the RPF to 
explain its motives to development partners. After all, striving for economic development is a noble cause. International 
supporters, whom Reyntjens (2013: xiii) referred to as ‘Friends of the New Rwanda’, are also not asking too many 
questions about the finer details behind the government’s plans – afraid that dissenting voices would soon be ostracised 
from a perceived African success story. 
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6.5.1 The connectedness model and policymaking 
 
As indicated in Section 6.4.3, policymaking in Rwanda is a dynamic and interactive process that 
involves many stakeholders. Leadership in policymaking is exemplified by home-grown, context-
specific strategies that are rooted in the country’s culture. Ubudehe, a traditional Rwandan practice 
of cooperative problem solving, forms the basis of this process (Kigabo 2010: 91, 95).158 
Nsanzabaganwa (2012: 11) identified four key agents in the process of policymaking, namely:  
 
 The politician who sets the vision and broad policy direction 
 The policy expert or administrator who designs and administers policy 
 The change manager whose role is to enlighten the private sector actors in their rational 
decision processing 
 Private sector actors (the policy targets) who stand to be the real implementers of the change 
via the market mechanism159 
 
Nsanzabaganwa (2012: 12, 22) used the relationships between these agents to formulate a 
‘connectedness model’ of a policymaking process. The model defines nexuses of connections 
(relationships) between the agents and the policy process and among the actors themselves. These 
connections create conditions for success. Institutional settings with high degrees of connectedness 
and trust among these players increase the likelihood of policy success (Nsanzabaganwa 2011: 2-3). 
The opposite is also possible. Nsanzabaganwa (2012: 8-9) indicated that the aim of her research was 
to contribute to answering North’s (1993) question about why it was sometimes so hard to get policy 
implementation right even when leaders had the best of intentions. Nsanzabaganwa (2012: 6-7) 
emphasised the role of leadership in this policymaking process and quoted Eng, Robinson and Tan 
(2010: 110) to explain that effective leaders (politicians) contribute to successful policy 
implementation “by their ability to envision the road ahead, to mobilise the people, and to build 
consensus for their policies through a politics of convergence, not divergence”.  
 
The four key agents in the connectedness model engage in eight distinct levels of interaction. The 
identities of the politician160 and the private sector actors161 in the model are intuitive, but those of 
the other two agents require explanation. While the politician and the policy expert are often referred 
to interchangeably as ‘policymakers’, the connectedness model makes a clear distinction between the 
two agents: the politician defines the policy framework in broad terms, but relies on the policy expert 
to operationalise this framework. The policy expert has specialised knowledge and has to provide 
advice to the politician on the best methods to achieve desired economic and political outcomes, 
monitor the overall performance of solutions and strategies, and adjust policy where required 
(Nsanzabaganwa 2012: 107). The policy expert defines the details of the policy and administers them 
with the aid of the central and local government machinery. The two important ingredients of 
successful policymaking in the connectedness model are the participation of private sector actors as 
                                                          
158 The literal meaning of the word ‘Ubudehe’ is the digging up of fields and preparation of soils before the rain arrives 
and the planting season starts (Kigabo 2010: 91). 
159 These definitions of the four agents are derived from the critical social theory model (Nsanzabaganwa 2011: 2).  
160 In the context of this dissertation, the politician can be seen as a member of the dominant network. The politician 
provides transactional leadership (as discussed in Section 5.2.2) by sharing a clear vision of and broad policy for the 
direction in which the other agents should take the economy.  
161 The private sector comprises of households, firms and financial intermediaries. These agents are also referred to as the 
policy implementers and are not mere stakeholders (Nsanzabaganwa 2011: 2, 24, 27).  
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well as deliberate efforts on the part of the policy expert to gain a proper understanding of the 
operating conditions for private sector actors (Nsanzabaganwa 2012: 2, 111). 
 
Although the interactions among all four agents are important, the crucial element of policy success 
is the connection between the policy expert and the private actor (Nsanzabaganwa 2012: 100). Policy 
experts should endeavour to also fill the role of change manager. This will increase private actors' 
trust in the policy expert and in the proposed policy as the broad role of change manager will also be 
elevated in importance (Nsanzabaganwa 2012: 124). The role of the change manager is to enlighten 
(not persuade or force) the private sector agents in rational decision processing. The brokering of 
consensus between policy expert and private actor requires change managers capable of fostering 
enlightenment and empowerment of both parties (Nsanzabaganwa 2011: 2, 7). To this end, change 
managers do not pretend to be masters of all policy solutions and logical processes. Instead, they 
apply their talent and skills to a certain topic to broker a nexus between policy measures and their 
implementation areas. This often involves ironing out of information asymmetries between agents 
(Nsanzabaganwa 2011: 2, 30).  
 
At the centre of the functioning of the connectedness model is the relationships among agents. By 
explaining the dependence of the relationship between the policy expert and the private sector on the 
support of the change manager, the model further affirms the importance of nurturers of change. 
Within this dynamic, the policy expert and the change manager provide the “hard stuff” and the “soft 
stuff”, respectively (Nsanzabaganwa 2012: 110). This underscores the importance for a successful 
outcome to the policy expert-private actor relationship of the change manager’s relationships with 
both parties. In this arena, the change manager helps private actors articulate their needs. Trust forms 
an important part of the relationship between the change manager and the private actor, because the 
private sector agent must have certainty about the character of the person to whom he or she discloses 
his or her needs. The change manager has to inspire confidence, has to be compassionate as well as 
knowledgeable of the system, and must lead by example. As the example below confirms, the ideal 
is that the change manager should be a member of the target community (Nsanzabaganwa 2012: 110). 
 
As an illustration of this process, Nsanzabaganwa (2012: 151) used the connectedness model to 
explain how policy experts, change managers and private actors cooperated to facilitate a paradigm 
shift in the agricultural sector in Kirehe District in Rwanda's Eastern Province. In 2007 the 
government (politicians) launched a Crop Intensification Programme (CIP) to encourage farmers in 
different districts to synchronise their planting calendars, seasonal choices of crops, and application 
of agricultural inputs (Nsanzabaganwa 2012: 162). Agricultural officials (policy experts) were met 
with resistance when they proposed changes to crop cultivation methods. Kirehe farmers (private 
actors) were apprehensive about switching their crop planning from drought-resistant sorghum to 
maize or beans, even though the latter two offered better yields and income potential.162 Many farmers 
were sceptical that maize alone could generate enough income to feed their families. Even those who 
adopted the new strategy initially combined their maize plantings with plantings of other crops 
(Nsanzabaganwa 2012: 163-164).  
 
A definite policy outcome was obtained by change managers who mediated between the policy 
experts and private actors. These change managers included a first-mover farmer, an agronomist, 
                                                          
162 Kirehe is the driest district in the country. Sorghum yields were falling annually because failure to rotate crops reduced 
the quality of the soil. Furthermore, sorghum could be harvested only once a year, while the maize planting model desired 
by the state could yield two harvests per year (Nsanzabaganwa 2011: 46).  
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extension workers, and the prime minister of the country. The first-mover farmer volunteered a piece 
of land to the policy experts to display their proposed reforms. The agronomist and extension workers 
used different methods to cultivate crops as per their proposals. The volunteering farmer’s neighbours 
were convinced of the positive outcomes of the CIP by comparing the yields they obtained from the 
traditional method with that on the demonstration field (Nsanzabaganwa 2012: 164). One farmer 
reflected in an interview that he was still not convinced by this, but changed his mind when he 
observed Prime Minister Bernard Makuza working in the fields to help launch the CIP 
(Nsanzabaganwa 2012: 165). The change managers had various occupations but worked resolutely 
to bring policy experts and private actors together to achieve positive policy outcomes.  
 
The strategic planning behind this agriculture transformation was a highly participatory process, in 
line with the thrust of the connectedness model. While undoubtedly state-led, the agricultural reform 
was a heterogeneous phenomenon that incorporated private sector actors, local and international 
NGOs, donors, and other actors in policymaking processes and in multiple institutional structures 
(Huggins 2013: 7). The mayor of the Kirehe District underscored the importance of leadership in this 
example of successful reform. By being active in the fields and guiding farmers, leaders (the 
politicians) were empowering rather than authoritarian (Nsanzabaganwa 2012: 165). As a result, 
maize cultivation and crop rotation were for the most part implemented without further resistance 
(Nsanzabaganwa 2011: 46). After this success, the district government implemented a system of role-
model farmers who were selected to act as links (change managers) between policy experts and 
private actors in ongoing reform processes. This provided farmers with more voice in the reform of 
policies and moved them to take ownership for implementing these changes (Nsanzabaganwa 2012: 
165).  
 
The connectedness model can also be used to study the policymaking process behind the changes to 
the local business environment that were aimed at improving the competitiveness of the economy and 
its attractiveness to investors. In this case, the politician is well known: Kagame has driven a private 
sector-led growth agenda for the past two decades. Section 6.4.3 reported on his defining role in the 
development of the broad policy framework and his effective transactional leadership by means of 
dialogue and engagement in decision-making processes, coordination of actions for alignment of 
policy implementation, and creation of commitment and accountability for performance. This is the 
core role required from the politician in the connectedness model. Regarding the second component, 
policy experts are found in two entities, namely the SPU in the president’s office and the RDB – the 
Doing Business Unit’s mother body. The SPU's tasks are policy design and analysis, as well as broad 
monitoring of government activities to ensure consistency in policy implementation (AfDB 2009: 1). 
Policy experts at the SPU have included Diane Karusisi, who was chief economist and head of the 
unit from 2012 to 2016. She holds a PhD in Economics from the Fribourg University in Switzerland, 
where she also served as an assistant professor from 2000 to 2006. Karusisi was also a former Director 
General of the NISR (2009-2012) and a fixed income portfolio engineer at Credit Suisse Asset 
Management in Zurich (2007-2009).  
 
The RDB is an umbrella organisation that brings together government agencies and departments 
associated with private sector growth and the attraction, retention and facilitation of investments. It 
contains offices involved in investment promotion, business registration, privatisation, specialist 
agencies (that provide support to the tourism and ICT sectors, among other things), and human 
resource development. The creation of the RDB was based on international best practice examples 
from Costa Rica and Singapore (Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa [COMESA] 2018). 
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The RDB champions the country's nation branding and investment promotion activities, and plays a 
crucial role in making the local business environment investor-friendly (Nkundimana 2013: 6, 53). 
The RDB is intended to be a one-stop shop for all investors and has offices in Shenzhen (China), 
Quebec (Canada) and Istanbul (Turkey). While nominally independent, the RDB reports directly to 
the president.  
 
The organisation has a senior management team (policy experts) of 11 individuals with excellent 
academic and experience credentials for dealing with business environment reforms. Thus, the CEO 
of the RDB at the time of writing, Clare Akamanzi, has 15 years of experience in areas such as 
economic development; private sector growth, business environment reforms, and foreign investment 
promotion. The LinkedIn profile for Akamanzi (2018) shows that she was previously the head of the 
SPU (2016-17), a former COO of the RDB (2008-2015), and Deputy Director General of the Rwanda 
Investment and Export Promotion Agency (RIEPA) before it was merged with the RDB (2006-2008). 
These are some of the most important positions in policymaking related to the business environment. 
A lawyer skilled in international trade and investment issues, Akamanzi was previously a trade 
diplomat in London and a negotiator for Rwanda at the World Trade Organisation (WTO). She 
studied at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government (2015-2016) and the University of Pretoria 
(2003-2004), and received an honorary doctorate from Concordia University in Canada (2018). As 
the CEO of the RDB, Akamanzi is also an ex officio member of Rwanda's cabinet. 
 
Considering the private sector agents, the COO of the RDB at the time of writing, Emmanuel 
Hategeka, was previously the CEO of the Private Sector Federation (PSF) (2006-2010) during his 
tenure in the management of telecommunications company MTN. The LinkedIn profile for Hategeka 
(2018) shows that his work at PSF included policy advocacy for an attractive business environment. 
His activities at the PSF included involvement in key reforms that made the country a leading 
reformer in the Doing Business reports. His tenure at the PSF culminated in Rwanda being named 
amongst the 10 leading reformers in the 2010 edition of the Doing Business publication. He also 
introduced and organised investor roundtables chaired by Kagame to foster dialogue between the 
public and private sectors. Hategeka’s also served as Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Trade 
and Industry (2010-2016), where he was involved in strategic planning and policy formulation.  
 
From 1994 to 1999, the Rwandan Chamber of Commerce represented private sector actors. This 
entity was government-driven and had three key shortcomings: a lack of autonomy, weak coverage 
of the private sector, and inadequate support services. Hence, various industries in the private sector 
created their own associations. The PSF was established in December 1999 as a replacement for the 
struggling chamber. The PSF is a professional organisation and was identified as the country’s 
flagship business entity, dedicated to promoting and representing the interests of the business 
community. PSF members look to the organisation to address and facilitate solutions to constraints 
on private sector activity (PSF 2012: ii). By 2013, the organisation’s membership included 17 sectoral 
and six provincial business associations. The federation was organised into ten chambers associated 
with agriculture, arts and crafts, ICT, liberal professions, female entrepreneurs, commerce, finance, 
industry, tourism, and young entrepreneurs (Nkundimana 2013: 2, 38).  
 
The Kirehe District example showed that managers are a diverse group. This group could include 
community leaders, community-based organisations, private associations, research institutions and 
academics (Nsanzabaganwa 2011: 28). Change managers could come from the government (e.g. the 
prime minister), private sector (e.g. a volunteer farmer), or an enabler (e.g. an agronomist and 
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extension workers) employed by the state, private sector, both, or another entity like a donor 
organisation that is not affiliated to either sector. The objective measure of a change manager is a 
person with the ability to build trust between policy experts and the private sector and to use his or 
her talent and skills for the specific policy matter to reach a positive policy outcome. When it comes 
to institutional reforms to improve the business environment, one of the main change managers in 
Rwanda has been Harvard Business School Professor Michael Porter. The academic’s talent and skills 
are widely recognised: he is an authority on competitive strategy for businesses as well as the 
competitiveness and economic development of sovereign nations. Various rankings and surveys have 
listed him as the world’s most influential thinker on management and competitiveness. He refers to 
himself as a ‘friend of Rwanda’.  
 
Porter has been working with the Rwandan public and private sectors since the early 2000s to build 
the capabilities and strengths needed to foster economic development. He has also provided guidance 
and inputs on many policymaking processes. In a 2009 interview, Porter emphasised that he has not 
been a paid consultant but has acted as a catalyst (change manager) for changes that have stimulated 
private sector development. He described himself as a “counsellor and advisor” who has in a friendly 
way tried “to get things [to] move along” in policymaking processes involving the central government 
(policy experts) and the private sector (Asiimwe 2009). For example, Porter worked with the public 
and private sectors to obtain consensus amongst stakeholders on the need for cluster development 
(AfDB 2009: 4). Clusters are concentrations of firms in particular industries that share specialised 
skills, infrastructure, and supporting institutions. Such clusters boost the productivity and 
microeconomic competitiveness of firms through these externalities.  
 
The reforms recorded by the Doing Business project have been the outcomes of the interplay of these 
four actors. Kagame (the politician) has determined the broad policy direction that has emphasised 
private sector development as a key factor in Rwanda’s post-genocide recovery and fight against 
poverty. Highly qualified and experienced officials (policy experts) at the SPU and RDB (including 
Akamanzi in the capacity of COO) were tasked in the early 2000s with the development of policies 
to improve the competitiveness of the domestic private sector and were key stakeholders in decisions 
made at the Government Leadership Retreat and National Dialogue Council. In turn, the PSF (private 
sector actor) under Hategeka worked with these public entities to develop a business-friendly 
environment. The reforms implemented after policy consensus was reached catapulted Rwanda to 
one of the leading business environment reformers in the world. Porter (the change manager) brought 
skills and knowledge of international best practice to this policymaking process by facilitating the 
flow of necessary information to and between the policy experts and private sector actors. He 
facilitated this change with the blessing of Kagame. Porter also serves on the country’s Presidential 
Advisory Council.  
 
The emphasis in the connectedness model on relationship factors such as trust and the factors that 
have determined the level of difficulty of transactional leadership are manifestations of the role of 
informal institutions in macro-level institutional change. As indicated in Section 2.2.4, informal 
institutions are elements of a society’s heritage – such as the ethnic divisions of Rwanda's past – that 
influence how people process and use information. The change manager plays a crucial role in the 
processing and use of policymaking-related information. In fact, some cultural variables determine 
economic policymaking choices that culminate in changes to formal institutions. Trust is vital for the 
success of such changes. Furthermore, Alston et al. (2016: 15) underscored the importance for 
effective leadership of trust between the polity and the citizenry. It is difficult to develop measures of 
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trust and other informal institutions, however, because the available sources of information are 
surveys of individuals and setting-influenced laboratory experiments (Voigt 2018: 18-19). Even 
researchers that that have argued for the inclusion of social norms such as trust in NIE research (e.g. 
Keefer and Knack 2005: 72) have advised that attempts to quantify informal institutions should 
proceed with caution. The development of such measures falls outside the scope of this dissertation. 
Section 8.3 emphasises that future research into the relationship between institutional change and 
leadership would have to incorporate more detailed study of the role of informal institutions. 
 
6.6 Conclusions 
 
This chapter explored various factors underlying the pathway solution associated in Chapter 5 with 
Rwanda's reform success: LEADERSHIP*AUTOCRACY*democracy*BUSINESS. It explored the 
outcome and causal conditions to determine the accuracy of the data that generated this pathway 
solution. Sections 6.2–6.4 established that the data adequately reflected prominent factors in 
institutional change and that the indicators accurately measured the phenomena in question. The only 
sources of uncertainty were elements of Rwanda's autocracy score in the Polity IV database. Such 
uncertainty, however, affected only one subcomponent of the Polity IV score for autocracy and had 
very little impact on the country’s overall calibrated score used in the fsQCA. On balance, Sections 
6.2-6.4 confirmed the accuracy of data and satisfactorily explained the role of the different causal 
conditions in recent, pro-business institutional change in Rwanda. This served the purpose of such an 
analysis, as outlined in Section 6.1. 
 
By explaining and validating the solution pathway, this chapter also reflected on the four hypotheses 
formulated in Section 5.2. The results supported Hypotheses 1, 3 and 4. Effective transactional 
leadership was required in Rwanda for the implementation of pro-business institutional change, as 
postulated by Hypothesis 1. Regarding the autocratic nature of the government, it was found that this 
feature of the political system supported institutional change from 2002 to 2013. This finding verified 
Hypothesis 3, which states that reforms to improve business environments that are more often 
associated with democracies can also be undertaken by autocracies. Hypothesis 4 was also found to 
be valid in the case of Rwanda: a business environment that is already supportive of private enterprise 
provided the foundation for further institutional reform to improve the business environment. 
Hypothesis 2, however, could not be verified in the case of Rwanda. The country’s assessment of 
state fragility was too close to the point of maximum ambiguity to have played a clear causal role in 
its institutional change from 2002 to 2013.  
 
Based on the overall theme of this dissertation, Chapter 6 also explicitly considered the relationship 
between transactional leadership and institutional change. As with the other causal conditions, the 
data used to develop a measure of effective transactional leadership accurately described the Rwandan 
reality. A qualitative review of the elements of transactional leadership showed that Rwanda has had 
strong policy coordination attributes. Policymaking in the country has included processes like the 
annual National Dialogue Council that have ensured dialogue and engagement in decision-making as 
well as the creation of commitment and accountability. Furthermore, the annual Government 
Leadership Retreat has ensured coordination of actions for alignment of policy implementation. This 
chapter also considered the impact of factors that complicate exercising of transactional leadership 
by the Rwandan government. These included the effects of stateness-related problems, the rule of 
law, poverty, education, infrastructure, geography, civil society traditions, and conflict intensity.  
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
158 
 
Civil society traditions include macro-level trust between the government and citizens as well as 
micro-level trust among individuals involved in policymaking processes. The connectedness model 
implied that the relationships and trust between four actors have been critical for successful 
policymaking, as was illustrated by the agricultural modernisation process in the Kirehe District. 
These actors are the politician who gives broad policy direction, policy experts who formulate and 
implement policies, private sector actors involved in such formulation and implementation of 
policies, as well as change managers who broker consensus between policy experts and a private 
actor. Chapter 6 identified four key actors in policymaking processes to improve the business 
environment in Rwanda: the politician Kagame, policy experts like Clare Akamanzi from the RDB, 
private sector representative Emmanuel Hategeka during his time as the head of the PSF, and change 
manager Michael Porter. The importance of trust between these actors underscores the vital role of 
informal institutions in policymaking and overall institutional change. It is difficult to measure this 
element of policymaking accurately, though. Section 8.3 returns to this issue. 
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CHAPTER 7: ADDITIONAL INSIGHTS FROM ANALYSING 
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN BURUNDI 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
Many parallels have been drawn between Rwanda and its neighbour Burundi. Their population 
densities, climates, topography, the ethnic and socio-demographic composition of their populations, 
religious profiles, and languages are very similar (Uvin 1999: 253).163 The countries had similar pre-
colonial political systems (Turner 2013: 7) and both were colonies of Germany (1897-1916) and 
Belgium (1916-1962) before gaining independence simultaneously on 1 July 1962. Their respective 
post-independence governments were most often centralised, unrepresentative, single-party regimes 
controlled by a single ethnic group (the Hutu in Rwanda and Tutsi in Burundi). Political changes 
frequently happened via coup d'états in the decades after independence before both countries 
embarked on democratic transitions in the 1990s. Both countries experienced genocidal violence164 
and warfare over the past three decades (Daley 2009: 167). This caused economic ruin, large-scale 
human suffering and state failure (Acemoglu and Robinson 2013: 344). Both conflicts were fought 
over identity issues rooted in long-standing ethnic challenges (Cunningham 2011: 138). Economic 
similarities include the dominant roles of agriculture as sources of jobs, farming activities (crops, 
animals, etc.), and export items (coffee and tea are vital for both countries).165  
 
To this list of parallels can be added the two countries’ stellar performance with regards to pro-
business institutional reforms. Burundi was amongst the Doing Business project’s top 10 reformers 
in 2012, 2013 and 2014, and Rwanda featured in the same list in 2010, 2011 and 2014. Both countries 
established high-level committees that report directly to their respective presidencies to drive business 
environment reforms (World Bank 2013: 26). Since the project started in 2002, Rwanda was the top 
reformer globally while Burundi was joint 33rd out of 190 countries, i.e. in the first quintile. As was 
the case in Rwanda, Burundi’s reforms were diverse and extended to nine out of the project’s ten 
pillars.166 In terms of the outcome variable used in Chapter 5, Burundi’s reforms were calibrated to a 
reading of 0.91. This was the fifth-highest fuzzy membership score after those of Rwanda, Mauritius, 
Burkina Faso and Sierra Leone, and it did not fall far short of Rwanda’s calibrated reading of 0.99. 
These reforms enabled Burundi to improve its Doing Business ranking from 42nd out of 50 African 
countries in 2007 to 19th out of 54 African countries in 2014. The momentum built by this “radical 
economic surgery” led the IMF to predict that Burundi could by 2035 graduate from low-income to 
middle-income status (Briscoe, Gasana and Specker 2010: 10).  
 
Despite their many similarities, Chapter 5 found that Burundi's outcome could not be explained by 
the pathway solution associated with Rwanda's reform success. In fact, none of the seven pathways 
                                                          
163 Based on ethnic, religious and linguistic data from the Encyclopaedia Britannica, Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, 
Kurlat and Wacziarg (2003) calculated ethno-linguistic fractionalisation scores of 0.32 for Rwanda and 0.30 for Burundi. 
Only three African countries – Lesotho (0.26), Seychelles (0.20) and Swaziland (0.06) – have lower readings that point 
to more homogenous societies. 
164 Burundi’s genocide resulted in the death of 200,000 people. Six genocide episodes since 1950 had caused the deaths 
of larger fractions of countries' populations (Diamond 2005: 313). 
165 Unlike the two Koreas, Rwanda and Burundi do not represent a natural experiment, as the two countries have been 
separate states for centuries. While a single indirect administration governed both during the colonial period, they were 
separate entities in the pre- and post-colonial eras. 
166 Getting Credit was the only area in which reforms have been lacking. 
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identified in Section 5.4 offered a potential explanation for Burundi's reform success. To be sure, it 
is not necessarily the case that pathways identified in an fsQCA provide plausible explanations for 
the outcomes of all cases, and the outcomes of eight other SSA countries (listed in Section 5.4) could 
not be explained by the solutions either. This, however, creates an opportunity for further analysis of 
the fsQCA data that may enhance interpretation of the results. This deeper analysis resorts under the 
last step in Lobe and Rihoux’s (2009: 230-237) list of operations performed during a QCA (see 
Section 4.3.3): attempts by researchers to revisit and reinterpret the fsQCA results. The process could 
include a re-examination of the data used for a specific case to verify accuracy, reducing the sample 
of cases, exploring the possibility of adding additional causal conditions, or changing the way some 
causal conditions have been calibrated. The outcome of this “dialogue with the cases” is a deeper 
understanding and potential improvement of the information used (Lobe and Rihoux 2015: 1050).  
 
The aim of the review of Burundi in this chapter is two-fold: to re-examine the data used in the fsQCA 
to determine whether the causal conditions were measured well, and to explore the possibility that 
important causal conditions were overlooked in Chapter 5. The remainder of Chapter 7 is structured 
as follows. Section 7.2 provides a broad overview of Burundi’s economic and political history that 
identifies components of the critical transitions framework. Section 7.3 reviews the precision of the 
values assigned to Burundi's causal conditions in Chapter 5. Section 7.4 attempts to uncover driving 
forces of the reform process in Burundi by revisiting the nature of the outcome. Section 7.5 considers 
the results of the preceding sections and the possibility that a previously unidentified causal condition 
linked to regional integration processes in East Africa may have been influential in pro-business 
institutional reforms in SSA. It also comments on the implications of this additional factor for 
interpretations of Rwanda’s reform success. Section 7.6 concludes.  
 
7.2 Background 
 
A Tutsi aristocracy and elite ruled pre-colonial Burundi. The majority Hutu (85% of the population) 
were organised under chiefs who were accountable to the Tutsi elite. As was the case in Rwanda, the 
ethnic and socio-economic class lines between Tutsi and Hutu were blurred and up to 70% of 
Burundians are of mixed ethnicity (Watt 2008: 26). This structuring of society caused small-scale 
conflict, because princely clans (baganwa) were inevitably rivals in a system that was less centralised 
that that of Rwanda. Many of the princedoms were semi-independent of the central royal court 
(Turner 2013: 13). Nonetheless, oral history indicates that no wars occurred during the pre-colonial 
period. The pre-colonial economy was structured around agriculture: Tutsi leased land or cattle to 
Hutu who, in turn, provided labour and in-kind payments to Tutsi landlords (Watt 2008: 25). The 
Tutsi aristocracy and elite continued to rule during the colonial period with only indirect influence 
from Germany167 and later Belgium. Again parallel to Rwanda was that ethnic, social and class 
divisions became more rigid under the Belgian administration. The state also intervened more heavily 
in ordinary citizens’ economic lives by imposing new taxes, mandatory cropping and, occasionally, 
forced labour. The Belgians created an interventionist state, albeit with low capacity (Uvin 2009: 7-
8), with the Rwandan model in mind (Turner 2013: 13).  
 
Ethnic divisions in political parties made the post-independence government unstable. A bloodless 
coup d’état in 1966 heralded three decades of military rule under Michel Micombero (1966-1976), 
                                                          
167 Support from the Germans mostly consisted of assistance to the royal court when local rebellions had to be quashed. 
Contestation among princedoms and rival clans were common, and alliances were constantly negotiated to maintain 
power (Turner 2013: 13-14).  
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Jean-Baptiste Bagaza (1976-1987) and Pierre Buyoya (1987-1993). The Union pour le Progres 
National (UPRONA) party dominated the governance system, with little separation between the 
party, executive, legislature, judiciary and army. The government controlled the military and aid 
inflows, and actively sidelined Hutu. By 1985, the 65-strong central committee of UPRONA 
contained only two Hutu. Likewise, only two of the 15 provincial governors were Hutu. The 37 top 
positions in the army were all held by Tutsi. This structure enabled the state to control all aspects of 
society during the 1970s and 1980s. On the economic front, a plethora of state enterprises crowded 
out the private sector; clientelism, graft and corruption were rife; elites used extra-legal methods to 
confiscate arable land; and monopolies over import and sales licenses secured massive profits for 
connected officials. Under these economic and political outcomes, the economy stalled and public 
debt mounted (Uvin 2009: 8-11).  
 
In the wake of these growing disparities between desired and actual economic and political outcomes, 
Buyoya implemented economic and political reforms to stave off the risk of being overthrown. The 
executive became more representative of the population, and a new multi-party constitution was 
drafted. Following elections in 1993, the country’s parliament consisted of 85% Hutu and 15% Tutsi, 
which closely paralleled the ethnic composition of the population. Barely 100 days later, however, 
the new government was shocked by a coup d’état that killed the head of state as well as the president 
and vice president of the national assembly. This was seen as a fight-back by Tutsi groups that feared 
the so-called Hutufication of the state. These events triggered the start of a civil war after three 
decades of increasingly violent political competition in the country. Truce negotiations were almost 
completed when President Cyprien Ntaryamira died along with Rwandan President Habyarimana in 
a plane crash in 1994 (Uvin 2009: 12-14).168 A shock had plunged the country into an unsustainable 
economic and political outcome.  
 
The civil war was at its most intense from 1995 to 2000, and the Burundian economy suffered 
significant setbacks during this period. Real GDP contracted by a cumulative 14.8% from 1995 to 
1997, with recovery growth of 4.8% in 1998 followed by another 1% contraction in 1999. The 
production of export-oriented crops declined significantly: coffee output, for example, fell by 58.7% 
between the 1994/1995 and 1998/1999 crop seasons as conflict disrupted farming activity. Despite 
rising prices in Dar es Salaam and Mombasa, cotton fibre exports declined from 3,665 tonnes in 1994 
to just 151 tonnes in 1996 and zero from 1997 to 1999. Manufacturing was similarly hit: items that 
experienced output decline of more than two-thirds during the years from 1994 to 1999 included 
carbonated beverages, flour, cottonseed oil, animal feed, cigarettes, paint, insecticides, mattresses, 
household soap, matches and batteries. The weak economy could not provide the inputs required for 
production nor the reliable demand for the sector's outputs. Double-digit consumer price inflation was 
experienced throughout the period as fuel prices more than doubled. Moreover, real wages in Burundi 
francs more than halved (IMF 2000: 3, 13, 15-18).  
 
This was a clear deviation from the preferred economic and political outcomes of the dominant 
network. Following ten international summits to secure peace in the country from 1996 to 2000169, a 
window of opportunity for leadership emerged with the signing of the Arusha Peace and 
Reconciliation for Burundi Agreement in August 2000. The agreement stipulated the establishment 
of a transitional government with representation from all political parties, and that Buyoya should 
                                                          
168 See Section 3.5.  
169 These negotiations involved the USA, EU, South Africa, Tanzania, neighbouring heads of state, and the Organisation 
for Africa Unity (OAU) (Uvin 2009: 15-16).  
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leave his post after 18 months. In a show of leadership that was regarded as a milestone for the 
country’s peace process, Buyoya left his desk on 1 May 2003. Yet fighting continued in the country 
as the main Hutu rebel groups were not party to the peace agreement, and a ceasefire agreement with 
these groups was only signed in September 2006. Demilitarisation and disarmament were slow as 
soldiers stood little chance of finding employment in the decimated private sector (Uvin 2009: 16-17, 
19-20). Nonetheless, the resignation of Buyoya set in motion a period of institutional change and 
economic recovery in the country. Data from the IMF (2016) indicate that real GDP increased by an 
average of 4.4% per annum from 2004 to 2013. Real GDP per capita remained very low, however, 
and poverty was still rife.  
 
Regarding the key elements of the critical transitions framework, the dominant network was expanded 
to incorporate elites from all Burundian stakeholders in the peace agreement. The politics of 
compromise prevailed as the peace pact created incentives for cooperation and compromise.170 A new 
constitution was approved by referendum in February 2005 and started a four-phase electoral process. 
All relevant stakeholders accepted the consociational democracy enshrined in the 2005 constitution, 
albeit in some cases reluctantly. This system included a complex ethnic and gender quota system for 
all publically elected and administrative bodies (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2014b: 33). President Pierre 
Nkurunziza was elected in August 2005 as the majority Hutu electorate voted against the parties that 
previously held power. However, he inherited a civil service that consisted mostly of bureaucrats 
from the losing parties, which complicated reform implementation (Uvin 2009: 18-20, 22). The new 
constitution created an effective system of checks and balances in law-making and enforcement by 
apportioning powers among various state organs. The judiciary was formally independent: the 
minister of justice, for example, had to be a judge with no affiliations to political parties (Bertelsmann 
Stiftung 2012b: 13). Compared to its state before the civil war, these changes markedly improved the 
legal system. Institutional progress, in general, was of such a nature that Burundi was allowed to join 
the EAC in 2009.  
 
7.3 Causal conditions 
 
The causal conditions used in Chapter 5 are explored in this section to provide a clearer picture of the 
context of the recent institutional change in Burundi. This also adds an additional level of validation 
for the data used to analyse the reform process in Rwanda. Table 7.1 extracts the raw and calibrated 
scores for Burundi from Tables 5.1 and 5.3.  
 
Table 7.1: Burundi outcome and causal condition data (raw and calibrated) 
 
 Reforms Leadership Fragile Autocracy Democracy Business 
Raw scores 19.00 3.19 96.59 1.10 6.40 42.04 
Calibrated scores 0.91 0.20 0.74 0.53 0.70 0.44 
Source: Tables 5.1 and 5.3 
 
As was stated before, none of the pathway solutions identified in Chapter provided plausible 
explanations for the extent of Burundi's business environment reforms.. While Burundi performed 
well as far as undertaking pro-business institutional reforms were concerned, the factors associated 
with Rwanda’s success and those of other strong performers were not present in Burundi. The seven 
                                                          
170 Whereas the RPF secured a military victory in Rwanda that ended the genocide and made it the main political party, 
the change in Burundi was a negotiated settlement (Turner 2013: 7).  
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pathway solutions identified in Table 5.8 all had at least four causal conditions. The calibrated scores 
on two of Burundi's characteristics (full autocracy and strong initial business environment) were 
ambiguous, while those on the other three (effective transactional leadership, state fragility and full 
democracy) did not match any of the pathway solutions. The following four sub-sections assess the 
values assigned to Burundi’s causal conditions in Chapter 5 and Table 7.1.to understand the 
measurement of this data.  
 
7.3.1 State fragility 
 
The FFP deemed Burundi’s state fragility in the ‘high alert’ category with an average reading of 96.59 
from 2005 to 2013. The average score for the period represented a mean reading of 8.05 out of 10 for 
each of the 12 components of the index. The calibrated score on the 96.59 number was 0.74. This 
section touches on aspects of Burundi’s poor FSI values, including poverty and economic decline, 
demographic pressures, capacity and other problems in the public sector, and the dependence on 
donor aid. FFP scores referred to in this subsection are out of 10, with a higher score denoting weaker 
or poorer assessments.  
 
Burundi’s real GDP per capita was stagnant or declined in all but two years from 1992 to 2014. Hence, 
its value in 2014 was virtually the same as it was a decade earlier. This reflected an average annual 
population growth rate of 3.5% from 2003 to 2014 matched by a similar real GDP growth rate (World 
Bank 2016). Three political economy obstacles contributed to these poor growth outcomes: internal 
conflict, self-interested economic policy decisions by politicians, and wealth inequality. Firstly, the 
conflict disrupted manufacturing production, led to extensive livestock losses, and encouraged short-
term oriented risk-averse behaviour not conducive to long-term investment, inter alia. Secondly, the 
private sector was marginalised by a large public sector, with state-run companies controlling trade 
and investment. Private companies also were subjected to an opaque tax system. In turn, public sector 
investment was concentrated in urban areas although seven out of eight Burundians lived in rural 
areas. Thirdly, social inequality and privileged access to resource remained (Briscoe, Gasana and 
Specker 2010: 10-13). Overall, the FFP scored poverty and economic decline 8.40 out of 10.  
 
A high rate of population growth intensified demographic pressures. Like Rwanda, Burundi is one of 
the most densely populated countries in the world and has very little underutilised land. The country’s 
fertile soils, moderate climate (it has two rainy seasons per annum) and the absence of severe disease 
allowed population density to increase from 111 people per km2 in 1961 to 465 people per km2 in 
2014 – in the latter year, the global average was 56 people per km2. Family plots used for subsistence 
farming are routinely subdivided to accommodate the farming needs of successive generations (Watt 
2008: 23, 165). Many Burundians see farming as “a prison” as they are unable to escape the confines 
of subsistence farming without education or migration to urban areas (Uvin 2009: 185). As a result 
of these confines, some 88% of Burundians lived in rural areas during 2014 (World Bank 2016). 
Population pressure is weighing on food security, and the under-nourishment of a large portion of the 
Burundian population makes it necessary to import food on a regular basis. Overall, the FFP scored 
demographic pressures 9.00 out of 10. 
 
Hampered by weak institutional capacity and pressure to deliver to impoverished citizens, public 
service delivery was feeble after the civil war. In the post-war period, the government improved 
essential services such as maternal and child health care and primary education. However, much of 
this improvement was an increase in the volume of service provision, with little progress made in 
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quality enhancement and other areas. Although objective developmental goals were not necessarily 
achieved, the ruling party viewed the progress as significant because the gains cemented its political 
appeal (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2014b: 7, 30-31). The Bertelsmann Stiftung’s weak assessment of 
resource efficiency reflected this underwhelming performance. The World Bank (2011a: 13) 
identified four challenges to the delivery of public services: excessive expenditure on the security 
sector, the presence of ghost workers on payroll, a lack of fiscal transparency and discipline, and 
inadequate professionalism. Burundi’s government had historically been inefficient at utilising 
financial and human resources due to the bloated nature of the bureaucracy, the need to channel 
resources to dominant security organs, and the patronage system in general. Political influence was 
rife in procurement matters while independent auditing was almost non-existent. Furthermore, 
national budgets were often too ambitious due to overoptimistic growth and revenue forecasts 
(Bertelsmann Stiftung 2016b: 33-34). The Heritage Foundation classified the country’s fiscal health 
as ‘repressed’ during 2005-2013. Overall, the FFP scored public services 8.70 out of 10. 
 
Like Rwanda, Burundi has little choice but to accept help from abroad to bolster its fiscal health. As 
a result, the state endeavours to positively utilise external support. At the same time, the government 
is acutely aware that foreign donors are keen to implement their programmes in Burundi effectively 
to present the country as an example of successful post-conflict peacebuilding. According to the 
World Bank, significant amounts of aid money flowed into the country, despite pervasive corruption: 
net official development assistance and official aid averaged $450 million per annum from 2002 to 
2013 (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2016b: 37-38).171 As an example of its commitment to outside support, 
the government was nominally dedicated to establishing a socially responsible market-based 
economy through its Vision 2025 socio-economic programme. However, this document was based 
on international guidelines and did not take Burundi’s social, economic and political idiosyncrasies 
into account. It has undoubtedly been successful in generating significant volumes of donor support. 
Nonetheless, this need to appease donors and multilateral organisations has severely limited the 
state’s ability to formulate economic policy in an autonomous manner (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2016b: 
31). This has added to the limits that the pressing need for improvement in the country’s socio-
economic situation had placed on the government’s ability to pursue long-term strategic goals 
(Bertelsmann Stiftung 2016b: 32). Overall, the FFP scored external intervention 8.93 out of 10.  
 
The above review of four FSI elements suggests a very complex environment in Burundi. The 
information collected from various sources corroborated the quantitative information the fragility of 
the Burundian state provided by the FFP. In conjunction with Burundi’s pro-business reform 
performance from 2002 to 2013, this evidence of state fragility also supports Hypothesis 2, which 
stated that economic and political trends threatening the longevity of the dominant network would 
stimulate institutional changes to improve economic outcomes.  
 
7.3.2 Initial business environment 
 
When the World Bank launched Doing Business project, Burundi had a sub-par business environment 
by SSA standards. The Mo Ibrahim Foundation’s IIAG placed the country’s business environment in 
the 28th position out of 52 African countries in 2002; Burundi's raw score for that year of 42.04 (see 
Table 7.1) implied a calibrated fsQCA score of 0.43. The inadequate business environment reflected 
                                                          
171 Lemarchand (2009: 41-42) claimed that no other conflict-ridden country on the African continent has received more 
“sustained remedial attention” from the international community than Burundi has since 1994. This partly explained why 
it took so long to resolve the civil war despite all the international attention to the country’s plight.  
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that the transitional government established under the peace agreement only came into power in 
November 2001. At the time, the country was still struggling with military conflict – including a 
failed coup attempt in April of that year – and the result was that the 2000 power sharing agreement 
failed to secure the peace and good governance envisioned by negotiators (Falch 2008: 1). The 
country’s economy was crippled by the three obstacles identified in Section 7.2.2. The political 
economy was characterised by discretionary public intervention and social stratification. Structural 
features weighing on the country included being landlocked between war-torn and destitute 
neighbours (Briscoe, Gasana and Specker 2010: 10-13).  
 
These factors contributed to Burundi's serious economic difficulties (IMF 2003). The presence of 
state-facilitated monopolies hamstrung the private sector. The government allowed members of 
certain ethno-regional entities (mainly Tutsi from the south) to accumulate wealth and reinvest in the 
patronage systems that enabled their riches. Unequal access to national resources caused by ethnic 
and geographic factors affected the majority of Burundians. Specifically, corruption and patronage 
systems constituted ethno-regional barriers against entry into economic activity by Hutu and non-
southern Tutsi (Ndikumana 2000: 437, 449). Ngaruko and Nkurunziza (2000: 370) found that these 
policies of exclusion and conflict over control of the country’s limited resources were the leading 
causes of the five major conflicts in Burundi since its independence.  
 
The weaknesses in Burundi’s business environment were outcomes of poor governance in the post-
independence period. Instead of encouraging productivity and growth, taxation of domestic economic 
activity and the organisation of markets and industries generated rents for those in power. These 
predatory policies left households stuck in subsistence activity, and the modern private sector 
remained rudimentary. As an example, the government still tightly controlled the central bank’s 
foreign currency market during the late 1990s, whereas other countries in the region had unified their 
foreign exchange markets earlier in that decade. Hence, purchasers of foreign currency operated on a 
two-tier system between 1990 and 2000 that imposed an average premium of 45% on those not 
favoured by the state. This, in turn, raised the import costs of private companies excluded from the 
patronage system. Money supply data also indicate that the country was less monetised than other 
poor countries, which implied severe financial repression and a lack of openness. Public sector 
occupations accounted for 80% of formal jobs (Ngaruko and Nkurunziza 2005: 1-2, 14 & 16). 
 
In the early 2000s, around 93% of the country’s workforce was employed in agriculture, with only 
10% of the population living in urban areas and fully 90% dependent on subsistence agriculture. Thus, 
there was limited non-agricultural private sector activity. Except for large public enterprises and a 
few significant private companies, the bulk of the private sector in 2002 comprised small or micro-
enterprises. These small operations were overwhelmingly unregistered enterprises. In a diagnostic 
analysis of the constraints on private business in Burundi, Webber (2006: 5-6, 9-20) identified 
structural, policy-induced, regulatory, and supply-side challenges. The factors grouped into these four 
elements included:  
 
 An unfavourable geographic location and associated high transport costs 
 A lack of physical infrastructure 
 Weak links between the rural economy and downstream market and value chains 
 Low rural productivity 
 Corruption 
 High import tariffs 
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 Legal, regulatory, and procedural frameworks that were outdated, inefficient, open to misuse, 
and poorly implemented 
 Weak technical and management skills 
 The limited availability of financial services and credit 
 
The information provided in this section supports the unfavourable assessment of the weak initial 
business environment by the IIAG. However, Section 7.1 showed that Burundi implemented 
significant reforms in the period after the introduction of the Doing Business reports. Hence, 
Burundi's experience in this period contradicts Hypothesis 4, which states that a business environment 
that already supports private enterprise offers the foundation for implementing more pro-business 
institutional reforms. It also contradicts the notion of path dependence in institutional change.  
 
7.3.3 Autocracy and democracy 
 
Polity IV scores for Burundi identified a transition period between 2001 and 2004 – the years that 
culminated in the signing of the Burundi Power-Sharing Agreement in August 2004 between the state 
and the Conseil National Pour la Défense de la Démocratie-Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie 
(CNDD–FDD) rebel group. The agreement ensured all ethnic groups a proportional share in political 
power as stipulated in the constitution. The power-sharing agreements were implemented in 2005 via 
national elections that brought a resounding victory for the CNDD–FDD and President Pierre 
Nkurunziza (Falch 2008: 3). Compared to the situation in 2000, the openness of executive recruitment 
and the strength of constraints on the executive improved significantly from 2005 onwards. Hence, 
Polity IV’s democracy score for Burundi improved from marginally more than zero in 2001 to a very 
positive 7 in the period from 2005 to 2013. In the period under consideration, which included the 
transition phase, the country’s average score was 6.40. It ranked 11th out of the 35 countries included 
in the analysis in Chapter 5. The country’s autocracy score declined from a reading of 2.00 in 1998-
2000 to 1.00 in 2005 (and thereafter), averaging 1.10 from 2002 to 2013. The reading was constant 
at 1.00 from 2005 to 2014 (the bulk of the period under review in this dissertation). However, even 
at this low level, the calibrated score for autocracy was 0.53.  
 
All major political parties accepted the results of the 2005 elections. At the time, the prospect of a 
stable government and an end to conflict gave rise to optimism even among opponents to the new 
regime. Nkurunziza’s inauguration speech was reconciliatory, and his appointments inclusive (Watt 
2008: 189). By 2013, the state had retained monopoly power on the use of force with formerly 
antagonistic groupings balanced by an elaborate quota system in all state security organs. 
(Nonetheless, numerous small incidents of armed violence against state institutions or civilians had 
taken place.) The 2010 elections contained some irregularities, but most domestic and international 
observers provided a positive overall assessment of the process (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2014b: 8, 11). 
International observers took the high number of formally registered political parties and civic groups 
as indicative of “relatively liberal practice” regarding the rights of political association and assembly. 
All conventionally required legal foundations of democracy exist in Burundi, and function by the 
constitution and other laws. This is relevant to parliament, the judiciary, government entities at 
various levels, and the professional arm of the public administration (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2014b: 
13, 16).   
 
Despite the existence of these formal foundations, questions have arisen about the underlying state of 
democracy in Burundi and, hence the accuracy of the country's Polity IV scores. Antagonists argue 
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that the legitimacy of the 2010 elections was impaired because many opposition parties boycotted the 
poll. Furthermore, it has been alleged that the ruling party uses an authoritarian mode of governance. 
While this pushes critics to argue that the de jure democratic features of the political system are not 
reflected in reality, the blame can also be placed with the opposition parties. Their boycott tactics 
could be considered selfish and counterproductive in nurturing democracy in the country. As a result, 
it could be misleading to question the legitimacy of the government because an effective, formal 
political opposition is lacking. The reality that government processes run smoothly because frictions 
caused by competing political forces are largely absent does not necessarily made the political system 
authoritarian in nature (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2014b: 11). While generally accepted democratic 
standards are not met, this could not be blamed exclusively on the RPF. The radical Hutu opposition 
parties and their tactics (which include election boycotts) should bear equal responsibility for the 
current situation (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2014b: 16). 
 
Opinions vary about the precise nature of the political system in Burundi. Arguments can be made 
for and against high democracy and low autocracy scores. This raises questions about the quality of 
the Polity IV scores for Burundi, but further investigation of this issue falls beyond the remit of this 
dissertation. Furthermore, it should not be assumed that a smaller disparity between the country’s 
autocracy and democracy readings would elevate one or more of the pathway solutions identified in 
Chapter 5 to plausible explanations for Burundi's reform success. Compared to the outcome of a 
similar analysis for Rwanda, the additional information about Burundi's political governance raises 
more difficult questions. This complicates assessment of Hypothesis 3, which states that institutional 
reforms to improve the business environment for the private sector are possible under both democratic 
and autocratic political dispensations. Data quality issues often hamper the efforts of fsQCA 
researchers and NIE scholars. Case studies are often undertaken from afar and reliant on secondary 
sources of information. Be that as it may, these results underscore the importance of the cumulation 
step in fsQCA. If this dissertation had a focus on Burundi instead of Rwanda, a much broader 
investigation into the nature of Burundian politics (and associated data) would have been necessary.  
 
7.3.4 Transactional leadership 
 
Burundi’s average unadjusted transactional leadership score was only 3.33 out of 10. It dropped to an 
adjusted mean of 3.19 when structural difficulties that constrained the capacity to govern – scored at 
8.17 out of 10 – were taken into account. These score indicated weak transactional leadership in a 
country with political leaders who remain relatively inexperienced leaders when it comes to technical 
and administrative duties. The next two subsections consider policy coordination and the level of 
difficulty of governance in Burundi.  
 
7.3.4.1 Policy coordination 
 
The coordination of financial and human resources in the policymaking sphere is complicated by the 
tendency of some politicians in decision-making positions to pursue priorities outside of the overall 
government strategy (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2016b: 33). Because of this disjointed management of 
resources, corruption can be found at all levels of government, the police and the judiciary.172 
Burundi’s adjusted score for policy coordination implied a set-theoretic membership score of 0.20. 
This ranked the country fifth from the bottom in the sample of SSA countries ahead of the DRC, 
                                                          
172 In 2013, Burundi was ranked 157th out of 177 countries based on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions 
Index, with a higher ranking indicating a higher level of perceived corruption.  
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Zimbabwe, Chad and the Republic of the Congo. As was done for Rwanda in Section 6.4.3.1, the 
following issues are discussed to provide insight into leadership in Burundi:  
 
 Dialogue and engagement with stakeholders outside of the ruling party to balance policy goals 
and agree on trade-offs in the decision-making processes.  
 Coordination of actions amongst different state departments and other stakeholders to ensure 
that policy implementation is aligned with and succeeds in achieving agreed-upon policy 
goals. 
 Proper assignment of responsibilities and evaluation of performance to create an environment 
of commitment to project and policy implementation amongst stakeholders.  
 
In contrast to the situation in Rwanda, however, these three elements did not complement effective 
transactional leadership in Burundi.  
 
A) Dialogue and engagement in the decision-making processes 
 
Burundi’s constitution stipulates that the country is a consociational democracy. This system includes 
a complex ethnic and gender quota system for all publically elected and administrative bodies. It also 
requires dialogue and engagement to function effectively. Lemarchand (2009: 167) observed that the 
Burundian constitution comes closest to the theoretical model of consociationalism of all African 
constitutions. Nonetheless, Watt (2008: 190) questioned whether the country is actually governed by 
a power-sharing system that protects the rights and considers the views of minorities.173 Since the 
contested national elections in 2010, there has been only a vague general consensus on economic 
policy (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2014b: 34). This is of great concern: while the conflict in the country’s 
past has been associated with ethnic divisions, it was also an issue of exclusion of the majority Hutu 
from access to resources and decision-making processes (Wilen 2012: 64). Mokoena (2006: 22) found 
that economic, political and social exclusion of Hutu may well have been the single most important 
cause of conflict in Burundi.174  
 
Despite the positive intentions of the 2005 constitution, governance in Burundi suffers from a lack of 
transparency and efficiency. A highly personalised line of command is still evident with the CNDD-
FDD intervening in the work of ministers and civil servants (the policy experts). Through this process, 
and in contradiction of the spirit of consociationalism, the ruling party asserts itself as the only 
legitimate decision-maker when it comes to government business (Lemarchand 2009: 184-185). This 
is not a serious departure from the country’s pre-war situation. Throughout the post-colonial period, 
policy choices have been structured by the dominant network to ensure their control over the 
economy, foreign aid and other available rents (Ngaruko and Nkurunziza 2005: 1). A more inclusive 
policymaking process that includes dialogue and engagement with a broader spectrum of stakeholders 
would not allow for this concentration of economic power in the hands of the CNDD-FDD.  
 
Policymaking in Burundi has been hampered by an inclination among politicians and policy experts 
within the CNDD-FDD to engage in ad hoc interventionism, often in contravention of laid out 
                                                          
173 Consociationalism works best where ethnic segments of the society are roughly of the same proportion. This makes 
Burundi a poor candidate for this kind of government system (Lemarchand 2009: 167).  
174 An alternative explanation for conflict in several Great Lakes countries is Collier and Hoeffler’s (2002 and 2004) 
opportunity thesis. They argued that the presence of conflict is not caused merely by grievance but also by circumstances 
that enable the aggrieved to rebel, especially the capacity to finance protracted and escalating violence. Put differently, a 
reason as well as the capacity to rebel have to be present.  
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principles. The country’s clientelistic political environment routinely tempts policy experts to 
intervene directly in the economic sphere and elsewhere. The result has been that political and 
personal preferences have dominated those of a broader domestic community of stakeholders when 
it comes to influence over economic activity (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2012b: 18). Overall steering 
capability is weak. The ruling party finds it difficult to focus on the dialogue and engagement 
necessary to achieve long-term policy goals, and short-term goals often take precedence in order to 
keep the fragile political landscape from unravelling. External influence is also an important factor 
due to Burundi’s dependence on foreign aid. As a result, socio-economic policymaking is not shaped 
strongly by ideological or consensus processes. Instead, it tends to be pragmatic and aligned with the 
requirements of donors (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2012b: 26-27). 
 
B) Coordination of actions for policy implementation alignment 
 
The Burundian government has a complex composition, as mandated by the constitution to ensure 
representation of all groups in the public sector. While this soothes some of the country’s historical 
ethnic tensions, the resulting complexity of the bureaucracy makes it very difficult to efficiently 
coordinate the activities of ministries and other public entities for successful policy implementation. 
Against a backdrop of ongoing political rivalries, politicians and policy experts would focus on 
personal priorities and their public images, for example, instead of adherence to government policy 
goals (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2012b: 31). Other persistent challenges faced by the public sector further 
hamper policy implementation. These include a high turnover of technical staff, low compensation 
and an associated lack of motivation, as well as an ineffective performance evaluation system. These 
issues have contributed to high levels of civil servant absenteeism. An evaluation of the execution of 
programmes under the first PRSP (2007-2011) revealed a serious lack of capacities for designing and 
implementing economic and social policies (IMF 2012: 54-55).  
 
C) Creation of commitment and accountability for performance 
 
The UNDP (2011: 7) pointed out that the public sector lacked a culture of commitment and 
accountability. This was associated with what the IMF (2012: 55) deemed an ineffective system for 
evaluating the performance of government officials and, consequently, weak commitment to reaching 
targets. The review of the country’s first PRSP also highlighted the absence of a culture of 
accountability within the public sector because of the poor performance evaluation process. The 
country also fared poorly when it comes to the financial management of processes to achieve policy 
outcomes (AfDB 2016: 3). The IIAG found that the accountability of public officials in Burundi 
deteriorated gradually from 2007 to 2012 (Mo Ibrahim Foundation 2017: 28).  
 
7.3.4.2 Level of difficulty 
 
As indicated in Section 6.4.3.2, the Bertelsmann Stiftung weighs countries' policy coordination scores 
by a level of difficulty measure to get the final score for effective transactional leadership. The 
Stiftung’s level of difficulty index is made up of several components, as listed in Table 7.2, with 
higher scores indicating more severe structural constraints to effective leadership.  
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Table 7.2: Level of difficulty component scores – Burundi  
 
Stateness and 
the rule of 
law 
GNI per 
capita 
Level of 
education 
Physical 
constraints 
Conflict 
intensity 
Civil society 
traditions 
Overall 
5.354 10.000 9.333 9.167 7.167 8.000 8.170 
Source: Own calculations based on data from Bertelsmann Stiftung 
 
Section 7.3.1 already reflected on the vulnerability of the country’s state. The FFP deemed Burundi’s 
state fragility in the ‘high alert’ category with an average reading of 96.59 (out of 120) from 2005 to 
2013. Its challenges included poverty and economic decline, demographic pressures, the weak 
capacity to provide public services, and the strong dependence on donor aid. Regarding the rule of 
law, the IMF (2011: 22) found the post-conflict judicial system in Burundi to have been ineffective. 
Judges handled only a small number of cases, a large backlog of more than 27,000 cases had 
developed by 2006, and only 46% of judgments were enforced. The justice system lacked resources 
and qualified personnel. In addition, available personnel were unevenly distributed among the 
provinces. Prisons had more than double the number of inmates for which they were built. The main 
reason for the excessively large prison population were the heavily reliance on preventative custody. 
The IMF’s (2009a: 28) assessment of the judicial system added a low degree of judicial independence 
to the other issues that had persisted from the post-conflict assessment in 2005-2006. The 
Bertelsmann Stiftung assigned a score of 5.354 out of 10 for stateness and the rule of law. The 
information in this paragraph suggests that this scored may have been a little flattering to the country.  
 
The Bertelsmann Stiftung gave GNI per capita the worst possible score. Using a cost of basic needs 
calculation, Bundervoet (2006) estimated the incidence of poverty at 71.5% in rural areas and 36.5% 
in urban areas. The IMF (2009: 4-9) found that civil conflict contributed to declining levels of income 
per capita in Burundi from the late 1980s onwards. An economic embargo by neighbouring countries 
during the late 1990s contributed to Burundi being one of the poorest counties in the world. According 
to the IMF, however, civil conflict and international sanctions could not suffice to explain the lack of 
sustained income growth over prolonged periods. Other factors included inefficient investment, as 
indicated by estimates of incremental capital-output ratios (ICOR), with distortions largely caused by 
inappropriate state intervention in the economy. Even when infrastructure investment was sufficient, 
inadequate maintenance of key facilities (e.g. the electricity network) during the conflict caused 
deterioration of public assets (IMF 2009: 4-9). The Bertelsmann Stiftung scored GNI per capita 10 
out of 10.  
 
Burundi achieved good results in education and healthcare provision; the country introduced free 
primary education and healthcare for pregnant women and children under the age of five, among 
other things. This was achieved by increasing the budget shares of these two sectors. One of the key 
outcomes was gender parity in primary school attendance. However, while this improved the 
country’s HDI assessment, Burundi was still ranked a lowly 183rd out of 185 countries in 2011. 
Indeed, while data on access to education improved significantly after the civil war, performance and 
outcomes data remained poor (African Economic Outlook 2012: 2, 11). Thus, enrolment rates 
improved significantly, but this overburdened the schooling system’s absorption capacity. 
Pupil/classroom and pupil/teacher ratios deteriorated and grade repetition rates remained very high. 
Progress in secondary and tertiary education also remained relatively limited. The Bertelsmann 
Stiftung scored level of education 9.333 out of 10.  
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Physical constraints include severe poverty and a low level of economic development, the effects of 
being landlocked, fragile environmental and ecological conditions, and weak quality of infrastructure. 
Burundi has extreme infrastructure gaps, with the overall quality of infrastructure scored 30 out of 
100 in 2014 by the IIAG. The World Bank (2011a: 16-18) specifically identified the road network, 
power generation, communications infrastructure, and water and sanitation infrastructure as severe 
shortcomings. As far as agriculture is concerned, nearly nine out of 10 Burundians live in rural areas, 
though only a relatively small proportion of these people have access to roads that can be used during 
all seasons. The road network in Burundi’s most arable areas is substantially less dense than 
elsewhere in SSA and other low-income countries. The poor state of power infrastructure raises costs 
and hampers new investment in the country. Almost 75% of firms surveyed by the World Bank ranked 
poor access to and the reliability of electricity as the most significant obstacle to new investment. The 
Bertelsmann Stiftung scored physical constraints 9.167 out of 10. 
 
From 1993 to 2008, internal conflict in Burundi caused the deaths of 200,000 people (of whom the 
majority were civilians) and forced another 1.2 million to flee their homes (IMF 2009a: 20). Amongst 
the factors identified by the IMF (2009a: 30-31) for improving post-war governance and security in 
the country was the resolution of risks of conflict associated with the country’s land tenure system. 
The issue was considered an acute challenge that was exacerbated by the return of repatriated and 
displaced persons to their places of origin. This results in increased population pressure on productive 
agricultural land. Some 56.3% of court cases in Burundi during 2007 were linked to land tenure 
issues. Such cases were heard in the appeals court, administrative court, Court of High Instance, 
Commercial Tribunal and Residential Tribunal. Land tenure problems often involved opposing 
families and were “genuine hotbeds of tension, and even of violent conflicts”. Media reports indicated 
that these conflicts could degenerate into fatal brawls (IMF 2009a: 31). The Bertelsmann Stiftung 
scored conflict intensity 7.167 out of 10.  
 
Civil society traditions include institutional trust (trust within society that the government does what 
is best for the citizenry) and interpersonal trust. Practically everyone in post-civil war Burundi has 
been exposed to ethnic mistrust, both in the public sphere and on an interpersonal level. Uvin (2009: 
19) suggested that an acute awareness among ordinary Burundians of the pointlessness of ethnic 
divisions has contributed to an apparent softening in ethnic mistrust. However, this ostensible 
relaxation of divisions between ethnic groupings should be interpreted carefully. Some (e.g. Turner 
2013: 35) have argued that a profound lack of trust remains, and that Burundians have maintained a 
more extensive number of societal relations to cope with the possibility that some relationships may 
turn out to be flawed. Furthermore, ethnic mistrust is increasingly overshadowed by mistrust along 
political party membership lines. The rejection by the opposition of a one-party state has contributed 
to a definite divide between members of the CNDD-FDD and those associating with other parties.175 
Uvin (2009: 160) also highlighted a lack of trust between communities and the judiciary. The 
Bertelsmann Stiftung scored civil society traditions 8.000 out of 10. Overall, the Bertelsmann Stiftung 
scored the structural difficulties that policy coordination more difficult 8.170 out of 10.  
 
The above paragraphs found that the measures for three elements of policy coordination and the 
majority of the sub-components of the level of difficulty variable in Table 7.1 accurately reflect 
conditions in Burundi. The only exception is the score for stateness and the rule of law; in these cases, 
the overall assessments are possibly too favourable. While further investigation of this issue falls 
                                                          
175 While the country was not officially a one-party state, the CNDD-FDD had an absolute majority in both houses of the 
legislature.  
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outside the scope of this dissertation, this subsection amplified concerns raised in Section 7.3.3 about 
the quality of the data for Burundi. Hence, it is worth considering the possibility that data problems, 
rather than the omission of important causal conditions, were the reasons why none of the solution 
pathways identified in Chapter 5 provided plausible explanations for Burundi's reform performance. 
To explore this possibility, Section 7.5 discusses possible additional causal conditions.  
 
7.4 The outcome: pro-business reforms 
 
Because the fsQCA failed to identify a pathway that might explain Burundi’s outcome, the country's 
business environment reforms should be analysed more deeply than those of Rwanda. Such an 
analysis should reveal the drivers of the reforms, including omitted causal conditions (i.e. factors 
others than the causal conditions considered thus far). A summary of Burundi's reforms is an 
appropriate starting-point for the discussion of the driving forces behand institutional changes to 
improve the business environment. To this end, Table 7.3 provides a verbatim list in chronological 
order of the 19 pro-business reforms recorded in the annual Doing Business publications from 2005 
to 2013.  
 
The reforms recorded in the 2007 edition had to do with contract enforcement and resolving 
insolvency. The country’s judicial system was reorganised by means of the Code of Organisation and 
Judicial Competence of March 2005. At the time, Burundi was addressing broader problems in the 
judicial system, including delays in commercial court rulings and dispute resolution. The government 
set time limits for the finalising of commercial court cases and proceeded with the computerisation 
of commercial court information systems (IMF 2009b: 15). This contributed to a reduction in the 
portion of cases before the Commercial Court that extended beyond the 60-day mandated deadline 
from 40% in 2007 to 10% in 2009 (World Bank 2011b: 3). The aim of the increase in the size limit 
on cases in the small claims court was to reduce the overall backlog of cases in the judicial system. 
The number of backlogged cases increased from almost 24,500 in 2005 to nearly 31,000 in 2007 
(IMF 2012: 43).  
 
The Doing Business website reports that the motivation for the property registration reforms in 2008-
2009 was the desire to satisfy the MCC eligibility criteria. The MCC is a US government agency that 
provides grants to countries that demonstrate “a commitment to just and democratic governance, 
investments in its people and economic freedom as measured by different policy indicators”. As an 
MCC Candidate Country, Burundi’s performance on indicators related to these three elements had 
been tracked since 2004. However, despite the property registration reforms, Burundi’s scores on the 
eligibility criteria exceeded the averages in only three of the 16 tracked indicators, namely political 
rights, primary education expenditure, and consumer price inflation. The full list of 16 indicators are: 
 
 political rights,  
 civil liberties,  
 control of corruption,  
 government effectiveness,  
 the rule of law,  
 voice and accountability,  
 immunisation rates,  
 health expenditure, 
 primary education expenditure,  
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 girls’ primary education completion rate,  
 regulatory quality,  
 cost of starting a business,  
 days to start a business,  
 trade policy, and  
 inflation and fiscal policy (MCC 2007). 
 
The process of becoming an MCC Candidate Country is mostly outside the control of such a country. 
Firstly, the MCC Board of Directors determine a list of eligible countries based on per capita incomes 
and the absence of political sanctions. Secondly, they consider these countries’ performance on the 
three elements mentioned above, the availability of funds and the scope for reducing poverty and 
generating economic growth. Thirdly, the MCC starts collecting data to track the 16 key indicators 
and publish annual scorecards. Once the Board has selected an eligible country after these three steps, 
its government finally is invited to develop Compact Proposal with the Corporation (MCC 2017). 
Thus the process is external to the government until it is officially invited to develop a proposal. 
Burundi had not yet developed a proposal by 2014 as it failed to meet some of the quantitative 
benchmarks for the 16 key indicators. 
 
This initial set of MCC-focussed institutional reforms, which notably lagged those in many other SSA 
countries, did not inspire much confidence amongst academics such as Briscoe, Gasana and Specker 
(2010: 5). Rwanda’s reform process had by then resulted in a 76-position improvement in the 
country’s Doing Business ranking. The AfDB (2010: 4, 18) commented that Burundi still needed to 
strengthen its business environment, infrastructure and human capital to boost investment, suggesting 
that the country had one of the least business-friendly economies in the world. The World Bank 
concern reflected the belief that a supportive business environment, and more specifically an 
accommodative investment climate, was essential for successful diversification of the country’s 
economy. According to the World Bank (2011a: 70), Burundi’s private sector faced a multitude of 
significant constraints, including: 
 
 A poor regulatory framework 
 Cumbersome administrative and bureaucratic procedures 
 One of the highest tax burdens in the world 
 Outdated legislation, including a weak capacity to enforce contracts 
 An economy dominated by financially-strained public enterprises 
 An underdeveloped financial sector 
 
Several months before the AfDB (2010) publication, the IMF (2009b: 3, 13) also classified the 
Burundian economy as among the least business-friendly countries in the world. The multilateral 
organisation warned that if the situation continued it would be difficult to secure the private 
investment needed for sustained post-conflict economic growth. This was important for Burundi, 
which was considered one of the poorest countries in the world at the time. The multilateral 
organisation’s modelling suggested that the quantity and quality of the country’s capital stock were 
instrumental in its long-term economic growth prospects and that Burundi would be able to graduate 
from the low-income country group by 2035-2040 (or even sooner) if significantly higher capital 
investment could be realised. This could be achieved if the magnitude of investment increased to 
15%-20% of GDP from a reading of 10.8% of GDP observed during 1970-2007. The IMF (2009: 15) 
signalled that it was of utmost importance for Burundi to continue to improve the business climate 
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and reinforce institutions to make the economy more attractive to investors. The country needed to 
move to a market-friendly economy with strong institutions that could maximise the impact of the 
investment.  
 
Table 7.3: Pro-business reforms in Burundi (2005-13) 
 
Doing Business 
publication 
Pillar Reform 
2014 
Starting a Business 
Burundi made starting a business easier by allowing registration with 
the Ministry of Labour at the one-stop shop and by speeding up the 
process of obtaining the registration certificate.  
Dealing with 
Construction Permits 
Burundi made dealing with construction permits easier by 
establishing a one-stop shop for obtaining building permits and utility 
connections.  
Registering Property 
Burundi made transferring property easier by creating a one-stop shop 
for property registration.  
Paying Taxes 
Burundi made paying taxes less costly for companies by reducing the 
corporate income tax rate.  
Trading Across Borders 
Burundi made trading across borders easier by eliminating the 
requirement for a pre-shipment inspection report of findings.  
Getting Electricity 
Burundi made getting electricity easier by eliminating the electricity 
utility’s monopoly on the sale of materials needed for new 
connections and by dropping the processing fee for new connections.  
2013 
Starting a Business 
Burundi made starting a business easier by eliminating the 
requirements to have company documents notarised, to publish 
information on new companies in a journal and to register new 
companies with the Ministry of Trade and Industry.  
Dealing with 
Construction Permits 
Burundi made obtaining a construction permit easier by eliminating 
the requirement for a clearance from the Ministry of Health and 
reducing the cost of the geotechnical study.  
Registering Property 
Burundi made property transfers faster by establishing a statutory 
time limit for processing property transfer requests at the land 
registry.  
Trading Across Borders 
Burundi reduced the time to trade across borders by enhancing its use 
of electronic data interchange systems, introducing a more efficient 
system for monitoring goods going through transit countries and 
improving border coordination with neighbouring transit countries.  
2012 
Dealing with 
Construction Permits 
Burundi made dealing with construction permits easier by reducing 
the cost to obtain a geotechnical study.  
Protecting Minority 
Investors 
Burundi strengthened investor protections by introducing new 
requirements for the approval of transactions between interested 
parties, by requiring greater corporate disclosure to the board of 
directors and in the annual report and by making it easier to sue 
directors in cases of prejudicial transactions between interested 
parties.  
Paying Taxes 
Burundi made paying taxes easier for companies by reducing the 
payment frequency for social security contributions from monthly to 
quarterly.  
Resolving Insolvency 
Burundi amended its commercial code to establish foreclosure 
procedures.  
2011 Paying Taxes 
Burundi made paying taxes simpler by replacing the transactions tax 
with a value-added tax.  
2009 Registering Property 
Burundi made registering property cheaper by reducing the 
registration fee. These measures were in part motivated by the desire 
of the country to pass the MCC eligibility criteria.  
2008 Registering Property 
Burundi made registering property less costly by reducing the 
registration fee – it abolished a 7% property registration tax. 
2007 Enforcing contracts 
Burundi modified procedural rules and adopted new rules to reduce 
delays and the cost of going through court proceedings, including 
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Doing Business 
publication 
Pillar Reform 
raising the size limit on cases for the small claims court from $300 to 
$1,000. 
Resolving insolvency 
Burundi enacted a law giving jurisdiction in bankruptcy to recently 
established commercial courts, set time limits, and introduced 
creditors’ committees. 
Sources: Doing Business website (2014), World Bank (2006: 49, 50, 54) 
 
Several months before the AfDB (2010) publication, the IMF (2009b: 3, 13) also declared Burundi 
one of the least business-friendly countries in the world. The multilateral organisation warned that it 
would be difficult to secure the private investment needed for sustained post-conflict economic 
growth if the situation persisted. This was important for Burundi, which was one of the poorest 
countries in the world at the time. The IMF’s modelling suggested that the quantity and quality of the 
country’s capital stock were instrumental to its long-term economic growth prospects and that 
Burundi would be able to graduate from the low-income country group by 2035-2040 (or sooner) if 
capital investment could be increased to 15-20% of GDP from the average of 10.8% of GDP recorded 
from 1970 to 2007. The IMF (2009: 15) pointed out that it was of utmost importance for Burundi to 
continue to improve the business climate and reinforce institutions to make the economy more 
attractive to investors. The country needed to move to a market-friendly economy with strong 
institutions that could maximise the impact of investment.  
 
7.5 An additional causal condition: regional integration and supranational leadership 
 
After making no notable reforms in the first several years of the Doing Business project, Burundi 
implemented five reforms in 2007-2011, four each in 2012 and 2013, and a further six in 2014. This 
indicated a significant acceleration in reforms from 2010, as reflected in Table 7.3. The African 
Economic Outlook (2012: 7), a joint annual publication of the AfDB, OECD, UNDP and UN 
Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), reported that Burundi’s accession to the EAC in July 
2009 motivated extensive pro-business reforms aimed at improving the operating environment as 
well as medium-term economic policy in general. A key focus was the envisaged free movement of 
the people, goods, services and capital within the EAC. According to the African Economic Outlook 
(2012: 7), Burundi occupies a geostrategic position that could eventually make the country a sub-
regional, regional and international hub. This was amongst the key reasons why Burundi joined 
several RECs, including the EAC, COMESA, the Economic Community of Central African States 
(ECCAS), and the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries (ECGLC).  
 
Burundi’s accession to the EAC was significant for further stabilising the country after the civil war 
(Braganza 2015) as it contributed to the modernisation and effectiveness of the public administration 
(IMF 2012: 55). To secure these benefits and adhere to the agreed upon regional policy requirements, 
Burundi embarked on an aggressive reform programme from late-2009 that aimed to simplify the 
complex regulatory and tax environments for business as well as the absence of real dialogue between 
the public and private sectors (International Finance Corporation [IFC] 2014: 1). The government set 
up a high-level committee for this process under the leadership of the second vice-president.176 The 
Executive Reform Committee included four full-time staff dedicated to reform-related work and ten 
working groups tasked with technical work linked to each of the ten Doing Business pillars (IFC 
                                                          
176 The 2005 constitution established a two-member vice-presidency: the first vice president is responsible for political 
and administrative affairs and the second for social and economic affairs. 
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2014: 2). These reforms included efforts to promote foreign trade, strengthen investment protection 
through a new investment code, and new bankruptcy and commercial arbitration legislation, amongst 
others (African Economic Outlook 2012: 7).  
 
To encourage trade, for example, Burundi reduced the time to trade across borders by enhancing its 
use of electronic data interchange systems, introducing a more efficient system for monitoring goods 
moving through transit countries and improving border coordination with neighbouring transit 
countries. The country also strengthened investor protection by introducing new requirements for the 
approval of transactions between interested parties, requiring more extensive corporate disclosure to 
boards of directors and in annual reports, and making it easier to sue directors in cases of prejudicial 
transactions. Furthermore, Burundi amended its commercial code to establish foreclosure procedures. 
These three steps are reported verbatim in Table 7.3. The three reforms recorded by the Doing 
Business reports match the changes identified by the African Economic Outlook (2012: 7), which 
were outlined in the preceding paragraph. The influence of EAC membership on Burundi’s reform 
drive suggests an additional causal condition for institutional change: membership of regional 
groupings. 
 
The reform narrative in the preceding section indicated that Burundi’s accession to the EAC was an 
important driver of pro-business institutional reforms in the country from 2010 onwards. Countries 
in the EAC have since the 1980s endeavoured to improve their business environments by reducing 
direct government intervention in their economies and stimulating private sector growth. Articles 127 
and 128 of the EAC Treaty underscored the organisation’s commitment to providing an enabling 
environment for the private sector. Under the EAC Treaty (1999: 102-103), the partner states 
endeavoured to: 
 
 Promote dialogue with the private sector to improve the business environment 
 Strengthen the role of national business organisations in the formulation of economic policy 
 Remove barriers to market development 
 Allow entrepreneurs to participate in improving policies and activities of the EAC that affect 
them 
 Protect property rights 
 
Burundi has shown a strong commitment to EAC membership: the World Bank found that the country 
made significant efforts to align itself with EAC requirements in the political, institutional, and 
economic spheres during the first four years of its membership. Progress regarding the promotion of 
a benign environment for private enterprises was particularly notable. These successes were achieved 
despite Burundi's massive deficit in technical and institutional capacity (Dihel 2011: 4, 7). To rectify 
this, the president created the post of Minister in the Office of the President responsible for EAC 
Affairs (MPACEA).  
 
Regional integration can undoubtedly be a driver of institutional change, specifically in the area of 
business environment reform. As discussed in Section 2.3, North (2005: 22) saw room for endogenous 
and exogenous influences on institutional change. Exogenous influences like regional integration 
could alter relative prices to organisations, among other things. Regional economic integration occurs 
when two or more countries undertake policy changes that create stronger mutual economic 
interdependence. Such integration can bring many benefits, including (i) lower transaction costs for 
businesses, (ii) reduced investment risks, (iii) expansion of markets and better utilisation of 
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economies of scale in production, (iv) pooling of and more efficient allocation of regional resources, 
(v) closer political contact amongst members, and (vi) the promotion of regional security.177 Regional 
economic integration can also enhance and solidify domestic reforms. The diverse motivations for 
regional integration include enhanced economic growth and development (Madyo 2008: 1, 12). 
 
Conversely, regional de-integration can have adverse economic effects. This affected Rwanda, the 
DRC and in particular Burundi after the three countries obtained independence in the early 1960s. 
During the colonial period, these states were parts of an integrated market under Belgian rule. At the 
time, Burundi’s capital Bujumbura was the industrial capital of the region. However, upon gaining 
independence, the three countries adopted import-substitution policies and instituted tariff as well as 
non-tariff barriers. This negatively affected Burundi’s exports to Rwanda and the DRC, to the extent 
that the country lost half of its external market. Survey evidence indicated that Burundian firms’ 
capacity utilisation dropped from near full before independence to between 25% and 50%, on 
average, in the two years after the political change (UNCTAD 2009: 7). 
 
Yet it is not easy to quantify regional integration (or de-integration) for the purpose of constructing 
causal condition for pro-business institutional change. In 2009, the continent’s regional economic 
communities (RECs) were already a spaghetti bowl of overlapping memberships. The “spaghetti 
bowl” phenomenon was first identified in the mid-1990s as RECs and free trade agreements (FTAs) 
proliferated and became more complex (Bhagwati 1995). As summarised in Figure 7.1, 27 of the 53 
African countries were members of two regional groupings in 2009, 18 belonged to three RECs, and 
one country had joined four regional blocs. Only seven countries maintained membership of just one 
grouping (UNCTAD 2009: 11). Burundi was a member of h the EAC and COMESA.  
 
Not only was the nature of RECs and their overlapping membership complex, but levels of regional 
integration within these communities also varied considerably. Table 7.4 lists examples of African 
and non-African RECs in different stages of integration. It indicates a vast chasm between the degrees 
of integration in, for example, the free trade area of the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) and the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WEAMU).178 The reasons behind 
varying degrees of regional integration within these blocs include diverse initial conditions, 
implementation issues of an administrative nature, basic design deficiencies, the high dependence of 
most member countries on the export of primary commodities, bureaucratic and physical hindrances, 
inadequate coordination and harmonisation of policies and regulations at the regional level, and 
overlapping membership (UNCTAD 2009: 15). 
 
The acceleration in the business environment reform process in Burundi was strongly affected by the 
country's accession to the EAC in 2007. An appropriately specified index of regional integration 
could be a causal condition in set-theoretic analyses of pro-business institutional change. Rwanda is 
also a member of the EAC and COMESA. Moreover, it implemented similar reforms to those linked 
to Burundi’s membership of the EAC by the African Economic Outlook (2012: 7). As was shown in 
this subsection, however, is would be far from easy to create an indicator that captures the influence 
of regional integration on institutional change. The majority of SSA countries are members of more 
than one REC, which gives rise to a mixture of influences from different regional groupings on 
                                                          
177 This dissertation does not attempt to weigh the benefits and disadvantages (see UNCTAD 2009: 7) of regional 
integration, and does not seek to ignore the criticism levelled against the practice. Rather, the benefits are identified as 
motivations for countries like Burundi to embark on regional integration. 
178 A free trade area is the least integrated and a monetary union is the most integrated grouping in the African context. 
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domestic institutional reforms. The differences among RECs and the joint effects of different 
combinations of groupings result in a spaghetti bowl of potential effects. This does not even take into 
account the varying levels of regional integration in these RECs – another factor that influences 
domestic reforms. 
 
Figure 7.1: Spaghetti bowl of African RECs179 
 
Source: UNCTAD (2009: 12) 
 
                                                          
179 CFA = Communauté Financière Africaine; COMESA = Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa; CEMAC 
= Central African Economic and Monetary Community; CMA = Common Monetary Area; EAC = East African 
Community; ECCAS = Economic Community of Central African States; ECOWAS = Economic Community of West 
African States; IGAD - Intergovernmental Authority on Development; IOC = Indian Ocean Commission; SADC = 
Southern African Development Community; SACU = Southern African Customs Union; AMU = Arab Maghreb Union; 
WAEMU = West African Economic and Monetary Union; WAMZ = West African Monetary Zone. 
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The majority of SSA countries are members of more than one REC, resulting in a mixture of 
influences from different regional groupings on domestic reforms like pro-business institutional 
change. The different nature of each REC and the combined influence of different combinations of 
groupings results in a spaghetti bowl of potential combinations of impacts. This does not even take 
into account the varying levels of regional integration within these different RECs – a further factor 
influencing domestic reforms. While accurate measurement of the effects of regional integration on 
domestic institutional reform is exceptionally difficult, an important first step would be to 
conceptualise the elements of an appropriate measure. The three essential elements that would have 
to be incorporated in such a are the number of REC memberships held by a country, the types of 
RECs a country belongs to, and the levels of integration in the community or communities it has 
joined. A reliable measure based on theoretical ideas and empirical observation could reflect the 
extent to which supranational leadership decisions of RECs influence domestic institutions. Such a 
construct would fit well into an fsQCA of institutional change, as the method accommodates such 
scaled indicators. It would also provide further insight into the effects of leadership on institutional 
change – in this case, leadership from an external source. 
 
Table 7.4: Examples of RECs and varying regional integration 
 
Stage of 
integration 
Description African 
example 
Other 
example 
Fiscal union A fiscal union can be described as the transfer of part of 
the fiscal resources and competencies in the fiscal policy 
area, as well as fiscal management, from a national level 
to a supranational level. This includes, among other 
things, a joint guarantee of government debt. 
None None 
Monetary union A monetary union establishes a single monetary and 
foreign exchange policy amongst its members. This then 
grows into a common currency functioning in the 
common market. This union can result from a bilateral or 
multilateral agreement between the member countries. 
West African 
Economic and 
Monetary Union 
(UEMOA) 
Euro zone 
Common market A common market is a customs union that free 
movement of goods, labour and capital among its 
member countries. The member states are also required 
to remove all trade barriers, including any non-tariff 
restrictions, between members. 
Common 
Market for 
Eastern and 
Southern Africa 
(COMESA) 
Central 
American 
Common 
Market 
(CACM) 
Customs union A customs union is a free trade area in which member 
countries apply a common external tariff on goods 
imported from outside the union, regardless of which 
country within the union the goods enter. This tariff can 
differ across goods, but not across any of the union 
member countries. 
Southern 
African 
Customs Union 
(SACU) 
Gulf 
Cooperation 
Council (GCC) 
Free trade area A free trade area involves an arrangement between 
member countries whereby no tariff barriers exist on 
goods and services produced within the union. However, 
each country still maintains their separate tariff barriers 
on trade with non-member countries.  
Southern 
African 
Development 
Community 
(SADC) 
Commonwealth 
of Independent 
States Free 
Trade Area 
(CISFTA) 
Sources: Marinov (2015), European Commission (2015) 
 
Even in the absence of an appropriate measure, it remains important to consider the possible impact 
of regional integration on reforms in Rwanda. The country joined the EAC in July 2009, just a few 
months before the release of the Doing Business 2010 report that listed Rwanda as a top 10 reformer 
(World Bank 2009: 2). Hence, reform success was already well underway in Rwanda when it joined 
the EAC, with the country’s CEDP and Doing Business Unit fully operational. This suggests that the 
event had no direct influence on the business environment reform process.  
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Looking further back, Rwanda joined COMESA in 2004. As indicated in Table 7.4, COMESA is a 
common market that allows free movement of goods, labour and capital among its member countries. 
According to COMESA (2010: 1), the main aims of the regional grouping is: 
 
 Supporting sustainable growth and development by promoting a more balanced and 
harmonious development of its productive structures; 
 Promoting the joint adoption of macroeconomic policies and programmes to raise the standard 
of living of citizens of its member states 
 Cooperation in the creation of an enabling environment for foreign, cross border and domestic 
investment 
 Promotion of peace, security and stability 
 Strengthening the relations between the grouping and the rest of the world  
 
The key entity driving business environment reforms in the region is the COMESA Business Council, 
a private sector institution that aims to address pertinent constraints on private business in the region, 
influence policy formulation on behalf of the private sector, and increase private sector participation 
in the regional integration agenda (COMESA 2017). The PSF, which was identified in Section 6.5.1 
as a key role player in Rwanda’s business environment reforms, represents Rwanda on the COMESA 
Business Council. Emmanuel Hategeka was the leading private sector actor in Nsanzabaganwa’s 
(2012) connectedness model of policy change during his time as the head of the PSF. More generally, 
the connectedness model accommodates foreign influence on policy: as was pointed out before, it 
identifies the American academic Michael Porter as the change manager.  
 
The analysis in Section 6.5.1 did not identify regional bodies such as COMESA and the EAC as 
influential in policymaking in Rwanda – Nsanzabaganwa (2012) also did not refer to such 
international influence. However, it is certainly possible that the work done by COMESA could have 
influenced actors in the connectedness model. At an executive level, for example, Kagame and policy 
experts could have gained valuable insight into reforms from other COMESA leaders. The private 
actors as well as the change manager could also have been influenced. An assessment of regional 
integration based on the three minimum factors listed above should reveal the extent of such 
influence, if any. The development of a measure for this purpose falls outside the scope of this 
dissertation, though. 
 
7.6 Conclusions 
 
Researchers can revisit fsQCA results to incorporate new information. This cumulation process 
enables researchers to strengthen the explanatory power of fsQCA results. In this dissertation, an 
analysis of Rwanda’s reform success raised questions about reforms in Burundi, given that the 
countries share many characteristics. Burundi's characteristics include the following: ineffective 
transactional leadership and inefficient resource use due to multiple structural challenges; high state 
fragility associated with a weak economy and demographic pressures; a weak initial business 
environment and private sector caused by weak post-independence governance; and a democratically 
elected government with some elements of autocracy. However, this combination of characteristics 
did not feature in any of the pathway solutions generated by the fsQCA. Put differently, the analysis 
could not provide a plausible explanation for Burundi’s reform success.  
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Following a short historical overview of Burundi’s economic and political outcomes, Chapter 7 
undertook a review of the values of the outcome and causal conditions for Burundi in the fsQCA in 
Chapter 5. This review indicated that most of these values are accurate reflections of conditions in 
Burundi from 2002 to 2013. The exceptions were the BTI data for stateness and the rule of law as 
well as the Polity IV data for autocracy and democracy. The BTI possibly understated the severity of 
the challenges affecting stateness and the rule of law, while the Polity IV classifications reflected the 
broader debate about the true nature of the country's political system. Such questions about the quality 
of data underscore the importance of critical reviews of the sources of information about cases.  
 
The discussion of Burundi’s outcome variable revealed a marked acceleration in the tempo of 
business environment reforms from 2009 onwards. This was linked to the country's accession to the 
EAC and the consequent need for reforms to deepen integration with other members of the REC. The 
potential benefits of such regional integration include larger markets and accelerated economic 
growth and development. It is entirely plausible that considerations of regional integration contributed 
to institutional change in SSA countries. However, the differences in the nature of African RECs, the 
overlapping spaghetti bowl of membership, and the varying degrees of integration in these 
arrangements make it very difficult to quantifying the influence of regional integration on a case-by-
case basis. Given North’s (2005: 22) perspectives on causes of institutional change, the influence of 
regional factors on domestic reforms is certainly a topic for further study.  
 
The reflections on Burundi in this chapter also served to generate insights into Rwanda's reform 
experience. Five such insights can be identified. The first has to do with the data used in the fsQCA. 
The analysis in Chapters 6 and 7 confirmed the validity of most of the measures used in Chapter 5. 
However, the reality that both chapters raised questions about some measures indicates that the minor 
issue identified for Rwanda in Section 6.4.2 is not necessarily an anomaly. Similar questions about 
measures for Burundi suggest that deeper study of other SSA countries may also reveal data-related 
qualms. Most pertinently, attempts to classify the political systems of SSA countries as autocratic or 
democratic face formidable problems. The de jure and de factor natures of such systems may differ 
markedly, and the perceptions of politicians and other observers are often at odds. 
 
Secondly, a key finding of this chapter has been that regional integration probably influenced 
institutional change in Burundi. Rwanda and Burundi are members of the EAC, which is generally 
regarded as the most integrated African REC in Africa. It is reasonable to think that regional 
integration, which subjects domestic institutions and institutional change to external influences, could 
also have contributed to Rwanda’s reform success. The key benefits of regional integration (enhanced 
economic growth and development) align closely with the Kagame regime’s strategy of using private-
sector led economic growth and development to steer the country away from its divisive and 
impoverished past. Hence, an impact from regional integration is a distinct possibility. 
 
Thirdly, Chapter 6 established that effective transactional leadership strongly affected Rwanda’s 
reform process via its influence on effective policy coordination. By contrast, transactional leadership 
was weak in Burundi. This implies a robust domestic driver for institutional change within the 
dominant network in Rwanda and the absence of such a force in Burundi. However, Burundi probably 
benefitted from an external driver for its institutional changes in the form of regional integration. 
RECs and regional integration are products of supranational political forces, and it is realistic to 
interpret regional integration as a conduit for supranational transactional leadership.  
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Fourthly, the values of Rwanda and Burundi's causal conditions differed markedly despite the many 
parallels between the two countries, including successful business environment reform processes. 
This links to Turner’s (2013: 7) view that the countries are in fact ‘false twins’ in the sense that their 
many resemblances mask many differences that emerge upon closer scrutiny. Chapter 7 has 
confirmed this view. The differences in the membership scores of Rwanda and Burundi on several 
causal conditions highlight the value of case studies and qualitative research for studying institutional 
change in countries that share many characteristics. It emphasises the uniqueness of cases and the 
importance of case-based research in NIE to come to grips with this diversity.  
 
Finally, the findings of Chapters 6 and 7 validate the use of fsQCA for studying business environment 
reform dynamics of SSA countries. By focussing on Rwanda and Burundi, the depth of perspective 
provided by fsQCA has become clear: the ‘false twins’ show many similarities but, upon closer 
inspection, also many differences. This underscores the importance of allowing for equifinality in 
empirical research, which is possible with fsQCA. The successful reform experiences of Rwanda and 
Burundi from 2002 to 2013 were textbook examples of equifinality, i.e. multiple causal paths to a 
similar outcome.  
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CHAPTER 8: SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND SUGGESTIONS FOR 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
 
8.1 Summary of findings 
 
This study of institutional change in Rwanda and the role of leadership in institutional change offers 
new insights to scholars of both Rwandan history and NIE. The analysis used the critical transitions 
framework, which is a relatively new tool for explaining institutional change. The model incorporates 
aspects of leadership – an important factor in Rwanda’s history and an element of institutional change 
that is neglected in most other models. Apart from case studies, the methods employed included two 
hitherto underutilised tools for studying institutional change, namely Doing Business data and 
fsQCA. These methods provided new insight into the factors driving recent attempts to improve the 
institutional environments for business in SSA countries, in particular, the role of transactional 
leadership. The following paragraphs summarise the key findings from each chapter.  
 
Chapter 1 argued that Rwanda’s recovery after the genocide was one of the most impressive examples 
of post-conflict reconstruction in recorded history. A crucial factor in this process was President Paul 
Kagame's role in steering the country away from its past of ethnic divisions. While the ethnic, 
political, social and legal aspects of this history have been well recorded, the economic factors have 
played second fiddle. As a result, there has been little research on the institutional aspects of change 
in Rwanda, despite the prominence of such change in new growth theory. When they have been 
considered, institutions have almost explosively been researched from a static perspective, with a 
dearth of work on institutional change regarding this impressive post-genocide turnaround. 
Furthermore, while the importance of Kagame’s role has been widely reported, institutional 
researchers have until recently not been paying enough attention to the topic of leadership. These 
research gaps are the bases of the four research questions formulated in Section 1.2 and reviewed in 
Section 8.2 below.  
 
Chapter 2 found that there is no consensus amongst social scientists about the best theoretical 
framework for analysing institutional change, mainly due to the varied nature of causes of change. It 
also explained that Alston et al.'s (2016) critical transitions framework was selected as the basis for 
this analysis because it incorporates the critical role of leadership in moving a country from 
unsustainable to sustainable institutions. In this framework, institutional change is set in motion by a 
shock that causes deviations in economic and political outcomes. In turn, these open a window of 
opportunity for a leader to affect change. The critical transitions framework is a qualitative tool and 
uses narrative case studies to analyse institutional change. The chapter also pointed out that a case 
study approach serves the purpose of this dissertation well, in part because the critical transitions 
framework satisfies the most important criteria identified in methodological writings on applying 
theoretical frameworks to study cases.  
 
Chapter 3 applied the critical transitions framework to Rwanda’s history and delineated five epochs 
of institutional change, namely the pre-colonial period, the colonial period, the two republics after 
independence, and the period since the genocide. The most recent period of institutional change, 
which started in 1994, witnessed the Habyarimana akusa replaced by Kagame and the RPF elite. The 
country’s current institutional trajectory originated from the changes set in motion after the 1994 
genocide, with incremental changes still taking place to maintain the autopilot situation. The critical 
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transitions framework introduces two key concepts into our understanding of the process of 
institutional change, namely windows of opportunity and leadership. The analysis in Chapter 3 
showed that both of these concepts have been instrumental in institutional change in Rwanda.  
 
Chapter 4 discussed two tools for studying institutions and institutional change. It firstly discussed 
the scope for using Doing Business data as indicators of pro-business institutional change. Because 
some authors have questioned the value of this information for academic research, it reviewed the 
theoretical underpinnings of the writings behind the Doing Business project as well as associations 
between Doing Business data and key NIE concepts. The review determined that the data are in fact 
fitting for use in NIE research. Secondly, fsQCA was examined as a tool for analysing cases. It was 
shown that the fsQCA method is ideal for identifying set relationships between outcomes (e.g. 
institutional change) and combinations of causal conditions. This method yields one or more causal 
pathways to an outcome that can be used for further study of the individual cases included in the 
analysis. 
 
Chapter 5 applied the tools discussed in Chapter 4; more specifically, it used fsQCA (with Doing 
Business information as an outcome indicator of institutional change) to generate results to underpin 
a case study of institutional change. The fsQCA explored the set-theoretic connections between pro-
business institutional reform and combinations of four causal conditions – state fragility, effective 
transactional leadership, the initial quality of the business environment, and political regime types – 
in a selection of SSA countries. These conditions were derived from four hypotheses rooted in 
theoretical ideas. The case information for each country was compiled from various data sources, and 
included a novel approach for measuring transactional leadership. The fsQCA results provide seven 
pathway solutions for explaining the outcomes recorded for these countries.  
 
Chapter 6 used the outcome of the fsQCA to provide deeper insight into recent institutional change 
in Rwanda. The pathway solution associated with Rwanda linked the country's pro-business reforms 
in Rwanda to a combination of effective transactional leadership, a strong initial business 
environment, and strongly autocratic governance. An exploratory narrative confirmed that this 
combination accurately reflected the process of change after the Rwandan genocide. It was found that 
the casual conditions were all influenced by the need to exit the country's ethnically-divisive past, 
and that economic growth and development have facilitated the change process. The chapter also 
outlined Nsanzabaganwa’s (2012) connectedness model, which underscores the importance of 
relationships and trust in successful policy outcomes, to elucidate the policymaking process behind 
institutional change in the country. 
 
Chapter 7 presented the results of the cumulation step of fsQCA by revisiting the analysis to gain 
deeper and additional insights. The focus of this step was Burundi, which had many similarities with 
Rwanda in the study period. These includes their stellar reform performance as recorded by the Doing 
Business project. Burundi, however, is not strongly associated with any of the pathway solutions 
identified in Chapter 5. The review of the quantification of the causal conditions used in the fsQCA 
raised some questions about the quality of data available for Burundi. The chapter also finds that 
regional integration had a marked impact on the process of domestic institutional change. While 
difficult to quantify, this factor may well be an additional causal condition in studies of pro-business 
institutional reform. The findings in Chapter 7 therefore indicate that Rwanda and Burundi should be 
considered ‘false twins’ as they resemble each other in many ways, while differ in various respects 
when subjected to closer scrutiny. 
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8.2 Conclusions: answering the research questions 
 
As specified in Section 1.2, this dissertation endeavoured to explain institutional change and the role 
that leadership plays in the process, with a specific focus on the experience of Rwanda. In order to 
achieve this goal, the research aimed to answer four questions: 
 
1) What framework can be used to explain institutional change that incorporates the role of 
leadership?  
2) Which periods of institutional change in Rwanda’s history that can be identified using such a 
framework?  
3) Which qualitative and quantitative tools can be used to enhance understanding of recent 
institutional change?  
4) Based on empirical results, what role did leadership play in recent institutional change in 
Rwanda?  
 
Firstly, there is as yet no consensus amongst NIE scholars about the best single framework for 
studying institutional change. Attempts to select such a framework are also complicated by the reality 
that such frameworks tend to ignore the role of leadership. As explained in Chapter 2, Alston et al.'s 
(2016) critical transitions framework fills this gap. This framework postulates that leaders take 
windows of opportunity to affect change following shocks to the economic and political status quo. 
What follows is a readjustment in the dominant network’s beliefs about appropriate governance of 
the country. Such leadership results in changes to constitutional-level institutions, laws and 
enforcement mechanisms to achieve new economic and political outcomes. Hence, leadership is an 
integral part of the conceptualisation of institutional change; in the critical transitions framework. The 
narrative of institutional change in Rwanda clearly illustrated this.  
 
Secondly, the application of the critical transitions framework to the known history of Rwanda in 
Chapter 3 identified five epochs of institutional change in the country: 
 
 The so-called Golden Era, which stretched from the country’s pre-history under successive 
kings until the arrival of the Germans in the late 1890s and the start of colonial rule.  
 The Colonial era, which stretched from the beginning of German rule in 1896 and continued 
through Belgian rule (which began in 1922) to the country’s independence in 1961. 
 The First Republic under Gregoire Kayibanda that lasted from 1961 until 1973. 
 The Second Republic under military leader Juvenal Habyarimana from 1973 until 1994. 
 The Kagame regime from 1994 to date.180 
 
As was shown in Table 3.1, leadership and windows of opportunity were instrumental in initiating 
institutional change in each of these periods. 
 
Thirdly, apart from the critical transitions framework, this dissertation employs two other tools to 
study recent institutional change in Rwanda. It showed that Doing Business data can be used to derive 
measures of institutions and institutional change. The information collected by the World Bank since 
2002 was grounded in theoretical and empirical research with strong links to NIE ideas. Furthermore, 
the dissertation showed that the fsQCA method is suitable for analysing the factors associated with 
                                                          
180 To put this in context, Alston et al. (2016) identified four epochs in Brazil since the 1960s and three in Argentina since 
1912. There is no rule of thumb about the average length of an epoch.  
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this change. Compared to linear regression analysis, this method enables more thorough investigation 
of country-specific determinants of change. It also allows the researcher to revisit initial results to 
improve the analysis and findings. Another advantage of fsQCA is that it accommodates equifinality 
– and important issue in NIE. In addition to these tools identified in Chapter 4, Nsanzabaganwa’s 
(2012) connectedness model is employed in Chapter 6 to provide additional perspective on the 
policymaking process behind successful institutional change.  
 
Fourthly, one of the most popular explanations for the dramatic economic and political turnaround 
after the Rwandan genocide has been that the country’s national leadership succeeding in creating the 
necessary conditions for such a recovery. This explanation has emphasised the leadership of President 
Paul Kagame. The findings of especially Chapter 6 underscored the importance of effective 
transactional leadership in Rwanda’s recent institutional change. Kagame has created a policymaking 
environment that exhibits all three elements of De Groot et al.'s (2009) definition of transactional 
leadership. His hands-on approach to ensuring performance and accountability has structured a 
uniquely Rwandan policymaking process, as confirmed by Nsanzabaganwa’s (2012) connectedness 
model. This has resulted in inclusive policymaking – an unexpected style in an otherwise autocratic 
political system, yet one that evidently has been successful. The process of change was strongly linked 
to relationships and the rebuilding of trust.  
 
By answering these four questions, this dissertation has made a contribution to research on the role 
of leadership in institutional change in Rwanda and other SSA countries. This contribution also has 
value for the NIE in general, given the paucity of work on the role of leadership in institutional change 
despite many examples of the transformative role of seemingly extraordinary leadership traits. As 
emphasised by Alston et al. (2016: 207-208), it is possible to derive broader lessons from case studies 
even though economic and political development is contextual. This dissertation applies their critical 
transitions framework to Rwanda to generate such lessons about the dynamic interplay of power, 
leadership, institutions, policies and beliefs. The most important next step to enrich this framework 
would be to incorporate the influence of informal institutions. 
 
This dissertation has also contributed in a small way to debates about modern development theory. 
Rwanda is a developmental state that has put in place the right institutions to stimulate economic 
development. By using home-grown policies and development strategies, Rwanda departed from the 
development theory and SAPs of the 1980s and embraced more recent thinking about the importance 
of institutions for generating long-term economic growth. In creating a relatively autocratic style of 
government with an efficient bureaucracy, Rwanda has followed the lead of other successful 20th 
century developmental states. The adoption of economic institutions supportive of private enterprise 
in the context of a relatively authoritarian government was reminiscent of the strategies of several 
East Asian countries, and raised similar questions about the necessity of democratic dispensations for 
economic development. As was pointed out by Mkandawire (2010: 70), other African countries have 
also prioritised economic development over the extension of political rights.  
 
8.3 Suggestions for future research 
 
The Doing Business data contain little information about informal institutions, and this was reflected 
in the outcome variable in the fsQCA in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. Nonetheless, this dissertation has 
definitely not ignored informal institutions and their role in changes to formal institutions. Chapter 2 
highlighted the importance of informal institutions in the reduction of transaction costs, among other 
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things. Shared cultural traits affects levels of trust between contracting parties. Cultural and other 
social factors influence many choices, and social scientists have recently become more interested in 
these topics and their economic implications. Chapter 2 also elaborated on the role of beliefs in the 
critical transitions framework of Alston et al. (2016: 226-227). As was argued by North, beliefs are 
the subjective perceptions of individual and organisations about how the world works.  
 
The historical narrative of institutional change in Rwanda reflected that the dominant network 
implements institutions to align economic and political outcomes with their beliefs about how society 
should operate. Changes in these outcomes open a windows of opportunity for leadership to change 
the institutional trajectories of countries. Ultimately, this could give rise to changes in the beliefs or 
composition of the dominant network. The historical narrative in Chapter 3 identified changes in 
beliefs during Rwanda’s five epochs of institutional change. Its people’s dependence on agriculture 
determined cultural traits in the country. In turn, this was strongly influenced by ethnic divisions that 
determined the identities of landlords and peasants. It was only in the current period after the genocide 
that the roles of agriculture and ethnicity have been downplayed in favour of a focus on a unified 
society benefitting from broad-based economic growth and development.  
 
Chapter 4, however, pointed out that none of the Doing Business categories records information about 
the effects of informal institutions on the private sector (the World Bank has acknowledged that this 
database does not cover all the factors affecting SMEs). As Williamson (2009: 372) stated, public 
policy cannot directly control informal institutions, which are found in the private realm. Nonetheless, 
Chapter 4 reiterated that shared culture influences the level of trust between contracting parties, and 
has a positive and statistically significant bearing on the probability of becoming an entrepreneur. 
This emphasised informal institutions are important elements of business environments via their 
effects on transactions and market entry by entrepreneurs.  
 
Reflecting this, some of the causal conditions for pro-business institutional reform in the fsQCA in 
Chapter 5 were related to country-specific informal intuitions. Chapter 6, for example, explained that 
Rwanda already had a benign business environment when the Doing Business project commenced in 
2002. This was the result of the government’s drive to use private sector-led economic growth as a 
catalyst for development in the country. The aim of this strategy has been to create prosperity to heal 
ethnic divisions and to undo decades of mistrust amongst Rwandans. The country’s informal 
institutions (e.g. ethnic and cultural divisions) have been at the heart of change in formal institutions 
over the country’s history. While the features of political regimes that determine placement on the 
spectrum from autocracy to democracy may not seem strongly linked to informal institutions, 
Rwanda’s consociational democracy and autocratic practices are a product of the country’s cultural 
history and informal institutions.  
 
An important aspect of this dissertation has been that the causal condition for effective transactional 
leadership incorporated several elements of informal institutions. As discussed in Chapters 6 and 7, 
transactional leadership involves interaction with stakeholders, dialogue, compromise, and 
commitments. Trust (a socio-cultural phenomenon and important informal institution) is essential for 
all of these, and elements of moral authority matter as well. Civil society traditions like societal trust 
also affect the scope for and complexity of effective transactional leadership. Chapter 6 explored 
Nsanzabaganwa’s (2012) connectedness model, which describes the policymaking process behind 
changes in formal institutions. It found that the relationships and trust between policy experts, change 
managers and private sector agents have been crucial to the success of policymaking in Rwanda. The 
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chapter used examples from the agricultural sector and the pro-business reforms to identify these 
trusting relationships.  
 
Trust was a recurring theme in this dissertation. Chapter 1 noted that NIE theory offers tools to 
examine the influence of formal and informal institutions on the choice sets of individuals and 
organisations. These informal institutions include interpersonal trust. Chapter 2 stated that a more 
trusting relationship between parties lowers transaction costs by reducing the need for complex 
contracts and increasing the sharing of information. In addition, Alston et al. (2016) underscored the 
importance of trust between the polity and the citizenry for effective leadership to be possible. Apart 
from highlighting the distrust between Hutu and Tutsi throughout Rwanda’s history, Chapter 3 
identified the need to rebuild trust as one of the problems Rwanda faced after the genocide.  
 
Chapter 4 pointed out the neglect of effects of informal institutions on SMEs is a shortcoming of the 
Doing Business data. One effect of this is that low levels of trust pose certain risks to entrepreneurs 
in institutional settings that would appear supportive in terms of Doing Business indicators. Chapter 
5 introduced the effects of the level of societal trust on the complexity of implementing effective 
transactional leadership. Furthermore, Chapter 6 explained that the need to rebuild trust between 
ethnic groups played an important role in the economic policy decisions of the Rwandan polity. 
Nsanzabaganwa’s (2012) connectedness model provided theoretical and practical confirmation of the 
salience of trust amongst key stakeholders in the policymaking process in Rwanda. Chapter 7 
reiterated these themes.  
 
Nonetheless, the complexity of measuring trust remains a formidable barrier to more prominent 
incorporation in this dissertation. This implies that there is scope for further elaboration of the 
perspectives on institutional change and leadership developed in this dissertation. The influence of 
trust on changes in formal institutions cannot be ignored: as Alston et al. (2016: 15) pointed out, trust 
by citizens is a prerequisite for the kind of leadership required to change formal institutions. While 
economists have been reluctant to rely on cultural features like trust to explain economic phenomena, 
Alesina and Giuliano (2013: 2) observed that recent research convincingly demonstrated strong 
connections. According to Voigt (2018: 8-9), the factors that complicate measurement of informal 
institutions include the following: 
 
 It is difficult to observe some informal institutions 
 Researchers and other outsiders often find it difficult to understand the roles that informal 
institutions and sanctions for breaching them fulfil in particular contexts 
 The reality that informal institutions are unwritten rules means that some have few easily 
quantifiable characteristics 
 It is often difficult to separate informal institutions and their effects 
 The influence of beliefs and other informal institutions are not necessarily aligned with 
national borders 
 Some norms may be so self-evident to respondents that that they do not identify them to 
researchers as determinants of behaviour 
 Surveys can be unreliable sources of data about informal institutions, because they tend to 
elicit information about opinions as opposed to actual behaviour. 
 
North (1990: 36) acknowledged long ago that informal institutions are significant even though they 
are less amenable to description and definition than formal institutions are. The impact of trust on 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
189 
 
formal institutional change is an important topic for future research. The available measures of trust 
are inadequate for this purpose. In the future, a structured and reliable measure of trust could provide 
more insight into the interplay between trust and leadership in the process of institutional change. 
Trust is one of the most frequently chosen proxies for informal institutions, and the WVS the most 
common source of data for the construction of such proxies. However, Voigt (2018: 9-11) found that 
these proxies are often ill-suited for their intended purposes. In fact, he argued that trust is an outcome 
of various informal institutions, and that it “is at best very imprecise” to use it as a proxy the full 
gamut of informal institutions. To remedy this, Voigt (2018: 10) recommended a change in the focus 
of laboratory experiments undertaken to obtain measures of trust: in his view, it would be appropriate 
to jettison a direct focus on trust itself and to focus on informal institutions that induce trust instead.  
 
The issue of trust is particularly important for Rwanda. Many historians argue that the initial arrival 
of the Tutsi in the 15th century was peaceful, with the Tutsi adopting Hutu language and cultural traits. 
By the 16th century, when a Tutsi monarchy had assumed power over the region, the basis of the 
distinction between Tutsi and Hutu had changed markedly from ethnicity to socio-economic status. 
According to Alder and Wang (2014: 2), theory and empirical results suggest that ethnic polarisation 
– a lack of trust between groups – is an important determinant of conflict. Using Rwanda as an 
example, they argued that the collapse of trust between the Hutu and Tutsi over the following 
centuries was an important determinant of the 1994 genocide. The appointment of Tutsi chiefs to 
oversee Hutu on a district level solidified a distinction in social status between the two groups. 
Furthermore, Hutu clans experienced internal conflict as struggles amongst the groups to seek favour 
from the Tutsi chiefs divided communities. The colonial period intensified this distinction with the 
introduction of identity cards that labelled individuals as Hutu, Tutsi or Twa.  
 
In sum, ethnicity initially was a small factor in Rwandan society, but became increasingly influential 
as trust broke down between Hutu and Tutsi. The country’s ethnic and political dynamics have been 
driven by a division between Hutu and Tutsi that centred on the humanly-devised construct of socio-
economic status. Cultural constructs such as trust, norms, customs, religion and traditions are informal 
institutions that have determined the country’s ethno-political history and, ultimately, its cycles in 
institutional change. It is therefore crucial in future research on institutional change in Rwanda to 
account for the influence of trust on changes in formal institutions. Nsanzabaganwa’s (2012) 
connectedness model makes this clear. The interaction between leader and other economic agents is 
augmented by the actions of the change manager. This actor must create trust between the 
policymakers (politicians and bureaucrats) and the private sector. Mutual trust helps private actors to 
embrace policies, which contributes to more successful policy outcomes.  
 
Successful leaders can explain complicated economic choices to economic agents and persuade them 
to endorse those choices. Rwanda scholars like Kiwuwa (2012: 33) are aware of the importance of 
trust as an enabler of transitions. Kagame also appears acutely aware of this, based on a 2011 
statement about the nature and effects of leadership: “It is not the leader alone that matters. There 
must be [a] connection between the leader and the led. Yes, there is something about the leader, but 
there is also something about the quality of the led as well. The actual engine of change is a hidden 
one, the spirit. The secret lies in having succeeded in galvanising the Rwandan spirit" 
(Nsanzabaganwa 2012: 8). Kagame’s words highlight the importance of conceptualising leadership 
as an engine of institutional change in the context of the trust between leaders and their followers. He 
believes there must be trust (a connection and spirit) between leaders and citizens, and that the actual 
driver of change is galvanisation of trust between the leader and the led.  
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The enabling role of institutional change also makes it an important element of economic 
development – and modern development theory. According to Bjørnskov (2012: 1346-1348), 
countries with high levels of trust have grown faster in recent decades than otherwise comparable 
ones. Trust allows the formation of human capital, which the institutional approach, new growth 
theory and capabilities approach all regard as central to economic development. Higher levels of trust 
improve the quality of decisions in the bureaucracy, political process and overall governance system 
– another critical determinants of economic growth. Trust also influences growth-enabling activities 
like FDI and international trade; hence, this informal institution should feature more prominently in 
economic development theory. Indeed, empirical research by Bjørnskov (2012: 1360-1361) reported 
robust causal connections links running from trust to governance and leadership.  
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